As an independent scientific body, it proposes itself as a service provider open to collaboration with national and European institutions, local administrations, welfare and health-care agencies, non-profit organisations, schooling institutions, Italian and foreign research centres, libraries and documentation centres, international organisations, and private companies.

Over the course of 2018, immigration became one of the main issues facing the European Union and its constituent countries, a development reflected in the significant media coverage of the issue, as well as by its increasingly central role as a topic of political debate and among public opinion.

As well as the traditional areas of interest (demographics, legislation, labour and education), the Report examines a number of other current phenomena related between Europe, Africa and immigration; the outcome of Italy’s 2018 political elections; the Brexit debate; and the crisis of the European asylum system.
Edited by Vincenzo Cesareo

The Twenty-fourth Italian Report on Migrations 2018
Our annual Report contains the results of the studies carried out by the research staff and collaborators of ISMU Foundation – Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity (Fondazione ISMU – Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità).


This Report was written under the direct supervision of Secretary-General Vincenzo Cesareo, as Editor-in-Chief, with the assistance of Editorial Board members Ennio Codini, Livia Elisa Ortensi, Nicola Pasini, Mariagrazia Santagati, Giovanni Giulio Valtolina, Laura Zanfrini, and with the editorial coordination of Elena Bosetti and Francesca Locatelli.

ISMU Foundation ([www.ismu.org](http://www.ismu.org)) is an independent research centre founded in 1991. It is committed to conducting research, as well as providing consultancy, training and education, in the area of migration and integration. To develop a better understanding of these phenomena, it provides its expertise to research projects on all aspects of migrations in contemporary society.

It works with national, European and international organizations and institutions, in both the private and the public sectors. It is inserted in academic networks, it cooperates with welfare and healthcare agencies, and it exchanges with libraries and documentation centers in Italy and beyond.

ISMU organizes conferences and seminars on migration and produces a wide-range of publications. It has its own Documentation Centre (Ce.Doc.) which, over the years, has built a comprehensive collection of volumes, periodicals and audio-visual material to contribute to the sharing of information on migration.

*This publication has been produced with the contribution of*

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ISBN 9788894432411
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1. New and emerging concepts

As the issue of migration is becoming more and more relevant these days, it is important for us to underline, once again, that the mission of ISMU Foundation is to build and spread a proper culture of migration. In the debate about migration, due to the alarmingly growing gap between perception of migrations and reality, we firstly need to focus on the language used within the public debate. To do so, we will follow our guiding principles, which consider the person the main object of the study of social phenomena, and therefore of migrations. In the last few years, the public debate has centered on the issue of migration, which has often been oversimplified and misrepresented, as well as used in a sort of misleading and divisive way – thus misinforming and polarizing public opinion. For these reasons, entities such as ISMU Foundation contributing to the public debate through information based on their ongoing unbiased research activity must choose the language they use in a more accurate way. Despite an overall alarming “normalization” of verbal violence (the so-called hate speech, with hatred being expressed in very offensive words), it is safe to say that the trend is even worse when it comes to the migration issue – with the result of irrational fears being spread. Such fears are fueled by a limited knowledge of the phenomenon, whose complexity is often not grasped by many.

That is why it is useful to clarify all of the new keywords framing emerging concepts in the current political vocabulary. Terms such as “nativism”, “sovereignism”, and “authoritarianism” are associated with specific political parties – either newly-formed or not – which have risen in importance in both Europe and the US. As for Europe, we are referring to the National Front in France, the Freedom Party of Austria, the UKIP in the UK, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD). These parties, when mentioned in scientific analyses or by the media, are usually labeled as “radical right populist parties” (RRPP). Since the 1990s, the use of the adjective “radical” in place of “extreme”, as pointed out by Piero Ignazi (2000) and Cas Mudde (2007), has helped political analysts distinguish the various small groups inside the neo-fascist far right party – completely against the democratic system and often violent – from other right-wing groups that are integrated in the democratic system, but still against some elements of the constitutional principles and of the representative democracies. Except for some discrepancies due to the different political and social systems they come from, these parties share certain similarities concerning the way they look at society. Concerning their cultural and socio-economic point of view, here are the main features they share:

I. Nativism – which can be defined as a political ideology that holds that “States should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and
that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state (Mudde, 2007: 19). Such ideological principle comes with a certain level of exclusion as it maintains that a community’s social and cultural environment should remove all alien elements, which are seen as a threat to the national interest. However, nativism and racism are different from each other because while the latter is associated with exclusivism and a strictly ethnic hierarchy, the former is usually based on a cultural and religious discriminating factor. Compared to the traditional “twentieth-century” racism, in fact, nativism is closer to the so-called “differentialist ethno-pluralism”, i.e. a philosophical and political doctrine elaborated by the French New Right between the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1980s (Taguieff, 2003). The main principle of this doctrine is not that of racial supremacy (clearly inherited from fascism) but that of “differentiation”, whose aim is to prevent ethno-cultural groups from disappearing. In the economic field, for example, a form of nativism is the so-called welfare chauvinism, which promotes a social model where the distribution of economic resources sets apart privileged groups (natives) from discriminated groups (non-natives) on the basis of the fact that immigrants “weigh” on the welfare state and therefore increase the taxes imposed on native workers. From this point of view, it is possible to consider the welfare chauvinism as a by-product of a cultural and ideological principle. Another effect that is directly linked to the nativist ideology is the rejection of both the “multicultural society” and the liberal cosmopolitanism, regarded as the source of any dysfunction inside society. The populist radical rights generally present themselves as the defenders of the Judeo-Christian tradition, undermined – in their opinion – by the threats of a “globalist” ideology (of which multiculturalism is considered to be the first product) and of Islamization. Many of these parties, both in their statutes and in their political rhetoric and actions, unequivocally claim that national cultures and traditional lifestyles should be protected from external and destabilizing influences.

