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Edited by Vincenzo Cesareo

The Twenty-fifth Italian Report on Migrations 2019



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Our annual Report contains the results of the studies carried out by the research staff and collaborators of ISMU Foundation – Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity (Fondazione ISMU – Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità).

The Twenty-fifth Report on Migrations 2019 is a shorter version of the Italian edition (Fondazione ISMU, *Venticinquesimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2019*, FrancoAngeli, Milano).

This Report was written under the direct supervision of Secretary-General Vincenzo Cesareo, as Editor-in-Chief, with the assistance of Editorial Board members Ennio Codini, Livia Elisa Ortensi, Nicola Pasini, Mariagrazia Santagati, Giovanni Giulio Valtolina, Laura Zanfrini, and with the editorial coordination of Elena Bosetti and Francesca Locatelli.

ISMU Foundation (www.ismu.org) is an independent research centre founded in 1991. It is committed to conducting research, as well as providing consultancy, training and education, in the area of migration and integration. To develop a better understanding of these phenomena, it provides its expertise to research projects on all aspects of migrations in contemporary society.

It works with national, European and international organizations and institutions, in both the private and the public sectors. It is inserted in academic networks, it cooperates with welfare and healthcare agencies, and it exchanges with libraries and documentation centers in Italy and beyond.

ISMU organizes conferences and seminars on migration and produces a wide-range of publications. It has its own Documentation Centre (Ce.Doc.) which, over the years, has built a comprehensive collection of volumes, periodicals and audio-visual material to contribute to the sharing of information on migration.

This publication has been produced with the contribution of



Table of Contents

1. 1994-2019: Twenty-five Years of Migrations to Italy			
Vincenzo Cesareo	page	5	
2. Migration in Italy			
Gian Carlo Blangiardo and Livia Elisa Ortensi	»	19	
3. The Regulatory Framework			
Ennio Codini	»	31	
4. Labour			
Laura Zanfrini	»	39	
5. Education			
Mariagrazia Santagati	»	57	
6. The European Elections			
Nicola Pasini and Marta Regalia	»	71	3
7. The EU's Integration Policy and the New Multiannual Financial Framework			
Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem	»	81	
8. Europe, Africa and Migration			
Luca Merotta	»	91	
9. The New Faces of Change: the Second Generation in Italy			
Veronica Riniolo	»	103	
10. The Protection of Unaccompanied Minors. The Voluntary Guardian			
Nicoletta Pavesi and Giovanni Giulio Valtolina	»	115	

1. 1994-2019: Twenty-five Years of Migrations to Italy

Vincenzo Cesareo


The year 2019 marks a significant milestone for ISMU, as it brings us to the twenty-fifth edition of our annual Report on migrations. Since the issue of migration has played an increasingly paramount role in the public debate, and many are the common mistakes – or even mystifications – reported on the subject, we will take the opportunity offered by this meaningful anniversary to retrace the trends of migration flows and of integration processes recorded in Italy in the past twenty-five years. Accordingly, we will paint a picture of a phenomenon that is indeed truly complex and that, for this reason, should never be reduced to mere slogans. By virtue of this historical approach, we will better highlight both its potential aspects and the challenges it poses; we will provide a broad outline of the different dynamics causing people to move, and we will also appreciate the outcomes of human mobility for our society – which cannot be adequately gauged by a reading that only focuses on the “here and now” of migrations. In this introductory essay, we will use the knowledge acquired and disseminated by ISMU during the last quarter century in order to illustrate the main transformations regarding both the dynamics of migration to Italy and the processes of integration of migrants and of their descendants. While the composition and the causes of the flows to Italy have undoubtedly changed since the 1990s, the gradual rooting of a considerable number of newcomers has triggered many changes, especially concerning job market and the schooling system. Indeed, today’s main focus on the arrivals from the Mediterranean seems to make us forget that, for most of the migrants residing in Italy, integration is substantially and silently proceeding though there certainly remains a number of obstacles, and grey areas.

As it turns out, this aspect is not sufficiently emphasized in today’s public debate. The unprecedented political and symbolic significance assumed by migration as a topic in the public debate has generated a worrying polarization of our society, with factions that are either “pro” or “against” migrants and which end up distinguishing too easily between “good” and “bad” people – thus oversimplifying a complex issue, with the risk of undermining social cohesion and of disrupting our societies. As ISMU Foundation has affirmed since day one, no discussion on this issue should be based on such premises. Rather, societies should discuss how a balanced and regulated management of migration can be achieved – always bearing in mind that migration has always been, and always will be, a distinctive feature of human history.

1. The presence of foreign nationals in Italy: trends

The evolution of the foreign presence in Italy also tells the story of how, over the years, the Italian statistical system has gradually refined its analysis tools. In this regard, the first ISMU Report clearly marked a fundamental step. In 1995, in fact, the Report devoted a large section to the review of sources in terms of data quality and availability. In the Report, ISMU highlighted the inadequacy of the Italian statistical system of the time to monitor what was then seen as a brand-new phenomenon. Because of the absence of a publication that would present all the types of data regarding foreign nationals in Italy, a systematization and optimization of the detection tools was strongly needed. The Report did not provide any data on the overall presence of foreigners, since it only showed a table with 17 different estimates in terms of quantity, year of reference and population considered. The first data elaborated by an official source documented the presence of 922,000 foreigners, of whom 781,000 non-EU citizens with regular residence permits. The estimate of irregular immigrants ranged from 400,000 to 500,000. The number of foreign residents was even lower: in 1991, they amounted to roughly 345,000 persons. They mostly originated from Morocco (92,000), Yugoslavia (89,000) and Tunisia (41,000). Since then, the number of immigrants saw a gradual growth: Graph 1 shows the rise in foreign resident citizens, as well as the increasing feminization of the foreign population. As of 2019, according to the most recent estimates elaborated by ISMU Foundation, the foreign population in Italy exceeded 6 million. In fact, besides the 5 million 256 thousand resident foreign citizens, we must consider the 404,000 foreign citizens who regularly live in Italy, but who are not residents, as well as ISMU's estimate of irregular migrants, who amounted to approximately 562,000 people in 2019 (see Graph 6 and Chapter 2 of this volume).


Graph 1. Total foreign citizens residing in Italy. Years 1998-2019



Source: ISMU elaborations on Eurostat data

The data on the Italian net migration rate clearly highlight this trend. If Italy has long been characterized by a surplus of outflows as compared to inflows, especially between the 1960s and the 1970s, in the 31 years between 1988 and 2018, net migration was always positive, because of a higher number of entries as compared to the total number of exits (4,921,081) – which meant an annual average of 158,745 units. However, in the years 2014-2018, paradoxically characterized by the current “migration crisis”, this average stood at 72,111 units, meaning lower than in previous years, as can be seen in Graph 2. This was due to the corresponding growth of migration from Italy – which, while not offsetting the total number of entries, still represented a large outflow of people (117,000 in 2018). As a matter of fact, these figures were worrying, since they mainly concerned young Italians who were leaving their country, thus creating a loss of about € 14 billion per year, as declared by the 2018-2019 Minister of Economy and Finance.¹ In any case, despite a growth of migration flows from Italy recorded in the last few years, Italy can mainly be seen as a country of immigration.

Graph 2. Italian net migration rate. Years 1960-2018




Source: ISMU elaborations on Eurostat data

The trend of entries recorded in Italy is part of more complex dynamics affecting the European continent as a whole. In fact, although the so-called “South-South” migrations – i.e. transfers from countries located in the South of the world to other countries in the South of the world – are on the rise, they remain lower than the flows towards the North of the world (Gagnon, 2018).

¹ Speech by the Minister of Economy at LUISS University on 16 July 2019 (see: https://www.ilmessaggero.it/economia/news/fuga_cervelli_perdita_italia-4623019.html - last access: 30 September 2019).

Europe is confirmed to be one of the main destinations for immigration on a global level. Graph 3 shows the significant growth in the number of foreigners residing in the 15 countries composing the European Union prior to the 2004 enlargement: from about 20 million at the beginning of 2001 to 37.8 million, as of January 1, 2018.²

Graph 3. The presence of foreign citizens in the Member States of “EU-15”. Comparison between the years 2001 and 2018. In thousands



Source: ISMU elaborations on Eurostat data

In that period, the migrants who came to Europe to find a job were joining those who had already settled in countries of older immigration (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands). And had acquired the citizenship of the country over time. For this reason, traces of this considerable number of people are lost in the official statistics. However, it is necessary to remember how the presence of foreigners,

² We decided to consider the EU Member States since the 1995 enlargement and not to include the States that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013, as the data for the current EU-28 Member States are not available retrospectively.


on the whole, has significantly contributed to change the cultural and religious characteristics of the European population, which has permanently become more diverse.³

With respect to the “plurality” that characterises Italy, as measured by ISTAT (the Italian National Statistical Institute), in 2018 the top ten countries of origin of foreign citizens residing in Italy were: Romania, Albania, Morocco, China, Ukraine, Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Moldova, and Egypt. Although people migrate to Italy from many different regions of the world (see, for example, the large Latin American component in Italy), we must point out that the first three nationalities by number of citizens –Romanian, Albanian and Moroccan – account for 40% of the foreign residents, thus constituting sizeable and rooted communities within the diverse Italian migratory landscape.

Indeed, Italy is now one of the main countries of immigration in Europe, alongside France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which have experienced immigration for a longer time. In fact, the relative weight of the foreign population in Italy compared to that of the countries that currently make up the EU-28 has grown, from just over 4% in 1998 to the current 12.9% (with a peak of 14.5 % in 2015). This means that, if in 1998 there were only 5 foreigners in Italy out of 100 living in what would later become a European Union consisting of 28 members, in 2018 this proportion rose to 13.

While the foreign population in Italy was progressively augmenting, and because of the “time effect” due to the growing number of years of residence in Italy, the acquisitions of Italian citizenship increased too, with an all-time high recorded in the five-year period from 2013 to 2018, as shown in Graph 4. Since 1998, the acquisitions of Italian citizenship have reached a total of 1,253,289 units. Between 2013 and 2018, they were always above 100 thousand units per year.

Graph 4. Acquisitions of Italian citizenship. Years 1998-2018




Source: ISMU elaborations on Eurostat data

³ As an example of the changing religious landscape in Europe, we can report the significant increase in people of Muslim faith. According to the estimates of the Pew Research Centre (2019), in 2050 Muslims will make up 10% of the total European population, against 8.4% in 2010. Pew also noted a decline in the Christian faith in Europe between 2010 and 2015: net of the deceased, there are 5.6 million fewer Christians and 2.3 million more Muslims.

While these data clearly show how migration to Italy started a long time ago, we must also point out how foreign citizens did not just migrate *to* Italy, but also *from* Italy. In fact, while the number of citizens who moved from Italy to other States because of the economic crisis certainly includes many Italians, it also concerns an extremely significant and increasingly growing share of citizens not born in Italy.

As a result, we can speak of “secondary movements”, i.e. transfers to other countries, as clearly illustrated in Graph 5.


Graph 5. Percentage composition of citizens born abroad and born in Italy in the context of migrations from Italy, by year of emigration. Years 2008-2017



Source: ISMU elaborations on Eurostat data

Italy is affected not only by migrations to other European countries, but also by internal migrations. A key factor in the changes occurred in the last twenty-five years, in fact, is the migration from the South to the North of the country – which, according to the estimates elaborated by SVIMEZ (2019), have concerned approximately 2 million people in the last fifteen years. It is a worrying brain drain of human resources and of social and cultural capital. This is both the cause and the result of the difficulties suffered by Southern Italy, which is still lagging behind in terms of infrastructural, industrial and technological development. Any reflections on the Italian demographic changes – and on the role that migrations played in producing them – should not be exempted from the consideration of the persistent and relevant gap between the North and the South of Italy.

Paragraph 2 will examine the evolution of the Italian regulatory measures on migration, thus showing the inadequacy of Italy's legislative instruments in offering legal labour migration channels towards the Country. The effect of this deficiency has become visible in the trends describing the presence of irregular migrants on the Italian territory and in the amnesties granted over the years. Since its inception, ISMU has been providing a reliable estimate of the presence of irregular foreigners. In 2019, it amounted to 562,000 persons, as shown in Graph 6 (see also Chapter 2 of this volume).

Graph 6. Trend describing the presence of irregular foreigners. Years 1990-2019

Source: ISMU

As shown by this historical reconstruction of the phenomenon, the presence of irregular migrants fell in the years during which amnesties were offered (2002, 2006) and in the period of the recent economic crisis, which caused some of the worst effects on employment ever recorded. However, it has risen again in the last few years, mainly as a result of number of rejection asylum applications of the either expired or never-renewed residence permits for humanitarian protection,⁴ and of the very few returns that have actually been carried out.

The issue of international protection and of the types of permits connected to it has especially concerned the past five years, when the composition of the flows towards Italy has radically changed because of two main factors. On the one hand, we can see an increase in the migratory pressure from countries affected by conflicts or characterized by the presence of violent dictatorial regimes – for instance, various areas of sub-Saharan Africa (in particular, Nigeria and Eritrea) and of the Middle East (see the Syrian and Iraqi situation) – and from countries with a persistent socio-economic precariousness (e.g., in sub-Saharan Africa).⁵ On the other hand, regular entry channels have been drastically reduced.⁶ The combination of these two factors (high migratory pressure and significant

⁴ A form of protection that is peculiar to the Italian system, which was abolished through the so-called “Security decrees” at the end of 2018.


⁵ These are the trends that have been recorded in recent years and the main changes that have occurred in the composition of flows and in the regions of origin of the migrants. However, it must be pointed out that, since 2017, the arrivals and asylum applications have decreased for people from sub-Saharan Africa, and have increased for people from other countries – North Africa (mainly Tunisia) and Asia (Pakistan and Bangladesh). This drop is likely to be attributable to the effects of the agreements concluded in 2017 between Libya and the Italian Minister of the Interior Minniti. Such agreements aimed at increasing the presence and the interventions of the Libyan Coast Guard in the Mediterranean in order to decrease the arrivals in Italy of people arriving in Libya from countries south of the Sahara – with consequences critically discussed in Chapter 2 of this volume.

⁶ As explained below (see par. 2 and par. 3), the annual “flow decrees”, aimed at allowing the entry of third-party citizens for work reasons, have left a very limited number of available places.

reduction in regular entries) has made migrations to Italy and to Europe turn into perilous journeys on routes managed by traffickers and culminating in the landing on the coasts of the European “frontier” countries – i.e., Greece, Malta, Italy and Spain.

Therefore, applying for asylum became the only entry channel for these migrants, thus raising the several critical issues discussed in the latest editions of the ISMU Report and which will also be examined in this volume, in light of the recent measures introduced between 2018 and 2019. Graph 7 well illustrates the change in the composition of the flows that has occurred since 2014.

Graph 7. Composition of inflows towards Italy. Years 2011-2018



Source: ISMU elaborations on ISTAT data

The increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees is not a trend that affects only Italy or Europe: as reported by UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), forced migration has grown in Africa (South Sudan, Somalia) and Asia (Afghanistan, Myanmar) due to wars, persecutions and human rights' violations. Most of the people fleeing from these contexts of strong instability or danger are displaced in other parts of their countries or in the closest neighbouring countries (e.g., Uganda and Sudan if we mention the South Sudanese, and Pakistan in the case of the Afghani). As for the approximately 6.7 million Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2019), they are mainly displaced in Turkey and reach nearly 3.7 million units.

To complete this first historical reconstruction of the trends regarding the foreign presence in Italy, it is useful to cite the studies conducted by the Regional Observatory for the integration and multi-ethnicity of the Lombardy Region, to which ISMU has significantly contributed since its establishment in 2000. Such studies offer an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the dynamics regarding the settlement of foreign citizens, thus contributing to the understanding of a significant part of integration processes in Italy. Lombardy, in fact, represents a privileged observatory for the study of the foreign presence, as it is home to approximately a quarter of the foreign citizens present on the Italian territory.

Migration to this Region, in line with developments recorded at the national level, has undergone a transformation not only in terms of quantitative growth or changes in the countries of origin, but also in terms of structural characteristics. In particular, the studies highlighted the trend of gender rebalancing, an increase in the average age of the immigrant component, and a gradual aging process of such component. The surveys conducted by the Observatory have also shown an increase in the average period of stay in Lombardy. The level of education achieved by foreign migrants has also increased over the years, as has the immigration of family members, which signals a stabilization and a better inclusion of the foreign presence in Italy.

2. The main changes in the Italian regulatory measures

In the past twenty-five years, the common trait of all the measures aimed at governing migration was that of intervening *after* the events had taken place by adopting a short-term “corrective” approach, rather than a long-term “management” strategy, with a progressive closure of several legal entry channels. In this regard, below are the main stages characterizing the evolution of immigration measures.

- Until 1998, the legislation was extremely fragmented and mostly adopted in emergencies (with the partial exception of Law no. 39 of 1990, known as the Martelli Law).
- Law no. 40 of 1998, the so-called Turco-Napolitano, introduced a systematic regulation of the migration issue (except in the area of asylum law), which was in the same year incorporated into the Consolidated Act referred to the Legislative Decree no. 286. Law no. 40 specified the rights of migrants, as well as the rules on entry in Italy for work reasons. This law, however, proved inadequate.
- In the following years, the phenomenon of migration was still characterized by migrants entering Italy and finding “irregular” jobs. As a result, Law no. 189 of 2002, the so-called Bossi-Fini Law, tightened sanctions and made the regulations on expulsions more stringent. It also started a regularization campaign that would concern over 600,000 positions.
- Even after 2002, however, migration to Italy for work purposes continued to be largely irregular. Many were the amnesties: in 2006, for example, thanks to the so-called “Flow Decree”, 500,000 permits were issued to legalize the positions of irregular workers.
- In 2007, after the enlargement of the European Union, the possibility of entry and of residence of Romanian citizens (who, at the time, accounted for one of the main components of the overall number of migrants arriving in Italy) was liberalized.
- In 2009, the general legislation was modified by Law no. 94 (part of the so-called “security package”). As in 2002, the norms on sanctions and expulsions were tightened. The idea of a strong link between migration and security explicitly emerged.
- Since the economic crisis of 2008, inflows of workers have tended to decline. On the other hand, the issue of asylum started to gain greater importance. In compliance with a specific European directive, in fact, a systematic regulation of the issue was finally introduced: reception was regulated by the Legislative Decree no. 140 of 2005, the asylum status by the Legislative Decree no. 251 of 2007, and asylum procedures by the Legislative Decree no. 25 of 2008.

- In the following years, many measures regulating asylum were adopted. They were modified several times, thus improving the reception system. The concept of “first reception” was especially implemented between 2015 and 2017, in line with an “emergency logic” concerning the strong increase in asylum seekers recorded in those years. The so-called “second reception” (i.e. the second phase of the reception of an asylum seeker) based on the SPRAR system (Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees), was also improved. However, although the system could be considered a best practice even at the European level, it suffered an insufficiency in terms of numerical capacity, i.e. in the number of places made available for reception.
- With the Law Decree no. 13 of 2017, the so-called Minniti-Orlando, the regulation on migration and asylum was modified with the aim of deciding on asylum applications more quickly and of increasing the number of coercive expulsions. In the same year, Law no. 47, also known as the Zampa Law, was adopted to deal with the issue of unaccompanied minors, which has become a relevant topic, in light of the 70,000 unaccompanied minors having landed in Italy between 2014 and 2018. The Zampa Law can be considered the only systematic law on the matter, even at the European level, as it protects the rights of unaccompanied minors.
- Finally, with the Law Decree no. 113 of 2018, the so-called Salvini Law (which reintroduces the idea of a strong link between migration and security), changes were made especially regarding the regulation of asylum. In particular, the Law excluded the possibility of granting asylum-seekers a humanitarian permit even when, despite the absence of any conditions for the recognition of the refugee status or for the granting of the subsidiary protection, the repatriation could not be chosen as the right solution. Furthermore, the distinction between first and second reception was made more rigid, since the access to the facilities of the latter was offered only to those who could obtain the refugee status or benefit from subsidiary protection (except in the case of unaccompanied minors). In parallel, an action was started in 2017 to prevent asylum-seekers from leaving the Libyan territory. This action was carried out initially through agreements with the Libyan authorities and then by contrasting rescue operations at sea, since they would involve Italian ports. Lastly, another security decree, subsequently converted into law, introduced rules explicitly aimed at contrasting the rescue operations carried out by humanitarian NGOs. The evolution of the Italian legislation has also undergone the effects of the migration policies decided by the EU – which, in the course of the last twenty-five years, developed a greater awareness of the global scope of migration. However, many issues still need to be tackled in a more effective way, also in terms of political acceptability, as we will examine in the following paragraph.


3. The inclusion of migrants in the Italian labour market

Italy's migratory transition, which started with the decline of the Fordist economy, ushered in a new era in the history of migrations in Europe, marked by: a) a migratory phenomenology increasingly independent from any active labour market policies; b) a migratory pressure far higher than the quotas set by the destination countries and due, above all, to “push factors”; c) a tendency for a “deinstitutionalized” access to the labour market,

as migrants often decide on their own to try to enter specific employment niches, especially those represented by some companies at the margins of the economic system, mainly interested in reducing labour costs; d) an unprecedented and high labour demand expressed by families or generally connected to people's care and assistance needs– thus mirroring an ageing society that has been having a hard time with its welfare system; e) the ambivalence of the host society, which oscillates between a willingness to welcome migrants “because they take jobs that we no longer want” and the claim on an alleged pre-emptive right to access work and other social resources, especially when they appear to be in short supply – as during the long crisis began in 2008 and continued for several years. All of the above-mentioned characteristics are paradigmatically true for Italy, as the various ISMU Reports have thoroughly documented over the years thanks to their studies regarding the labour market.

However, coinciding with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the ISMU Report, it should be noted that, in the past quarter century, the Italian society and the labour market have both undergone an extraordinary and irreversible transformation, which has made them grow distant from the perpetuation of the myth of ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity. Alongside the increase in the number of migrant workers (who represent more than 10% of the active population) and of foreign workers (who have grown up to 2 million 455 thousand units, according to ISTAT – see Graph 8), we must report a rise in their contribution to the creation of GDP – estimated at almost 10%.

Graph 8. Total number of valid residence permits for work purposes. Years 2004-2018



Source: ISMU elaborations on Eurostat and ISTAT data

What seemed to be an invisible and silent presence at the time of the first ISMU Report (1995) has now become not only a structural component of the labour market and of the production system, but also a phenomenon increasingly able to reveal both the critical aspects of the Italian economy, as well as and the many new opportunities connected to the development of inclusive organizations and markets.

It is exactly a scenario composed of both strengths and weaknesses that the different ISMU Reports have documented over the years, thus leading the way in tackling issues destined to become prominent in the research agenda, as well as in the political and public

debates. Just to name a few, the need for migrant labour, studied as paradigmatic of the competitive strategies implemented by different enterprises and local production systems; the problem of discrimination, with a specific analysis of gender-based discrimination; the phenomenon of over-qualification and, at the same time, the importance of effectively valorising the *diversity dividend* generated by migrants; the risk that the often disadvantageous working conditions of migrant parents may negatively affect the educational and professional trajectories of their children, and, at the same time, the competitive advantages gained by the second generations with their intercultural competences, paradigmatic of a plural and globalized society; lastly, the recent refugee crisis and the ways in which it interacts and interferes with labour and business development policies, as well as with the many civil society organizations which have given birth, in the last few years, to examples of social innovation in terms of skills recognition, job support schemes, and diversity management.

Lastly, we would like to underline how the annual analyses presented in our Report over the past twenty-five years have invariably observed how, despite the significant growth of the migrant labour force, the “structural defect” of the Italian work integration model has become even stronger. This is what the Report defines as “the axiom of complementarity”, which comes with the risk that the advantage of having a ductile and cheap labour force might compromise, over time, the cohesion of our society, the sustainability of integration paths, and the competitiveness of the economy.

4. The children of immigrants in Italian schools


As highlighted above, during the past twenty-five years, the presence of foreign immigrants in Italy has veered towards a greater stabilisation. This trend, constantly monitored by ISMU, clearly emerges from some specific indicators: the important increase in the number of children born in Italy to foreign mothers, the widespread recourse to family reunification, and the constant rise in the presence of foreign minors in schools. These indicators also show that, today, migrants tend to leave their countries with a different plan in mind, as compared to the past. In Italy, immigration used to be linked to the history of the single individuals – a short-term project characterised by a specific purpose, whose fulfilment allowed the migrant to return to its homeland. Now, migration is mostly seen by migrants as a journey to start a new and completely different season of their life. ISMU has examined this profound transformation, which has led Italy to reshape not only its welfare system, but also its models of social coexistence. Our Foundation has also focused its attention on the impact of the growing presence, in Italian schools, of students with a migratory background.

Graph 9 illustrates the trend of the presence, in Italian schools, of students with non-Italian citizenship (defined as students with a migratory background) as recorded in the last thirty years and allows us to observe three distinct phases.

1. During an initial period, which can be defined as the start-up phase, the increase in the number of presences was slow and gradual and saw the amount of non-Italian citizens in schools grow tenfold over 12 years: in the school year 1985/86 there were 7,050 students, while in the school year 1997/98 they rose to 70,657.

2. Between the school year 1997/98 and the school year 2011/12, we can see a second phase of acceleration, in which the increase was clear and fast, with very significant percentage increases from one school year to another, with a total number of students once again grown tenfold over 14 years, reaching 755,939 units in schools of all levels.
3. The third phase, shorter in terms of time, describes the school years 2012/13 and 2017/18 as characterised by a stagnant situation, with a clear and sudden slowdown in the growth trend – which, in four years, saw an increase of 5% in the number of enrolled students with non-Italian citizenship, but also a progressive decline, year after year, in the growth factor, reaching a “zero-growth” situation in the school year 2015/16. However, the school year 2017/2018 recorded saw a new increase (+27,000 presences).

Graph 9. Students with non-Italian citizenship in Italian schools. Years 1985-2018



Source: ISMU elaborations on MIUR (Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research) data

Over the years, the slowdown in the numerical growth of students with a migratory background is certainly the consequence of the alignment of birth rates between Italians and foreigners (who are progressively reaching Italians as regards the number of children per family) but also the result of the drop in the migratory pressure on Italy caused by the economic downturn and the job crisis.

Secondly, given the aforementioned data on the acquisitions of citizenship, we must point out that, in Italy, the school population lost a share of students with non-Italian citizenship not because they had dropped out of school, but because they had finally become Italian citizens, having acquired the Italian citizenship either by election (after turning 18) or by transmission (citizenship obtained through the family unit).

Despite the growing diversification of all school levels, however, the indications provided by the government regarding the integration of foreign students, have not been completely adopted to this day. While these indications can be found in heterogeneous sources (ministerial circulars, pronouncements, documents drafted by commissions, laws, etc.) and are fragmentary in nature, they all point to a recommendation to adopt the principle of “intercultural education”, which is constantly put forward. However, in the absence of coherent actions – supported by adequate resources, as well as by training

programmes and evaluations of practices – and despite the full commitment of many teachers,⁷ the process of intercultural education has still a long way to go.

Nevertheless, important steps forward have been taken in recent years: for example, the inclusion of “foreign students” in the category of students with “special educational needs” (MIUR, 2012), as well as the incorporation of recommendations for students who are also unaccompanied foreign minors in the “Guidelines for the right to education of students away from their family of origin” (MIUR, Italian Authority for Children and Adolescents, 2017). In addition to that, the National Scientific Committee for the curriculum of the pre-primary school and the first cycle of school education (i.e. primary and lower secondary school), by accepting the indications of 2012 (MIUR, 2012), explicitly encouraged schools to face the issues arising from the migration phenomenon. Schools are in fact asked to reflect “on themes such as civil and democratic coexistence, intercultural exchange, and inclusion policies” (MIUR, 2018: 3) and train teachers to both “teach Italian as a second language and practice new integrated and multidisciplinary methods” (Ibid.: 10). These indications embrace the principles and the objectives defined by the UN in the 2030 agenda for a sustainable development, which includes the goal of “providing a quality, fair and inclusive education for all” (UN General Assembly, 2015: 14).

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⁷ With regard to the initiatives independently carried out by Italian schools and teachers, we must mention the collection of good intercultural education practices compiled by ISMU since 2003, which contains approximately 2,000 experiences, freely available in ISMU Foundation's archives.

2. Migration in Italy

Gian Carlo Blangiardo and Livia Elisa Ortensi

1. Bucking the trend of demographic decline

In 2018 the number of foreigners living in Italy continued to grow. This trend contrasts with the demographic decline recently observed in the native Italian population, which lost 677,000 residents over the last four-year period. According to the latest evaluations by the ISMU Foundation, as of 1 January 2019, 6,222,000 foreigners were living in Italy. In a country of 60,360,000 residents (and an estimated 61,068,000 presents), the latest estimates of foreigner numbers mean that Italy consolidated the passing beyond the symbolic threshold of one foreigner for every ten inhabitants that we underlined in the previous edition of this Report (Blangiardo, 2019). An analysis by legal status shows that 84% of the foreign population is registered in the population registry (anagrafe), while a minority has legal status but is not (yet) resident (6.5%). A larger group, equal to 9% of the foreign population (about 562,000 persons), is undocumented (Table 1).