II. Sovereignism – i.e. the ideological tendency arising from the opposition to the erosion of State sovereignty and to the economic, political and social “transnationalization” caused by globalization. The sovereignistic ideology also promotes the return to the “sovereignty of the people”, who must reaffirm their will and their power by restoring their political and economic primacy over the various international and supranational interferences. To put it in some sort of “populist” terms, the re-appropriation of power can be achieved through an opposition to foreign elites (and national ones, when thought to be “collaborating” with the latter) and it can also be seen as the cause of a polarizing dichotomization of the political rhetoric (“us against them”). Consequently, socialism tends to distinguish between people seen from a nativist point of view and external groups, composed of both foreign and domestic elites. Sovereignism is also associated with another concept, i.e. Euro-skepticism, commonly used to indicate the broad subset of attitudes, opinions and political positions in contrast to the European Union and the integration process (Krouwel, Abts, 2007).

III. Authoritarianism – this term is used by Mudde to refer to “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely.”
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(Mudde, 2007: 23). This principle is associated with a mentality, or rather, a cultural and psychological approach, based on the principles of "law and order". This undermines one of the cardinal values of our liberal-democratic societies, which are based on cultural pluralism. These attitudes can be found in both the programmatic approaches and the communication strategies of the populist radical-right leaders. These politicians place particular emphasis on issues such as the strict application of the law and the “zero tolerance” principle against transgressors - topics that are often linked to the immigration issue. Their idea is that the law does not punish offenders as heavily as it should, when it should.

As mentioned above, the political forces that support these views have largely succeeded in the elections that took place all across Europe. The Italian case, however, may seem even more emblematic, since the negative rhetoric concerning immigration has increased significantly in just one year (2018), when the number of arrivals greatly decreased, as explained below.

2. The issue of migrant reception in Italy and beyond: critical and positive aspects

2.1 Data analysis

Arrivals

Over the past four years, the severe crisis that has been affecting many countries of the African continent, as well as a large area of the Middle East, has generated a massive flow of migrants applying for international protection in Europe, with many arrivals in Greece and Italy through the Mediterranean and over 1 million people disembarked in 2015. Italy has had to sustain a migratory pressure of considerable proportions and intensity starting from 2014, when the number of migrants arrived on the Italian coast exceeded 170,000 units. In 2015, approximately 154,000 migrants had reached Italy by sea; in 2016, the highest figure recorded was exceeding 181,000 arrivals, including 26,000 unaccompanied minors. The year 2017 marked a significant drop, with 119,000 migrants arriving on the Italian shores.

During the first nine months of 2018, over 90,000 migrants landed in Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus. The flow to Italy decreased by 80% compared to that recorded in the same period of the previous year: from 1 January to 10 October 2018, 21,000 migrants arrived on the Italian shores, while in 2017 they were over 107,000. Still in 2018, we can observe a change in the nationalities of the people landing: most of them are Tunisian (4,700 people), Eritrean, Sudanese, and Pakistani, while the Nigerians move down to the sixth place in the ranking.

The number of unaccompanied minors among the people landed remains significant in relative terms: in the first nine months of 2018, they constituted 15% of the total (i.e. 3,254 unaccompanied minors arrived between January and 1 October). Although we can observe a decrease in the number of unaccompanied minors compared to the over 24,800 of 2016 and the almost 16,000 of 2017, in 2018 they still represent a relevant portion of migrants. For this reason, we can understand the importance of the new 47/2017 law.
containing the provisions for the protection of unaccompanied foreign minors. One year after its enforcement, one of the aspects that best worked, along with the support of foster care as an alternative to reception centers, concerns the figure of the voluntary guardian, who represents the civil society's response to the needs of these minors. On 23 February 2018, the Italian Authority for Children and Adolescents counted 3,981 citizens who had filed an application and participated in training courses in view of a possible designation by the Juvenile Court. We can count 700 applications in the Lazio region, 589 in Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta, 581 in Lombardy and 265 in Sicily. The applicants are above all women (3 out of 5) with an average age of 40 to 50 years old. Most of them have a degree, gained mainly in the fields of law, education and health.

Finally, the decision of the Italian government to close the ports (see points 2.3 and 2.4) has caused a rise in the number of migrants brought back to Libya’s shores: many are the boats carrying migrants and intercepted by the Libyan coast guard, which has the official priority to intervene over other vessels (whether commercial or belonging to NGOs that are active in the Sicily channel). UNHCR reports that in the week from 21 to 28 June, 2,425 people were intercepted during sea rescue operations and then returned to Libya. The peak was touched on June 24, when almost a thousand soldiers saved in a single day returned to that country. Besides, migrants are more and more likely to die in the vain attempt to leave Libya.

Reception

Migratory pressure, along with a high number of asylum-seekers, has had a considerable impact on the national reception system. However, since a drop in the arrivals by sea in the summer of 2017, that impact grew less dramatic: if on December 31, 2017 the reported number of migrants was 183,000 (the highest figure in recent years), at the end of December 2018 it fell to 135,858, 14% of which in the facilities of the Lombardy region (18,582).

Asylum applications

Data from the Ministry of the Interior on the number of asylum applications submitted in Italy indicate that in 2017 these applications totaled 130,000 units – which means the highest number recorded since 1997 and more than twice as many people compared to four years ago. However, in the first nine months of 2018, there was a significant drop, with over 44,000 asylum applications submitted between January and September, namely 58% less than in the same period the year before. The requests presented by unaccompanied minors remain significant: in 2017, there were 9,782 of them, registering a record high (they were in fact 2,500 in 2014) and 73.5% more than in 2016. In the first nine months of 2018, 3,343 unaccompanied minors applied for asylum, accounting for 7.6% of all requests.

Out of the approximately 71,000 applications examined between January and September 2018, the majority did not fall through: denials represent almost two thirds of the outcomes (an upward trend compared to the previous year). 5,000 migrants have obtained the refugee status (7% of the total), while many were granted humanitarian protection, i.e. over 18,000 people; besides, 3,000 people obtained subsidiary protection.

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With regard to relocation, the data referring to the period from September 2015 to September 30, 2018 indicate that 12,707 migrants applying for international protection were transferred from Italy to another EU Member State. These migrants were mostly Eritrean citizens (95% of the cases). Among the relocated, just over 1,100 were accompanied minors, while 260 were unaccompanied. Germany received most applicants for international protection and relocated 43% of them on its territory.

Repatrification and expulsions

From August 1, 2017 to July 31, 2018, forced returns amounted to 6,833 – they amounted to 6,378 in the same period the year before – while the assisted voluntary returns recorded totaled 596. Besides, 108 people were expelled from Italy for security reasons, while in the period from August 1, 2016 to July 31, 2017 the people expelled equaled a total of 96.

2.3 Rescues, solidarity and control

If we look at the events of 2018, we cannot help but notice how the tendency towards the “criminalization of solidarity” is alarmingly increasing. To cite just a few examples, we can consider the case of Benoit Ducos, a French citizen who helped a family cross the Italian-French border at the Montgenèvre, in the mountains. The migrant woman, who was eight and a half month pregnant, was brought by the man to the nearest hospital, where she gave birth to her baby only a few hours after the rescue. Benoit Ducos was later interrogated by border police with the accusation of having “enabled illegal immigration” through the transportation of undocumented persons (May 10, 2018).

Another emblematic example of the above-mentioned tendency was in May 2018 when Hungary introduced a law criminalizing efforts made by either citizens or organizations to help and rescue undocumented migrants. The law created a new criminal offence punishing with imprisonment anyone who would help migrants in any way, for example by providing food or even by giving information on how to apply for asylum.

The accusation of “conspiracy to facilitate illegal immigration” was made against NGOs that use their boats to rescue migrants in the Mediterranean: between March and April 2018, the Spanish NGO rescue ship “Proactiva Open Arms” was seized by the Catania and Ragusa prosecutors and then released. The investigation was opened by the Italian authorities on the basis of some disagreements concerning the way search and rescue operations had been conducted on March 15, 2018 off the Libyan coasts: the above-mentioned NGO was accused of having carried out operations in a search and rescue region for which Libya was the competent authority. However, the seizure order was later withdrawn, thus showing that the rescue ship could not have – and should not have – handed over the migrants to the Libyan coast guard, since Libya is not a safe country for migrants, who risk facing human rights violations once on the Libyan territory.¹ On June 20, 2018, the

¹ These violations have been recorded, among others, by the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) entitled Detained and Dehumanised. Report on Human Rights.
charges against the Spanish NGO were dismissed. In both cases – problems at the Italian-French border and NGOs rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean – some people have mobilized in defense of the cause by launching the campaign “Sea rescue is not a crime” on social media channels. A similar negative attitude towards NGO’s search and rescue operations can be found in the decision of Italy’s newly formed government to close its ports to NGO’s ships rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean. In this regard, the way the rescue vessel Aquarius incident played out was emblematic. In June 2018, after being banned from Italian ports, Aquarius headed to Spain, as it offered to take the 600 migrants the ship had rescued in the Strait of Sicily. The decision to “close the ports” produced a series of negative effects as it inevitably harmed the health conditions of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean and compromised the chance of saving lives at sea.

Another case that we must mention is that of the Italian coastguard ship Diciotti. On August 16, 2018, Diciotti rescued 177 migrants (among which women and unaccompanied minors) from an overcrowded boat a few miles from the island Lampedusa. Clearly, the purpose of the Italian government was to make other EU countries receive the migrants. However, this exercise of power raised serious doubts from a juridical and humanitarian point of view and in terms of relocation of asylum seekers. Although a turn of events was observed only after some EU counties started receiving the rescued migrants, it is safe to say that this kind of solutions cannot truly manage the flows, considering that these movements are not isolated events. In fact, a similar pattern should not be adopted – a pattern according to which the Italian authorities have to refuse to allow migrant ships to enter their ports and, only afterwards, other EU countries can be asked to receive them. Besides, as far as rescue at sea is concerned, disembarking people at the nearest safe port does not have to be the only rule to follow. As is the case with the right to asylum, according to which all EU States can decide to receive asylum seekers and relieve the country of first arrival from its reception obligation (e.g. Germany receiving Syrians in 2015), each EU State can open its ports and relieve the nearest safe country of arrival from accepting the migrants. Nevertheless, it is essential that search and rescue operations be conducted in compliance with specific measures. The attitude of the Italian government, however, represents a very new way of managing the phenomenon, as we will discuss further on in this report.