Table 1. Foreigners in Italy in 2017–2019 by legal status (thousands)

<i>Legal Status</i>	<i>1.1.2017</i>	<i>1.1.2018</i>	<i>1.1.2019</i>
Residents	5,047	5,144	5,256
Non-residents, legal	420	431	404
Undocumented	491	533	562
Total	5,958	6,108	6,222

Source: ISMU analysis and estimates on ISTAT data

Compared to 1 January 2018, we observe a variation of +1.9% in the number of foreigners. This increase is lower compared to the previous year (+2.5%). The growth in the number of foreigners recorded during 2018 is partly explained by the increase observed in the number of undocumented migrants (+5.4%). This increase, however, is lower than in 2017 (+8.6%) and 2016 (+12.9%). This trend is driven primarily by the strong reduction in the number of arrivals on Italian shores – which is the main source of undocumented migration into the country – observed since 2016.

The resident foreign population, which is the most stable and well-established component within the overall foreign population, amounts to 5,256,000 people or 8.7% of all residents as of 1 January 2019 (ISTAT, 2019a). The comparison with 2017 data shows an increase in the number of foreign residents of 111,000 units. The overall growth is the effect of natural increase (+58,000 units due to the difference between births and deaths) and positive net migration (+166,000 resulting from the difference between immigration and emigration of foreign citizens from abroad). The effect of naturalisation is also relevant: the acquisition of Italian citizenship reduced the number of foreign residents by around 113,000 units.

2. The substantial contribution of third countries

A more detailed analysis of the foreign resident population as of 1 January 2019 by country of origin (Table 2) shows the presence of 1.58 million citizens of other European Union (EU) countries – including 29,000 British citizens – and 3.68 million third-country nationals (TCNs). The growth in the number of TCNs was around twice that of EU citizens residing in Italy in 2018. Among EU citizens, data show a clear predominance of Romanians (1.2 million).

Table 2. Foreign residents in Italy by area of origin as of 1 January 2018 and 2019 (thousands)

<i>Areas</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>Variation % (*)</i>	<i>Most represented countries</i>
European Union (EU28)	1.562	1.583	1.3	Romania, Poland, Bulgaria
Third-country nationals	3.582	3.683	2.5	
of which:				
Central and Eastern Europe	1,048	1,046	-0.2	Albania, Ukraine, Moldavia
Other European Countries	10	11	10.0	Switzerland, San Marino, Norway
Northern Africa	655	670	2.3	Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia
West Africa	377	405	7.4	Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana
East Africa	40	40	0.0	Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia
Southern Central Africa	25	26	4.0	Cameroon, Congo RD, Congo
West Asia	48	51	6.2	Georgia, Iran, Syria
Southern Central Asia	524	549	4.8	India, Bangladesh, Pakistan
East Asia	482	492	2.1	China, Philippines, Japan
North America	17	18	5.9	United States of America, Canada
Central and Latin America	354	362	2.3	Peru, Ecuador, Brazil
Oceania	2	2	-	Australia, New Zealand, Samoa
Total	5,144	5,256	2.2	

(*) Values have been calculated using data not rounded to thousands.

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

Among TCNs, around 1 million originate from non-EU European countries (mainly Albania, Ukraine and Moldova), 1.1 million from Africa (mostly Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia). Among African TCNs, some sub-Saharan communities showed significant increases in 2018, notably Guinea (+20%), Guinea Bissau (+19%), Gambia (+17%), Sierra Leone (+15.9%), Mali and Nigeria (both +11%), and Libya (+13%). Asian TCNs total just under 1.1 million, most of them from China, Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens had the most substantial

increases in 2018 (+7% and +6%, respectively). Finally, there are about 380,000 residents from the Americas, almost entirely attributable to Latin America (half of them from Peru and Ecuador), while citizens of countries in Oceania and subjects registered as stateless persons were represented in small numbers.

Expanding the analysis from the resident foreign subpopulation to the overall foreign population, we estimate that 4.44 million TCNs were present in Italy as of 1 January 2019. About 562,000 undocumented migrants and 200,000 non-residents with legal status add to the resident TCN population (Table 3). TCNs account for 71% of the foreign population in Italy, nearly all of them originating from Eastern Europe and developing countries.

Table 3. Foreign citizens in Italy as of 1 January 2019 by macro-area of origin and legal status (thousands)

<i>Legal Status</i>	<i>EU-28(*)</i>	<i>TCN</i>	<i>Total</i>
Residents	1,583 (+1.3%)	3,673 (+2.5)	5,256 (+2.2)
Non-residents, legal	196 (=)	208 (-11.5)	404 (-6.3)
Undocumented	...	562 (+5.4%)	562 (5.4%)
Total	1,779 (+1.2%)	4,443 (+2.1)	6,222 (+1.9)

(*) The United Kingdom is still included in the EU-28.

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

3. An analysis of first residence permits issued in 2018

In 2018 Italy issued 242,000 first residence permits, marking an 8% reduction compared to 2017 (Table 4). This decrease is mostly due to the drop in new permits granted to refugees and asylum seekers, which fell from over 100,000 in 2017 to less than 65,000 in 2018 (-36%). Legislative Decree n. 113 of 4 October 2018, which abrogates the issuance of residence permits granted on humanitarian grounds, played a role in this drop, which is nevertheless consistent with the trend recorded in the months preceding the entry into force of the new legislation (ISTAT, 2019b).

All other first residence permit typologies saw an increase compared to 2017. Work-related permits rose by 21%, reversing the trend observed during the most recent years. We must, however, point out that a significant proportion of the new residence permits for work have a duration limited to six months (27%) and that around 20% of the overall permits were issued to US citizens. Education-related permits to stay rose by 20% compared to 2017, with Chinese citizens receiving approximately 20% of the total (more than 4,500). Family-related permits to stay continued to grow in number. This permit type accounted for more than 50% of all first residence permits issued in 2018. The same proportion was only 43% in 2017.

Women received more than 45% of the new residence permits (this figure was 39% in 2017). The same proportion reaches 58% among permits for family reasons.

The reduction in asylum-related new permits also significantly impacted the number of beneficiaries by country of origin. Albania and Morocco, which are traditionally the two top countries of origin for immigration to Italy, were once again in the first positions in 2018, mainly driven by family reunification. Conversely, recipients from Nigeria

decreased by over 40% while Gambia and Senegal lost their positions in the top ten in favour of migrants from Egypt and Ukraine.

Overall migration from the Indian subcontinent remains stable, with arrivals from Bangladesh and Pakistan diminishing and those from India increasing.

Table 4. First residence permits issued to TCNs in 2018. Main citizenships

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Reason for permit (%)</i>				
	<i>(thousands)</i>	<i>Work</i>	<i>Family</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Asylum</i>	<i>Other</i>
Albania	23,479	7.2	67.4	2.3	2.6	20.5
Morocco	20,396	5.2	82.6	1.4	7.0	3.7
Nigeria	15,532	0.2	19.0	1.3	74.8	4.6
India	13,621	20.0	58.3	13.8	3.5	4.4
Pakistan	13,355	1.0	38.2	2.4	56.2	2.2
Bangladesh	13,189	0.4	47.1	0.2	50.3	2.0
China	11,367	5.0	49.6	40.1	2.2	3.2
United States of America	9,135	34.7	35.0	24.3	0.0	5.9
Egypt	8,807	4.2	81.9	3.4	6.1	4.4
Ukraine	7,951	4.4	51.1	2.8	30.5	11.1
Other countries	105,177	4.2	45.5	10.9	31.7	7.7
Total 2018	242,009	6.0	50.7	9.1	26.8	7.3
Total 2017	262,770	4.6	43.2	7.0	38.5	6.7
Change	-20,761	+1.4	+7.5	+2.1	-11.7	+0.6

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

The effects of the overall decline in asylum and humanitarian permits were especially noticeable for some citizenships. For example, new inflows from Nigeria almost halved in 2018 compared to 2017.

Table 5. First residence permits issued for protection and asylum-related issues in 2018. Main citizenships

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>% Var over</i>	<i>% Asylum</i>	<i>% aged</i>
	<i>(thousands)</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>& protection</i>	<i>below 18</i>
Nigeria	11,616	17.9	66.7	-49.4	74.8	6.8
Pakistan	7,511	11.6	98.1	-18.9	56.2	1.5
Bangladesh	6,629	10.2	99.6	-28.3	50.3	1.0
Senegal	3,974	6.1	97.4	-47.7	53.4	3.7
The Gambia	3,892	6.0	98.3	-48.5	94.0	7.9
Mali	3,575	5.5	98.5	-43.4	94.4	4.6
Ivory Coast	2,814	4.3	87.3	-56.7	76.8	7.0
Guinea	2,482	3.8	97.9	-57.8	87.2	6.1
Ghana	2,469	3.8	95.3	-43.1	58.4	2.8
Ukraine	2,425	3.7	34.4	15.3	30.5	6.7
Other countries	17,432	26.9	69.4	-9.6	10.5	10.2
Total	64,819	100.0	81.9	-35.9	26.8	6.1

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data


For Senegal and Gambia, the decrease was around 47%. The new permits issued to citizens from Ivory Coast and Guinea were reduced by 56.7% and 57.8%, respectively. The decline observed in Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens was smaller (-18.9% and -28.3%, respectively). Ukraine citizens showed a different trend, with a 15% increase in permits issued for asylum and humanitarian reasons (Table 5).

4. Sea arrivals and asylum requests: Trends and new legislation

As already mentioned, the reduction in the number of monthly arrivals by sea explains in large part the decline in the number of new residence permits issued for humanitarian reasons. After peaking in November 2016, when more than 27,000 people landed on Italian shores, monthly arrivals by sea have been below 2,000 since July 2018 (Graph 1). In the first half of 2019, there were 2,678 arrivals compared to 16,557 and 83,754 entries, respectively, in the same periods in 2018 and 2017 (Ministry of the Interior, 2019). The overall decline is very pronounced and equal to -96.8% compared to 2017 and -83.9% compared to 2018.

Over the same period, arrivals of foreign unaccompanied minors (UMs) have also decreased in both absolute and relative terms (Table 6). After the maximum observed in 2016, when UMs made up 21.3% of arrivals by sea, in 2018 the proportion was 6.6%, and a further decline was observed in the first months of 2019. In 2018, 78.8% of UMs came from Sub-Saharan Africa; the predominant nationalities were Gambia (16.6%), Nigeria (10.7%) and Guinea (9.9%). It is crucial to underline that not all UMs arrive in Italy through the asylum channel or ask for asylum. A significant proportion reach Italy by other routes and apply for the specific permit of stay dedicated to UMs. In 2018 Italy issued 3,756 such permits, mostly to minors from Albania (36.8%), Kosovo (19.7%) and Egypt (12.0%).

Graph 1. Arrivals by sea and first asylum applications in Italy, January 2015-June 2019



Source: ISMU analysis on Ministry of the Interior and Eurostat data

The drop in the number of sea arrivals does not imply a comparable reduction in asylum applications. At the beginning of the so-called migratory crisis, Italy was primarily a transit country rather than a destination for asylum seekers. The situation changed when the identification procedures became more stringent due to the implementation of hotspots and leaving Italy became more difficult due to more thorough border controls. In the early stages of the crisis, less than half of the migrants who crossed the Italian border by sea were identified. Avoiding the identification procedures upon arrival in Italy meant escaping the rules imposed by the Dublin Regulation.¹ Starting in 2017, the credentials of almost all incoming migrants were included in Eurodac, the European database that contains the fingerprints of asylum seekers and of those who have entered or stayed illegally in the EU (Villa, 2017).

The relationship between the number of sea arrivals and asylum applications soon reversed. Asylum applications in Italy have exceeded sea arrivals since August 2018. If in 2015 Italy received around 54 asylum applications for every 100 sea landings, the proportion has been steadily growing, reaching 674 asylum applications for every 100 sea landings in the first six months of 2019 (Table 6).

Table 6. Sea arrivals, asylum applications and proportion of unaccompanied minors, 2015–2019*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Sea arrivals</i>	<i>Asylum applications</i>	<i>Asylum applications per 100 sea arrivals</i>	<i>Unaccompanied minors (UMs)</i>	<i>UMs as % of total sea arrivals</i>	<i>UMs asylum applications</i>	<i>First permits to stay issued to UMs (not applying for asylum)</i>
2015	153,842	83,535	54	12360	14.9	4,070	4,365
2016	182,657	122,960	67	25846	21.3	6,020	5,272
2017	119,369	128,855	108	15779	12.5	10,005	5,279
2018	23,348	59,955	257	3536	6.6	3,885	3,756
2019*	2,678	18,047	674	371	2.1	371	n.d.

* Last updated in June 2019.

Source: *Cruscotto Statistico, Minisery of Interior; Eurostat [migr_asyappctzm] [migr_asyappctza] [migr_asyunaa]*

Many factors explain the diverging trends in the number of asylum applications and sea landings. First, a (long) delay can occur between the arrival in Italy and the presentation of the asylum application. The latter could be presented in Italy, for example, following the failure of many attempts to leave the country. Another crucial point concerns the arrivals at land borders. The border with Slovenia is one of the landing points of the so-called “Balkan Route” which, although reduced compared to the exceptional flows of 2015, is still open. Data accounting for the arrivals at Italian land borders are not systematically disseminated. However, according to the Ministry of the Interior in 2019 (as of 20 June 2019), 898 people were apprehended at the border, and

¹ According to the Dublin Regulation, the country responsible for examining an asylum seeker’s application is the first country of arrival (and identification) if the migrants entered illegally, the country that issued an entry visa, or the country where a family member who is recognized as a refugee or asylum seeker resides. In the case of UMs, the country in charge of the request is the one where a family member lives or the first country of arrival if there are no family members in Europe.

129 of them returned to Slovenia. This figure is more than double compared to the entire 2018, when about 450 people were intercepted (Chamber of Deputies, 2019a). The arrivals from Slovenia were also the topic of a recent parliamentary question (Chamber of Deputies, 2019b). According to parliamentary records, asylum seekers from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh mainly use this channel.

Table 7. Transfers according to the Dublin Regulation, take-charge requests pending, take-charge requests accepted, outgoing Dublin transfers and resettlements from third countries, 2015–2019

<i>Year</i>	<i>Implemented incoming Dublin transfers</i>	<i>of which minors</i>	<i>Pending take-charge requests</i>	<i>Accepted requests</i>	<i>Implemented outgoing Dublin transfers</i>	<i>Resettlement from third countries</i>
2015	2,963	74	30,249	15,914	28	95
2016	4,512	255	34,157	25,666**	0	1,045
2017	5,948	273	34,971	23,668	75	1,515
2018	6,469	305	42,406	35,433	189	1,180
2019*	3,100	n.a.	19,895	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

* Data as of 30.06 **Based only on Eurodac.

Source: Ministry of Interior; Eurostat [migr_dubdi] [migr_dubti] [migr_dubto] [migr_asyresa]

Another (re)entry stream that potentially increases asylum applications is due to incoming transfers from other European countries according to the Dublin Regulation (Table 7). These transfers concern citizens who, after being identified and fingerprinted in Italy, applied for asylum in another European country which is consequently not competent for the application assessment. Indeed, it is necessary to distinguish between accepted transfer applications and the implementation of such transfers. In 2018 Italy received nearly 42,000 transfer requests (+57.4% compared to the previous year), while Italy accepted just over 35,000 requests (+49.7% compared to 2017). However, the number of implemented transfers is much lower, albeit growing. In 2018 the returns to Italy were just over 6,000 (+11.9% compared to 2017). Due to Italy's geographical position, the balance of transfers under the Dublin Regulation is positive. The Dublin mechanism can therefore lead to a large number of re-entries into Italy – transfers which, if implemented, could exceed the number of sea arrivals, even though the number of executed transfers in the last four years has never exceeded 25% of accepted transfers in the same year.² The Dublin statistics for the first half of 2019 are substantially in line with 2018, both in terms of requests received and completed transfers. Finally, a further channel for new asylum requests derives from entries under the refugee resettlement scheme from Lebanon and Sudan (IOM, 2019). In 2018 most of these entries were in favour of Syrian (58.5%) and Eritrean (26.7%) citizens.

² This is just a raw measure because the year of transfer acceptance may differ from the year of transfer implementation.

Table 8. Persons in charge of the reception system and pending asylum requests as of 31 December 2017-2019*

Year	Italy	Regional distribution			Pending asylum requests
		First	Second	Third	
2017	183,681	Lombardy (14.4%)	Campania (9.1%)	Lazio (9.0%)	152,420
2018	135,858	Lombardy (13.7%)	Lazio (9.0%)	Campania (8.8%)	102,995
2019*	108,924	Lombardy (13.8%)	Emilia- R. (9.4%)	Lazio (9.0%)	67,205

* Data at 3 June.


Source: Cruscotto Statistico, Ministry of the Interior, Eurostat [migr_asypencztzm]

Around 100,000 individuals are currently registered in the Italian reception system (Table 8). The observed decreasing trend is due to the reduction in sea arrivals and the decrease in pending asylum requests.

A final consideration concerns the impact of Legislative Decree 113/2018 (which abolished the issuance of residence permits for humanitarian protection) on first-instance decisions regarding asylum applications. This decree is likely to increase the number of undocumented migrants, assuming that all rejected applicants decide to remain in Italy.

An analysis of the first-instance decisions on asylum applications between 2013 and 2019 shows that the percentage of rejections (which also include cases of unavailability or inadmissibility) has been increasing over time, from around 30% in 2013 to 80% in the first half of 2019 (Graph 2). While the proportion of rejections has been consistently over 50% since 2015, rejections peaked in the first seven months of 2019 after the abolition of humanitarian protection.

26

Graph 2. First-instance decisions by year of the decision, 2013-2019

* Years from 2015 to 2018: rejections also include cases of unavailable applicants.

Source: ISMU analysis on Ministry of the Interior data

Due to the reduced availability of legal entry channels for work reasons, many migrants from countries characterised by poverty, instability and violation of civil rights tend to access the asylum channel to obtain a residence permit even if they do not meet all the criteria. For this reason, in 2013-2019 first-instance decisions granting refugee status have been very limited, and always below 15% of all decisions, a proportion that is in fact very high in the context of applications related to resettlement procedures (Allievi, 2018).

The abolition of humanitarian protection thus reduces the possibility to legalise applicants in the 'grey area' where it is difficult to make a clear distinction between migration for economic reasons and protection needs. Our first assessment of the impact of the legislative change builds on the comparison between first-instance decisions in the first seven months of 2018 and 2019, for which it is also possible to separate the proportion of unavailable applicants among the rejected. The condition of unavailability is not directly dependent on the legislation but has generated 13% and 9%, respectively, of the rejections in the two periods considered. The data show that the positive decisions among available applicants fell from 41.3% in the first seven months of 2018 to 20.8% in the same period of 2019, while rejections rose from 58.4% to 78.6%. As partial compensation for the abolition of humanitarian protection, the proportion of applicants granted refugee status increased (from 7.4% to 11.9%) and the same happened for subsidiary protection (from 4.4% to 7.3%). Net of the effect of applicants' unavailability and with the assumption that the profiles of the applicants are on average overlapping, we can hypothesise that the new law resulted in about 11,000 more rejections in the first seven months of 2019.

This trend will undoubtedly increase the number of undocumented migrants in the medium term. This transition, however, is uncertain in its timing and, in part, in the final number of migrants involved. A first-instance rejection does not necessarily turn into an immediate loss of legal status. In fact, upon rejection, the applicant can appeal – an act that, in most cases, suspends the order to leave Italy (CIR, 2019). The proportion of appeals among rejected asylum seekers is not known. Eurostat data show that in 2018 Italy rejected 64,540 first-instance asylum requests, while 42,970 decisions were taken regarding migrants' appeals. It is not possible to link the two data because the decision about the appeal may not be received in the same year as the first rejection. Among the appellants there are certainly no migrants rejected on grounds of unavailability, which, based on data for the first half of 2018 and 2019, amount to about 7-8% of all applicants. Furthermore, on 19 February 2019 (4890/2019) the Court of Cassation established that the abolition of humanitarian protection is not retroactive and cannot apply to asylum requests submitted before 5 October, the date of approval of the decree. While this sentence does not seem to have had an impact on first-instance decisions (Ministry of the Interior, 2019), it may impact appeals against rejections of asylum applications that were still pending in October 2018 (according to Eurostat, around 107,500 at the end of September 2018). The surplus of undocumented migrants due to Legislative Decree 113/2018 relating to the 32,230 applications presented between October 2018 and June 2019 (Eurostat, 2019), and probably not yet examined, can be estimated at around 6,500 additional first-instance rejections (on about 25,000 total rejections), assuming that the profiles of the new asylum applicants are similar to those of the first seven months of 2018 and 2019 and in the case of full availability of the asylum seekers. Also, in this case, a proportion of rejections will be appealed.

In summary, the impact of Legislative Decree 113/2018 on undocumented migration is difficult to quantify. The first-instance decisions received by those who applied before October 5 may be subject to substantial revision in the appeal, but the proportions of the appellants and the timing of the final decisions are unknown. However, the impact of the appeals will probably be lower on asylum applications submitted after the entry into force of Legislative Decree 113/2018.

5. Conclusions

The most recent data on migration in Italy show stability, or at most a modest growth, in the number of foreigners. The trend is the result of the moderate amount of new entries for work reasons, the steady growth of entries for family reasons (which remains the main entry channel to Italy) and a reduction due to the acquisition of Italian citizenship. In this context, even the growth of arrivals from third countries remains contained, albeit double compared to that of EU citizens. The reduction in new permits of stay for humanitarian reasons mainly affects the citizens of Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Central Asia.

Trends in sea and land arrivals, which in many cases contribute to asylum applications, are in line with 2017, despite the lack of a significant change in push factors driving these dangerous journeys. The recent legislative change (i.e., the abolition of humanitarian protection) has not yet had a significant impact on the presence of undocumented migrants. Even the recent alarms regarding an overload in the Italian reception system due to the increase of transfer requests generated by the Dublin Regulation, although worth attention for the significant number of take-back requests received in Italy, are not substantiated by significant changes in actual flows. Criticalities are expected more as the consequence of the reorganisation of the reception system than as a consequence of new inflows. The number of people hosted in reception facilities is currently decreasing steadily.

The progressive reduction of the native Italian population requires careful long-term planning of the migratory phenomenon. On the one hand, it is essential to consider the demographic dynamics, which often lead to theorizations on the 'need' for immigration to cope with the expected loss of over 6 million people of working age in the next 25 years, even in the presence of migration (Bank of Italy, 2019). On the other hand, we must also objectively evaluate both the need for a workforce that will affect the Italian job market of the future and the ability of the country to activate effective integration paths, for both the first generation of migrants and their descendants.

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3.The Regulatory Framework

Ennio Codini

1. Introduction

In 2019, even more than in the past, conflict over the regulation of immigration was dramatic. The approach of Italy's so-called "Yellow-Green" government (Five Stars Movement and League Party) was restrictive to an unprecedented degree, particularly in terms of international protection, first and foremost by closing the Italian ports to ships carrying asylum seekers rescued at sea. In response, there have even been cases where the blockade was defied (the Sea Watch blockade in June being a dramatic example and that of the vessel Eleonore on 2 September the most recent).

These conflicts were often marked by their reference to needs that were so basic so as to justify any behaviour: in closing the ports, the government spoke of defending the country's borders, while those who helped the migrants at sea founded their demand to allow them to disembark in Italy on a state of necessity.

These procedures are typical of emergency strategies. This may seem peculiar, considering that the number of migrants had decreased over the 2017-2018 period in general and among asylum seekers in particular. However, the government chose to consider any arrival an emergency (except for the few that made use of the humanitarian corridors), especially those resulting from rescues at sea by non-governmental organisations. More generally, the government chose to consider migratory influxes an emergency, as testified by the exclusive recourse to decrees law as the means of introducing new regulations with a legislative status in this regard. Indeed, as is known, in the Italian legal system, decree laws presuppose an extraordinary legal situation requiring the immediate amendment of the legislative framework. Such has been the case, despite the fact that some large influxes have been tolerated even when occurring outside of the rules, regarding which the government demonstrated a sort of indifference: we are referring to the numerous boats – from Libya as well as Tunisia and other countries – that have continued to smuggle thousands of migrants onto our shores by having them disembark outside of the ports.

Such emergency responses and dramatic conflicts have certainly done nothing to encourage an innovative, organic approach to the matter of immigration, despite it being necessary in light of various emerging problems ranging from managing incoming migrants to managing the illegal immigrants that are already in the country, not to mention the integration of beneficiaries of protection. Thus, a paradox arose: in 2019, although immigration was considered a significant and highly problematic phenomenon by all, including by the government, and therefore one that required intervention, its underlying issues were not addressed.

In August, the Yellow-Green parliamentary majority faced a government crisis and on 5 September a new government with a new majority, i.e. the so-called "Yellow-Red" government, took office (Five Stars Movement and Democratic Party). The new government's

stance seems to deviate, at least to some extent, from the previous government's *modus operandi* on immigration. The emerging approach seems to involve fewer emergency measures and a reconsideration of the regulations with a view to adapting them to the present needs. In accordance with this position, the idea that the most important step is to cancel the two so-called "security" decree laws, emblematic of the previous government's policies, has also emerged.

All of this could invite us to consider the 2019 developments in the area of immigration regulation a mere parenthesis and, as such, of little importance. However, it is worth examining them more closely for the following reasons: 2019 will be remembered, in the history of our country, for its dramatic clashes over immigration; moreover, as we shall see, these developments appear particularly relevant, looking ahead as well, in terms of future government action, which should dwell less on cancelling changes and restoring the pre-existing regulatory framework, and more on drawing on experience to rethink the overall framework.

2. The port closures

Continuing along the path that was taken by the so-called 2018 Security Decree Law No. 113, (converted into law no. 32 of the same year), in 2019 the Yellow-Green government entrusted its policy of increasing the restrictive scope of the legislative framework on immigration to Decree Law no. 53 of 14 June (converted into law no. 77 of 8 August), or the so-called "Security B" decree law.

The main innovation that was brought by the Security B decree was that it enabled the Interior Minister to adopt measures to close ports to civil ships carrying asylum seekers rescued at sea. More specifically, art. 1 of the decree states that "The Interior Minister... may restrict or prohibit the entry, transit or stopping of ships in Italian waters, except in the case of military vessels..., for reasons of public order and safety".

However, it would be a mistake to expect to find any kind of radical break with the past in the above provision, as it stands. The reference to reasons of public order and security, in fact, at the most should only have led to prohibitions in particular cases, that were in any case to prohibitions limited in time by the same need to uphold public order and security, as well as by the need, also mentioned in article 1, to avoid any conflict with international law. It was the specific application thereof by the government – albeit presumably in line with the motivations that led to the introduction of art. 1 – that instead transformed the above mentioned provision into a break with the past, because the government deemed all cases of asylum seekers rescued at sea as justifying the exceptional requirements laid down in the provision, and decided that the consequent closure of the ports should not be time-limited. It thus proceeding, by means of a series of measures enacted by the Interior Minister, with the systematic closure of Italian ports to all the civil rescue vessels that came in the summer of 2019.

The government's decision to close the ports to civilian ships carrying asylum seekers rescued at sea almost inevitably gave rise to conflicts, sometimes on a dramatic scale. The Italian judiciary authorities even had to rule on some cases, mostly resulting in subsequent rulings that were unfavourable to the government. After all, it could hardly have

been otherwise: if the rule of landing in the first safe port after fulfilling the duty of rescuing shipwrecked persons leads a ship to the Italian coast, then the adoption of a ban on entry and disembarkation, not for one specific port but for all ports, that is in force long term and offers no alternative solutions, will inevitably conflict with the safeguard of the basic needs of those responsible for the ship and of the shipwrecked persons themselves. As a result, a state of necessity arises. As noted by the Judge for the preliminary investigations of the Court of Agrigento in relation to the Sea Watch case, if there is a duty to rescue shipwrecked persons (under the Montego Bay Convention) – whose non-fulfilment entails, among other things, a criminal sanction based on art. 1158 of the Code of Navigation – and if these people must disembark at the first safe port (according to the 1979 Hamburg Convention), then it cannot be illegal to access a port by breaching a blockade that would otherwise make it impossible for the ship captain to fulfil his or her duties.

The matter of port closures clearly demonstrated, once again, that the action of any government regarding asylum, regardless of its political motivations – and in support of the closure of the ports, which was justified in various ways, i.e. border defence, the fight against terrorism, the need to discourage illegal means of reaching Italy, etc. – cannot violate certain legal principles. Members of the Yellow-Green government have shown indifference, and even contempt, towards the interventions of the judiciary authorities “against” the blockade measures, but such a position is not sustainable. The political of the country will must be expressed not against, but in line with, the principles of the legal system, which are also closely connected to our civilisation. It should be noted that this certainly does not mean that the influxes of asylum seekers should simply be endured, for possible legitimate means of managing them do exist.

3. Beyond port closure

Whilst the closure of the ports derives, in legal terms, from a particular interpretation of Article 1 of the Security B decree, the issue of its interpretation never appeared more pivotal than in 2018-2019.