3. The influence of the migration issue in the 2018 Italian general elections and legislation

As we know, the 2018 Italian general elections resulted in a hung parliament, where none of the three main political groups (the center-right alliance, the center-left alliance, and the Five Star Movement) managed to achieve a parliamentary majority. If we look at the results and consider the different attitudes towards migration, we can see that 37%...
of the electorate voted for the center-right coalition (with its strong anti-immigration leanings represented by the League party and the FdI – Brothers of Italy party) and another 32.7% for the Five Star Movement (moderately against immigration), for a total of 7 voters out of 10. Only 24.7% voted for parties having pro-immigration views, i.e. the Democratic Party (Pd), the Free and Equal party (LeU), and the More Europe party (+Europe).

The law decree of October 4, 2018, n. 113, converted in law of 1 December 2018 n. 132, introduced many changes regarding the regulation of international protection and immigration. For instance, residency permits for humanitarian reasons are no longer issued – and this represents a radical change, considering that around 20-25% of the asylum applications in the past few years did grant such permit. As for the reception system, the Italian Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) will now only receive migrants who have been granted the refugee status and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (besides unaccompanied foreign minors). Asylum seekers will have to wait for their request to be fulfilled in preliminary reception centers. Furthermore, irregular migrants will have to spend a maximum of 180 days (instead of 90 days) in Repatriation Centers (the Italian CPR) before returning to their countries.

All of these new restrictive measures, however, appear to have critical consequences. Thanks to humanitarian permits, many migrants avoided becoming irregular, as among the ones who could not be granted international protection, many were however given the opportunity of integrating in the Italian society. By eliminating the humanitarian permit, thousands of migrants will become irregular stayers on the Italian territory. A de-escalation of the role played by the system granting international protection means a de-escalation of the part played by authorities, which were nevertheless handling the matter rather successfully. Therefore, preliminary reception centers will be the ones dealing with the situation, despite being the subject of controversies – as they are usually too big and too costly if we consider what they can actually accomplish. As for the extension of the time limit for staying in Repatriation Centers, there are no studies proving that it will result in a rising number of illegal migrants leaving Italy. Besides, we cannot help but mention how hard it has been for many EU States to implement forced returns, and that was because of their inability to offer their African counterparts fair deals to conclude readmission agreements. In fact, we believe that Europe should open a long-term dialogue with all the different and important realities of present-day Africa.

4. Migrations, Africa and Europe

Because of its current geopolitical centrality, Africa has assumed great importance in the European political debate on migration. Although slightly less than the record high hit in 2015 and in 2016 during the so-called “migration crisis”, the flows from Africa to the EU are still at the heart of the European migration policy. For this reason, ISMU has decided to start, within its strategic line of research “Migrations and the future of Europe”, a thematic think tank specifically dedicated to Africa. By constantly monitoring data and studying all the political developments related to migrations towards and from Africa, we would like to paint an informed general picture that will help establish a dialogue between research and policy-making. In order to fully understand the phenomenon, it is necessary
to examine the data first. In terms of stock, the demographic growth that Africa is experiencing is the reason why there is a general increase in migrants. In fact, if the number of African citizens residing abroad has remained rather stable in relative terms, the number is strongly increasing in absolute terms. Population growth entails economic growth, with high peaks in countries such as the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Kenya, where GDP increased by 8.5%, 6.6% and 6% in 2016. This increase, however, does not mean greater inclusiveness or a better redistribution of wealth. When confronted with economies that are increasingly expanding but that, at the same time, have many structural limits, millions of African citizens choose to migrate in search of better socio-economic conditions, especially towards other African countries. In fact, 53% of people migrate within the continent (19.4 million people), which means that a considerable part of the African migration happens inside of Africa. Some leave their country in order to find new opportunities; some other are victims of conflicts and instability and flee to find refuge in adjacent territories. In 2016, Africa received some 5.3 million refugees from African countries. Most of these found refuge in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the same time, 12.6 million Africans were internally displaced, or forced to move to another area of their country, mostly to Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, South Sudan and Somalia. This situation ends up making the European “migration crisis” look less alarming, with a total of around 705,000 asylum applications filed in Europe in 2017. These data can also help policy-makers plan – in the medium and long term – humanitarian aid programs in African countries where refugees from adjacent countries are received. It is important to work in order to prevent humanitarian refugee camps from being opened in the very precarious social and health conditions that the British writer Ben Rawlence documented (2018) in his description of the Kenyan refugee camp of Dadaab (which welcomes over 235,000 people).

With regard to the issue of political instability, the picture is as complex as it is heterogeneous, since it shows both weak States and States that succeeded in creating solid and efficient institutions (see Medici et al., 2017). The international press enthusiastically welcomed the cooperation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which started after having settled the territorial disputes that had erupted along their borders. However, we still do not know how this peace is going to affect migratory flows, considering that the instability that both Ethiopia and Eritrea have to face has produced two of the most massive displacements of migrants in the region. Having managed to ease cross-border tensions, the two countries should focus on the development of a sustainable and inclusive economy – a scenario that is strongly encouraged by the EU, which would like to create bilateral relations with Eritrea to reduce its migratory flows. While on the one hand we can generally observe some positive developments, on the other we can see a deterioration of stability in some West African countries: we can in fact speak of an “overturned Africa”. In particular, Nigeria has to face even more instability because of the presence of Boko Haram, against which the Nigerian government has deployed its army – with both victories and defeats, thus shaking Nigerians’ confidence in the government. Cameroon, too, is involved in a fight against the same terrorist group. Political instability also affects several States of the vast Sahel region, where there are groups affiliated with ISIS (Mali and Niger, where another Italian missionary, Father Pierluigi Maccarelli, was kidnapped on September 17, 2018), and with Al Qaeda (Mali), as well as other local independent groups (Chad, Niger,
Cameroon). Large areas of that territory are under the control of armed gangs, which happen to manage drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and even the trade in natural resources, as the local governments are not able to stop them. The situations mentioned above show that many areas of the African continent are still affected by conflicts. This, along with the widespread poverty, is the reason why many people choose to leave their country, even if they know that their migratory journey will encounter many risks, especially while crossing the African continent. In fact, Africa is not just a place migrants flee; it is also a continent of transit. According to the 2017 Frontex data on irregular migrants at border crossing points (BCPs), a substantial share of illegal flows by sea (through the Mediterranean to southern Europe and across the Atlantic Ocean to the Canary Islands) is made up of citizens of the Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, two countries are at the center of the European political debate on irregular transits in Africa: Libya and Niger. The decrease in irregular arrivals from Africa to Europe recorded over the past two years can be explained thanks to a renewed cooperation with the Libyan authorities and a progressive implementation of the reception and repatriation centers in Niger. This system of repatriation for irregular migrants, however, does not always seem to work. On the one hand, it is true that the Libyan coastguard can be relied upon; on the other, however, the UN and the EU have officially recognized the dire conditions that migrants have to face after being received by Libya. For this reason, with the help of other international actors, such as IOM, they have started transferring some of the migrants disembarked in Libya back to their home countries. The events of summer 2018 have exacerbated this paradox and increased the debate on cooperation with third countries. As for the intervention in Niger – which is the second poorest country in the world, i.e. 187th out of 188 – it was regarded by some as a good emergency management practice, thanks to the construction of many temporary residences across the desert. As for the conditions of Libya, they are notoriously precarious, with a public administration increasingly split between parallel governments and rival militia. In particular, the diplomatic impasse due to the fact that ships operated by humanitarian groups had been banned from landing rescued migrants in Libya and that some migrants fleeing Libya were taken back there has raised the following question: is Libya a safe port for migrants? In this regard, the European Commission has clarified that, as of today, Libya cannot be considered a “safe port”. It also stated that it would be able to agree to migrants landing in third countries only if “migrants” lives were not endangered and migrants’ need for food and a proper healthcare had been satisfied”.

Regarding the EU’s commitment to the crucial issue of migration, the adoption of the 2015 European Migration Agenda can be considered a very significant event. In particular, the Agenda proposes interventions aimed at fighting irregular migration by working on the “root causes of migration” (i.e. civil war, persecution, inequality, unemployment and climate change) and on the promotion of legal migration channels. The EU has adopted several instruments to implement the Agenda in Africa. Among them, it is worth mentioning the Trust Fund for Africa, established to improve cooperation with the countries of origin by financing capacity-building projects relating to many social policy areas (security, border control, fight against unemployment, food security, etc.) in North Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel/Lake Chad. Another important tool is the EU External Investment Plan launched in September 2017 with an initial EU investment of 4.1 billion euros aimed at collecting more than 44 billion euros from individuals.
With respect to the European strategy for Africa's development, investments will play a key role in future years. As suggested by the founder of Microsoft and philanthropist Bill Gates, African population growth will force European donors to reshape their development policy towards that continent. In particular, in order to limit the increase in migratory flows from Africa, the EU should guarantee strategic investments. To prevent situations of emergency from arising in that continent, and therefore to stop people from going away, it is necessary to invest more in the human capital represented by the new generations. Engaging in sectors such as education and healthcare would result in an increase in voluntary behaviors aimed at curbing population growth – which would definitely be beneficial.

To complete the picture on the African migratory reality, it is also necessary to focus on its positive aspects. The presence of African citizens in other States of the same continent and in Europe means that diasporas have great significance. Money transfers (“remittances”) during diasporas are historically an important financial source for the countries of origin and largely exceed the aid granted by the official development assistance. In 2017, the value of the remittances towards low- and middle-income countries reached $466 billion, while public development aid was a total of $146 billion. It is interesting to note that the flow of remittances is increasing again (+8.5% between 2016 and 2017, +0.8% between 2015 and 2016) after several years of stagnation and decline. Nevertheless, the EU does not seem to believe that diasporas should be taken into consideration when it comes to the governance of economic development policies. Following public consultations, the European Commission put forward a legislative proposal with the aim of extending the scope of the Regulation on fees applied to cross-border payments to third countries.

This initiative is fundamental to maximize the effects of public and private aid to the development of African countries, but it will not work if a stronger ownership of diasporas is not guaranteed within local development projects. Structural reforms in remittances are necessary in African law systems, as the cost of sending money to sub-Saharan Africa is the highest in the world (9.5% for sending $200, as of the last quarter of 2015). In order to fully exploit the potential of diasporas, it is essential to pursue a strategy based on the importance of their role in the development of the countries of arrival, of transit and of origin.