The developments that took place regarding decisions on asylum applications are emblematic of this. At the end of 2018, by means of the aforementioned Decree No. 113, the government radically modified the rules in this regard, cancelling the general clause that traditionally enabled permits for humanitarian reasons to be granted to many asylum seekers not considered eligible for refugee status or subsidiary protection. As a result, there should have been a drastic drop in the number of humanitarian permits issued in the first months of 2019 following the pronouncements of the Commissions, in conjunction with the entry into force of the decree. Instead, there was no significant drop. However, this does not mean that the government’s restrictive stance had no effect. Rather, these effects simply emerged before the security decree; in fact, the data related to autumn 2018 show a clear decrease in the number of humanitarian permits issued during that period following the examination of asylum applications. The apparent paradox of the effects that seemingly preceded the provision to which they should relate can be explained by the fact that the Interior Ministry had given directives to the Commissions in the summer of 2018 to the effect of drastically limiting the interpretation of the clause regarding humanitarian permits. The Commissions had followed these directives, to the

extent that the number of humanitarian permits issued for humanitarian reasons had almost already fallen to zero in autumn before the security decree even came into force, meaning that, in itself, said decree did not change the situation.

Interpretation proved decisive for another issue: the registration of asylum seekers. There are those who perceived one of the provisions of Decree No 113 as the introduction of a prohibition in this regard. Some administrations followed this interpretation, whilst others did not. Again, the judiciary authorities were called upon, with most judgments opting for an interpretation that acknowledged no such prohibition. In particular, the judges argued that the provision in Article 13 of Decree No 113 – according to which the residence permit for asylum applications “does not constitute a qualification” for registration – should have the single effect of abolishing the existing special system for registering asylum seekers, thereby only applying the ordinary system, whereby registration is simply linked to habitual residence. This interpretative line was followed by many courts, including Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Cagliari and Parma. In other words, under this perspective an attempt was made to maintain harmony between the legislation and the principles, considering that registration is fundamentally linked to an established fact – i.e. permanent residence in the territory – and that it is associated to benefits, which if denied to a regular migrant (such as a legal asylum seeker) would not conform with the principles. However, based on the presumption that the non-registration of asylum seekers would conflict with the principles of the legal system, some courts, including that of Milan, chose instead to raise the question of constitutional legitimacy, considering the above interpretation to be impossible. Thus, a certain disparity in terms of orientation increasingly emerged with regard to provisions that appear to be at odds with the principles: there are those who try to interpret such provisions so as to bring them in line with the above-mentioned principles even if it means departing from the intention of the legislator. Others prefer to focus on their cancellation, if the compliant interpretation is not straightforward, by denouncing them as illegitimate before the Constitutional Court.

Finally, the issue of interpretation also emerged, albeit in decidedly *sui generis* terms, with regard to the two messages with which the President of the Republic thought fit to accompany the signing of both of the above mentioned decrees and their relative conversion laws. It is an unusual solution that in some ways is linked to doubts surrounding the constitutionality of the provisions, and aimed at guiding the interpretation, as well as the subsequent activity, of the legislator. Such messages – not being specific provisions of the law – are not binding, as became clear in the months following those in which they failed to gain traction: the Yellow-Green government, in particular, ignored them. However, this does not make the two messages entirely irrelevant; the new government that took office in September 2019 expressly mentioned them as a reference for its own line of action.

In these messages, the President of the Republic essentially recalled certain important principles. In particular, in the face of the restrictions on protection defined in the first security decree, he referred to the constitutional and international obligations on the matter, which stipulate, as it should be noted, protection with a very wide scope. Instead, in view of the possibility of “closing” ports to ships carrying shipwrecked survivors as per the Security B decree, the President, on the basis of the duty of rescue at sea, emphasised the need to limit power and to balance various interests.

One cannot help but notice that if the government had implemented Decree No. 53 in line with these indications, the aforementioned dramatic confrontation regarding the closure of ports to ships carrying shipwrecked persons that took place in the summer of 2019 would have been avoided. Likewise, it should be noted that if the government and the territorial commissions had acted, both before and after Decree No. 113, in a way that prioritised full compliance with constitutional and international obligations regarding the protection of asylum seekers, the dramatic fall in the number of permits issued following the examination of applications for protection would probably not have occurred. Since it is possible (in accordance with the lines of action that nevertheless emerge in law) to interpret the provisions on granting refugee status or subsidiary protection more broadly (as well as an approach/a view that decidedly aims at resolving the numerous doubtful cases in favour of the claimant), just as a more generous application of the rules on humanitarian permits would have been possible before the Security Decree, and that of the rules on permits for special cases would have been possible afterwards.

4. An error to be avoided

As mentioned in the introduction, despite the centrality of the issue of immigration in 2019, the key issues in this regard have not been addressed. Therefore, drawing on the experience of 2019, it is now time to do so.

In the context of the government crisis of the Yellow-Green majority, as already mentioned, the idea that a priority for the new majority and the new government would be that of cancelling the previous government's two emblematic security decrees emerged; a further priority was that of cancelling the provisions of the old Bossi-Fini Law, which had long been a target of harsh criticism by the Left; finally, some forwarded a further priority of approving the plan to introduce a temperate *jus soli* that had been discussed in the previous legislature.

This would be a mistake. The security decrees certainly contain provisions that give rise to various doubts, including from a technical and legal point of view. The same goes for the provisions that had been introduced by the old Bossi-Fini law. And of course, there are also reasons to consider it appropriate to rethink the rules regarding the acquisition of nationality by the so-called second generations. However, as pointed out above, some of the controversial provisions that were introduced by the security decrees can and perhaps even should be interpreted so as to overcome the doubts of the critics to a large extent. The closure of ports to civilian ships bearing victims of shipwreck rescued at sea, for example, should be an exceptional and time-limited event; the choice lies with the government. To give another example: territorial commissions could well adopt interpretative and applicative solutions that are more favourable to applicants and bring concrete protection closer to constitutional principles and those of European and international law without needing to amend the provisions in force; this is made clear by the fact that, on the basis of the same legal framework, of course, judges frequently grant protection to those to whom it had been denied by the commissions. As for the much reviled – by some – Bossi-Fini law, it should be noted that its provisions are part of a complex system, that of the consolidated law on the entry and residence of foreigners, which should be recon-

sidered as a whole because it presents serious flaws that go well beyond the easily identified critical aspects of the provisions that had been introduced with the Bossi-Fini law. To give an example: if we consider a key aspect such the provisions on the entry of so-called non-EU foreign workers, we must observe that it is not a matter of cancelling the provisions of the Bossi-Fini law in order to restore some “fair” and effective system that had been originally foreseen by the so-called Turco-Napolitano Act, but rather one of rethinking the whole framework in order to give life to a new model since all the solutions that have been adopted in the past have proved inadequate to govern the influx of migrants. Finally, with regard to the issue of *jus soli*, whilst it is true that the regulation of the acquisition of citizenship by the second generation can be improved, it is also true that, currently, with the need for some adjustments at the application level at most, the system in place still guarantees essential rights to foreign minors.

We can, therefore, conclude that it is certainly not urgent to interfere with the security decrees or *jus soli* at the moment, and it would be misleading to focus on the Bossi-Fini law. Moreover, it should also be noted that these are issues on which, almost by definition, debate turns into conflict. Therefore, it would be a mistake to prioritise them also because, amid the ensuing controversy, it would result in certain key issues being overlooked.

5. For a new framework

But where can we begin in reconfiguring the way immigration is managed?

In recent years, undoubtedly, the hottest issue has been the chaotic influxes of asylum seekers and illegal migrants. A further problem has been represented by the fact that the influx of asylum seekers was objectively mixed, comprising both those “seeking refuge” but also, to a significant extent, by simple economic migrants. What were the underlying factors here?

One of the contributing factors was undoubtedly the inability of economic migrants, particularly those from Africa, to migrate to Italy legally as such. It also derived from the absence of structured legal channels for asylum seekers. This was also the main factor behind the chaotic, dramatic, and illegal influx of people seeking refuge on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. On the other hand, the inability of economic migrants to enter legally, as such, has at least partially resulted in the arrival of many of them as illegal or mixed in with asylum seekers, and the emergence of related problems.

Two priorities, therefore, emerge.

It is necessary to provide economic migrants with reasonable opportunities to come to Italy as such. As a consequence, immigration regulation must be reconsidered as a whole, as regards the consolidated text that has proved to be completely inadequate in recent years. It must be stressed that this requires specific attention to the needs of young people in sub-Saharan African countries, because, above all, will be knocking on our borders, to offer their labour in the coming years, and we must be able to convert them into a resource. A good point of reference could be, among other things, the popular legislative initiative presented on 27 October 2017 at the end of the 17th term (Chamber no. 4712), which addressed the unavoidable issue of providing a legal form of entry for those seeking work. In October, a decree was adopted to speed up the processing of asylum applications submitted by people from countries that were considered “safe” with the stated aim of

identifying and expelling irregular economic migrants as quickly as possible. But it is clear that this does not solve the problem of economic migration.

It is also necessary to develop channels for those fleeing persecution or war to allow them to arrive and legally seek asylum. As in the case of economic migrants, it is certainly not easy to find appropriate solutions in this regard, but the issue is unavoidable for various reasons.

It should be noted that the existence of legal channels for workers and asylum seekers would make it possible to firmly oppose on irregular immigration, given that it would be unjustified for the most part in this case.

Moreover, the construction of legal channels for asylum seekers, as well as the management of existing influxes, threaten to leave Italy with an excessive number of asylum seekers to manage in the coming years. The experience of Italy and Germany in 2015-2016 clearly shows how difficult it is, even for “rich” countries, to cope with influxes above a certain threshold. Hence the need for their distribution among the countries of the European Union. Looking ahead, the best instrument in this respect would consist in a revision of the Dublin Regulation with clauses relating to redistribution. In the meantime, since the emergency logic followed in 2018-2019, by which some kind of redistribution was negotiated on an arrival-by-arrival basis, was absolutely inadequate, the only way forward is through agreements between countries, within the European framework, providing for the acceptance of pre-established quotas of asylum requests, in accordance with the line that emerged at the Malta Summit on 23 September.

On the other hand, as concerns the migrants that are already in the country, two apparent priorities emerge: to make greater efforts to integrate asylum seekers by making the most of their resources; and to tackle the problem of the hundreds of thousands of irregular immigrants in a decisive manner. The issue of asylum-seeker integration, which was overlooked by the Yellow-Green government, is a central one. What is striking in general here is the disproportionate relationship between the recent emphasis on problems linked to the arrival and initial stay of asylum seekers on the one hand, and the lack of attention to the fate of these people in the medium to long term on the other. Many of them, however, will live in Italy for decades and a positive integration and enhancement of their resources it not to be taken for granted, not least because of the radical difference in the migratory processes of asylum seekers compared to those of so-called ordinary migrants. In this regard, the following basic conditions must first be met: that the integration/enhancement process begin as soon as possible; and that the people are not hosted in structures that are too large and/or created according to an emergency strategy, but rather in small, organised structures, that are in line with the model of the former SPRAR systems (“Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees”). However, these conditions – which have only partially been fulfilled in the past years – are no more than a starting point, so investments will also be required in order to value talent. In Italy, very little has been done or even said about this last point (unlike in Germany), but it is clearly much more important for the future of the country than deciding whether or not this or that ship should enter a port.

Finally, a nod to the dramatic problem posed by the presence of hundreds of thousands of irregular immigrants in Italy is in order. Much was said about this in 2019, particularly in terms of the controversy between the supporters of the Yellow-Green government – for whom the latter, with its official hard line of action on the subject of expulsions and

port blockades, was working effectively to reduce the number of irregular immigrants – and its critics, who accused the government of doing little of substance in terms of repatriation and even of increasing the number of irregular immigrants by restricting humanitarian permits. Indeed, there are currently no estimates on how the number of irregular immigrants in 2019 can be changed. We know that repatriations, whether forced or assisted, did not increase, and we know that the restriction of humanitarian permits produced a few thousand irregular migrants that we would not otherwise have had, but we lack other data: we do not know, for example, how many foreigners actually arrived in Italy, disembarking outside ports or crossing land borders illegally without later seeking asylum; nor do we know how many irregular migrants have left Italy outside of any return scheme. However, we do have a starting point: the present Foundation’s estimate of 562,000 irregular immigrants on January 1 2019 (see chapter 4 in this volume). And there is no reason to think that there has been a drastic change in 2019 in a figure that has remained relatively stable in recent years (as reported in the same chapter). And so, when faced with such an important phenomenon, the government should not evade the question of what can realistically be done with these people, as the present situation cannot be tolerated. This will not be the first issue to be tackled; first, the right solutions will have to be found, for example, to manage the influxes but the government will have to decide on these. It is also clear that, with over 500,000 irregular immigrants already present in the country and no more than 8,000 repatriations per year in the 2017-2019 period, with no upward trend, even beyond any unavoidable consideration regarding respect for life, solving the problem through repatriations alone is unrealistic. The solution will inevitably have to be more complex founding its rules on the distinction between those who have a chance of integrating and will therefore have to be integrated, and those who will actually have to leave Italy (an approach we find, for example, in the above mentioned popular legislative initiative bill, whereby provisions are made to issue residence permits based on ascertained integration).

4. Labour

Laura Zanfrini

1. The reference framework: more workers, less work, more “working poor”

According to the latest data provided by ISTAT, the Italian National Statistic Institute, published in summer 2019, despite the Italian economy having entered a cyclical slowdown (after a few years of “sluggish” recovery), labour statistics point to substantial improvement, both in terms of employment levels and activity rates. The latter, whilst still too low in terms of sustainability of an increasingly “ageing” country, indicates a small reduction in underemployment. As for employment, the figures are now approaching pre-crisis levels.

This improvement is, however – according to the same authors of the Yearly Report of the National Statistic Institute (ISTAT, 2019) – counterbalanced by worrying data: the overall number of hours worked remains substantially below pre-crisis levels; the involuntarily part-time work is exhibiting strong growth (in general terms and for females in particular); there is more fixed-term employment; there is an increase, in the self-employed sector (which is declining as a proportion of the workforce as a whole), of independent self-employed individuals with no employees. All of this – besides the many variables behind these phenomena and the wide range of worker categories affected – seem to corroborate the interpretation proposed several times in this annual report: the conviction that the crisis has not so much caused as revealed (and in certain respects obfuscated) a structural transformation of the Italian labour market, whereby tendencies towards “de-institutionalising” wage society are being fully realised; tendencies that, in Italy, have coincided temporally with migration transition and an increasing influx of non-Italian workers.¹ It is therefore conceivable that immigrant workers are playing an important part in this development (or regression) for the following reasons: their fairly substantial contribution to labour supply, their hyper-adaptability (making them particularly useful in the eyes of employers seeking cheaper and flexible labour) and mobility within the territory, and their ability to intercept to both intercept the available opportunities and to mirror the main weaknesses of the labour market.

39

2. The employment performance of non-Italian workers

In 2018, the working-age non-Italian population was almost four million. Compared to 2017, there were over 32,000 more non-Italian nationals in employment and the number

¹ For an analysis of these processes, see the chapters published in the Fondazione ISMU, *The Tenth Italian Report on Migrations 2004. Ten Years of Immigration in Italy* and *Twenty Years of Migrations in Italy: 1994-2014* (cf. Zanfrini, 2005 and 2014).

seeking work had fallen by just over 6,000 units (but increased among the EU component), whilst the number of unemployed fell significantly, by 11,538 (thanks entirely to the strong performance of the non-EU component). Based on the data in Table 1, we can calculate that non-Italians represent 10.2% of the working-age population, 10.6% of the employed population, 14.5% of the unemployed population and 8.6% of the inactive population.

Table 1. Population per employment and citizenship status. 2018

	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Non-Italian EU nationals</i>	<i>Non-European nationals</i>	<i>Total non-Italian nationals</i>	<i>Total</i>
Working age population	35,238,616	1,264,559	2,727,931	3,992,490	39,231,106
Employed (15 years and over)	20,759,946	806,314	1,648,688	2,455,002	23,214,949
Seeking employment (15 years and over)	2,355,726	125,751	273,995	399,746	2,755,472
Inactive (15-64 years)	12,122,944	332,494	805,248	1,137,742	13,260,686

Source: ISTAT, ongoing data collection on labour forces, 2018

These figures confirm, therefore, two of the main features of the Italian context: non-Italian nationals are more “active” and more employed, but also more unemployed than Italians.

These characteristics are particularly marked when we compare the activity, employment and unemployment rates of non-Italian nationals with those of Italians.

The activity rate among non-Italian nationals is consistently higher, both for males and for females – thanks to levels of participation among EU migrant women almost 10 percentage points higher than those of non-EU immigrants, and over one point higher than those of Italian females. The highest rates of female inactivity are found, as always, in the Bangladeshi, Egyptian and Pakistani communities – confirming that inactivity in these groups is the norm, as is also the case among Tunisians, Indians and Moroccans, albeit to a lesser degree. Conversely, activity rates among females from the Philippines and, some way behind, Peru, Moldavia, China, Ukraine and Ecuador are significantly higher than those of their Italian counterparts, thanks to the influence of specific migration models which places females in the role of breadwinner.

Italy also retained its most important characteristic in terms of employment rates in 2018 i.e. a positive difference in favour of non-Italian nationals. Nevertheless, the gap closed to a third of its pre-crisis value (from nine to three percentage points), despite high migration levels – albeit now entirely independent from the mechanism of the planned quotas – making work more difficult to find, even for a highly adaptable labour force. However, the overall employment rate is an outcome of performances that vary somewhat between the various national groups. Among male immigrants, those of Asian origin (as well as Moldovans) achieved the highest rates: among males from Bangladesh, China, the Philippines, India and Sri Lanka, rates range from 82.1% to 84.2%, or over 15 percentage points above Italian males. Among females, as usual, Filipinos stand out: with an employment rate of 82.3%, they are almost ten percentage points ahead of the Chinese – the next

highest group – and all other groups (particularly, those noted above for their low activity rates, among whom the employment rate is equally low and the unemployment rate is often high).

Finally, in terms of the unemployment rate, the slight downturn recorded in the previous year did not close the gap between non-Italian nationals and their higher-performing Italian-national counterparts; on the contrary, the discrepancy increased, reaching values double those of the pre-crisis period. Once again, the average figure hides strong divergences between the various national groups, which, in some cases, even reverse the traditional female disadvantage. The groups with by far the lowest figures, for males and females, are the Chinese (3.5%) and the Filipinos (4.1%). As we know, these two national groups follow very different employment patterns (one with a strong propensity for self-employment and working within the ethnic economy, the other focused on domestic labour for Italian families). However, both groups do share a migratory model governed by the so-called ethnic networks, which, decades from Italy's migratory transition, continue to represent the most effective channel for penetrating the employment market – and, simultaneously, the most effective protection from the risk of unemployment, thanks to the well-known mechanisms of internal and external trust that build up within and around such networks.

Table 2. Rates of activity, employment and unemployment; comparison between non-Italian nationals and Italians. Various years between 2005 and 2018

	2005		2008		2011		2017		2018	
	<i>Non-It.</i>	<i>It.</i>	<i>Non-It.</i>	<i>It.</i>	<i>Non-It.</i>	<i>It.</i>	<i>Non-It.</i>	<i>It.</i>	<i>Non-It.</i>	<i>It.</i>
<i>Activity rate</i>										
Males	87.5	74.0	87.1	73.6	84.0	72.1	82.9	74.2	83.9	74.2
Females	58.0	50.0	59.9	51.0	59.1	50.7	60.2	55.4	60.2	55.7
Total	72.9	61.9	73.3	62.3	70.9	61.4	70.8	64.8	71.2	65.0
<i>Employment rate</i>										
Males	81.5	69.4	81.9	69.5	75.4	66.7	72.4	66.5	73.8	67.0
Females	49.1	45.1	52.8	46.8	50.5	46.1	50.2	48.8	50.2	49.4
Total	65.5	57.2	67.1	58.1	62.3	56.4	60.6	57.7	61.2	58.2
<i>Unemployment rate</i>										
Males	6.8	6.2	6.0	5.6	10.3	7.4	12.6	10.1	12.0	9.5
Females	15.4	9.8	11.9	8.3	14.6	9.1	16.4	11.9	16.4	11.2
Total	10.2	7.7	8.5	6.7	12.2	8.1	14.3	10.8	14.0	10.2

Source: ISTAT, ongoing data collection on labour forces, various years

In terms of sector, more immigrants are working in sectors that employ a higher proportion of non-Italian workers overall (Direzione Generale dell'Immigrazione e delle Politiche di integrazione, 2019): particularly “Community, social and personal service activities” (36.6%) followed, at some distance, by “Agriculture” and “Hotels and restaurants” (both 17.9%) and “Construction” (17.2%). “Transport and warehousing” accounts for 11.1%, a figure slightly above the percentage of non-Italian workers among the employed labour force as a whole (which, as we have seen, is 10.6%). To a large degree, this picture replicates trends found in most advanced countries, albeit probably with a greater focus

on domestic labour, which pushes up the numbers of employees in the “Community, social and personal service activities”.

The characteristics of non-Italian nationals’ employment confirm the very clear under-representation of immigrants among the self-employed: indeed, the self-employed proportion of the Italian workforce as a whole is around twice that of the non-Italian workforce. Similarly, non-Italian nationals are disadvantaged in terms of accessing stable employment, as indicated by the fact that 22% of non-Italian employees have a fixed-term contract compared to 16.3% of Italians (Direzione Generale dell’Immigrazione e delle Politiche di integrazione, 2019); a figure that does not take into account the very strong over-representation of non-Italians among domestic staff employed by Italian families (a sector in which seven out of ten employees are non-Italian nationals), who officially have a permanent contract but are, in practice, subject to the risk of employment instability inherent to this type of work (particularly when caring for elderly people towards the end of life). Finally, involuntary part-time labour is also more common among immigrants (19.8% compared to 10.8% of Italians), a phenomenon that is magnified among females, to the degree that one non-Italian female worker in three is affected (compared to 18.2% of Italian women) (ISTAT, 2019).

As we know, however, employment professional level is the most important factor in defining the structural subordination of immigrant workers. More than three in four non-Italian nationals are employed as labourers (76.8%) compared to 31.4% of Italians. Office workers, who form a relative majority among Italians (36%), account for only 8.7% of non-Italian employees. Managers and directors as a whole account for 7.8% of Italian employees but only 1% of non-Italian employees (and 0.6% of non-EU).

Slackening demand for immigrant labour in manual and executive roles inevitably creates a situation of widespread deskilling, tolerated by workers who are highly motivated to achieve their migratory objectives.² However, this is both the cause and effect of the characteristics of immigrant workers and of their (low) levels of education. Indeed, whilst de-skilling is primarily a concern for Italians in the phase of entering the labour market, for non-Europeans it often applies regardless of age and seniority: awareness of this factor is certainly an integral part of the “migratory knowledge” transmitted through social networks in the countries of origin, which are likely to be exerting a selective effect on new arrivals. In this way, on the one hand, Italy mainly attracts poorly-educated immigrants (about half of all working-age immigrants are educated to secondary level or under); on the other hand, their low level educational capital tends to divert non-Italian workers toward more low-skilled occupations, reinforcing common expectations about the role of immigrants.

Indeed, the concentration of immigrants in low- (or medium-) skilled roles is certainly not an exclusively Italian phenomenon: in fact, it affects about two in three non-national workers on average in OECD countries (10 percentage points more than non-national workers). However, in Italy, the figure is almost nine in ten, or a good 26 percentage points

² Previous editions of this report contain a number of analyses on this matter. Here, we shall simply observe that among immigrants educated to university level, 46.2% of EU nationals and even 73.6% of non-EU nationals (compared to 17.5% of Italians) work in medium- to low-skilled jobs, for which they are, therefore, over qualified.

higher than among Italian nationals. It is therefore clear that, in a country where the demand for medium-to-low skilled roles continues to account for a particularly significant proportion of new recruitment, employers have reinforced their association between immigration and the ability to fill positions that are further and further removed from the aspirations of new cohorts entering the labour market.³ In recent years, besides the longest recession since the post-war period, the recomposition of labour demand per sector and professional profile (leading to an increase in unskilled staff and growth in the sector of services to businesses and families – ISTAT, 2019), is in fact likely to have reinforced the “need” for immigrant labour and, with it, the image of a country where opportunities are limited to unskilled roles. It may, therefore, not be by chance – although the reasons are certainly not attributable to a single cause – that the younger generations of non-Italian workers are even less well educated than their older counterparts (Direzione Generale dell’Immigrazione e delle Politiche di integrazione, 2019). Bearing in mind that, among Italians the exact opposite is true (i.e. mature workers are on average less educated than the new cohorts entering the labour market), it is easy to predict that this phenomenon will lead to further segmentation, fragmenting our labour market more markedly along ethnic and national lines.

3. The demand for immigrant labour

During 2018, just under one third of Italian businesses hired a non-Italian worker.⁴ These 2,207,775 new employees (of which 1,466,745 were non-EU workers) corresponded to 19.4% of all recruitments for the same period. In the same way as for Italians, more non-Italian nationals were recruited in 2018 than in 2017 (a less-marked increase, however, than we saw between 2016 and 2017); nevertheless, the positive dynamic is entirely attributable to the non-EU component, with a reduction in the number of non-Italian EU nationals employed. In any case, the proportion of recruitments – and terminations⁵ – involving non-Italian workers is far greater than the non-Italian proportion of employees as a whole. Based on this situation, we can imagine the crucial role they play, particularly, in managing the so-called “external labour market” – which places a premium on immediate availability and low cost – and much less in the “internal job market”, through which companies tend to manage more qualified human resources in whom they intend to invest.

In terms of sector, the highest number of recruitments were recorded in “Agriculture” (37.3%), followed by “Construction” (23.5%), “Industry in a narrow sense” (20.5%), “Other service activities” (15.6%) and finally “Trade and repair” (4.8%). The proportion of recruitments that concern non-Italian workers are, per sector: 37.3% in “Agriculture”,

³ In contrast to the average trend in OECD countries, the proportion of non-Italian workers in highly-skilled roles has in fact reduced over time.

⁴ Data on recruitment dynamics from the *Sistema Informativo Statistico delle Comunicazioni Obbligatorie* are taken from the aforementioned report prepared by the Direzione Generale dell’Immigrazione e delle Politiche di integrazione 2019.

⁵ Out of the 11,007,910 employment contracts terminated in 2018, 19.1% affected non-Italian workers.

23.5% in “Construction”, 16% in “Industry”, 15.6% in “Other service activities” and 12.9% in “Trade and repair”.

Finally, on the list of prevalent jobs, the usual, now highly “ethnicised” figures predominate: above all, agricultural labourers who account for 572,338 recruitments, almost all fixed term; following close behind, personal service providers (171,285), waiting staff and similar (157,802), household employees and related professions (114,337). Combined, these four figures account for almost half of the total new recruitments of non-Italian workers.

Data derived from the register of obligatory communications paints us a picture of a labour market that tends to spontaneously reproduce the features of the model of immigrant labour incorporation, seeing in foreign workers as a resource to draw on for the “real time” filling of the low-skilled roles required by the production system (particularly the agricultural system) and “reproductive” tasks required by families. It would appear, therefore, that nothing is changing and that, in fact, in a context of stifled growth and general labour “impoverishment”, the hope of seeing some form of rejuvenation of the Italian model of integration – a closing note of so many versions of this chapter on labour in recent years – remains thwarted for now.

The recruitment projections in the latest edition of Sistema Informativo Excelsior (2019) are of particular interest, in terms of understanding potential signs of discontinuity in the orientation of Italian businesses towards immigrant work forces. For a more comprehensive analysis, we recommend referring to the specific report. Here is a summary of just some of the key data.

Table 3. Projected recruitments of immigrant workers per sector (absolute values and as a % of the total projected recruitments)

	<i>No. of recruitments</i>	<i>% of total recruitments</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>Equally suitable</i>
Manufacturing industry	106,650	11.4	60.5	16.1	23.5
Public utilities	4,970	9.3	70.8	5.4	23.8
Construction	40,510	10.9	88.5	2.6	9.0
Total in industry	152,130	11.2	68.3	12.1	19.6
Trade	54,870	8.1	31.2	29.8	38.9
Tourism	102,400	13.0	21.7	19.9	58.4
Business services	201,890	26.7	36.1	17.7	46.3
Personal services	76,640	7.9	14.2	31.4	54.4
Total services	435,810	13.6	28.2	22.1	49.6
Total	587,930	12.9	38.6	19.6	41.9

Source: our selection of Unioncamere–ANPAL data, Sistema Informativo Excelsior, 2018

Firstly, it should be noted that the projected number of immigrant workers recruited by companies (including all contract forms) was 587,930 in 2018, or 3.5% more than in the previous year, which amounts to 12.9% of all projected recruitments (therefore, fairly close to the their proportion among all employees, a circumstance which could already be

interpreted as a sign of normalisation")⁶ distributed as indicated in Table 3, which also highlights any potential preferences in terms of worker gender.

In terms of sector, the need for immigrant staff is ranked as follows: the services sector, with 453,810 projected recruitments,⁷ or over 77% of all immigrant recruitments; in the industrial sector (152,130 projected recruitments), construction accounts for 26.6% of the total. Going more into detail, the specific sectors most in need of immigrant labour are ranked as follows: "Hospitality and catering services; tourism services" (with 102,400 projected recruitments); "Business and personal operational support services" (98,140, or 22.8% of all recruitments); "Transport logistics and warehousing services" (78,640, 21.4%); "Health, social care and private health services" (39,820, 17.6%); "Cultural, sports and other personal services" (21,310, 11.2%).

Turning to the industrial sector, after the traditional primacy of the "Metallurgical and metal product industries" (31,470 recruitments projected, or 29.5% of all immigrant recruitments in industry in the narrow sense) we find, in rank order, "Machinery, equipment and vehicle manufacturing industry" (17,340), "Textile, clothing and footwear industries" (16,070) and "Food, drink and tobacco industries" (15,710). In all these sectors, the number of immigrant recruitments is entirely in line (or just above) the current non-Italian proportion of the active population (with the exception of the metallurgical industries, where it reaches 15.4%).

Ultimately, the current distribution is the result of a trend whereby, over time, the industry and construction sectors have shrunk and, simultaneously, the tertiary sector has grown. But this also has to do with the increased demands for turnover that characterise the tertiary sector and obviously – returning to our previous point – with the prevalent "role" assigned to immigrant labour in the Italian economy. In particular, it should be noted that in the sectors with a non-Italian labour recruitment quota that exceeds the number of non-Italian workers as a proportion of all employees, we would expect to see further reinforcement of those tendencies for "ethnicisation" that often already characterise them: this is most markedly the case in the operational services sector, in which the number of immigrant recruitments is 2.5 times higher than the proportion of immigrants among all employees; likewise, the social and health services and the transport and logistics sector (in the tertiary sector), as well as metallurgical companies (in the industrial sector). Conversely, the more advanced tertiary sectors, with a high demand for qualified graduates, exhibit a far weaker propensity to use immigrant labour.

In terms of contract type, immigrants are under-represented among employees with permanent contracts (22.7% compared to 27.6% overall and 28.4% of Italian workers) – the most valued contract type – and particularly among those with apprenticeship contracts (4.7% of immigrants compared to 6.6% of Italians), confirming their role as predominantly part of the "external labour market". On the same point, it is significant that only one in four non-Italian recruitments are for roles requiring knowledge of Italian. At

⁶ In this regard, let us recall that the propensity to use immigrant labour was far higher in the past, with non-Italian workers accounting for up to a third of all recruitments, related to the degree of "mismatch" – real or perceived by businesses – present in certain sectors with a high demand for medium- to low-skilled workers.

⁷ We point out that the survey does not cover the demand for labour on the part of Italian households, traditionally the main sector for hiring immigrant labour.

the same time, of all the transversal skills covered by the survey, the most frequently required by the roles for which immigrants are employed are “flexibility and adaptability” (in 58.7% of cases). The least frequently required is the ability to work independently (32.9%) and solve problems (30%).

Table 4. Projected recruitments of immigrant and non-immigrant workers in 2018 per broad occupation group (absolute values and as % distributions)

	<i>Immigrant recruitments</i>		<i>Non-immigrant recruitments</i>	
	<i>Recruitments</i>	<i>No. of recruitments</i>	<i>No. of recruitments</i>	<i>% of total recruitments</i>
Unskilled workers	162,150	27.6	539,240	13.6
Plant operators and operators of fixed and mobile machinery	98,420	16.7	550,810	13.9
Craftsmen, skilled workers and farmers	91,370	15.5	606,030	15.3
Skilled professionals in trade and services	149,610	25.4	1,088,530	27.4
Executive professions in office work	25,560	4.3	374,850	9.5
Technical professionals	37,110	6.3	565,510	14.3
Executives and highly-specialised intellectual and scientific professionals	23,720	4.0	241,070	6.1

Source: Unioncamere – ANPAL, Sistema Informativo Excelsior, 2018

However, the clearest confirmation of the subordinate role attributed to immigrants within the recruitment strategies of businesses is the distribution of the demand for immigrant labour by profession: demand remained focused on unskilled professional profiles and, to a slightly lesser degree, skilled profiles in trade and in the services, which account for almost double the number of non-Italian recruitments compared to Italian recruitments. Correspondingly, Italians are heavily over-represented in senior profiles and in technical and office-based jobs.

In fact, however asymmetrical, the distribution per profession is less unbalanced than the distribution in terms of employment – where, as we have seen, the proportion of immigrants in senior roles is almost non-existent – suggesting a certain propensity for “opening up”, even among professions in which immigrants have been almost entirely absent up to now (a normal development in increasingly internationalised economies). Also noteworthy, at least in terms of symbolic importance, is the strong increase between 2017 and 2018 in the demand for executives, highly-specialised workers and technicians, as well as the more moderate increase in the demand for specialised workers and plant and machinery operators: a development that reflects both general trends and those concerning non-immigrant human resources, albeit accentuating their scope.

However, confirming the fact the recruitment strategies are strongly influenced by stereotypical views on the role of immigrants, we can observe that, except in rare cases, the unskilled roles that immigrants are most frequently hired to fill rarely encounter signifi-

cant recruitment difficulties. This would seem to contradict the theory of complementarity (summed up in the common belief that “they hire immigrants because they can’t find available Italians”), or to suggest that immigration, which has increased over the years, has created a large enough pool of labour to radically reduce the importance of this type of justification. The fact remains that the large-scale use of immigrant labour, in the absence of any real difficulties in finding workers, seems likely to have consequences on the profitability, in the broad sense, of this type of jobs. All the more, when we consider that businesses that employ immigrants in these areas, which are decidedly less exposed to international competition, are little inclined to offer incentives that encourage the stabilisation of the human resources they employ. Not to mention the fact that the gradual decline in demand for medium-skilled professions reduces the potential for professional mobility on the part of people starting out in the lowest-level roles.

Essentially, we can say that some signs of change in the demand for immigrant labour exist: in particular, the data –which cannot be analysed here owing to space limitations – that point to a “premium” on qualification level, prior experience, specific skills and, above all, the ability to fill the top roles in companies and organisations. But these signs are so weak that, rather than supporting the hypothesis of a rejuvenated integration model, they point to a certain polarisation of the demand for immigrant labour, a phenomenon that is interacting with the ethnicisation processes underway in the Italian labour market, attenuating them in certain respects whilst reinforcing their problematic implications in others. The following paragraph will address a number of these implications.

4. The short-sighted benefit of low-paid work

47

In an attempt to outline a situation that is highly complex and certainly more articulated than the data presented here suggest, the evidence above discussed demonstrates how the segmentation of the Italian labour market has become more marked over the last quarter of a century, including along ethnic lines (i.e. relating to the status of “migrant” and the relative structure of opportunities). On this matter, the latest ISTAT Report (2019) refers explicitly to a “dual labour market” in describing the endemic disadvantage of immigrant working conditions, regardless of the variable examined – employment level, contract type, remuneration or the rate of deskilling –. In our opinion, these data are less indicative of the existence of an “immigrant labour market”, distinct and separate from the labour market as a whole, than they are of the high probability that immigrant and immigrant-origin workers will be employed in one of the classic “immigrant jobs”. This outcome is all the more likely for immigrants who are female: in fact, in half of all cases, this means finding employment as a maid or carer. In this scenario, the few openings for those with the right personal attributes and level of education to access skilled or even executive roles, are insufficient, at least in the medium term, to reshape the characteristics of the economic integration model. Rather, as we have repeatedly warned in recent years, the risk is of immigration becoming useful for the expansion of the secondary sector that accompanied the post-Fordist transition of the Italian economy, particularly during the crisis years (when employment fell overall, but the number of low-skilled jobs increased; likewise employment rates fell among Italians but rose among immigrants) and the subsequent period of recovery (which saw an increase in job instability and the

vulnerability of the most stable jobs) (cf. ISTAT, 2019). In light of this scenario, we could court controversy in stating that immigration, although commonly cited as the solution to the problem of mismatched labour demand and supply, is, if not part of the problem *per se*, at least a strong indication of the problem. This is an extremely important issue in terms of the sustainability of the Italian development model, even more so than the integration processes, and one we can define, essentially, as increasing occupational polarisation and its inevitable consequences: social polarisation and exclusion.

The impact of immigration on rising poverty levels and the condition of second-generation immigrant children are two particularly instructive phenomena in this regard. Although previously addressed in earlier editions of the ISMU Report, these phenomena are important enough to emphasise a second time, now on the basis of newly-emerged evidence.

The overrepresentation of immigrant families among poor households is, to a certain extent, a common phenomenon in all countries. In very few other countries, however, do we find a risk difference, in terms of exposure to poverty, as high as in Italy. Based on the most recent estimates, referring to 2018,⁸ there are⁹ over 1.5 million non-Italians living in absolute poverty, or an incidence of 30.3% (among Italians, the incidence is only 6.4%). Not only is this a question of social equality, but it also questions the sustainability of an immigration model whereby the arrivals are “poor” enough to make a significant impact on the overall scale of the phenomenon. Indeed, 31.1% of the families living in poverty are non-Italians (567,000), despite the latter constituting only 8.7% of families living in Italy.

Furthermore, in this analysis of the labour market, it is useful to recall that the poverty afflicting non-Italian families is certainly due to their greater exposure to the risk of unemployment, but also to their high concentration in low-paid jobs. Indeed, absolute poverty affects only 3.5% of Italian families in which the person in question is seeking employment, compared to a quarter of families in the same situation composed entirely of non-Italian nationals. Indeed, their concentration in jobs that are low-skilled – and offer fewer days/hours of work – makes non-Italians particularly numerous among the working poor: in 2018, non-EU national workers (there is no available data on their EU-national counterparts) received an average annual remuneration of 13,992 euro, or less than 35% than the average for all workers. The vulnerability of this income status is accentuated by the traditional culture of a male breadwinner among certain immigrant communities, excluding women from the paid-labour market and, thereby, increasing the incidence of single-income households (which, as we know, are more vulnerable to poverty). Furthermore, poor immigrant families – also because they are younger on average – are more likely to include minors. In this way, the already shocking figure of one in ten minors in Italy living in absolute poverty, is likely to increase for non-Italian minors, to an even greater degree if we consider that the communities with the most single-income households are also those with the highest birth rates.

⁸ ISTAT – Statistics Report, 18 June 2019.

⁹ Due to space limitations, we are unable to examine the phenomenon of relative poverty, a category in which non-Italian individuals and families are also significantly overrepresented.

In previous editions of the Report, we had the opportunity to discuss the medium-to-long-term consequences of this integration model, on which, by institutionalising a condition of structural disadvantage, undermines the future of the second generations. It is nevertheless true, as a natural effect of the stabilisation process, that it is easier for children of immigrants to integrate into the school system today (with more of them born in Italy and fewer having to resume schooling begun elsewhere) and we are also beginning to see them in what are considered the more prestigious branches of the educational system (cf. Santagati's chapter in this volume). But it is also true that school results and skill levels reveal systemic disadvantage, with inevitable implications for their careers,¹⁰ even in the absence of any ethnic penalty, whereby they are wilfully discriminated against. Moreover, even now, the employment rate among 15-to-34-year-old second-generation immigrants is drastically low: 28% compared to 58% among their counterparts with Italian-born parents. It is almost as if, in addition to the disadvantages that second generations typically face (amply documented in studies conducted in other countries) we can now add those derived from an integration model that sees immigrant families concentrated on the lower rungs of the social ladder, alongside further disadvantages associated with a cohort effect, whereby they must compete with their Italian counterparts when making the difficult transition to working age. A situation whereby these young people potentially find themselves caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. On the one hand, they must contend with the high expectations expounded by meritocratic rhetoric, which are bound tightly to their educational achievements, on which the socio-economic status of the family also has an impact. On the other hand, they must contend with the expectation to be adaptable, a quality celebrated by "pro-immigrant" rhetoric and associated with a structure of opportunity that, when not entirely below the threshold of common social acceptability, certainly falls short of the expectations of young people socialised in Italy. Accordingly, the condition of the children of immigrants seems to confirm a threat this report flagged up about twenty years ago. Our analysis of discrimination against immigrants demonstrated that this phenomenon was simply the other side of the coin of a "complementarity axiom", which, both in the past and now, the constructing the role of immigrants in the Italian labour market is based.

Exploring this matter further, the policies implemented to address early school drop-out rates and poor educational achievement are crucial if we are to break the intergenerational cycles of disadvantage associated with an immigrant background. Likewise, the initiatives to support students with high potential, and even mechanisms of reverse discrimination, which offer additional opportunities and fast track options to members of traditionally disadvantaged groups to support their educational and professional progress. These measures undoubtedly have symbolic and practical value, in that they increase individual employability and, in the long term, can help dismantle stereotypes regarding the role of people with an immigrant background. However, they are not able to change the structure of the opportunities defining the current openings for immigrant labour integration in any significant way. In some respects, increasing the skill level and

¹⁰ One of the most problematic aspects, from this perspective, is the early school drop-out rate. This phenomenon also involves a significant percentage of young Italians, but is dramatically accentuated among non-Italians: the percentage of 17-to-18 year olds in education is 64.8% for the first group and 89.9% for the second.

requirements of immigrant labour means potentially making the latter less well “adapted” to filling the required job vacancies and resolving labour-market mismatch, and thereby regenerating the need for a new hyper-adaptable immigrant work force. Ultimately, more urgently than the conditions and prospects of immigrants, what must be addressed are labour conditions in general in Italy today.

As emerged from an interesting conference organised by our Foundation,¹¹ “bad work” – which has somewhat characterised if not entirely defined the working experiences of many immigrants, at least in the initial (long) phases of their integration process – has spread in recent years like a virus, in an increasingly pervasive manner, throughout the Italian labour market (cf., among others: Caritas Italiana, 2018; Cavestri, Viola, 2018; Omizzolo, 2018; Oxfam Italia, 2018; Pazzaglia, 2018; Rossi, 2016): geographically, affecting even the Northern regions to an increasing degree, alongside the more innovative and internationalised metropolitan areas; in terms of sector, now not only affecting those sectors traditionally touched by the phenomenon, but those linked to the tertiarisation and globalisation of the economy as well; and in terms of the types of workers involved, not only affecting immigrant and marginal workers, but also growing swathes of the labour force, including even the young and educated. This amounts to an overall impoverishment of labour, which is neither conducive to social cohesion nor economic competitiveness. Italy’s “low profile” approach to immigrant labour reflects this development, of which, in certain respects, it may also be considered a warning sign.¹²

Conversely, the myth of a technological revolution destroying employment opportunities and impoverishing workers and families seems to shrink in the light of the available data. Indeed, the companies that are most innovative and most engaged in the digital revolution are those that are generating the best-paid skilled jobs (ISTAT, 2019). The threat to work, and to decent work in particular, comes, rather, from those companies determined to resist the fourth industrial revolution by adopting recruitment and remuneration practices that represent a clear regression compared to past practices, where not in fact bordering on modern-day slavery. Greater employment quality, in the broad sense, must be given equal priority to increasing the employment rate, if we do not want to undermine its impact on the performance of the national economy and the overall well-being of the population. This objective must also go hand in hand with a rethinking of labour migration policies, which can be delayed no further.

5. Reopening the borders? Some points on rethinking immigration policies

According to the latest available data, referring to 2016, most permanent arrivals to OECD countries were primarily motivated by family reunions (38%, including family re-

¹¹ *Il virus del “cattivo lavoro”: Il dilagare delle pratiche di sfruttamento dei lavoratori*, Casa della Memoria, Milan, 17 May 2019 (cf. <http://www.ismu.org/convegno-il-virus-del-cattivo-lavoro-il-dilagare-delle-pratiche-di-sfruttamento-dei-lavoratori/>).

¹² The #FilieraSporca campaign report (Ciconte, Liberti, 2016) provides a particularly effective example in this regard, arguing that illegal recruitment is less the cause than a consequence of pressures imposed by large-scale retail to reduce labour costs.

unification and accompanying family members), followed by the free movement of EU citizens relocating from one EU country to another. The proportion of entries for humanitarian reasons had reached, in 2016, 19%, but is now much lower. Arrivals for work, on the other hand, amounted to only 9%. Ultimately, within a scenario still dominated by the so-called “restrictive orthodoxy”, labour migration schemes have a residual role, largely superseded by categories which are not subjected to the planning authority by receiving states. Italy generally falls in line with these trends, but with a higher incidence of arrivals for family-related reasons (representing almost half of the total) and a decidedly lower proportion for work (3%, following the substantial zeroing of non-seasonal-type quotas).¹³

Contrary to what we often hear, the Italian borders are not, therefore, “closed”, and, despite the absence of significant quotas reserved for economic migrants, arrivals constitute – in percentages varying according to age and the different activity rates characteristic of the immigrant communities – an additional labour supply, albeit not selected for its suitability for filling vacant positions.

Based on this scenario and the considerations discussed in previous paragraphs, we can deduce certain useful guidelines for the managing and governance of migratory flows.

Firstly, we must bear in mind that the demand for immigrant labour estimated by forecasting systems such as the Excelsior study (paragraph 3), is certainly not tantamount – as perhaps it was in the past – to the need for “new immigrants”. Rather, this type of estimate reflects the changing composition of the work forces, whereby workers with a migratory background constitute a “visible” proportion which is destined to grow, even independently of migration policies, by means of family reunifications and, to an even greater extent, births within immigrant communities: already, “immigrants” today – often born in Italy – represent a far greater proportion of the youngest group of the resident population, even net of the high number of naturalisations. Basing the need for active migratory policies on projected recruitment is therefore an inappropriate response, particularly in view of the large numbers of unemployed non-Italian residents and the difficulties associated with their children’s transition to working age. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that, particularly in recent years, Italy has withdrawn from the international competition to attract so-called “talented migration” and, more generally, skilled labour capable of meeting the requirements of the most innovative sectors and companies. This situation – alongside the ongoing saga of young graduates leaving Italy – has clearly helped reinforce Italy’s image as a country capable of attracting primarily poor and hyper-adaptable immigrants, destined to meet the needs of an aging nation incapable of generating employment opportunities to suit the increasingly educated work force.¹⁴ Therefore, the time has come to develop an “Italian approach” to designing policies that can attract human capital; one that harnesses the extraordinary richness of our local productive occupations (with an eye on the areas most exposed to depopulation) but also,

¹³ It may be useful to reaffirm that this refers to permanent arrivals. The total number of arrivals is much higher, as evidenced by the figure of around 263,000 new residence permits issued in 2017 (last year available) including 12,200 work permits (of which around $\frac{2}{3}$ lasted less than 12 months). Although it is impossible to estimating their impact on the labour market - legal and illegal – this surely cannot be considered insignificant.

¹⁴ Notwithstanding certain rare success stories, such as the metropolis of Milan, which has proved itself remarkably appealing (Camera di commercio Milano Monza Brianza Lodi, 2019).

Italy's potential as a "laboratory" for professionals and researchers interested in the specific features of the country's historical heritage and landscape and its demographic, social and cultural fabric.

Seasonal agricultural production deserves a special mention. This sector often accentuates problems such as the illegal exploitation of workers, which, according to a number of observers, would persist even without a legal channel of incoming labour. In this respect, it should be noted that the average annual remuneration of a non-European seasonal worker was, in 2018, 8,419 euro: a significant sum in terms of remittances, but far from adequate to support any plans for settling in Italy and potential family reunification. It is, therefore, entirely inappropriate, particularly at a time of profound change linked to robotisation (which will reduce the need for unskilled labour), to consider alternative ways of entering the country, other than as a seasonal labourer. At the same time, the number of authorised arrivals today is far lower, not only compared to the estimated demand but recruitment levels as well. Therefore, it seems reasonable not only to simplify the arrivals process for seasonal labourers, but also to increase the quotas offered to potential employment providers. Provided, however, that workers are ensured adequate accommodation, access to health services and dignified standards of living and working. In other words, a situation light year away from the "ghettos" we hear about sporadically, whenever "a death occurs". In the absence of these conditions, migratory policies are certainly not able to counter the exploitation of the large pool of available labour, continuously fed by non-Italian nationals who have lost their jobs, by non-EU immigrants and by asylum seekers (including the rejected ones).

In particular, the painful matter of managing the "landings" and asylum requests highlights the need for migration policies that offer alternatives to the illegal entry channels, namely the improper use of the request for humanitarian protection. In this regard, many have hoped for the introduction of an arrivals system for immigrants seeking work. In our opinion, this solution is only practicable if we engage bodies (business associations, certainly, as well as the numerous civil society organisations operating in the field of immigration) that do more than provide some "mild" form of guarantee, and propose specific labour inclusion projects in sectors with documented job vacancies (not merely linked to the demand for hyper-adaptability) i.e. those requiring skills specifically linked to the immigrant background.

On the other hand, although small in scale – compared to other countries – immigration for protection (individuals we could categorise as "true" refugees) constitutes a particular challenge to the inclusive capacity of the Italian economy - particularly in the current context of uncertain recovery – which is experiencing serious difficulty in generating new jobs. Without entering into a discussion on the effects of the first Conte government's restrictive measures and the dramatic reduction in the number of immigrants accepted for protection-related reasons, it is well known that the occupational outcomes of the myriad initiatives implemented in the country – which saw significant investment of public resources, as well as large-scale mobilisation of civil society – have been somewhat limited. It is, however, essential that the controversy raised by these "security decrees" be prevented from undermining efforts on this front. Reduced numbers of asylum seekers and people under international protection can indeed present an opportunity to trial new integration approaches – in the labour market but also in the whole society – also as a result of the resources provided by the European institutions, which, in their turn, can help draw

up effective integration models for all individuals at risk of being marginalised within the labour market; in particular, those most vulnerable to being crowded out as an effect of a highly-adaptable workforce. An additional objective to that of individual employability, is the creation of an inclusive economy to guide investments in this field, learning from the good practices that have blossomed so copiously in recent years. These practices saw the objective of encouraging rapid economic empowerment combined with other objectives of a “systemic” nature concerning, among other aspects, the environmental sustainability of manufacturing processes, meeting the care needs of the more vulnerable, respecting the consumer and the ethicalisation of lifestyles and consumption, the regeneration of territories affected by depopulation and impoverishment, cultural promotion, and developing more equal relationships with the countries of the so-called global south.

In the recent past, the challenge of integrating refugees into the labour market ultimately distracted attention from the problem of unemployment afflicting those non-Italians already resident in the country. Over the last few years, their number has continuously fallen and their interaction with job centres has been highly significant: over half of the job-seeking non-Italian nationals recorded by the 2018 labour-force survey were contacted in the last month. However, only 0.3% of them were offered a job and only 0.5% the opportunity for regional vocational training. It is, therefore, remarkable to see how, despite calls from numerous sides for the reopening of the borders and the regularisation of illegally resident immigrants, very little is being invested in enhancing the employability of those already in the position to be legally employed. In this regard, the data generated by the Excelsior information system can offer valuable insights into planning labour policies which, by aiming to match supply with demand, can intervene to remedy weaknesses among the unemployed. Albeit in smaller volumes than in the past, some sectors of the industrial system continue to employ immigrants in roles for which recruitment is a serious challenge owing to a chronic lack of workers (both Italian and non-Italian) with suitable skills; particularly those provided by technical and professional schools. This observation calls for initiatives designed to offer a second chance to those who have lost their way, matching the requirements of companies to the need to re-engage early school leavers, who are particularly numerous among the children of immigrants, as mentioned above. However, it also calls for the commitment of business to resolve the age-old impasse that leads them to demand high levels of skills and prior experience from the very workers who are hardest to recruit, generating a vicious circle that immigration can only resolve on a superficial level. In other words, this is another case that requires action on the demand as well as the supply side, focusing more on engaging companies capable of technical innovation; indeed, we need technical innovation, but social innovation must come first.

Arrivals associated with free circulation – which represent a little under a third of arrivals in Italy – also deserve special attention. The importance of this flow could be interpreted as an indication of the success of the plan to increase mobility within the EU as a means of improving the allocation of human capital and the competitiveness of the European economy. Nevertheless, fragmented empirical evidence (referring to various territories and sectors) suggests that this has often topped up the large pool of “post-industrial reserves” represented by the immigrant labour force. The absence of intermediation agencies and control systems within the poorly regulated labour market (once again, Mediterranean agriculture provides the perfect example: Open Society Foundations,

2018), exposes these workers to forms of exploitation and abuse. In fact, last year's data points to a worsening of employment conditions for EU immigrants (in contrast to the performance of Third Country nationals), which may be linked (although this is only a hypothesis) to a displacement effect caused by the even more adaptable labour supply provided by the non-EU workforce.

Pursuing this line of reasoning, any far-sighted migratory policy must take account of the under-use of pre-existing labour potential, both immigrant (European and non-European) and Italian. This is an extremely wide-spread phenomenon in Italy, particularly marked in the South, and increasingly affecting immigrants and their children (as the data on NEETs of non-Italian origin unfortunately suggest). It affects, above all, those workers (both males and females) with the lowest skill levels and who left education early i.e. the "ideal candidates" – in terms of skill levels – to fill those roles that are inspiring people to call for more opportunities to enter the country legally. Based on this evidence, some would say that immigration is neither necessary nor desirable, but instead exacerbates the pathologies of the Italian system (Benatti, 2019). Without endorsing this type of conclusion, we must nevertheless emphasise the importance of raising the profitability, in the broadest sense, of "immigrant jobs" as a fundamental measure to counter the increasing forms of labour-market "dualisation", which all contribute to the exclusion of some from the labour market entirely and the marginalisation of others in poorly-paid jobs. But this implies a marked change of gear (Zanfrini, 2019a and 2019b) on various levels: ethicalising the behaviour of employers – and, upstream, that of clients and consumers; regulating the labour market, including through subsidising sectors with high levels of labour intensity (starting with home care services, which are markedly absent from both the Italian and European political agendas); and, finally, the representation of the role of immigration, looking beyond the axiom of complementarity that "pro-immigrant" rhetoric ceaselessly expounds.

Lastly, in managing human mobility, we cannot avoid dealing with the issue of internal migration and, above all, immigration to foreign countries. The so-called expat phenomenon: the emigration of individuals (usually but not always young and educated) seeking better opportunities to reward their human capital, alongside new experiences, driven by a desire to discover the world. This is an inevitable corollary of globalisation, as well as a strategic channel for the realisation of the individual and the internationalisation of Italian society. However, it becomes alarming when it leads to depopulation, brain drain and the flight of more enterprising workers; phenomena which, in turn, impose impoverishment and demographic and cultural decline on entire regions. The last Svimez report, *L'economia e la società del Mezzogiorno*, ("The economy and society of the South"), published on 1 August 2019, reconstructs a situation that could euphemistically be referred to as critical – over two million emigrants from the South in the last 15 years (and a negative balance, net of returns, of 852,000 inhabitants), 132,187 in 2017 alone – and identifies, in the haemorrhaging of young people from the region (50.4% of migrants in the last year, of which 33% were graduates) "the true crisis of the South, which, in recent years, has spread to the rest of the country". Beyond the employment trends in the Southern regions – which, according to the latest data, once again diverge from the positive trends

in the Centre-North¹⁵ – the Southern question is a paradigmatic example of the risk that the goal of generating jobs, particularly good jobs, by means of competitive repositioning, will remain out of reach.¹⁶ This failure is reflected in the inability to attract highly-skilled immigrants – dictated inevitably by the economic-employment context, but also the quality of the government and local authorities, public services and the social climate¹⁷ – which sees Southern Italy lagging behind the rest of Europe (Espon Egtg, 2019).

It is, however, on the capacity for competitive repositioning that the long-term sustainability of the Italian economy and society depends. If we continue along this short-sited approach to immigrant labour, we are only distancing ourselves from our desirable goal. We say this with all due respect to those who insist on arguing to the contrary, confusing the – indisputable – justifications for welcoming immigrants with economic viability; and the advantages of a workforce willing to do jobs Italians no longer want to do with the long-term benefits of an immigrant workforce (self-)selected according to the opportunities offered by a low-profile integration model.

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¹⁵ To appreciate the scope of the employment crisis in the South, one need merely point out that it would take an extra 2.9 million employed to achieve the employment rates of the Central-Northern regions.

¹⁶ On this, see the study in the last ISTAT Report (2019), in the chapter entitled "Educated young people: a capital to be exploited (I giovani istruiti: un capitale da valorizzare)".

¹⁷ And by a shift of the same European strategy, which is now, in many respects, out of synch with the needs of the economies of Central-Southern Europe.

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5. Education

Mariagrazia Santagati

A hallmark of the ISMU Foundation is its longstanding tradition of studies and research on the presence, characteristics, needs and career paths of students with non-Italian citizenship (abbreviated to NICs hereafter). In its *Report on Migrations*, it has been investigating the multicultural evolution within the Italian educational system for the past 25 years, contributing to the analysis of nationwide official statistical data, enriched by the results of research conducted in local contexts (Besozzi et al., 2010; 2013). Such analyses have been further explored in the five *Annual Reports on Students with Non-Italian Citizenship* – produced in collaboration with the MIUR (Ministry of Education) from 2011 to 2016 – where each edition included new topics and new interpretative perspectives, such as: the comparison between the educational careers of Italians and non-Italians in a longitudinal perspective, the trajectories of second-generation migrants (those born in Italy), the transitions and the educational careers of NICs in upper secondary schools, a focus on school drop-out and on the ‘containing’ role of VET, the relational climate in “predominantly multicultural” schools in different areas across the country, a comparison of the struggles and successes of NICs and non-NICs, access to higher education.