5. The European Union and the migration crisis

In 2017, elections were held in many important EU Member States and EU right-wing parties, along with anti-immigration positions, saw an increase in popularity. One year after, in 2018, the EU became the center of the public debate. In fact, political-institutional terms such as “Dublin” or “Schengen” became commonly known. If we consider these two past years, we can observe how the difficulties encountered by the EU in adopting appropriate measures for managing the flows of asylum seekers have been undermining the institutional architecture of the European project. Despite numerous appeals requesting more solidarity towards Italy and despite the promises made by Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron at a summit held in Rome in July 2017, there have been no significant developments in that area, and a climate of general dissatisfaction still remains. In this
regard, the case of the reform of asylum policies is emblematic. In 2016, the European Commission published a series of proposals aimed at reforming the European asylum system substantially, in order to create greater homogeneity and greater solidarity between Member States. There are 7 legislative proposals that constitute the asylum reform and they touch on issues such as the harmonization of reception standards and the creation of a European asylum agency. On the table, there is also the reform of the so-called “Dublin system”, which still fails to be agreed upon, although the Presidents of the European Council have tried, in turn, to continue talks on the reform of what is deemed an unfair system – i.e. the country in which an asylum seeker first arrives is the one responsible for processing the asylum application. This rule was established in the 1990s in order to avoid the so-called “asylum-shopping” phenomenon and ensure that asylum seekers had their application processed in at least one European country. This system, however, had not been designed for the management of massive and sudden flows of asylum seekers such as those occurred in the period 2014-2016. In particular, EU States at the external borders of the Union, being the ones facing the arrivals, had to handle the impact of the initial reception. The reform proposed by the European Commission in 2016 aimed at modifying the distribution of asylum seekers through the establishment of a compulsory relocation mechanism. The proposal immediately aroused strong opposition from the so-called Visegrad Group – i.e. Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – for which the relocation mechanism constitutes an unacceptable violation of their sovereignty. In order to face this opposition, the presidencies of the Dutch, Slovak, Maltese and Estonian councils tried to find a solution, but failed. At the beginning of 2018, under the pressure of Germany and Sweden, Bulgaria elaborated a compromise text, discussed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) on 4-5 June 2018, aiming at creating a bridge between the so-called “frontline Member States” – mainly Italy and Greece – and the Member States of the Visegrad group.

This text calls for the application of the relocation mechanism in the event of a crisis, but without binding quotas and with possible exceptions. However, instead of creating the conditions for a unanimous consensus, it has strengthened the opposition to this Reform, later creating a coalition between countries opposed to the proposal. Italy, represented by the new Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, immediately expressed its opposition to the text, along with Austria, Spain, the Baltic countries, and the Visegrad group. Germany also stated at a European Council meeting in June 2018 that it would not support it unless substantially amended. These events threw the ruling coalition in Germany into disarray, therefore creating divisions between Angela Merkel, leader of the CDU party, and her Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer, Merkel’s Bavarian ally and leader of the CSU party. In the days following the meeting at the Justice and Home Affairs Council, Italian Minister Salvini announced he would start working with Seehofer and his Austrian counterpart for the presentation of a counter-proposal. The result of this difficult process was the compromise reached at the European Council meeting of 27-28 June 2018, at the end of which the new Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, solemnly announced that Italy was no longer alone. Many aspects of the conclusions reached by the European Council are, however, unsatisfactory: to name a few, the way NGOs are treated, the choice to still adhere to the agreement with Turkey, as well as the actual intentions behind the cooperation and development plan outlined with various African countries. Nevertheless,
those conclusions turned out to be nothing but guiding principles and do not have immediate operational effectiveness. It will be up to the European Commission to put forward concrete proposals approved by the Member States. In particular, at least three aspects of the above-mentioned compromise must be highlighted. Firstly, it is clearly enunciated in the text that it will only be possible to derogate from the Dublin regime on a voluntary basis. This provision casts doubts on the effective sharing of the burden between Member States, which are unwilling to accept more than what strictly established by the European legislation.

Secondly, the conclusions evoke the concept of a “regional landing platform”, which could finally have Italy’s desired effect to reduce flows to its shores. However, the solution to outsource border control raises a series of questions regarding the feasibility of this option as well as its ethical implications. From a feasibility point of view, providing other sovereign countries with platforms undoubtedly means to ask for their consent. Ensuring bilateral border control in exchange for financial support may not be enough any more. Libya, Tunisia, and, in general, the African Union, but also Albania, have already taken position against this proposal. Apart from Libya, which lacks a central authority able to grant control along its borders, the countries mentioned above must face socio-economic problems as well as the emigration of many unemployed young citizens. In this context, we must wonder what would happen to those who are denied protection. The difficulties that the EU has to face to repatriate those who do not receive protection are very well known and it is therefore likely that the third countries hosting these platforms will encounter similar problems. As a result, these people would be forced to stay in “transit” countries or, rather, find other ways to continue their migration path – which means looking for alternative (probably dangerous and illegal) routes. Consequently, the creation of these platforms does not seem to act as an incentive to get to sign an agreement with the EU. However, if these centers were actually established, it would become necessary to decide where to relocate the beneficiaries of international protection once granted the refugee status. In the absence of an agreement on their distribution within the Union, which Member State would be assigned the responsibility for said distribution? Is it correct to believe that such distribution would be determined on a voluntary basis? Besides, from an ethical point of view, we should ask whether these platforms are in line with the international human rights law. If the people rescued at sea are taken to these platforms, both the principle of non-refoulement and the right for everyone to leave one’s country run the risk of not being respected. UNHCR and IOM play a key role in the refugee status determination. However, it is not enough to ensure the full respect for human rights. That is why Leonard Doyle, the IOM spokesperson, claims that these centers should be created mainly in Europe, also in the light of the conditions of similar centers in Libya. Doyle adds that, in the event that these centers are built beyond EU borders, they should fulfill certain standards and be subject to rigorous international monitoring.