To these studies we must add the more recent Reports on *Students with a Migrant Background in Italy*, currently being written as part of a 2019 FAMI project, where the new title and name of the “protagonists” reflects a shift away from the previous approach and emphasizes how different generations of various nationality and origin – increasingly without a direct experience of migration, but all influenced, just like natives, by the dynamics of mobility between global trends and local contexts – are growing in Italy, building their sense of belonging to the country through a wide-ranging investment in education and training.

Drawing from these different contributions, the chapter offers a summary of the phenomenon, which follows on from the analyses of previous years, highlighting persistent trends and variations, positive elements and critical aspects in the current scenario of multicultural schools and education in Italy.

1. Born abroad and born in Italy: a picture of multicultural classrooms

At the beginning of 2019/20, the recent Report, *Students with Non-Italian Citizenship* (MIUR, 2019), publishes the data on 2017/18, citing a stable number of presences: in Italy there are approximately 842,000 NICs, equivalent to 9.7% of the total number of students enrolled in Italian schools, from pre-school up to upper secondary education (Table 1). After the halt and “zero growth” of 2015, the number of NICs has continued to rise, up 15,000 units in the past year, compared with a continuous fall in Italian students, which decreased by 93,000 presences, indicating a decline in Italy’s overall school population.

This explains also the rise, over time, of the percentage incidence of NICs, who are coming close to the symbolic quota of 10 students of migrant origin per 100 students.

Table 1. NICs in the Italian school system. 2007/08-2017/18. A.v., %, increase in a.v.

<i>School year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Per 100 students</i>	<i>Increase in a.v.</i>
2007/08	574,133	6.4	-
2008/09	629,360	7.0	+55,227
2009/10	673,592	7.5	+44,232
2010/11	711,046	7.9	+37,454
2011/12	755,939	8.4	+44,893
2012/13	786,630	8.9	+30,691
2013/14	803,053	9.0	+16,423
2014/15	814,208	9.2	+11,155
2015/16	814,851	9.2	+643
2016/17	826,091	9.4	+11,240
2017/18	841,719	9.7	+15,628

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

Looking at the trends of NICs enrolled in Italian schools (cf. MIUR, 2019: 9; Santagati, 2014: 120) in the last quarter century we can see that, from 1995/96 to 2006/7, presences increased tenfold – from 50,000 to 500,000 – whereas in the last decade they increased by approximately 260,000 units (going from 574,000 in 2007/08 to 842,000 in 2017/18). As we can see in Table 1, the annual increase has diminished significantly between 2007 and 2015, only to rise again in the next two school years; the rise for 2017/18 is the highest registered since 2014/15.

It is well known that the reduction in growth depends on various factors, such as, for instance:

- a smaller rise in Italy's foreign population, as a result both of a reduction in incoming migratory flows, and of an increasing number of foreign citizens who are naturalized each year (ISTAT, 2019: 18);
- the presence of foreign minors who do not gain access to the educational and training system, as evidenced by the low levels of schooling among children aged 3-5 or adolescents aged 15-20 (63% versus 76.7% of Italians enrolled in education or training in this same age range: ISTAT, 2019: 199, analysis of census data);
- the consistent quota of young people (over 40%) aged 18-24 who have interrupted their educational careers (ISTAT, 2019: 209);
- the obstacles and challenges faced by the significant group of unaccompanied minors (over 10,000 on 31.12.2018) in accessing ordinary education (Santagati et al., 2019).

In this relatively stable context, the largest number of enrolments of students with non-Italian citizenship are in primary schools (considering it is mandatory schooling lasting 5 years), followed by upper and lower secondary schools (Table 2). If we consider a national average, primary and pre-primary schools host approximately 11 foreign students per 100 pupils, followed by 10 in middle schools and, with a larger gap, 7.3 in upper secondaries.

Table 2. NICs by educational level. 2007/08 and 2017/18. A.v. and %

School Year.	A.v.				%			
	Pre-primary	Primary	Lower Sec.	Upper Sec.	Pre-primary	Primary	Lower Sec.	Upper Sec.
2007/08	111,044	217,716	126,396	118,977	19.3	37.9	22	20.8
2017/18	165,115	307,818	173,815	194,971	19.6	36.6	20.7	23.2

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

In terms of countries of origin, Romania, Albania, Morocco and China continue to represent the largest minority groups in educational institutions. In 2017/18 Romanians were 158,044 (a stable group which represents almost 19% of all NICs), followed by Albanians (114,240; 13.6%), Moroccans (103,216, 12.3%) and Chinese (53,339, 6.3%), traditional areas of emigration to Italy. Among the first 10 nationalities (which include almost 68% of all foreign students), we also have some Asian countries (Philippines, India, Pakistan), other Eastern European countries like Moldavia and the Ukraine, as well as Egypt.

The rise of a second generation of migrants, born in Italy, continues, representing one of the most significant demographic changes in the foreign school population: in 2017/18 this group reaches 531,000 units and, for the past 5 years, represents the majority of foreign students (63.1%: Table 3). Second generations represent over 50% of NICs in the first educational cycle (primary and lower secondary schools), whereas they represent 31% in the second cycle. Between 2007/8 (the first year data were collected by the MIUR) and 2017/18, this group trebled, increasing at all educational levels: in the bracket which includes pre-primary up to lower secondary schools, this component is currently the most prevalent among NICs, especially in the North, and is on the rise also in upper secondaries.

59

Table 3. Second generation NICs by educational level. 2007/08 and 2017/18. A.v. and % incidence

	A.v.		G2 NICs per 100 NICs	
	(2007/08)	(2017/18)	(2007/08)	(2017/18)
Pre-primary	79,113	139,350	71.2	84.4
Primary	89,421	231,412	41.1	75.2
Lower Secondary	22,474	98,636	17.8	56.7
Upper Secondary	8,111	62,069	6.8	31.8
Total	199,119	531,467	34.7	63.1

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data


As well as monitoring, for the past 10 years, the educational careers of second generation NICs, the Statistical and Research Office of the MIUR has been responsible also for charting the trends of NIC students born abroad, especially those who entered the Italian educational system for the first time. This group has followed a variable trend over the years: in the past decade there has been a decrease of almost 23,000 units, but with a rising tendency in the period between 2013-2015 (with a peak of over 34,000 students in 2015/16).

Table 4. NICs entering the Italian educational system for the first time. 2007/08 and 2017/18. A.v. and % incidence

	A.v.		New entries per 100 NICs	
	(2007/08)	(2017/18)	(2007/08)	(2017/18)
Primary	23,650	9,303	10.9	1.9
Lower Second.	12,064	7,600	9.5	4.7
Upper Second.	10,440	6,751	8.8	3.8
Total	46,154	21,554	10.0	2.6

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

In the past two years, however, there has been a new decrease and the group has diminished to 21,554 students or 2.6% of all foreigners among those attending the first and second educational cycle. The percentage incidence of new entries has gone down, especially in primary schools, whereas it has increased by some percentage points in secondary schools and in the South (De Sanctis, 2020), which have been more affected by the phenomenon of unaccompanied minors (UMAs). There is, as yet, no available systematic data collection on the educational trajectories of UMAs, although some studies conducted in local contexts highlight how this group struggles to access ordinary education and are prevalently concentrated in CPIAs (Provincial Centers for Adult Education: Di Rosa et al., 2019; Santagati, Colussi, 2019) or in VET (Colussi, 2020).

Graph 1. First and second generation NICs. A.s. 2007/08-2017/18. %

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

Overall, the trends of Italy's foreign student population (Graph 1) illustrate how, in 10 years, we have witnessed a true "inversion" in composition percentages: whereas in 2007/8, those born abroad (G1) were the majority (66%) and those born in Italy (G2) the minority (34%), by 2017/18 this relationship had been turned on its head, with the majority (63%) made up by second generations and the minority (34%) by first ones. The rapid and radical change in the characteristics of NICs in the Italian educational system has required and still requires a continuous reflection upon and tweaking of the measures

and strategies to support school entry and the specific educational needs of the wide variety of students with a migratory background (and beyond). Over and beyond place of birth, the large cultural, linguistic and religious pluralism – as a result of the impacts of migration on education – renders the picture increasingly complex, and points to the need to pay special attention to the relationships between learning process and cultural and identity differences. Recent studies go precisely in this direction, considering the point of view of migrant students (Ricucci, 2017; Santagati et al., 2019; Santagati, 2020), while analysing the micro and macro policies necessary to foster both equality of opportunity, free expression of cultural and religious identities, inclusion and solidarity within the democratic and intercultural model and the contradictions between values and practices within the European Union (Zanfrini, 2019).


2. Italy, from North to South: a geography of multicultural schools

In addition to the differences among students with a migratory background, we must consider their non-uniform distribution in the country, which reflects the different settlements of migrant communities in various local contexts across the peninsula. The largest concentration is in the North (Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Veneto, etc.), but with a significant percentage incidence in school population also in some areas of Central Italy (Tuscany, Umbria). Their number is higher in the larger Italian provinces (Rome, Milan, Turin, Brescia, etc.), but with relevant percentage incidences in smaller and medium sized provinces (Prato, Piacenza, Mantua, Cremona, Asti, etc.).

Lombardy has always been the region with the largest number of foreign students, with over 213,000 students in 2017/18, followed by: Emilia Romagna and Veneto (with almost 100,000 e 93,000 NICs, respectively), Lazio and Piedmont (78-77,000), Tuscany (70,000). Sicily, the Southern region with the largest number of students with a migratory background, is well behind the group of Northern and Central regions with 26,000 students. If we consider the relationship between foreign students and the total school population, however, Emilia Romagna surpasses Lombardy with 16.1 NICs per 100 students, followed by Lombardy (15.1%), and then Tuscany, Umbria, Veneto and Piedmont, where the ratio is approximately 13 (NICs) to 100. Overall, the Central and Northern regions with a percentage incidence of NICs higher than the national average of 9.7% are 10.

Considering the composition of NICs in 2017/18 in terms of being born in Italy or abroad (Graph 2), in 13 regions, second generations represent the majority, while in the 7 remaining regions (South and Islands) first generations are still the largest group. Overall, 7 regions (2 in the Centre, Tuscany and Umbria, and 5 in the North) are characterized by percentages of second generations greater than the national average of 63.1%. Observing the graph we can see two extreme cases: Calabria, with approximately 67% of first generations with direct experience of migration; and Veneto, with over 70% second generation NICs.

Graph 2. Second generation and first generation NICs by region. S.Y. 2017/18. %



Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data


At the provincial level, in 2017/18 the ranking of provinces by number of NICs is similar to that of previous years, with the province of Milan on top (almost 89,000 foreign students, 10.6% of all NICs in Italy), followed by the provinces of Rome (62,300), Turin (over 39,000) and Brescia (almost 33,000). Among the first 10 provinces (which include over 40% of all NICs in Italy) there is a prevalence of Northern areas (8 in 10 provinces, with 3 regional capitals – Milan, Turin, and, Bologna – e 5 provinces which are not regional capitals – Brescia, Bergamo, Verona, Modena, Treviso) and the presence of two provinces of Central Italy (Rome and Florence, MIUR, 2019: 16).

If we consider the percentage incidence of foreign students, Prato (26,1 NICs per 100 students) and Piacenza (22,2) come out on top, followed by Mantua (18,4), Brescia (17,8), and Cremona (17,8). Brescia is an area that has become representative of multicultural schools in Italy, 4th in terms of number and percentage incidence of NICs (Barabanti, 2019a). Modena also appears in the first 10 provinces in both rankings with 18,236 NICs and an incidence of 17.3% on the overall school population in the province.

If we look at cities, there are 14 cities in Italy that host over 5,000 NICs in their schools (Graph 3); 3 are in Central Regions and all the rest (11) are in the North. These cities can be found in 7 regions: 4 are in Emilia Romagna and 3 in Veneto. Rome (approx. 41,500 NICs enrolled) comes first, followed by Milan (39,486) and Turin (24,482 students). With some distance we have Genoa, Bologna and Florence (with around 9-10,000 presences), Prato, Brescia, and Verona (7-8,000 NICs), Padova and Venice (around 6,000), Modena, Parma, and Reggio Emilia (over 5,000).

Looking at schools with an high percentage of foreign students and considering the progressive reduction of school numbers in Italy, in 2017/18 the trend of schools not impacted by migration continues to decrease over time (these are 10,414; approximately 18% of the total number of schools), whereas the number of school with a percentage up to 30% of NICs are on the rise ($\frac{3}{4}$ of all Italian schools). Albeit at lower percentage levels, there is an increase also in schools with over 30% of NICs, which have risen to 3,350, accounting for 6% of all Italian schools: a threefold increase over a 10-year span.

Graph 3. Italian cities with over 5,000 NICs. 2017/18. A.v.



Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

Table 5. Italian schools per % incidence of NICs on the total number of students. 2007/08 and 2017/18

	No NICs	<30%	≥30%	Total
2007/08	28.7	69	2.3	100
2017/18	18.6	75.4	6	100

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

Within the group of schools with 30% or more NICs, there is a rise also in schools where NICs are the majority of students: from 691 in 2016/17 to 729 in 2017/18, equal to 1.3% of 55,945 (the total number of Italian schools). Despite the increasing trend, it is well known that the concentration of foreigners is a relatively marginal phenomenon in Italy, which affects mainly the pre-primary and primary education, especially in some areas of the North and Centre, where the percentage of second generations is significant. However, the issue of potential segregation of second generations – and, more generally, of all those students who could be classed as “different” or “disadvantaged” in some way – raises a multitude of concerns, despite the small number of figures. Monitoring risks and challenges in highly multicultural schools, in terms of fewer educational opportunities, a poorer school climate, and an increase in interethnic tensions and intolerant attitudes remains crucial (Bergamaschi, Santagati, 2019). Identifying and recognizing these schools in areas with a “strong migratory force” is important in order to verify, over time, if they

have the necessary human, financial and institutional resources to intervene in processes of socio-educational marginalization for all disadvantaged students (Bonini, 2019).

3. Positive and negative aspects in educational pathways of students with migrant background

Following on from the contributions of previous reports, we shall now take into consideration the educational and training careers of students with a migratory background, with the aim of describing, on the one hand, aspects which continue to be problematic (educational delays, early school dropout, and percentages “not in education nor in employment”), which highlight the main inequalities that affect these students in access, during permanence and exiting the educational and training system. On the other hand, we shall consider the emergence of positive results via specific indicators (secondary school choices, levels of core skills in Italian and Mathematics, access and attendance in higher education), which point towards more optimistic perspectives, especially for second generations and in the first educational cycle.

First and foremost, school delay represents one of the most significant indicators of the challenges faced by NICs in the Italian educational system, as it may be a causal factor in educational failure and in early school leaving. School delay is determined by academic failures, which may keep them back one or more years, but also by the widespread tendency among teachers, especially in secondary schools, to allocate migrant students to classes not correspondent to their age group. The percentage of students with a migratory background with an educational delay has gone down approximately 10 percentage points over the course of a decade (Table 6). This percentage, however, is still very high, especially in upper secondary schools, where approximately 58% of all NICs are delayed by one or two years. The percentage in middle and primary school (32% and 12%, respectively) is nonetheless quite significant.

Table 6. Italian and NIC students, affected by educational delay (per 100 students) by educational level. 2007/08 and 2017/18

	2007/08			2017/18		
	<i>Italians (a)</i>	<i>NICs (b)</i>	<i>b-a</i>	<i>Italians (a)</i>	<i>NICs (b)</i>	<i>b-a</i>
Primary	1.8	21.1	19.3	1.7	12.4	10.7
Lower Secondary	6.8	51.7	44.9	5.5	32.4	26.9
Upper Secondary	24.4	71.8	47.4	20	58.2	38.2
Total	11.6	42.5	30.9	9.6	30.7	21.1

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

As always, the persistent gap between Italians and foreigners sticks out, as does the inequality among the latter: the percentage of students of immigrant origin affected by educational delay is seven times that of their Italian counterparts in primary school, (almost) six times in middle school and three times in upper secondary education.

The risk of a progressive distance and, ultimately, of disengagement from education and training is evident also from the analysis of educational rates (calculated on the basis of ISTAT data on residents by age group). In the 17-18 age group, 34.2% of NICs and

20.3% of Italian adolescents no longer attend post-mandatory education. If we look at the beginning of the educational cycle, in the 3-5 age range, 21% of children with a migratory background compared with 6.4% of children who are not of immigrant origin is not enrolled in preschool (cfr. De Sanctis, 2020). The literature emphasizes how educational attendance, already from pre-primary schools, is a key strategy for the improvement of the educational biographies of more disadvantaged students (Eurydice et al., 2014), from whom $\frac{1}{5}$ of these little foreign students in Italy seems to be excluded.

Further issues appear from the analysis of rates of school dropout, measured by the quota of ELETs – *Early Leavers from Education and Training* – namely, the percentage of young people aged 18-24 who do not have a secondary school title or a vocational training qualification and is not enrolled in any form of education or training. This is a “serious problem”, which has affected the entire Italian educational system over time (Colombo, 2015). Albeit within a gradually improving trend, in 2017, considering a national average of 14 young people in 100 who completed only the lower secondary school cycle and are thus characterized by a relatively poor human capital, ELETs with an immigrant background are more than double (33.1%) compared with natives (12.1%). This is also connected to the need, among the former group, to take on economic and care-taking responsibilities within their family of origin (ISTAT, 2017). This latter aspect is confirmed also by the ISTAT figures of the same year that register that the non-Italian, female component among young NEETs (*Neither in employment nor in Education and Training*) in the 15-29 age range is 44%; twice that of Italian females. Not considering the presence of discouraged and resigned young people who are no longer looking for work because they lost hope in the possibility of finding it (Santagati, Lodigiani, 2020), within the heterogeneous group of NEETs we can identify a component which typifies the Italian situation: these are women who are not available to access paid labour due to an inability to balance family and work commitments. Young women of immigrant origin and those who do not have family support for childcare, or younger brothers or sisters, stand out among this subgroup (Quarta, 2016).

If we turn to consider some positive results from the educational trajectories of NICs in Italy, it is useful to observe the distribution of secondary school choices in this group. Although the “channeling” of foreign students towards VET has long been investigated (Besozzi et al., 2009), the trend of the last decade (Table 7) illustrates how foreigners have remained a stable component of those enrolled in technical institutes (approximately 37%), whereas their presence in VET has gone down (-7 percentage points in 10 years), and has risen correspondingly in lyceums (+7 points).

Table 7. NICs per types of upper secondary schools. 2007/08 and 2017/18. %

	2007/08	2017/18
Lyceums	21.8	28.9
Technical institutes	37.6	37.6
VET	40.6	33.5

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

At the same time, however, the largest percentage incidence is to be found in VET (12.5 NICs per 100 students), followed by technical institutes (8.7) and lyceums (4.2). As we

know, Italian students represent the majority of all students and they tend to prefer lyceums, which account for approximately 50% of all native students in upper secondary education. The differences are smaller if we compare Italians and second generation NICs: the latter tend to make choices which are more geared towards lyceums (34.6%) and technical institutes (38.8%: MIUR, 2019).

In terms of core skills, the results of the INVALSI test measures in Italian and Mathematics in the second grade of upper secondary school (Table 8) – i.e., at the end of mandatory schooling – highlight both positive and negative aspects of NICs' educational achievements (for further details, see Barabanti, 2019b and 2019c).

Table 8. Average scores in Italian and Mathematics in grade II of upper secondary school. INVALSI tests by citizenship. 2013/14-2017/18

	<i>Italian</i>			<i>Mathematics</i>		
	<i>Natives</i>	<i>1st gen.</i>	<i>2nd gen.</i>	<i>Natives</i>	<i>1st gen.</i>	<i>2nd gen.</i>
2013/14	202	175	188	201	187	193
2014/15	203	175	189	201	185	195
2015/16	202	181	189	201	188	194
2016/17	202	178	189	202	187	195
2017/18	203	176	187	202	183	191

Source: ISMU analysis on INVALSI data

If we look at results in Italian, natives tend to have, over time, better results than second generations who, in turn, perform better than first generations. The distance between scores is relevant especially for performances in Italian language tests, whereas differences scores are much smaller, if we compare natives and second generations.

If we consider the trend over 5 years, performances remain relatively constant over time, with some improvements, but also some contradictory tendencies. In 2017/18, the distance in Italian language scores between natives and second generations is -16 points (for the latter) and goes up to -27 when comparing natives with first generations. When considering scores in Mathematics, the situation improves with a difference of -11pts for G2s and -19pts for G1s.

To complete our analysis on educational achievements, let us turn to NICs in higher education. This is an area which is receiving an increasing amount of interest in sociological analyses, which highlight difficulties among NICs in access to university, but also opportunities for a positive transition to higher education (Bertozzi, 2018; Bozzetti, 2018). According to the national student census data collected by the MIUR (with figures considered up to 8/8/2019), in the period between 2007/08 and 2017/18: the number of NICs enrolled in university went from 4% (approximately 12,000) to over 5% of total students (over 15,000); those enrolled in 3-year courses and single cycle courses went from 2.5% (44,000 NICs) to 3.4% (over 60,000) of the university student population; students with an immigrant origin who have reached an higher education degree increased from 4,000 (1.6%) in 2007/8 to 7,000 (2.1%) in 2016/17. The main minority groups present over time in various Italian universities include Romanians, Albanians and Chinese, with 2,307, 1,578 and 1,005 new students in 2017/18, respectively; 8,320, 8,150 and 4,609 students, respectively, enrolled in the same academic year; 905, 1,042 and 580 students who completed their degree in 2016/17.

4. Conclusions

If we consider the bigger picture of the educational careers of students with migratory background, we find not only their trajectories characterized by obstacles but also by opportunities. These young people are able to capitalize and draw upon on personal, family and school resources. In their complex biographical trajectories, they often face constraints and failures, but also they experiment success facing environmental challenges that require increasing adaptability, flexibility, propensity towards mobility and an interest in learning foreign languages (Santagati, 2019a).

For some years now, we have reached a “standstill” (C. Colombo, 2019) in terms of the number of students and the presence of minority groups on Italian soil, and it is time for Italy to take stock. Taking stock means evaluating the *achievements* reached in terms of education offered to non-Italians, but without underestimating *emergencies* when they emerge, considering all aspects that are borne out of the relationship between human mobility and school integration. We ought to look at the educational careers of students of immigrant origin, considering both educational and training *opportunities* and *obstacles* in accessing the system, especially for more vulnerable subjects. This chapter, enriched by the broader and more detailed analyses of the other Reports on education (Santagati, Colussi, 2019; 2020), sheds some more light on the challenges faced by these students, who still bear the brunt of the intergenerational transmission of social disadvantage; but also highlights some success stories, many of whom are yet to be written, thanks also to the support of significant adults (parents and teachers, first and foremost) that represent important *drivers* of educational and biographical success for these young people (cfr. Santagati, 2019b), by encouraging them daily to acquire those precious life skills necessary for a positive transition to adulthood.

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6. The European Elections

Nicola Pasini and Marta Regalia

1. Introduction

This chapter is part of a research programme that ISMU has been conducting for several years on the relation between migration and politics. While in the Twenty-third Report authors addressed this topic in light of the national elections held in some European Member states (France, Germany, The Netherlands and United Kingdom) throughout 2017, in the Twenty-fourth Report they looked at both the manifestos of the main political parties competing in the Italian general elections and the electoral outcome. In both cases the authors focused on two issues: attitude towards migration and attitude towards the European Union.

Between 23rd and 26th May 2019, citizens from the 28 EU Member states went to the polls to elect their representatives in the European Parliament. In line with prior studies conducted by ISMU, the relation between migration and politics turned out to be pivotal also in the political debate around the European elections. Key values that once enjoyed wide societal consensus in contemporary liberal democracies are now being questioned in the public debate, in the interaction between public opinion and the political offer and in the competition between different political parties (cf. chapters 1 and 7 of this volume). Creating a collective common cultural identity among Europeans is becoming increasingly challenging and it also includes attitudes towards migration and the European Union. As a result, before analysing parties' manifestos and the outcome of the European elections, we should ask ourselves if we are witnessing an increasingly hostile attitude toward immigration and an increasingly sceptical attitude towards the European Union. Previous reports indicated this is more than a trend – migration and Europe, generally in their negative connotation, are playing a central role in the political scene with an increasing electoral consensus in some not-so-marginal countries. This has and will inevitably change the political agenda of both national governments and the European Union, starting from the 2019-2024 legislature. Another key question is: were the 2019 European elections a test for the stability of the EU political system vis-à-vis these two issues?

This chapter is structured across different sections. Section 2 analyses Europeans' opinion on migration and on the role that the European Union should play in this policy area. To this end, it correlates the share of votes given to both right-wing parties with citizens' attitude towards migration from outside the EU and with the number of citizens declaring they do not feel Europeans. Section 3 breaks down the new European Parliament according to the different political groups. Who were the real winners of the European elections? If it is true that European elections still reflect national dynamics and that their outcome can hardly be interpreted in European terms, the 2019 electoral round represents a breaking point in the political history of the European Parliament. The electoral outcome is threefold: 1) for the first time in the history of the European Parliament the

two main political groups that supported and advanced the European supranational integration, the European People's Party (EPP) and the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), no longer hold the parliamentary majority with 44.7% of seats; 2) while there is a growing consensus for parties defined as either "sovereigntist", "populist", "nationalist" and "anti-European" that have taken strongly critical positions on the EU, this growth was lower than that expected; 3) there was a spike in the support to two groups, the liberals of Renew Europe – especially thanks to the seats secured by Macron's *La République en marche!* as well by other liberal parties across Europe – and the Greens – thanks to the good score of the German *Grünen* and French and British green parties.

To understand if any general conclusions can be drawn and to classify the different parliamentary groups, data are compared with the ones from the 2014 European elections across two "fractures", attitudes towards European integration and a binding relocation mechanism for refugees between Member states, through the lens of the pro-European/anti-European cleavage. In addition, data are analysed to highlight the geographical distribution of the vote and, where it was possible, identify some geographical trends.

The last paragraph features an analysis of electoral manifestos in Italy, namely by looking at the importance given to topics such as the EU and migration.

2. The role of Europe and migration as policy issues in the 2019 European elections

Making an overall assessment of the round of voting held in the 28 Member states is certainly challenging as European elections are often considered as "second order elections" reflecting national dynamics rather than supranational trends.

It is even more complicated to link electoral results to the importance that the electorate attributes to migration. For instance, it is extremely hard to assess to what extent the vote was influenced by concerns on migration flows from the South and the East without a survey. However, this chapter will try to give a preliminary answer using ecological data.¹

The best source of data on Europeans' attitude is undoubtedly the Eurobarometer. Launched in 1974, it builds on around 1000 face-to-face interviews conducted in each country twice a year. This chapter will consider the latest version available before the elections, the EB90, published in December 2018 with interviews from November 2018.

Table 1 shows the importance European citizens give to migration as a policy issues (column 2). Migration is one of the top priorities for half of Maltese citizens, 36% of Germans, 32% of Italians and 30% of Danish. Vice-versa, only 9% of Poles and Slovaks, 7% of Latvians and Bulgarian, 5% of Irish and Romanians, and 3% of Portuguese state the same. However, when looking at the most pressing issues that citizens feel they face personally in their everyday life (column 3), the picture becomes very different, with only 15% of Maltese listing migration as their top priority (35 percentage points less compared with column 2), followed by Italians (13%, -19 points), Belgians (11%, -18 points), Austrians

¹ The authors are aware of the methodological limitations of ecological research. However, available data related to aggregates and did not allow for an individual-level analysis.

(10%, -15 points) and Germany (8%, -28 points). It can therefore be argued that EU citizens perceive migration as a great societal issue that, however, does not involve their personal sphere.

Table 1. Relevance of migration as a policy issue. 2018, %


<i>Member state</i>	<i>Migration is one of the two major issues that my country faces</i>	<i>Migration is one of the two major issues that I personally face</i>	<i>There should be stricter measures to curb irregular migration</i>
Austria	26	10	87
Belgium	29	11	78
Bulgaria	7	2	90
Croatia	11	2	89
Cyprus	12	6	94
Czech Republic	16	5	97
Denmark	30	6	90
Estonia	12	2	90
Finland	15	3	89
France	15	3	79
Germany	36	8	87
Greece	22	4	97
Hungary	21	6	95
Ireland	5	3	87
Italy	32	13	88
Latvia	7	1	89
Lithuania	11	2	89
Luxembourg	14	4	82
Malta	50	15	97
Netherlands	27	4	88
Poland	9	3	85
Portugal	3	1	92
Romania	5	3	82
Slovakia	9	2	94
Slovenia	24	3	92
Spain	19	4	90
Sweden	20	8	72
United Kingdom	14	6	79

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 90, 2018

Column 3 shows how many Europeans think there should be stricter measures to limit irregular migration. In all Member states more than 70% of citizens consider them as something necessary, ranging from a minimum of 72% in Sweden to a maximum of 97% in Greece, the Czech Republic and Malta. It is therefore clear that Europeans are asking policymakers to adopt restrictive measures to deal with irregular migration, which they consider as a collective problem that nevertheless does not feature among the main problems citizens face in their daily lives.

How did perceptions translate into the vote? Graph 1 relates the share of votes to right-wing parties in the 2019 European elections and the declared negative attitude towards non-EU migrants among interviewed. The percentage of votes attributed to right-wing parties (y-axis) was calculated by aggregating the share of votes obtained by all parties classified by the ParlGov database as scoring 7 or more on a left-right scale (0 to 10).

Graph 1. Votes to right-wing parties in the 2019 European elections and attitude towards migration




Source: ParlGov database, 2019 and Standard Eurobarometer 90, 2018

The negative attitude towards migration (x-axis) was computed as the share of citizens interviewed who, in each country, answered “rather negative” or “very negative” to the following question: “Please indicate if [Extra-European immigration] evokes a positive or negative feeling”.

74

Graph 2. Votes to right-wing parties in the 2019 European elections and sense of European citizenship



Source: ParlGov database, 2019 and Standard Eurobarometer 90, 2018

The graph shows there is a positive yet weak relation. The higher the percentage of citizens saying they have a negative attitude towards immigration, the higher the percentage of votes to right-wing parties.

Graph 2 relates to another key aspect of the European vote, i.e. the attitude towards the European Union. The graph shows the share of votes given to right-wing parties (y-axis) and the percentage of citizens who declare they do not feel European (x-axis). The graph shows there is a positive relation that is even stronger. The more citizens rejecting European citizenship, the higher the percentage of votes to right-wing parties.

Table 2 shows Europeans' opinion on some salient issues related to migration by Member states. Data is drawn from the November 2018 Eurobarometer.

The second column shows the share of citizens in each Member state who indicate that the European Union means fewer border controls.

Table 2. Europeans' opinion on migration-related issues. 2018, %

<i>Member state</i>	<i>The EU does not effectively control external borders</i>	<i>I support a common European migration policy</i>	<i>My country should help refugees</i>
Austria	44	56	26
Belgium	26	75	23
Bulgaria	16	59	62
Croatia	20	66	40
Cyprus	28	77	24
Czech Republic	37	36	72
Denmark	26	60	10
Estonia	19	41	48
Finland	23	56	20
France	26	70	29
Germany	24	84	13
Greece	32	74	23
Hungary	19	44	63
Ireland	13	75	13
Italy	17	68	44
Latvia	13	48	59
Lithuania	9	75	47
Luxembourg	19	78	11
Malta	28	75	16
Netherlands	20	85	9
Poland	12	55	30
Portugal	27	69	20
Romania	22	55	36
Slovakia	25	50	62
Slovenia	22	69	54
Spain	11	86	15
Sweden	21	76	6
United Kingdom	13	59	12

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 90, 2018

There are three countries where this percentage exceeds 30% – Austria (44%), the Czech Republic (37%) and Greece (32%) – and only one it is below 10% – Lithuania (9%).

The third column shows the share of citizens who are in favour of a common European migration policy. In this case values are always at least one third higher – from a minimum of 36% in the Czech Republic to a maximum of 86% in Spain, with values below 50% found only in Estonia (41%), Hungary (44 %) and Latvia (48%).

The fourth column shows the share of citizens who believe their country should not help refugees. Only three Member states score equal to or less than 10%, i.e. Sweden (6%), the Netherlands (9%) and Denmark (10%). On the other hand, this percentage exceeds one third of the sample in 11 countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary – with the highest peak in the Czech Republic (72%, i.e. more than two thirds of respondents).

The policy message to the newly elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) seems clear: increase controls at borders, tighten the conditions to issue residence permits and work on a common European migration policy.

3. The new European Parliament

Which parties have gained influence at European level and can be counted among the winners of the 2019 elections? It is not easy to answer this question because, as it was previously said, European elections often reflect national dynamics which makes it difficult to draw conclusions at supranational level. The 2019 European elections undoubtedly represented a breaking point with the political history of the European Parliament. The overall outcome of the vote indicates that for the first time in the history of the European Parliament the two main political groups that supported and advanced supranational integration, the European People's Party (PPE) and the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) no longer control the parliamentary majority with 44.7% of seats.

Another novelty is the growth in consensus among parties defined as “sovereigntist”, “populist”, “nationalist” and “anti-European” that, within their countries, have strongly criticized the European Union. This growth is, however, smaller than initially predicted by analysts and commentators. The newly formed group “Identity and Democracy (ID)”, that in the last legislature gathered 37 MEPs as the “Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)” group, has now more than doubled its seats with 73 MEPs (9.7% of the total number of MEPs). A relevant increase which, nonetheless, does not indicate the drastic shift to the (extreme) right many expected.

The share of votes of the ID group, however, becomes more critical when also considering representatives from parties defined as “eurocritical” that, while openly criticising specific EU policies, do not question wider supranational European integration, i.e. the Group of the “European Conservatives and Reformists” (ECR) and the “Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left” (GUE/NGL). The three groups accounts for 23.4% of the overall number of seats. However, the ECR and the GUE/NGL groups are ideologically and culturally distant, which makes it difficult for them to coordinate on long-term programmatic issues.

The victory of the liberal group “Renew Europe” is unquestionable. Thanks to the seats secured by French President Macron’s *La République en marche!* and some liberal parties

in other Member states, the former ALDE group went from 67 to 108 seats (+5 percentage points on the total of the European MPs).


The Greens have also been strengthened in the 2018 European Elections, going from 50 to 74 seats (+3 percentage points) thanks mainly to the votes of the German *Grünen* and the French and British ecologists.

Another noteworthy element is the failure to form the “Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)” group, that was to include representatives of Movimento 5 Stelle (Italy) and the UK Independent Party. Despite an increase in its composition, the group could not be formed with MEPs joining the group of “Non-attached members”.

Which is the geographical distribution of these results? Are there any noteworthy national trends or is there a relatively homogeneous distribution? Some geographical trends can be identified. For example, the consensus for left and green parties was strengthened in Western and Central Europe, while right-wing nationalist parties grew notably in Southern Europe (the outcome of Orbán’s party in Hungary was substantially in line with that of 2014). The loss in consensus within centre-right parties is rather homogeneous across the continent, with higher peaks in the South (due to the poor results of Forza Italia in Italy and the People’s Party in Spain) and in the North (due to the major defeat of the British conservatives). The situation of centre-left parties is more nuanced. In Southern Europe the clear growth of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) in Spain is offset by the debacle of the Democratic Party in Italy, the defeat of the left in Greece and the substantial stability of the Socialist Party in Portugal. In Western and Central Europe, on the other hand, there has been a decline in consensus especially in France and Germany and with the exception of the Labour Party in the Netherlands.

The following paragraphs offer a brief comparison with the 2014 elections across two “fractures” – the attitude towards European integration (Graph 3) and the attitude towards a binding relocation mechanism for refugees between the Member states (Graph 4).

Graph 3. Number of seats of parliamentary groups in 2014 and 2019 by attitude towards the EU




Source: authors' visualisation of European Parliament data

Graph 3 allows to interpret electoral results through the lens of the Europeanism/anti-Europeanism pair and sorts out the parliamentary groups into three clusters: Europeanists (EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, Greens-EFA), Eurocritics (GUE-NGL, ECR) and Eurosceptics (EFDD, ID). Generally speaking, the elections did not lead to a collapse of the Europeanists or to the increase in Eurosceptics and Eurocriticals.

However, if the newly elected MEPs from Movimento 5 Stelle and the UK Independence Party that are now gathered under the “Non-attached” group were considered, the Eurosceptic cluster would go from 73 to 102 MEPs and the Eurocritic cluster from 103 to 117 MEPs.

Graph 4 looks at the electoral results from the point of view of the migration issue and classifies groups based on their support for a binding relocation mechanism for refugees among Member states. The EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, Greens-EFA and GUE-NGL groups are in favour, while the ECR, EFDD, and ID groups are against. Based on this classification, both clusters (for and against) appear to have come out of the elections weakened. However, this data sometimes hides nuanced and conflicting positions among group members.

Graph 4. Number of seats of parliamentary groups in 2014 and 2019 by attitude towards a binding relocation mechanism for refugees among Member states



Source: authors' visualisation of European Parliament data

In his inauguration speech, the newly elected President of the European Parliament David Sassoli reminded members of the European Council that “this Parliament believes the time has come to discuss an overhaul of the Dublin Regulation – something which this House voted for by an overwhelming majority in the last parliamentary term”. Member states, on the other hand, have preferred to close borders, suspend the Schengen rules and provide financial compensation to countries taking charge of asylum seekers. Addressing this issue, Sassoli stressed, is key to not undermining the trust of European citizens in the European institutions. According to a recent survey conducted by Ipsos for


“Corriere della Sera”² (2-4/07/2019) the consensus around Matteo Salvini’s closed-ports policy is not due to widespread concerns on Italy’s capacity to welcome new migrants (28%), but rather to concerns on the capacity of the EU and the willingness of its Member states to address common border management issues (71%). Salvini’s firm policy is therefore considered as the only useful tool to persuade other countries to do their part.

4. The electoral manifestos of Italian parties

Despite the small media and public resonance, the main Italian political parties developed their manifestos ahead of the 2019 European elections. These documents feature, among other things, key information on the importance given to topics such as the EU and migration.

Istituto Cattaneo (2019) analysed the content of party manifestos for the European elections using content analysis. The analysis revealed (Graph 5) that the policy sector that generally received the greatest attention was the economy. European issues such as the institutions and functioning of the EU usually come third, right after national institutional and administrative reforms, but are particularly relevant in the Lega’s programme (37.5%).³

Graph 5. Thematic distribution of parties’ electoral manifestos according to seven different policy areas (% of total “statements” featured in each programme)



Source: Istituto Cattaneo, 2019

² www.corriere.it/cronache/19_luglio_05/gli-italiani-la-linea-fermezzacrollata-fiducia-le-non-profit-f625ce7e-9f61-11e9-9a57-b175c64fdab2.shtml.

³ It should be noted that the Lega did not produce a programmatic document but, instead, used the manifesto of the “Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom” signed together with other European parties.

European issues also take up a significant space in the manifestos of Forza Italia and Casapound (34.1% and 25.3% respectively), while other parties focused 20% or less of their manifestos to the EU and, more generally, to international relations.

Security and migration have a central position in the manifesto of Fratelli d'Italia (31.2%) while accounting for 25% of the Lega's programme. The manifestos of other parties focus on these topics by 20% or less.

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7. The EU's Integration Policy and the New Multiannual Financial Framework

Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem

1. Introduction

The elections for the European Parliament and the appointment of the new European Commission were certainly important moments of 2019. On the one hand the elections, held in May, marked a drastic change in the composition of the chamber, especially with the failure of the traditional alliance between the European People's Party (EPP) and Social Democrats (S&D), which proved incapable of obtaining a majority, and the strengthening of the presence of far-right parties, gathered in the Identity and Democracy group (see Pasini and Regalia, this volume). At the same time, the nomination of the conservative Ursula Van Der Leyen (EPP) at the head of the European Commission, in place of another conservative, J.C. Juncker (EPP), after a tumultuous process that ended with a slight majority in favor of the former, suggests a certain continuity in the work of the Commission for the years to come. If both events could, to a certain extent, decide the future of European migration policies, another game, less visible to the public but as important, is being played for the future of the EU in general and for migration policies in particular: the negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2021-2027.

Over the past few years, the asylum crisis has generated numerous tensions among Member States; tensions that are paradoxically capable of facilitating the emergence of a consensus on the need for more funding for the European migration policy. More precisely, the reluctance of Member States to manifest solidarity through relocating migrants in their territory (Zaun, 2017; Ortensi et al., 2018) could very well result in their preference for greater financial solidarity. Considering, on the one hand, the virulent opposition to relocation from the Visegrád group and, on the other, the pressure exerted last year by Germany and Austria to stop secondary movements, financial solidarity looks like the best alternative to any other kind of practical solidarity.¹ The ongoing negotiations regarding the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2021-2027, which should be completed by the early months of 2020, present interesting aspects that could certainly change the management of the phenomenon in the Old Continent. While the issue of asylum has been at the center of the debate for several years now, this chapter aims to investigate the innovations introduced by the proposal for a new MFF with regard to the integration of foreigners. More precisely, it intends to assess whether the common policy for the integration of foreigners is strengthening or, on the contrary, if it is receding.

¹ For more on that, see Van Wolleghem, 2019c.


This chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a definition of Multiannual Financial Framework. It also outlines the quantitative forecasts regarding the financing of European migration policies. The third section examines the evolution of the resources allocated to integration, comparing some aspects of the proposal for the MFF 2021-2027 with previous MFFs. The fourth section analyzes the main innovation proposed by the Commission: the mainstreaming of integration into the social policies financed by the European Social Fund (ESF). The fifth section illustrates the state of the negotiations, focusing on the positions of the two main actors of the decision-making process: the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. I conclude in a sixth section.

2. What is the Multiannual Financial Framework

The MFF is an interinstitutional agreement that defines the Union's spending limits over a period of at least five years. In this sense, it aims to guarantee a Union expenditure that is organized and contained within the limits of its resources (Article 312 TFEU). Proposed by the European Commission, it is discussed within the Council, where it is unanimously voted by the member states. The process ends when the European Parliament accepts the budget as defined by the Council. Over the years, the EU budget has stabilized at around 1% of the member states' cumulated Gross National Product (GNP) (for ease of reading, let us call it EU GNP). For example, it represented 1.25% of EU GNP in the period 1993-1999 and 1% in the 2014-2020 period. According to the Commission proposal for the MFF 2021-2027, it should represent 1.11% of EU GNP (see graph 1).

82

Graph1. Size of EU budget in terms of percentage of EU GNI, %



Source: simplified version of COM(2018)321 final, p. 24. *: forecast

The EU budget as per MFF is divided into various items – or headings – that reflect the fields of action of the Union but also, more importantly, its *political priorities*. The Union's priorities have historically included the Common Agricultural Policy and the policy for the

cohesion of the territories² of the Union, which together represented around 80% of EU spending.³ The Union's migration policy, on the other hand, has always constituted a much smaller part of the common budget. If we consider for example the 2014-2020 period, the appropriation aimed at financing the migration and border management policy barely represented 0.93% of the total budget.⁴

With regard to the next financial cycle, the Commission proposes a significant increase of the resources supporting the common immigration policy.⁵ Considering the relative stability of the total Union budget, a sizable increase of the amount devoted to migration policies necessarily implies sizable reductions of the appropriations reserved for other policies. While the amount allocated for immigration matters for the period 2014-2020 amounted to about €13 billion, an expenditure of €34.9 billion is expected for the period 2021-2027; that is, 2.6 as much as with the previous MFF. In the general economy of the EU budget, the migration policy would therefore weigh about 2.73% of the total budget. This increase regards all the areas of the common immigration policy, although it is greater for border control and for the strengthening of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. While the fund for migration and asylum is expected to increase by 36% compared to the 2014-2020 financial cycle, the resources allocated for border management would increase by 197%.⁶

3. More resources for integration?

If the increase in resources devoted to the EU migration policy is evident, it is less clear how they will be distributed among the various areas of migration policy; e.g. how much will go to border control and how much to asylum and integration, to name but a few of these areas.⁷ That is, over the last few years, the search for greater flexibility in the spending of migration funds has made it difficult to quantify the portion actually dedicated to integration (Van Wolleghem, 2019b). The first funds dedicated to migration policies made clear distinctions between the various political objectives. In the case of the 2007-2013 MFF, there were four funds: the asylum fund, the integration fund, the border fund and the return fund. Each fund had its own target (where relevant) and specific rules for its spending. The European Integration Fund was a € 825 million fund, aimed at the inclusion of third country nationals residing in the EU for reasons other than international protection.⁸ Similarly, the fund for asylum, with a total amount of € 628 million, concerned the financing of asylum policies in general, including the integration of

² The cohesion policy aims at reducing the wealth differential between the regions (NUTS-2) of the EU.

³ From 1993 al 2006. Their cumulated relative importance started to decrease with the 2007-2013 MFF. For the next MFF, forecasts place it at a little more than 60% of total spending. See COM(2018)321 final, p. 23, for more detail.

⁴ Own estimation, realised on the basis of European Parliament, 2018.

⁵ See COM(2018) 321 final.

⁶ For more information, see European Parliament, 2018.

⁷ In order to clarify such a distribution, it is necessary to consider, beyond the Commission's proposal for the next MFF, the specific proposals relating to single funds; namely, for our interest, the asylum and migration fund and the European social fund (see below). Such funds are located under the umbrella of the MFF.

⁸ See Van Wolleghem, 2019a, for more detail.

beneficiaries of international protection. The clear distinction of the two target groups between two funds with partly overlapping objectives had generated implementation difficulties.

In the programming of the MFF 2014-2020, one of the main objectives was to remedy the operational complexity caused by the clear distinction between the funds related to the different migration policies (Malmström, 2014; Ramboll, 2018). To this end, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) was created, a single fund that brought together the previous funds, allowing member states to spend resources according to their priorities. In order to guarantee a diversified use of the fund, the AMIF set a limit to the discretion of the member states through the definition of minimum thresholds: for example, a minimum of 20% of the total resources allocated had to be dedicated to integration. In absolute terms, this change meant that the minimum share to be dedicated to integration was potentially less than the figure set by the previous MFF. In fact, while the European Integration Fund of 2007-2013 devoted a total of € 825 million to integration, with the FAMI the minimum quota to be allocated for this purpose was only € 478 million.⁹ Available data show that most member states have nevertheless exceeded this threshold (Ramboll, 2018), despite different levels of spending between countries (Westerby, 2018).

The Commission's proposal for the next Asylum and Migration Fund¹⁰ (AMF) – successor to the AMIF – seems to reinforce the logic initiated with the previous MFF; namely, making the use of funds even more flexible.¹¹ While the AMIF envisaged a minimum quota of 20% dedicated to integration, the AMF does not impose any threshold, causing some human rights international organizations to worry over the fact that the AMF has lost the “I” of integration (Red Cross et al., 2019).

4. Mainstreaming integration

An important innovation of the next MFF is to divide the objective of promoting the integration of foreigners into two different categories, included in two different financial schemes. On the one hand, integration in the short-term should be managed through the new Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF), through specific policies aimed at guaranteeing reception and facilitating the first steps into the receiving society. On the other hand, long-term integration should be managed through inclusion measures falling under the European Social Fund Plus, new edition of the historic European Social Fund (ESF). Since its creation in 1958, the ESF has had as primary objectives: increasing employment rates and improving opportunities for Europeans, promoting the improvement of quality and productivity of work and reducing social exclusion. Incidentally, the ESF has therefore always contributed to the inclusion of migrants, considered as a group at risk of exclusion,

⁹ The amount indicated here is lesser than 20% of the total, for that only 88% of the fund is spent by the member states. The minimum threshold only applies to these 88%. The rest of the fund is spent by the Commission for common actions.

¹⁰ See COM(2018) 471.

¹¹ Numerous are the references to greater flexibility for the spending of immigration funds for the next MFF. See for instance the Commission's proposal (COM(2018) 321) or the note of 8 October 2018 from the Presidency of the Council to the members of the Council (document n. 12777/18).

and whose integration into the labor market had to be guided and facilitated through targeted measures. However, this contribution has always been implicit and, consequently, its effects have always been difficult to fathom (CSES, 2011). With the next MFF, and if this aspect of the Commission's proposal is not altered, the inclusion of foreigners will become an explicit objective of the ESF Plus. Consequently, the share of the fund actually dedicated to the integration of foreigners should be more easily traceable and quantifiable.

Two points deserve particular attention: the distribution of the resources of the ESF Plus between member states and their effective allocation to integration policies. First, the idea that the ESF Plus can explicitly contribute to the integration of foreigners suggests the possibility of a significant increase of the resources committed by the EU for this purpose. In fact, the ESF is an important component of the European budget; representing around 8% of the successive MFFs implemented thus far -- much a bigger share than that devoted to migration policies, even more so to policies for the integration of foreigners. Since the reform of the cohesion funds in 1988, the ESF has been given the task of contributing to reducing the gap between the poorest and the richest regions in the EU. As a result, more than half of the fund was distributed among member states according to macroeconomic differentials between the various regions (European Commission, 2007). Placing the integration of foreigners among the explicit objectives of the new ESF -- the ESF Plus -- implies a reshaping of the mechanism for the allocation of resources to member states. Indeed, the inclusion of the objective of promoting integration in the ESF Plus is manifested by the introduction of a new distribution key. More precisely, there is a premium of € 400 per foreigner per year,¹² applied to the quota of foreigners present in the various regions since 2013. This provision should contribute to the solidarity effort on migration issues and should result in a significant increase in the portion of the budget attributed to the countries most affected by the arrivals of recent years; Italy included.

Having said that, and this is the second point that deserves particular attention, the proposal for the ESF Plus, a bit like the proposal for the AMF, does not provide for a minimum share of resources to be explicitly spent for the integration of foreigners. This produces uncertainty with respect to the resources that will actually be used for integration.¹³ The mainstream approach promoted by the Commission may not at all constitute an expansion of the integration policy and, at the same time, pose the same problems as previous ESFs with respect to the evaluation of their effect on foreigners (CSES, 2011). Overall, this poses a problem of transparency between the distribution of the funds and their use: a portion of them would be distributed as a function of the number of foreigners without *any* guarantee of an actual expenditure in this direction.

¹² See COM(2018) 375 final. The same provision applies to the European Regional Development Fund.

¹³ See COM(2018) 382 final, article 7(3).


5. Actors' position in the decision-making process

In May 2018, the European Commission's proposal¹⁴ for the MFF 2021-2027 was presented to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the Union, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, in order to start the formal process of negotiation. In this section, we will focus on some positions expressed by the actors whose consent is necessary for the adoption of the MFF: the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. In addition to the proposal for a new MFF, we will also focus some of the attention on the proposals for the AMF and the FSE Plus.¹⁵

5.1 The European Parliament

With regard to the MFF, in March 2018, anticipating the formal proposal of the Commission, the European Parliament approved a first resolution¹⁶ outlining its position with respect to the priorities, structure and size of the next financial framework. A second resolution,¹⁷ adopted in November 2018, confirmed the Parliament's position, proposing a series of changes to the text presented by the Commission. Regarding migration policies, the Parliament proposes to guarantee an adequate level of funding for migration and border management, with an increase (all in all contained, see graph 2) of the resources proposed by the Commission. The increase proposed by the Parliament concerns the resources allocated to the European agencies involved in the management of migration (mainly European Asylum Support Office and Frontex).

Graph 2. Difference between Commission's proposal and European Parliament's proposal, billion Euro (current prices)



Source: adapted from European Parliament, document n. 2018/0166R(APP), p. 54

¹⁴ See COM(2018) 321 final.

¹⁵ See respectively COM(2018) 471 and COM(2018) 382.

¹⁶ See European Parliament document n. 2017/2052(INI).

¹⁷ See European Parliament document n. 2018/0166R(APP).

The proposal of the European Parliament to clarify the issue of the share of the AMF dedicated to the integration of foreigners¹⁸ appears more relevant. In its legislative resolution of March 2019, the Parliament has proposed a modification of the Commission's text, inserting a minimum threshold of 10% to be allocated to the integration fund.¹⁹ In this way, Parliament proposes a change with respect to both the initial proposal of the Commission (which does not provide for any threshold) and the previous MFF (which provided for a minimum threshold set at 20% of the share allocated to member states). This amendment seems to fulfill two purposes going in opposite directions: on the one hand, it aims at guaranteeing greater flexibility in the spending of funds so as to deal with any sudden issue, an objective whose relevance has clearly emerged during the asylum crisis; on the other hand, it aims at ensuring that a significant portion of the fund is specifically dedicated to integration (let us recall that the sum of the AMF is well above that of the AMIF).

A similar amendment has not been proposed by the Parliament with regard to the expenditure of the ESF Plus,²⁰ despite the fact that the integration of migrants is explicitly mentioned among the objectives of the fund and despite the fundamental role it could play in easing migrant integration in the medium-long term.

5.2 The Council of the EU

Just after the formulation of the Commission proposal's for the next MFF, the Council opened the discussion on the occasion of the General Affairs Council of 14 May 2018. Until the summer of 2019, the Council, in its various formations, met 12 times in order to move forward with the negotiations,²¹ the objective being reaching an agreement by the end of the year 2019. As a bottom line, it appears that the members of the Council have agreed on the importance of migration-related policies in the overall financial framework. Most member states seem to support an increase of available resources for migration. It is the case for the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Denmark, Slovenia, Cyprus, Croatia, Portugal, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy,²² Spain, Belgium, Latvia and France (European Parliament, 2018).

As regards the more specific Asylum and Migration Fund, the Council has reached a series of agreements²³ for the amendment of the text proposed by the Commission, also based on the opinions of the European Parliament. An important aspect, even if, all in all,

¹⁸ See section 3 above.

¹⁹ Such a proposal is broken down in two different aspects: 10% of the share allocated to member states but also 10% of the share reserved for the Commission's spending through the s-called "thematic facility". For more detail, see document n. P8_TA-PROV(2019)0175, p. 45 and p. 49.

²⁰ Amendment n. 92 presented by Parliament foresees a series of threshold for various policy objectives, such as social exclusion, NEETs, children's rights to health care and education, but not for the integration of foreigners. See document n. P8_TA-PROV(2019)0350, pp. 66-68.

²¹ For a complete list of the Council's meeting on the matter, see <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-budgetary-system/multiannual-financial-framework/mff-negotiations/>

²² Italy's position is clearly stated in a document available on the Ministry of the Interior's website: https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2018/06/addendum_qfp_final.pdf.

²³ See the Outcome of Proceedings of 12 June 2019, Council of the EU document n. 10148/19.

of merely symbolic importance, is the return of the “I” of integration in the name of the fund.²⁴ In this way, the fund would formally recover the objectives of its predecessor, without however replicating its substantive measures: despite the amendments proposed by the Parliament and the opinion expressed by the Committee of the Regions²⁵ and civil society,²⁶ the latest version of the text adopted by the Council in June 2019 does not introduce any minimum spending threshold for integration policies.²⁷

6. Conclusion

While the public's attention in 2019 focused on the European elections and on the appointment of the new European Commission, another element, fundamental for migration policies, was being decided at European level: the EU budget for the years 2021-2027. The EU budget takes the form of a multiannual financial framework within which the various policies of the Union are placed. For the next MFF, the Commission has proposed a significant increase in the resources devoted to migration policies: more than 36% for migration and asylum policies; plus 197% for border management. Having said that, one may wonder whether this increase necessarily implies an increase in the resources dedicated to integration policies. Overall, the Commission's proposal suggests their possible increase through two novelties: on the one hand, the increase of the absolute value of the Asylum and Migration Fund guarantees greater resources for national and European migration policies; on the other hand, the explicit association of the European Social Fund to the objective of promoting the integration of foreigners seems to promise a substantial increase in the resources available for this purpose. However, the scheme adopted by the Commission for the use of resources does not provide for any minimum spending threshold for integration policies, neither for the specific asylum and migration fund nor for the more general fund for social policies. This leaves ample room for member states' discretion in defining their priorities. This critical aspect was underlined, for the Asylum and Migration Fund, by various actors, such as the Committee of the Regions and various non-governmental organizations. It was also the object of a proposal for an amendment by the European Parliament in its first reading of the proposal on the Asylum and Migration Fund. Despite this, the latest version of the text, adopted by the Council at the beginning of June 2019, does not seem to have granted this request.

²⁴ The reintroduction of the “I” in the fund's name was a request from civil society organisations (Red Cross et al., 2019) and from the European Economic and Social Committee's opinion (document n. SOC/600 del CESE).

²⁵ Adopted in October 2018. See Committee of the Regions document n. CIVEX-VI-035.

²⁶ See *inter alia* Westerby, 2018 and Red Cross et al., 2019.

²⁷ See Council document n. 10148/19.

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8. Europe, Africa and Migration

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1. Migration flows

1.1 The stock of African migrants and sub-regional trends

Providing an accurate overview of migration flows from African countries can often be hard due to the fragmentation of national statistical systems and, especially, due to the scarce traceability of irregular movements and secondary movements.

One strategy to partially overcome these empirical limits is to look at the stock of African migrants. The number of Africans living abroad has remained relatively stable in relative terms, while the increase in absolute terms is in line with the strong population growth characterising the continent (European Commission Joint Research, 2018). From a geographical point of view, most of African migration takes place within Africa, especially at the sub-regional level (North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa and East Africa). This is the case in almost all sub-regions with the exception of North Africa, whose migrants prefer moving to European countries.¹ According to recent research, the tendency to migrate at sub-regional level has not only historical-cultural roots but also shows people's will to remain as close as possible to their own country of origin, taking advantage of the increasingly high level of regional integration within the different blocks of Africa, in particular West Africa (Kirwin & Anderson, 2018).

1.2 Irregular border crossings

Another strategy to get an idea of migratory flows from Africa is to look at Irregular Border Crossings (IBCs). From a European point of view, data from 2018 shows a sharp drop in irregular crossings on the Central Mediterranean route (-80%), with numbers reaching the lowest levels since 2012 (Frontex, 2019a). It is interesting to note that Tunisia has taken over Libya as the main country of departure for irregular migrants on this route. Tunisian and Eritrean citizens represent the largest group of irregular migrants from this country.