The third aspect, which is extremely important as it concerns the issue of solidarity between European States, is the financial commitment of the EU. As a matter of fact, the multi-annual budget currently under negotiation presents a significant increase in the resources allocated for migration management and border control. While funding for these expenditure items in the 2014-2020 period amounted to 12.4 billion, funding for the period 2021-2027 will total around 33 billion, which means that the budget will almost triple. This rise will also mean greater solidarity, at least from a financial point of view, but
it is still not sure if it is going to be sufficient to share the cost of reception. If we consider that a large share of the general public and many EU parties are critical of the phenomenon of migration, these measures, however useful, are not enough to guarantee a reception of migrants based on the sharing of EU States’ responsibility. Nevertheless, in the absence of a valid proposal aimed at reforming the Dublin system, solidarity between Member States is currently likely to be expressed only in financial terms.

Because of Italy’s continuous requests to its European partners, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, in his State of the Union speech on 12 September 2018, announced that EU policies would be strengthened with the aim of overcoming the current situation and guarantee a more lasting solidarity. He formulated the following ambitious proposals: a) strengthening both border control and the Coast Guard, with an addition of 10,000 new units by 2020; b) further equipping the EU Asylum Agency (EASO) with new tools and adequate financial means; c) improving return procedures in order to further limit irregular secondary movements; d) implementing new legal ways to Europe. These proposals were then discussed at the informal summit of Heads of State or Government in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018, during which most Member States supported the proposed strengthening of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, while four countries – Greece, Italy, Spain and Hungary – took position against it, arguing that it would violate their sovereignty.

8. Building a stronger and more united EU

After having examined the EU in 2018, it is necessary to highlight, once again, the need for a stronger and more united Union, also in view of a better management of migration flows. To this end, internal border controls should not be reintroduced – as instead suggested by nationalistic groups. However, it would be necessary to reinforce controls at the external borders, but without of course promoting the anachronistic concept of a “fortress Europe”. Safe borders, in fact, do not mean close borders. Closing borders would create serious problems, such as the end of free circulation within the EU, an increase in smuggling, a rise in the attempts to enter EU countries illegally, as well as a limit to human mobility. The EU should therefore adopt shared, clear, universalistic, non-discriminatory rules for managing entries into its territory, without forgetting that it was Europe that first laid out the universal and inalienable human rights of each living person. Therefore, we must underline once again how security does not mean closure.

As for the migration issue, the role that Italy has been playing so far has been fundamental; nevertheless, it is likewise essential that every other European country takes on its responsibilities. This means, for instance, starting to implement the redistribution of migrants in a fair and equitable way. Many EU Member States have not begun yet, while others, especially those of the Visegrad group, refuse to even take it into consideration. If Italy is left alone in the management of flows, it is not because of decisions made by the European Commission – which, in truth, has always been in favor of the redistribution of immigrants. It is not the European Parliament’s lack of initiative either, as it had already approved a revision of the Dublin Regulation. The real issue is that, since the final call has to be made by the single Member States within the Council of the EU, Italy ends up being left alone – as happened during operation Sophia. With reference to this military mission,
Managing Migration: a Test for the European Union

in fact, Italy’s proposal to change its disembarkment rules (proposal presented at the summit of the European Union Defense Ministers, held in Vienna on August 31, 2018) was rejected. The request was for other EU Members to receive rescued migrants (who total 45,000 units from 2014 until today) in their ports, too, considering that Italy was usually being left alone in facing the arrivals.

These events highlight the Italian Government’s need (and duty) to ask all Member States to change their attitudes. Italy should draw up a concrete proposal and look for the support of other EU States, such as those from Southern Europe, that are put in a similar position as Italy’s. Therefore, closing ports and borders does not seem to be the right solution, as it would not stop illegal migration from taking place. As of today, in Italy there is a total of 533,000 people regarded as irregular and unable to return to their home country either voluntarily or forcibly.

Building a stronger and more united European Union is desirable not only to better manage migratory flows, but also in the light of two considerations regarding the global geopolitical context. The first has to do with the United States and Russia’s attitudes towards Europe. It is indeed quite clear that both are interested in heightening the already existing tensions within the EU. In fact, these two superpowers would rather hope for a weaker Europe instead of promoting a united and strong Union. The second consideration concerns the new economic and sociopolitical situation. If Europe is able to keep in line with the sociopolitical context, it will definitely become the most important interlocutor representing the interests of the whole continent. An even stronger and more united Europe would face the challenges posed by a non-stopable globalization, such as the current global phenomenon of migration, in a more effective way. Besides, it would manage to negotiate more favorable selling conditions for European products.

A weak and divided Europe, on the contrary, would not only become the object of disputes among the great world powers; it would also bring out new and old conflicts between European States – as history eloquently demonstrates.