The Western Mediterranean route shows a different pattern, as it has become the busiest route to Europe in 2018 (Frontex, 2019b). The number of IBCs detected at the end of 2018 doubled for the second consecutive year, reaching a historic peak. Morocco continues to be the main departure country for irregular migrants heading towards Europe via this route. Despite the majority of migrants coming from sub-Saharan African countries, the number of Moroccans using the Western route started to increase towards the end of

¹ A specific trend can be observed in Egypt as Egyptian citizens choose to move mainly to Asia.

2018. In the same year the share of unaccompanied minors reached particularly high levels (9%) with the most represented nationalities being Guinean, Malian and Algerian.

At continental level, most of the irregular crossings between January 2019 and July 2019 were detected in Morocco (2,457), Congo DRC (809), Cameroon (743) and Somalia (416) (Frontex, 2019c).

1.3 Forced displacements

Besides being a hotspot of voluntary migration, Africa is also a continent strongly characterised by forced displacement. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that sub-Saharan Africa hosts around 26% of the world's refugees. There are growing concerns on the tragic conditions that citizens of countries such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and South Sudan are facing (UNHCR, 2019a). The presence of asylum seekers in Libya has diminished due to the dramatic conditions the country has fallen into amidst the current civil war, which has pushed the European Union to implement a gradual evacuation to the reception centres in Niger jointly with the UN and the African Union (EEAS, 2018a). Parallel to this, an initiative was set up to protect and reintegrate migrants in African countries together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (European Commission, 2017a). In May 2019 the number of refugees hosted in Libyan centres was around 57,192 and included namely Syrians (42.1%), Sudanese (20.1%) and Eritreans (13.6%) (UNHCR, 2019b), while the number of refugees in Nigerien centres was 175,577, almost exclusively Nigerians (67.7%) and Malians (32.1%) (UNHCR, 2019c).

Sub-Saharan Africa represented 36% of global number of internally displaced persons (10,057 people) (IDMC & NRC, 2019). Two thirds of the global number of these people were fleeing internal conflicts and a quarter was fleeing due to natural disasters (Ibid.). The main countries affected by displacement were Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria.

1.4 The structural factors behind African migration

The concerns voiced by UNHCR on the explosion of new regional crises appear to be legitimate when looking the recent worrying geopolitical developments. Libya's long-standing emergency is now paired with a long list of critical events such as the increasingly pressing security challenge posed by terrorist groups in Central and Northern Mali (International Crisis Group, 2019a), by Boko Haram in the North of Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2019b) and by Al-Shabaab in Somalia (International Crisis Group, 2018). Events of high political instability are also becoming more common, e.g. the crackdown of protesters by the Sudanese president al-Bashir and the establishment of the new government in September (International Crisis Group, 2019c), the civil war in South Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2019d) and the so-called "Anglophone crisis" in Cameroon (International Crisis Group, 2019e).

In this already sufficiently complex framework, the impact that climate change is having on local populations can also play a major role. According to a report by the World Bank by 2050 and in the absence of concrete action on the climate and development, 143

million people could be forced to move within their own country as a result of climate change (i.e. about 3% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South East Asia) (Rigaud et al., 2018).

The vulnerability caused by climate change is particularly high, as clearly demonstrated by the case of the Lake Chad. The surface of the lake, which borders four sub-Saharan countries (Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon) and is of paramount importance for agriculture, fishing and farming in the region, has been reduced by 90% compared to the 1960s. This has so far threatened food security of nearly 7 million people and led to high levels of unemployment among fishermen and farmers in the area, which has in turn generated 2.5 million displaced people in the region (ECFR, 2017).

Cases like this show how the fragility produced by climate change, combined with demographic trends, can create highly explosive situations both from a migratory and a security point of view. Some analyses have shown how desertification and prolonged periods of drought have contributed to sparking some of the clashes that then led to the civil war in Syria (Gleick, 2014). According to some geopolitical forecasts made in the Sahel area and that take into account the impact of climate change on the living conditions of indigenous peoples, major conflicts for the management of scarce resources will be more common. This, in turn, will generate large migratory flows internally and transnationally (ECFR, 2017).

Despite the key role played by the socio-economic situation, personal/collective security and climate change in leveraging migration, some research has recently looked more at indirect factors, such as the development of public welfare or the citizens' trust in the democratic institutions.

Some research on the structural factors of migration in some West African countries (Kirwin & Anderson, 2018) highlighted, for example, that in the case of Nigeria the desire to migrate does not stem from the perception of the economic situation of the country but rather from the perception of its democracy. On the one hand, this data indicates that greater economic development does not seem to be sufficient to discourage migration as long as per capita income does not reach high levels. On the other hand, it also highlights the importance of the quality of democracy and citizens' perception of it. In this perspective, the level of trust towards the police (e.g. corruption, use of violence and violation of human rights) appears to be a key factor in leveraging migration, which echoes the idea that the police is one of the institutions that enjoy the lowest level of trust among Nigerian citizens (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016).

The factors that push Africans to migrate, especially irregularly, often contribute to the minimisation of the perceived risks that are associated with the journey. The data collected in a series of interviews with Ethiopian migrants highlighted this trend (Mixed Migration Center, 2019). Those intending to migrate to Yemen in spite of the civil war within the country showed a strong awareness of the dangers, with Ethiopians who had already settled in Yemen discouraging them from taking the same route. Nevertheless, migrants from East Africa were convinced that economic opportunities in Saudi Arabia made the risks along the journey tolerable as only migration was believed to guarantee them a better life (CNN, 2019). Similar data resulted from a study conducted on Malian migrants by

ISMU in the framework of the European project “AwArtMali” on raising awareness among migrants on the dangers of irregular migration and the existence of local alternatives.²

1.5 Financial flows

Migration within Africa and to other continents plays a very important role for the countries of origin. Money transfers, in particular the remittances of diasporas living in all regions, have historically represented an important financial source for countries of origin that far exceeding Official Development Assistance (ODA).

According to the World Bank data (2019), remittances sent by migrants to medium-low-income countries worldwide reached record levels in 2018. In particular, the Bank estimated that these remittances were worth \$529 billion, 9.6% more than the record (\$483 billion in 2017). When also considering global remittances to high-income countries, this value reaches \$689 billion in 2018, an increase compared to \$633 billion in 2017.

At regional level, growth in remittance inflows ranged from almost 7% in East Asia and the Pacific to 12% in South Asia. The overall increase can be attributed to improved economic and employment conditions in the United States and the impact of flows coming from some countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council³ and from Russia. Excluding China, remittances to low- and middle-income countries (\$462 billion) were considerably higher than flows of foreign direct investment in 2018 (\$344 billion).

Remittances in the Middle East and North Africa grew by 9% reaching \$62 billion in 2018. This increase was driven by the rapid increase in Egyptians' remittances (about +17%). The value of remittances in the region should continue to increase beyond 2018, albeit at a slower pace (around 3%) due to the contained growth in the Eurozone.

Remittances in sub-Saharan Africa grew by almost 10% reaching \$46 billion in 2018 thanks to favourable economic conditions in high-income countries. Considering the weight of remittances on the GDP, the main beneficiary countries are the Comoros followed by the Gambia, Lesotho, Cape Verde, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Togo, Ghana and Nigeria.

It is widely assumed that remittances are used almost exclusively for consumption. In reality, about 75% of remittances to families cover primary needs such as food, housing and household expenses (e.g. bills) (IFAD, 2017). The remaining 25% is usually aimed at securing a safe future and greater independence among beneficiaries, for example by ensuring better education, improving health conditions and increasing savings and investments in certain activities.

Another assumption is that most of diaspora members are not inclined to saving or investing. However, there are millions of migrant workers who formally or informally save despite significant economic limitations, invest capital and send home about 15% of their income (Ibid).

² Although data collection was completed, the outputs will be made publicly available over 2020. More information on the project is available at <https://awartmali.org>.

³ The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council are: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar.

Remittances could potentially increase the income of receiving families and, in the long term, facilitate the achievement of sustainable development goals (SDGs) such as goal 1 (“End poverty in all its forms everywhere”). However, the persistence of some barriers reduces the impact of remittances. The cost of sending money to sub-Saharan Africa remains the highest in the world (9.5% for sending \$200 in the last quarter of 2015) (World Bank, 2016b), a trend that makes it difficult to meet another particularly important SDG target (10.c “Reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%”). In addition, since remittances are financial transfers between private individuals, the senders and recipients are free to decide upon their use (IOM, 2019) and this raises the question of how to increase the ownership of diasporas within the framework of national and local development programmes.

2. EU initiatives and instruments

2.1 *The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa*

Since the Valletta Summit and the approval of the European Agenda on Migration in 2015, the European Union has substantially reinforced its action towards Africa in an attempt to address the “root causes of migration” (e.g. civil wars, persecutions, inequalities, unemployment and climate change).

In light of the crisis in the management of irregular migrants between 2015 and 2016, the European Union has begun to equip itself with tools increasingly dedicated to the development of Africa and in line with the rhetoric on the fight against the “root causes of irregular migration” contained in the European Agenda.

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (hereinafter the “Trust Fund”) is one of the most relevant tools to implement the actions proposed in the Valletta Action Plan. In general, the Trust Fund is aimed at responding to crises on the African continent, contributing to better migration management and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. The European Union intends to achieve these goals by promoting resilience, better and more equal economic opportunities, security, development and human rights. The main beneficiaries of the programs are refugees, displaced persons, readmitted migrants, host communities and other vulnerable or marginalized groups (victims of trafficking in human beings, young people, women, etc.).

In geographical terms, the Trust Fund finances projects in three regions: the Sahel region and the Lake Chad region (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal); the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda); North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt). Projects implemented in neighbouring countries are eligible for funding on a case-by-case basis and provided they address the regional dimension of cross-border migration flows and other issues.

The periodic assessment made by the European Commission on the programs approved in 2018 (European Commission, 2019a) shows that, out of €3.6 billion spent on 187 projects, most of the financial resources of the Fund have been dedicated to programmes in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel/Lake Chad regions. In thematic terms, on

the other hand, funds dedicated to programmes on managing migration flows (30% of the total) were higher than those dedicated to programmes on strengthening community resilience (26%), on supporting the creation of economic and employment opportunities (22%), and on supporting governance and conflict prevention (20%).⁴

The Trust Fund also continues to be a strongly state-led intergovernmental programme. Out of the total funds contracted out, 37% were managed by Member states agencies, 30% by the UN and other international organisations and only 18% directly by NGOs (Ibid.).⁵

It should be noted that while the Trust Fund was conceived and launched as an emergency instrument, it has ended up becoming a substantial part of the European approach to development cooperation with African countries. The Trust Fund strengthens the centrality of migration in European programmes in line with the trend behind the programming of the European budget for the 2021-2027 seven-year period or behind the negotiations of the post-2020 partnership between the EU and ACP countries. The Trust Fund will expire at the end of 2020 and it will be up to the EU institutions to evaluate its renewal under the same configurations or in a different fashion.

2.2 The EU External Investment Plan

In 2018 the European Commission chose to bring the relations between the EU and Africa to a higher level from a strategic point of view. In particular, it was proposed to create a new “Africa-Europe Alliance for sustainable investments and jobs” (European Commission, 2018b) with the aim of stimulating investment in Africa, strengthening trade, creating jobs and invest in education and skills.

The European Commission has launched a EU External Investment Plan as a fundamental tool of this new alliance at the end of 2018 (European Commission, 2018a). The Plan aims to finance the risk of private actors to leverage investments in countries where they would not otherwise go. The EU support under the Plan is open not only to private actors but also to partner countries, that are guaranteed financial assistance, technical assistance and a political dialogue to create a favourable environment for investments in Africa.

Considered as the counterpart of the Trust Fund in the private sector, the Plan adopts the same approach as other blending instruments, with blending being increasingly used in the context of international development and considered by the Commission as the model for future instruments under the EU budget for the period 2021-2027. This approach is based on the experience of the Investment Plan for Europe (the so-called “Juncker Plan”) and consists of using EU funds not as grants but rather as a guarantees for loans and other operations traditionally promoted by international financial institutions.⁶

Since the launch of the plan, the European Commission has created five thematic windows of investment: “Sustainable Energy and Sustainable Connectivity”, “Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Financing”, “Sustainable agriculture, rural entrepreneurs

⁴ The remaining 2% was allocated to transversal programs.

⁵ 12% of the funds contracted to partner countries and 3% of funds assigned to “others” should also be considered.

⁶ For more information on this topic see Counterbalance, 2017.

and agroindustry”, “Sustainable cities”, and “Digitalisation for Sustainable Development” (European Commission, 2017b).

The Commission has allocated €2.2 billion from the European Fund for Sustainable Development, distributing them across 94 blending projects in Africa and the European Neighbourhood. It is estimated that these projects have mobilized € 19.5 billion in public and private investments (European Commission, 2018c). While the Commission has contracted out some activities to financial institutions (i.e. development banks), the involvement of the private sector has proven particularly problematic. For instance, among the certified donors that the Commission urged to contribute to the Plan, only the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation had allocated their own funds by January 2019 (EEAS, 2018b).

In 2018, the Commission published a series of proposals for the next Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 which contained the proposal for a new investment framework for external action. The underlying intention was to significantly increase the External Investment Plan while simplifying the architecture of the investments themselves (Gavas & Timmis, 2019). With this in mind, the proposed framework will adopt the same three-pillar approach but will have an expanded financial component, the EFSD+, which will include a single global blending instrument and a new external action guarantee with a maximum capacity of €60 billion (Commission European Union, 2018d).

Besides these EU initiatives, it is also important to mention an important initiative at African level. The African Union’s creation of the African Free Trade Area, whose agreement was ratified by 27 of the 54 signatory countries, aims to generate jobs and well-being (Al Jazeera, 2019) and is part of a continuous effort by the African Union to promote the free movement of people on the continent.

2.3 The multiannual EU financial framework 2021-2027

During the negotiations of the next Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 some disagreements have arisen between the Member States over the general outline of the framework and its governance. In line with the on-going debate about EU internal funds, some of these disagreements concern asylum and migration, in particular the share of funds that would be guaranteed for the migration-themed objectives, what would be the specific objectives to be achieved, what would be the budget items and who would have competence over them. In particular, Member States disagree on how migration should be included in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, NDICI), to what extent the Justice and Home Affairs funds should cover also the budget items relating to migration outside the EU and what coordination should be put in place between internal and external funding for migration (ECRE, 2019).

According to the European Commission's proposal, at least 10% of NDICI should be spent on addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and supporting the management and governance of migration, including refugee protection and migrant rights (European Commission, 2018d). Furthermore, the idea of external management of migration was introduced as a feature in all three funds for Justice and Home Affairs: the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Integrated Border Management Fund and the Internal Security Fund.

2.4 The partnership between the EU and the ACP countries over Cotonou

On the multilateral side, the relations between Europe and Africa have now entered a delicate phase. The Cotonou Agreement, which has framed relations between the EU and the so-called ACP countries (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) since 2000, will expire at the end of 2020. Negotiations for a new ACP-EU partnership have been launched in New York in September 2018 in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly. As the management of migration flows continues to pose major political challenges to EU leaders and institutions, the European approach to negotiations is unsurprisingly characterised by a strong focus on migration and this has created tension since the beginning of the negotiations (Euractiv, 2018).

The international and regional context of today is very different from the one where the Cotonou agreement was signed, as back at that time different issues were at the core of negotiations (e.g. trade liberalisation). Over the past twenty years, however, a number of new factors have emerged: the African Union has acquired a growing political weight, new players have emerged (e.g. China), and the so-called “migration crisis” highlighted deep divisions within the European Union.

In the past, African elites largely followed the Western dogmas on economic liberalisation and political democratisation (IAI, 2018). According to this model, which has been called “donor-recipient” relationship (Bossuyt, 2017), the European donor expects the recipients to follow its program, at least on a formal level, in exchange for the transfer of money to the state and regional elites. Now that 2020 has started, the EU is still not satisfied with the implementation of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, in particular as regards the mandatory readmission of irregular migrants in their countries of origin. While the EU is pushing to strengthen the legal obligation for the ACP countries to accept the readmission their citizens (Council of the EU, 2018), the ACP governments insist that this it should take place on a voluntary basis (ACP Council, 2018).

Contrary to the donor-recipient model, African governments have identified new political levers by increasingly taking advantage of Europeans’ anxieties in order to gain influence and resources (IAI, 2018). This is the case of countries like Niger and Mali, whose leaders have publicly emphasised on several occasions how vital their cooperation is to tackle irregular migration (Lebovich, 2018). It is no coincidence that the two countries are among the main beneficiaries of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

Only by monitoring the discussions on the post-Cotonou partnership will it be possible to assess what is the power balance between the two blocks in the negotiation and, ultimately, confirm whether African countries have adopted a new kind of assertiveness or not. In May 2019, the EU concluded the round of consultations between the EU and regional blocks (European Commission, 2019b) which allowed specific issues to be addressed for each group of countries, including migration.

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9. The New Faces of Change: the Second Generation in Italy

Veronica Riniolo

1. Introduction

Ius music. This evocative song title from a popular second generation Italian rapper effectively summarises one of the most debated issues – above all in the past few years – related to the presence of the children of immigrants born or raised in Italy. In other words, the reform of the citizenship law (law n. 91 of 1992).¹ According to the most recent survey from Fondazione ISMU, in Italy the members of the second generation aged between 0 and 35 years are about 3 million.² This is a significant number that shows a new phase in the history of the Italian migration. It urges the adoption of renovated theoretical perspectives and interpretative paradigms. As a matter of fact, the number of children of immigrants in Italy, as well as in Europe, is expected to grow (OECD, 2017). Moreover, in the last decade, the second generation has gained visibility without precedent within the artistic scene, in sports and in the political arena (Zinn, 2011; Riniolo, 2019). Participation and visibility have increased with difficulty in an “adverse” context. The populist and xenophobic rhetoric (Martinelli, 2013), incited by what is inappropriately called the “refugee crisis” (Benhabib, 2006), has depicted immigrants as cultural, social and economic threats. This rhetoric has grouped together in a narrative of closure different categories of people, such as long-term immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees and even the second generation. Immigration, according to the most recent data collections of the Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer Standard 91), remains the biggest concern for Italians, followed by the economic situation of the country. The children of immigrants have been studied from different points of view. Both their positive and negative aspects have been analysed in depth. Some scholars, adopting analytical perspectives capable of taking into consideration the processes of globalisation and transnationalism, have highlighted how their migratory background can represent a real advantage for the young people who find themselves living in a society characterised by an increasing ethnic diversity (Kasinitz et al., 2008), because they “see and imagine themselves as global citizens” (Zanfrini, 2018: 86). Other researches have analysed more controversial and problematic issues; for instance, the persistence and the transmission of the socio-economic disadvantages of the first generation to the second generation (OECD, 2017); the religious radicalisation of the young people of foreign origin in Europe (Mezzetti, 2016; Valtolina, 2017); the contrapositions

¹ The author of the song is rapper and activist Amir Issaa. The son of an Egyptian father and Italian mother, he is involved in the issue of the reform of the law regarding the different modalities by which citizenship can be obtained. “Ius” recalls the debate on the principle of citizenship acquisition (*ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*).

² For further details on the data collection, see paragraph 4.1.

between the family claims and the ones of the society in which they are settled, contrasts that the young people in the second generation must face in some cases (Valtolina & Marazzi, 2006); or even the formation of youth gangs (Queirolo Palmas & Torre, 2005).

By now, there is a consensus that the realities of the second generation are extremely variegated and diversified (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Ambrosini & Molina, 2004). For this reason, in order to understand them, it is necessary to consider the role played by different factors and, in particular, by the consequences of their interactions: ethnicity, gender, class, age, religion, citizenship and social connections are just some of the elements that define their composite identities and their paths in their parents' receiving society (Eve, 2013; Withol de Wenden, 2015).

In the light of this scenario and in the wide literary production on the second generation, the present article aims to produce an image of the second generation in Italy, contextualising its members in the wider European context. The chapter is divided into four sections. After a brief discussion on the current debate on the terminological issues that define the frame in which the topic is discussed (cfr. par. 2), there will be an analysis on the results of some of the widest and most recent researches on the children of immigrants in Europe (cfr. par. 3), which have highlighted a general trend of progressive enhancement of their conditions. From the European context, the focus moves to Italy, confronting the methodological crux of the numerical consistency of the second generation based on data collected by different statistical sources (cfr. par. 4.1). The following section presents a wider discussion on the successful (and unsuccessful) paths in the different spheres of society, in terms of level of education and career perspectives (cfr. par. 4.2). The conclusive paragraph deals with some considerations on the Italian context and on future research prospects (cfr. par. 5).

2. The issue of definitions: second generation?

Italy, included in the list of the countries with recent immigration, compared to other countries of "long-standing" immigration (for example France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden) (Penninx et al., 2004), is still struggling when it comes to seeing the second generation as an essential part of society (Marinero & Walston, 2010). This is proven by the restrictive law on citizenship acquisition that dates to 1992 (Huddleston et al., 2011) and that widely affects the current debate on the terminological choices used to refer to the children of immigrants.

The most common term used in the international literature is "second generation". Consider the famous essay by the sociologist Alejandro Portes, titled "The New Second Generation" (1996).³ This definition has the merit of underlining the differences between the first generation, whose members have crossed the borders of one or more countries, and their children, who were born in their parents' receiving countries or have reached

³ In the present article "second generation" is the term of choice for three reasons: 1) it is the most common term in sociological literature; 2) thanks to its widespread use it is easier to understand the population to which it refers; 3) to date, the other defining options do not offer any valid alternatives to overcome the limitations and the criticism related to them.

them in pre-school age, childhood or teenage. Moreover, this definition allows for differentiation between them and the following generation, the so-called “third” generation, a reality also present in Italy. Nevertheless, this option is not exempt from criticism. Some scholars highlight the fact that the expression “second generation” brings about the risks of connecting the people belonging to this group to their family of origin and their ethnic community, emphasising the continuity with something that was “before” (Zanfrini 2018). This is part of the broader criticism to the “national-cultural” paradigm (Eve, 2013) where the emphasis is on the identity inherited by their parents. Others have highlighted the aversion existing between the life paths of the children of immigrants, more and more cosmopolitan, and their settlement in one place – the country where their parents have migrated to – to which the term “second generation” implicitly alludes (Ceravolo & Molina, 2013).

Outside the academic world, the terms used to refer to the children of immigrants born or raised in their parents’ destination country are extremely variegated and differentiated depending on the national context. In Italy, besides *second generation*, the following terms are used: “new generations”, “new Italians”, “Italian first-generation”, “bridge-generation” (*generazione ponte*), “intercultural natives”, “immigrants second-generation”, “immigrant minors”, “young people with a migratory background”.

“New generations” is the result of a process of self-definition put in place by a group of young people with a migratory background which has started the experience of a network, called National Coordination of the New Italian Generations (CONNGI)⁴, which gathers different experiences of associationism all over the Italian territory. The adjective “new” next to “generation” recalls a concept of change, innovation, evolution and potential enhancement. This definition has the advantage of releasing the content from its migrant origin. It is also possible to chance upon the term *intercultural natives* that, coined from “digital natives”, underlines their being born in their parents’ destination country with a specific and additional characteristic, that is, being intercultural. This option emphasises their being “natural bridges” between different cultures.

If the choices of “new generations” or “intercultural natives” implicitly legitimise and recognise the children of immigrants as citizens of the societies in which they were born or raised; “immigrant minors” underlines the diversity, distance and non-involvement of the individuals in the territory where they live. The terminological options presented here imply different undertones with consequences on the interpretation of the phenomenon of the children of immigrants. As Zanfrini writes, “The definitions are not only instruments for analysing the real processes, but they are also essential components for their understanding: the “debate” on the object of study must be the object of study itself”⁵ (2016: 3).

⁴ <http://conngi.it/>. Latest access on 8th August 2019.

⁵ Translation by the author of the present article.

3. The second generation in Europe: what are the scenarios?

3.1 A positive trend

In EU countries, the young people who were born from two foreign parents represent 9% of the population aged between 15 and 34 years and 11% of the minors under the age of 15 years (OECD, 2017). The European countries hosting the highest number of young people with a migratory background are Germany and France (3.4 million each) followed by the United Kingdom (2.4 million).

The widest longitudinal researches conducted so far in Europe on the conditions of the second generation are *CILS4EU (Children of Immigrant Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries)*,⁶ carried out in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, and the *ILSEG research (Investigación Longitudinal de la Segunda Generación)*, conducted in Spain. Both studies, despite the significant differences between the countries under examination in terms of history of migration and reception contexts, present a picture in evolution and a progressive enhancement characterised by similar paths of inclusion of the second generation (Kalter, 2018).

A common trait among young people who distinguish themselves for a generally good and stable psychological situation, is the elevated level of national identification with the country where they were born or raised (Ibid.). The identification, as can be easily supposed, is stronger in the young people born in their parents' country of destination or arriving during their early childhood, compared to those who have reached the country later, but it remains weaker when compared to their native peers (Ibid.).

The literature has widely recognised the importance of the context (*Politically Opportunity Structure - POS*) that affects the integration paths of the immigrants (among others Penninx & Martiniello, 2007; Morales & Giugni, 2011; Alba & Foner, 2015). This is also true for the second generation as highlighted in the investigation, *TIES. Integration of the European Second-Generation Project*, conducted in 15 cities in eight European countries⁷ on the children of immigrants born in their parents' destination country aged between 18 and 35 years.

3.2 Excellences and obstacles

Some current central issues in the study on European and American migrations are the success and the goals achieved by the children of immigrants in their education and careers.⁸ Regarding this, the research project "Elite. Pathway to Success" is emblematic.⁹

⁶ <https://www.cils4.eu/>. Latest access 16th July 2019.

⁷ Amsterdam and Rotterdam (The Netherlands); Antwerp and Brussels (Belgium), Paris and Strasbourg (France); Barcelona and Madrid (Spain); Basel and Zurich (Switzerland); Linz and Wien (Austria); Berlin and Frankfurt (Germany) and Stockholm (Sweden). In particular, the focus of the investigation was on the conditions of the young people from Turkey, Morocco and Yugoslavia.

⁸ In the United States, the studies focus on the achievements of the children of Asian immigrants, considered a "model minority" compared to other groups, such as for example the children of Mexican immigrants. In Europe, which is characterised by a major ethnic diversity if compared to the United States (Thomson & Crul, 2007), none of the ethnic groups are considered a "model". Conversely, the researches have shown from a comparative point of view how the same ethnic group can in different contexts achieve different goals as a result of a different structure of political opportunities (among others, see Crul et al., 2012).

⁹ The international project "Elite" was financed by the European Research Council (ERC). <https://www.elitesproject.eu/>. Latest access 10th July 2019.

This project focused on an analysis and comparison of the ascending social mobility of second generation youths in France, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. The study highlighted the effects of some factors (such as personal and relational abilities, ethnic capital and support from the family or other significant figures) in breaking the vicious circle connected to the mechanisms of transmission and reproduction of the disadvantages from one generation to the other (OECD, 2018b). These factors can favour ascending mobility paths, characterised by a progressive collection of opportunities which in turn open their doors to further chances and new social environments (Crul et al., 2017).

In these successful scenarios, though, we witness the persistence of some criticalities that could be defined as “inherited” from the first generation. Among these it is necessary to mention the “daily racism” (Essed, 2002), experienced above all by some groups, like afro-descendants or young girls wearing the veil (Frisina & Hawthorne, 2018), and the discrimination on ethnic-racial grounds, in particular when accessing the job world and the career-making processes (Withol de Wenden, 2015; Crul et al., 2017). As highlighted by the results of a recent investigation (FRA, 2017), the second generation is one of the groups that records the highest levels of perceived discrimination: 20% of the second generation interviewees recognised that they have been victims of discrimination on religious grounds (compared to 12% of the first generation); 29% claim that they have been discriminated against on ethnic-racial grounds (compared to 24% of the immigrant population). In particular, children of immigrants from North Africa record the most concerning results: 42% of the interviewees claim they have been victims of discrimination, compared to 25% recorded among the first generation from the same geographical areas (Ibid.).

To face the frequent experience of racism and discrimination, some young girls in different cities of the world, as well as in Italy, have come up with original and innovative forms of resistance. One example is through aesthetic practises used as a form of struggle (Frisina & Hawthorne, 2018). A group of young women, through the use of the veil or the valorisation of their afro-textured hair, have meant to strongly affirm their identity against the prevalent prejudices on beauty which relegate them to the margins of society, and to reinforce the personal and collective awareness of young Muslim girls or afro-descendants against the experiences of daily racism (Ibid.).

4 “We are not immigrants”: the second generation in Italy

4.1 *The presence of the second generation in Italy*¹⁰

In the Italian context, but in other locations as well, an inescapable issue is the difficulty in precisely evaluating the numeric consistency of the second generation. Indeed it can't be measured with traditional statistical data collections (Ceravolo & Molina, 2013). This is attributable to two problems: one is analytical while the other is methodological. From the analytical point of view, there is still an unanswered question: who must be included

¹⁰ For the writing of the present section, the author would like to thank Alessio Menonna, from the Statistic Department of Fondazione ISMU.

in the category “second generation”? Regarding this, no agreement has been reached in the academic debate. Although the differences between a minor born in Italy from foreign parents and one settled in the country during adolescence have been acknowledged, for the purposes of the present chapter, with the term “second generation”, we are going to refer to the children of immigrants born in Italy from at least one foreign parent, or those who settled in a country when underage.

The second issue is ascribable to the methodological challenge of data collection. The official records present a picture of the composition of the population resident in Italy by gender, age and citizenship. It is possible to distinguish the citizens according to their age, gender brackets and citizenship (Italian or non-Italian). However, the year of the immigrants’ arrival in Italy remains unknown. This information could allow us to understand how many individuals can be defined as second generation (even of those not in possession of Italian citizenship) and to further distinguish the category of those who arrived in their early childhood from the ones who arrived in the later phases of their lives.

Under these premises, it is possible to measure the presence of the second generation by adding together five different groups of people with a migratory background.

1) The first group regards the *foreign* (without the Italian citizenship) and *underage* citizens, whose presence on 1st January 2019, according to the most recent ISTAT data, is 1.061.815. According to Rumbaut’s specification, the generations included in this category are 2.0 (those who were born in Italy from at least one foreign parent); 1.75 (arrived at pre-scholar age); 1.5 (arrived between 7 and 12 years) and the 1.25 generation (migrated between the age of 13 and 17 years).

2) The second group is composed of *foreigners of age* born in Italy and with ages between 18 and 35 years, who for different reasons have not yet acquired Italian citizenship. As of 1st January 2019 their number is 360.000.¹¹

3) The third group is composed of *foreign citizens* from the ages of 18 to 35 years who *arrived in Italy when underage*. Based on the most recent surveys of Fondazione ISMU, it is estimated that their presence on 1st January 2019 is about 646.000.¹² This group, together with the previous, gives an overview of the adults in the second generation.¹³

4) The *new Italians* must also be added to the groups: those who have acquired Italian citizenship. On the basis of ISMU processing of ISTAT data, the new acquired citizens between 2012 and 2018 and with ages between 0 and 35 years are 552.917.¹⁴ This is perhaps the most “problematic” group from the methodological point of view, since it also includes those citizens who do not fit in the category of the second generation: consider, for example, the case of those who have acquired citizenship by marriage to an Italian citizen, for legal benefits, special merits or because they were adopted by Italian parents. These categories, however, are numerically limited.

¹¹ Data processing of ISTAT and MIUR data by ISMU.

¹² Data processing of ISTAT, MIUR and ORIM data by ISMU.

¹³ The second generation (who arrived in Italy when still underage) over the age of 35 years without Italian citizenship are not included in this group, because their effect might be limited. Taking into consideration the years of residency, they are likely to have obtained Italian citizenship.

¹⁴ The trend on the acquisition of citizenship is drastically decreasing: considering the period between 2012 and 2017, after a peak of almost 202.000 new citizenship acquisitions was reached in 2016, in 2017 the figure is about 147.000 of new acquisitions, with a decrease of more than 50.000 units. Source: ISMU processing of ISTAT data.

5) Lastly the children of *mixed-racial couples* born in Italy. They have Italian citizenship but share many aspects with those who have both parents of foreign origin (somatic traits, linguistic competences, religion, etc.) (Ceravolo & Molina, 2013). The number is around 498.474 units (born between 1984 and 2018).

From the sum of these five groups it is possible to estimate the overall presence of the second generation in Italy with ages between 0 and 35 years (born in Italy from at least one foreign parent or arrived when underage) at around 2.825.182. This proposal undoubtedly presents some limitations (the members of the second generation aged over 35 years or the irregular ones, for example, are not considered), but it offers a quantitative representation of the children of immigrants in Italy by also taking into consideration naturalised citizens, integrating therefore the statistics on the scholastic population.

In order to make this picture complete, it is possible to provide some data about the school world as well. According to MIUR, in the academic year 2016/17, the students with a non-Italian citizenship were about 826,000, equal to 9.4% of the scholastic population (MIUR, 2018). This number includes both the minors with a direct experience of immigration, as well as those who were born and raised in Italy. It is important to underline that the students born and raised in Italy represent 60.9% of all the students with a migratory background, equal to about 500,000 students (Santagati & Colussi, 2019). This figure has even increased in the past few years. The most numerous communities of students with a non-Italian citizenship (CNI) are from Romania (158.428, about 20% of CNI students), Albania (112.171, 13,6%) and Morocco (102.121, 12,3%) (Ibid.).

4.2 *The integration paths of the second generation in Italy*

109

There is a general agreement that education represents one of the most important indexes for the evaluation of the overall position of the second generation in the societies in which they were born or raised (Crul et al., 2012: 102), but also the friendship networks and the percentage of NEET (Not in Education, Employment or Training) in the population of foreign origin can be considered additional indexes. These three issues (education, NEET and friendship networks) will be briefly examined in the following paragraphs in order to reconstruct the condition of the children of immigrants in Italy.

In most of European countries, the students of foreign origin obtain lower academic achievements than their peers with native parents (OECD, 2017; 2018a).¹⁵ This is particularly true in those contexts, like the Italian one, which received immigrants with low socio-economic levels (Ibid.). In Italy, the data on the students with a migratory background present a picture of their systematic disadvantages when compared to their Italian peers in terms of school drop-out rates, learning and educational achievements and delays in their academic careers.¹⁶ On the one hand, the inequalities due to the migratory background are still present; on the other hand, the disadvantages of those who were born in Italy from foreign parents tend to diminish. The analysis of the INVALSI tests shows that the students born in Italy with at least one foreign parent obtain results more like their

¹⁵ In Canada the situation is reversed: the academic achievements of the children of immigrants are higher than their native peers (OECD, 2017).

¹⁶ For an overall and updated picture, refer to Santagati & Colussi, 2019.

Italian peers than their peers born abroad (Barabanti, 2019). Some indexes in particular contribute to an outline of a trend of progressive enhancement for those in the second generation born in Italy: an increase of students enrolled at technical schools and lyceums, a decrease of students attending professional schools, and an increase, even if slightly, of foreign students among the top performers (Santagati & Colussi, 2019).

A further index that can be used in order to study the condition of the children of immigrants is the percentage of young people between 15 and 34 years not working, not studying and not involved in any training courses (NEET). In Europe, the percentage of NEET among young people of foreign origin who arrived in the country during their childhood (20%) is higher than the percentage recorded among the young people with native parents (17%). In this scenario, Italy – together with the countries from the South of Europe, Spain excluded – represents an exception. 27% of young natives (with Italian parents) fall into the category of NEET, followed by the second generation, who arrived in the country during their childhood (26%), which is outdistanced by the young people born in Italy with both foreign parents (20%). This is a more favourable situation for the component of foreign origin.

Finally, a key issue is represented by the friendship networks of the students of foreign origin. The ISTAT survey (2016) on the integration of the second generation shows a rather variegated situation depending on the nationality of origin. At the two opposing ends of the spectrum, there are the Ukrainian students, with a circle of friends mainly Italian, and the Chinese, who claim to have mostly foreign friends. Also, Filipinos are characterised by a major closure when it comes to spending time with Italians. Albanians and Romanians, conversely, are just after the Ukrainians, with a stronger attitude of openness to Italians than the average of foreign groups (Ibid.).

Research conducted on high school students in Trentino has highlighted that “generations 2.0”, born and raised in Italy from foreign parents, tend to spend time exclusively with Italians or mixed groups of friends, to have Italians among their best friends and to confide in an Italian friend (Cvajner, 2015). Lower numbers of exclusively Italian friends are recorded among those who arrived in Italy during their adolescence (Ibid.). It seems that we can exclude the existence of rigid barriers between Italian young people and young people of foreign origin; we are facing forms of fluid social relations (Ibid.).

4.3 The political participation of young people in the second generation

In Italy, the literature on the second generation has focused mainly on issues like identity and belonging (Andall, 2002; Colombo et al., 2009) and education (Gilardoni, 2008; Miur, 2018; Santagati & Colussi, 2019, among others). These are fundamental issues related to understanding the condition of the children of immigrants and in evaluating the results of the integration of the first generation (Boccagni & Pollini, 2012; Penninx, 2014). However, another dimension of utmost importance has received scarce attention (Zinn, 2011). This is the political activism that has seen some young children of immigrants – mainly with high cultural and relational capital – become central players and promoters of initiatives in the political field.

How many young people of foreign origin between the ages of 15 and 34 years are in Italy? According to the most recent OECD data (2018a), 1% of young people were born in

Italy from foreign parents; 4% arrived in Italy when younger than 15 years; about 10% arrived in Italy with an age between 16 and 35 years. This means that 19% of the young people aged between 15 and 34 have a migratory background. Moreover, according to some data from 2014, the overwhelming majority of the second generation born in Italy have extra-European origins (about 85%) (OECD, 2017).

Undoubtedly, when we talk about the activism of the children of immigrants, the first image that comes to mind is the struggle for the reform of the citizenship law due to the life stories, told by the media, of the numerous young people with a migratory background determined to promote a modification to the law related to the modalities of citizenship acquisition (Codini & Riniolo, 2018). Besides the old protagonists, committed for years to bringing forward the campaign for the law reform (Rete G2, union trades, associations from the third sector, etc.), some new players have gained wide visibility and *voices* on the political scene. One example is the movement #ItalianiSenzaCittadinanza born at the end of 2016, which has obtained great media attention (Ibid.).

However, it could be reductive to connect the claims of the young people of foreign origin exclusively to the issue of citizenship acquisition. The areas of interest, the types and modalities of action of their commitment are variegated (Riniolo, 2019). Bottom-up mobilisation processes – born of the activists' willpower and means – integrate with top-down processes that are employed by different institutional and non-institutional players (associations from the third sectors, trade unions, etc.). The experiences falling into this category are varied: the above mentioned National Coordination of the New Italian Generations (CONNGI), born of the initiative of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies in 2016; the *Afroitalian Power Initiative*, set up by the Euro-MP Cécile Kyenge; Tunit, promoted by the Tunisian embassy, or the participation of some members of CONNGI in the institutional boards.¹⁷ Besides these top-down modalities, other young people have been active with a bottom-up approach (for example, movements like #ItalianiSenzaCittadinanza and #NonUnadiMeno, political assemblies in social centres [*centri sociali*], anti-eviction picket-lines, just to mention a few).

Young people's central role in political activism becomes a fundamental factor in interpreting the new narratives and representations that the children of immigrants—in their roles as protagonists—bring forward thanks to their struggles. In line with what was previously highlighted by the literature on the youth's political activism (Pirni & Raffini, 2018; Pitti, 2018), in the political actions of the second generation, it is possible to detect a recurrent element. We are witnessing some processes of reflective re-appropriation of the debates on the young people themselves and the collective sphere, allowing the young people with a migratory background to take distance from the undifferentiated and what is known today as a “stigmatised” group of immigrants, to which sometimes, as previously highlighted, they are erroneously connected to.

¹⁷ Some CONNGI delegates take part in the thematic work group Migration and Development of the National Board for Cooperation and Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the National Observatory for the Integration of foreign students and for inter-culture operating at the Ministry of Education.

5. Conclusive considerations

In Italy, in line with what was observed in other European countries, there are numerous elements proving a progressive enhancement of the conditions of the second generation, despite the persistence of some structural disadvantages. For example, what can be detected is the reduction of the gap between the academic results achieved by the second generation born in Italy and their peers born of Italian parents. Many young people with a migratory background distinguish themselves and excel in the educational field and have become protagonists in the public scene.

It is necessary to avoid a “polarised” vision of the second generation. On the one hand, we run the risk of embracing a positive rhetoric. However, this would underestimate a series of criticalities that need to be taken into consideration: first, the issue of discrimination on ethnic-racial and religious grounds. On the other hand, it is desirable to avoid “problematic” and national-cultural approaches (Eve, 2013) that impede the understanding of the complex twine of factors (age, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) defining their stories.

In conclusion, it is possible to claim that a new, complex and innovative process has begun in Italy. Understanding it requires new analytical instruments. This forces us to reconsider the essential traits of our societies so that we can enhance new resources and prevent new phenomena of marginality.

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10. The Protection of Unaccompanied Minors. The Voluntary Guardian

Nicoletta Pavesi and Giovanni Giulio Valtolina

1. A story that comes from afar

The figure of the voluntary guardian for unaccompanied minors (UNAMs) is formally established in Italy with the law 47/2017, known as the “Zampa law”. Article 11 of the law provides for the creation, at each Juvenile Court, of “*a list of voluntary guardians, to which private citizens can be registered, selected and adequately trained by regional department of the Children and Adolescents Authority, available to take on the protection of an unaccompanied foreign minor or more [minors], in the maximum number of three, unless there are specific and relevant reasons.*”

However, the debate that led to this formulation dates back to the period between the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 2000s, when the entries of number of unaccompanied minor arrivals began to become quantitatively significant. In that climate, two contrasting orientations developed regarding the type of protection to be offered (Micela, 2018). The first orientation considered the appointment of a guardian for the minor to be redundant, as it was taken over by the Social Services which, through the reception facilities, guaranteed care and assistance. In this perspective, the appointment of the guardian could only make sense in particular cases, for example when the UAM was involved in a *legal proceeding*. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s Decree of 9 December 1999, n. 535, in article 3, paragraph 6, stated that “*in case of need, the Committee for Minors communicates the situation of the minor to the competent tutelary judge, for the possible appointment of a provisional guardian*”. It should be noted, however, that this rule was – actually – denied by the Circular of the Ministry of the Interior on 9 April 2001, in which it is stated that the Committee for Minors must involve the Tutelary Judge for the appointment of a guardian, who is however referred to as “*provisional*”. The reasons supporting this first orientation are diverse (Turri, 2005): the observation that the remoteness of parental figures is not a condition that makes it impossible to manage parental authority thanks to new technologies; the evaluation, made by some judges, for whom, since the *de facto* minors are legally entrusted to relatives by the fourth degree, according to the art. 9 of the law n. 184/1983, the protection should not be activated; the observation that in the case of UAMs the interim protection authority is on “*public or private assistance institution*”, based on the art. 3 law n. 184/1983. The opposing orientation instead considered the indispensability of the appointment of the guardian based on the consideration that “*for any minor – as such lacking in ‘capacity to act’ – the possibility of exercising his rights depended inevitably on the representation function of parents and, in their place, guardians*” (Micela, 2018: 139). In essence, the very fact of being minor precludes the enforceability of some rights and therefore requires the appointment of a guardian, unless we want to

guarantee “*only those few who are allowed to exercise by their own alone*” (Turri, 2005: 132).

Moreover, it should be noted that the development of international law concerning human rights, starting with the New York Convention of 1989 and that of Strasbourg in 1996, has given the institution of protection a new connotation, which goes far beyond of the mere bureaucratic feature. In representing the child, the adult is not simply called upon to replace him because of his lack of legal ownership, but in assessments and choices concerning children it becomes crucial to listening to their point of view, to their opinion, of their feelings and the awareness that they are bearers of needs that must be satisfied and of rights that must be protected. The task of the guardian, therefore, is the advocacy for the minor.

The broad debate we have summarized above has produced pilot experiences of voluntary guardianship in several regions, well before the promulgation of the Law 47/2017.

This is the case of the Veneto Region with the activity of the Public Guardian, a figure established with the regional law of Veneto, n. 42, of 9 August 1988, which was given the functions of “*finding, selecting and preparing persons available to carry out protection activities and giving advice and support to appointed guardians*” (Article 2, letter a). The “Project Guardians”, which started in 2004 several years earlier than indicated by the Law 47/2017, was born thanks to an agreement between the public guardian of minors, the Regional Department for Social Services, voluntary organizations and non-profit organization and the Regional Directorate of Social Services. The territorial partners of the project were the Social and Health Companies and the Mayors’ Conferences. Finally, the project involved the drafting of protocols with the ordinary courts of the Veneto region (to which the tutelary judges belong) and with the Juvenile Court of Venice. Specifically, territorial referents have been identified, chosen from the social and health and social services professionals, who, after following specific courses at the Veneto Ombudsperson for Childhood and Adolescence Office, in the individual territorial areas have dealt with the awareness of the local community on the legal protection of minors, the recruitment of volunteer guardians, the organization of training courses, supporting and monitoring the guardians in their activities (Drigo, Santamaria, 2009). The names and information concerning the trained volunteers were then included in a special database from which the Judicial Authority could draw, when the need for the appointment of a guardian arose. “*The protections managed by volunteers are classified through the opening of a dossier so as to also favor an easier monitoring system*” (Memo, 2007: 80).

Even other regions and autonomous provinces had register for voluntary guardians before the 47/2017 law. The province of Trento, for example, between the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004 had set up a training course for volunteer guardians who, in addition to assuming the protection of UAMs, set up experiences exchange meetings to support each other in affair and thus improve the service offered. As a natural outcome of this activity, the Volunteer Guardians Association of Foreign Minors was founded in 2005, a voluntary association, with the aim of “*allowing the volunteers the necessary ongoing training and to acquire the availability of other citizens, Italians and foreigners, to the appointment as guardian*”(Turri, 2005: 134).

Similarly, in Ferrara in 2015, the Office for the Rights of Children of the Municipality and the Center for Social Action promoted a project to raise awareness among the local community and encourage the training of adults available to take on the legal protection

of unaccompanied minors. The following year the association “*Tutori nel Tempo*” was born, with the aim of promoting the development of this new figure of volunteer, trained to protect all minors without adult figures.

2. Who are the volunteer guardians

As mentioned, the law 47/2017 has introduced the figure of the voluntary guardian throughout the national territory, enhancing and systematizing the many experiments already active in the area and providing homogeneous criteria regarding training and selection.

The voluntary guardian is an adult who must have already turned twenty-five; if a foreigner, he must have an adequate and proven knowledge of the Italian language, if not an EU citizen, he must also be the holder of a residence permit. He must enjoy civil and political rights and not have been convicted or have criminal proceedings or security or prevention measures in place.

In order to become a voluntary guardian, the candidate must then pass a selection and follow a training course, responding to a notice issued by the Ombudsperson, Regional or National as appropriate. In the early stages of implementing the law, in regions without an Ombudsperson, in fact, the courses were managed by the National Ombudsperson, in collaboration with EASO: they were Tuscany, Abruzzo, Molise (until 31 December 2017) and Sardinia (until 30 June 2018). If, at the end of the course, the volunteer confirms his/her availability, his/her name is inserted in the institute list at the Juvenile Court of his region of residence or domicile. It will then be this Court that draws from the list of volunteer guardians to proceed with the matching and consequent appointments.

Each voluntary guardian can take care of a maximum of three minors, unless particular conditions exist. Since this is a voluntary activity, the voluntary guardian carries out his task free of charge, however some Regions have provided forms of support on particular issues, such as the insurance policy for civil liability and reimbursement of expenses (Save the Children Italy, 2018). However, it is not possible to obtain work permits for voluntary guardian activity, even if it is possible that they are granted by the employer, as a condition of greater favor due to the important social function covered by the employee.

On June 20, 2017, the Guidelines for the selection, training and registration in the lists of voluntary guardians were published on the website of the Guarantor Authority, with the aim of ensuring uniformity of procedures and criteria and guaranteeing the effective exercise of the function. In particular, with regard to training, which undoubtedly represents a strategic junction of the voluntary protection system, the Guidelines highlight the importance “*to provide multidisciplinary training so that the guardian has the basic cultural and cognitive tools to perform this role, crucial in the life of unaccompanied foreign minors. Therefore, the objective of training is not to create a professional of voluntary protection, nor to overlap with professionals who are in charge of the child. The training course must encourage the exercise of voluntary protection by people who have acquired knowledge, accepted responsibilities and are available for an appropriate relationship with the child that is significant in terms of quality and effectiveness*” (EASO, Authority for Childhood and Adolescence, 2018).

The voluntary guardian has the task of guaranteeing the protection of the rights of the UAM and ensuring that they are respected. To do this, it is necessary to have a close relationship with the system of services that revolves around the minor, in particular with the operators of the reception facilities, with the social services where the minor is in charge and with the Juvenile Court.

The main activities that the guardian has to carry out concern: the presentation of the request for a residence permit for minors on behalf of the minor; the presentation of the application for international protection on behalf of the minor; the evaluation, along with the minor, of the choices regarding his reception; participation in the identification phase and support during the age assessment process; for child victims of trafficking, the request for inclusion in a specific program; the request to start possible procedures for family investigations and for the consequent family reunification; legal representation in the procedures concerning the school or training course; the request to register with the National Health Service; support during the transition period towards the age of 18, even soliciting the choice of an extension of social protection until the age of 21, where deemed appropriate; the representation of the minor's interests and his/her support in all the jurisdictional proceedings that involve him/her. As it is evident, the voluntary guardian deals with all the life needs of the minor, keeping under control the aspects linked to reception, study, professional training, health, the future migration project and all the other areas that concern the daily life of the minor. It means that the guardian has a clear understanding of the opportunities and constraints that represent the frame within the Individual Educational Plan of the UAM has to be implemented, defining the possibilities of the best integration into the territorial community, in the present but also in a future perspective.

118

The data available to date on the number of voluntary guardians trained and present in the lists of the Courts are in the Report to the Parliament of the National Ombudsperson for Childhood and Adolescence (Autorità Garante per l'Infanzia e l'Adolescenza, 2019) which indicates in 5,501 the aspiring volunteer guardians, registered at December 10, 2018.

To support the activity of volunteer guardians, a project "*Monitoring of voluntary guardianship for unaccompanied minors*" has been activated, in implementation of art. 11 of the law n. 47/2017, supported by FAMI (Migration and Integration Asylum Fund). The project is in charge of the National Ombudsperson for Childhood and Adolescence, with implementing partners Don Calabria Institute, the CNCA (National Conference of Communities) and the "Street Lawyers" Association. The aim of the project is the monitoring of the implementation status of the voluntary protection measure. Since the project is two-years long (2018-20), results are not yet available.

However, it is possible to obtain some information from the annual reports of the Regional Ombudsperson, even if it is uneven information, both for the different period considered and for the quality of data. As an example, in Basilicata (a small region in the South of Italy), at March 31, 2019, 64 voluntary guardians were activate; or in Emilia Romagna, in 2017, 40 voluntary guardians were present in the lists of the Juvenile Courts and 15 voluntary guardians were operating with the UAMs. In the Lazio Ombudsperson's report, it is stated that 250 voluntary guardians were present in the lists in July 2018, but the Juvenile Court proceeded with the appointment of the guardian only for 71 UAMs and – for 65 of these minors – a voluntary guardian was appointed in the list "*proceeding in*

alphabetical order, but considering, as far as possible, the criterion of the proximity of the residence of the guardian to the host community of the minor" (Garante per l'Infanzia e l'Adolescenza, Regione Lazio, 2018:32).

3. Conclusive remarks

The voluntary guardian certainly represents a crucial figure in the realization of a project of adequate integration of unaccompanied minors, considering that minors traveling alone represent an important part of migrants arriving in Italy today (Gullace, 2018).

This figure is part of that frame of the "voluntary activities for the rights", that are activities of a voluntary nature, as expression of active citizenship, whose aim is the *"concrete recognition of the needs and rights of people, who are not able to defend themselves"* (D'Angelo et al., 2005: 44). The introduction of the institutional figure of the voluntary guardian therefore allows to provide to the UAMs a real protection, which as long as it was in the hands of the so-called "bureaucratic guardian" (the mayor, the councilor or the director of the consortium of social services) had purely formal characteristics, first of all due to the great number of UAMS assigned to each of them. Being the guardian of tens – sometimes even hundreds – of UAMS actually prevents *"from adequately exercising the vicarious functions of the parental ones"* (Micela, 2018: 142). The voluntary guardian, on the other hand, is characterized by the possibility of building a personal, trustworthy, direct relationship, within which to identify more clearly the best interests of the child through attentive listening, comparison, identification of desires and potential projects of the unaccompanied minor, without adult reference figures in Italy. Moreover, the appointment of the "bureaucratic guardian" also involved significant risks. As noted by Morozzo Della Rocca (2017:198), this figure could also *"lead to a situation of conflict of interest, due to the accumulation of positions by the bureaucratic guardian, who, on the one hand, as a guardian should require a series of services to the local authority and monitor the correct service supply, but on the other hand it belongs and indeed represents the entity responsible for such services"*.

Due to the personal relationship that it is established between UAM and guardian, the latter will be able to accompany the child *"in a real process of integration, making available one's own knowledge and social and relational resources, without losing sight of institutional obligations"* (Long, 2018: 8).

To do this, however, the guardian will have to interface with all the actors that revolve around the minor: the social services, the host communities, the education and training system, the health system, the police station, the Juvenile Court, third and fourth sector organizations, without neglecting any. In essence, the guardian – a private citizen who does not necessarily have a training in network approach – will be called to network with different actors, who speak different professional languages and who sometimes have – themselves – difficulties in collaborating with each other. It is also necessary that the figure of the guardian is recognized within the network of services: the role must be recognized and respected and the functions defined. Network relationships work, in fact, when they are two-way: therefore, recognition and mutual respect are needed: "Network work is an element that must be made in the relationship between volunteer and professionals, characterized by continuity and two-way communication. Especially where the choices

that are made affect the lives of vulnerable individuals such as single children, every action must be considered and shared” (Gullace, 2018: 156).

However, if it is necessary to train volunteer guardians to move within the reception system, it is also necessary to ask professionals to recognize their role and function, enabling the services to welcome them as a fundamental part of the system. This goal can be achieved, for example, through moments of shared training between guardians and operators: this would allow, in addition to greater mutual knowledge, also to build a common language and could lead to considering the voluntary guardian as a resource both for the minor as for the services.

With respect to the voluntary commitment to act as guardian, it is clear that volunteer guardians are “special” volunteers, who are asked for interdisciplinary skills, relationship skills, ability to move easily both in the system of rules and in that of institutions. For this reason, they cannot be left alone, but both continuous training and individualized counseling must be provided. A research carried out in Milan (Ortugno, Balena, 2019), which collected the opinions of the voluntary guardians, found the weakness of the system in the support offered to those nominated by the Court: *“all respondents confirmed that they were part of at least one informal, national or local network, created independently by some aspiring guardians, during training courses. However, they all pointed out that these autonomous networks are not able to fully respond to their needs, indicating the need for stable institutional reference figures to turn to after being assigned to a minor”* (Ortugno, Balena, 2019: 6).

It is precisely to respond to this weakness that several associations of voluntary guardians were born in Italy, such as “Officina 47”, established in June 2018, on the sidelines of the regional course held in Rome for the training of new voluntary guardians, who presented on 30 June 2019 its first report on the experience of voluntary guardians, entitled “Social Parents”. One year after the first appointments, the “Officina 47” association – which takes its name from the number of the Law about unaccompanied minors in Italy – has presented the results emerged from a questionnaire proposed to 100 voluntary guardians, operating in different regions of Italy. According to the study, the role of the voluntary guardian is that of a real “social parent”, as the title of the report states. The study, carried out in the period between November 2018 and May 2019, draws an initial state of the art: 25% of guardians are retired; 82% are women. A sore issue concerns the relationship with the institutions: 70% of the interviewees consider themselves – partially or completely – dissatisfied with the information received from the Courts and other institutions involved, and with the training courses to prepare themselves for the activity of guardian, which resulted too theoretical and little focused on the real difficulties that unaccompanied minors face in Italy. The guardians complain, moreover, difficulty in being inserted in the management of the minor by the host communities of the UAM, the Courts and the social services.

Despite they have a significant social role, the voluntary guardians are completely lacking the recognition of protections from the State. In particular, the literature on this delicate topic emphasizes the request to be able to access tools such as work permits, insurance policies and reimbursement of expenses, in the absence of which the burden of a voluntary guardian is very expensive and complex, especially to adequately carry out the function to which the guardian is called.

Another element of weakness, reported by several studies, which strongly affects the motivation of the voluntary guardians, concerns the length of time between the registration on the list at the Juvenile Court and the appointment.

Finally, it is necessary to highlight how, in the law 47/2017, there is no specific reporting obligation, as the laws actually in force on protection “do not appear to guarantee an appropriate monitoring of the work of this new figure, in particular in light of these parental tasks, which significantly differentiate them from the traditional guardian” (Albano, 2017: 60).

Hence, if the appearance of the voluntary guardian represents an important resource for a real protection of the unaccompanied minors, so that what the Italian Constitution provides for the involvement of private citizens in the “carrying out of activities of general interest” (art. 118), it is essential that the institutions support this figure as well as possible, also with the use of suitable tools and resources.

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In 2019, the annual ISMU Report on Migrations reached its 25th edition. The Twenty-fifth Migration Report presents a historical reconstruction of the migration phenomenon in Italy and analyses the transformations to which it has led in the past quarter century illustrating how the gradual rooting of newcomers has affected many aspects of our society, e.g., the labour market and the education field. As of 1 January 2019, ISMU Foundation estimates that the number of foreign people in Italy reached 6 million 222,000. Besides the traditional areas of interest – demographic aspects, legislation, labour and education – the Report examines other relevant topics, such as second generations and the protection of unaccompanied foreign minors. In this edition of the Report, ISMU once again focuses its attention on both the EU and the global level, with specific analyses on European integration policies and the new Multiannual Financial Framework, the impact of migration on European elections and the increasing role of Africa on EU migration policies and development aid.

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