Contrary to what erroneously believed, a more united and stronger Europe will not jeopardize the States’ national and sub-national single identities, whose legacies have to be preserved and promoted with more commitment than ever. This is of fundamental importance, especially in an era of growing uncertainty, when people tend to cling to their individual identities. Since people are today less likely to find their own identity in religious beliefs or even in the ideas of traditional political parties, territorial identities, emphasized by nationalistic movements, are becoming more and more valuable to many. However, it is safe to say that different, even though complementary, identities are perfectly able to coexist (the so-called “multiple identities” or “hyphenated identities”, e.g. Italian American) within a cultural pluralism that is at the basis of democracy. As far as cultural differences are concerned, a research (Alesina et al., 2017) shows that the differences between 16 EU States are not more relevant than those between the single citizens of each country examined.

The urgent need to strengthen and unite the EU is being challenged by a fall in the support of European institutions. This widespread disaffection was confirmed by the outcome of the national elections held in Sweden on 9 September 2018, which saw the advance of anti-European and anti-immigration political parties (17.6%). However, it is worth noting that, at least for now, the social and political majorities in Sweden do not identify with those views.
In order to make EU citizens believe in the European institutions again, Europe should first question itself and make an effort to examine both the positive and the negative aspects of what it has done so far. Then, it should attentively plan what to do next. As for the migration issue, it is first of all necessary to put in place a strategy aimed at reassuring the European population that expresses concern, or even fear, for this phenomenon. To this end, the EU should adopt specific measures demonstrating its ability to manage the phenomenon – always by guaranteeing the respect for each person’s dignity.

Many EU citizens are experiencing a general feeling of uncertainty and this is regarded as the cause of their fears, their precariousness, their risks, their difficulties in finding a job and their perception of an increase in crime. Of course, we cannot deny that migration poses many questions, whose answer are not always easy to find, but we cannot deny its importance, either. Migration is a resource that Europe has to manage properly. Anti-immigration attitudes generate hate and racism. Hence, the fundamental need for a correct communication, especially mass media communication. The issue of migration must be faced by all EU States with the aim of finding shared solutions. In this way, the new generations of citizens will be guaranteed internal mobility (e.g. thanks to the Erasmus Program) within a society that is open and at the same time characterized by a clear and efficient migration policy.

The young citizens of the EU are indeed the future of the EU and that is why it is vital that they never forget to respect the values embedded in the EU Treaty: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law.

References

2. Statistical Aspects

Gian Carlo Blangiardo

1. Over ten percent

On January 1st 2018 in Italy there were 6,108,000 foreigners. For a country with 60,484,000 residents this means passing the symbolic threshold of one foreigner every ten residents.¹ In 84% of cases, these are people who are regularly listed in the Population Registry Office of an Italian municipality. To this, we must add 7% of regular immigrants who are not (or not yet) “officially registered” and a further 9% (533,000 units) of those who are in an irregular position, as they lack a valid permit to stay (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of presence</th>
<th>1.1.2016</th>
<th>1.1.2017</th>
<th>1.1.2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>5,026</td>
<td>5,047</td>
<td>5,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular non residents</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregulars</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total presences</td>
<td>5,871</td>
<td>5,958</td>
<td>6,108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis and estimates on ISTAT data

Compared with the same figures on January 1st 2017, presences have risen by 2.5%, but the previous year the variation was smaller (+1.5%). This rise seems to be due primarily to the increase in irregular presences (+8.6%) mainly as a result of the number of unauthorised arrivals on Italian coasts, which has fallen but is still significant.

If we restrict our analysis to regularly residents in Italy – i.e. those listed in the Population Register and who are also, generally, the more stable and well-established component – according to the ISTAT’s 2017 figures (ISTAT, 2018) on January 1st 2018 their number was 5,144,000 units, or 8.5% of all residents. Compared with 2016, the absolute rise in foreigners was 97,000 units, with a growth that is greater compared to the previous year, but ought to be considered modest if compared with the peaks of 300-400,000 units recorded in recent years.

On the other hand, we ought to remember – and underline – that this is a figure which is largely determined by the significant and persistent number of newly acquired Italian citizenships. In 2017, 147,000 new citizens were registered which, albeit in slight decrease compared with the continuous rise in citizenship acquisitions which had led to its highest figure of 202,000 in 2016, confirms the vast scale of migratory projects which

¹ This figure falls from 10.15% to 9.99% if we compare the number of foreign presences with what EURO-STAT defines as “Usually resident” – according to a concept of residency that goes beyond Registry Office data – and whose total can be estimated in 61,157,000 units on 1.1.2018 (Blangiardo, 2018: 65).
Statistical Aspects

have reached their final phase, where individuals and families acquire permanent member status in their host community. This is a trend which looks like it is destined to persist over time: the estimates of the ISMU Foundation suggest that, in the 2018-2020 period, the number of immigrants who will be granted citizenship status will fall somewhere between 470,000 and 560,000 units; this figure rises to somewhere between 1.6 and 1.9 million over the next ten years (2018-2027).

2. The determinants behind flows and variations in presences

No doubt the massive number of new citizenship acquisitions represents one of the most important innovations in contemporary migratory dynamics, and appears likely to remain an element of contrast to the rise in Italy’s immigrant population. It is also true, however, that this presence still finds important push factors both in the positive contribution of the natural balance, supported by the number of births – which has, however, begun to contract since 2012 (from 80,000 to 68,000 in 2017) – both in the persistent surplus of foreigners produced by the immigration balance, whose figure for 2017 presents a slight increase compared with the mean value of the previous 3-year period (Table 2).

Table 2. Components of the balance of Italy’s resident foreign population (yearly average in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Natural balance (births-deaths)</th>
<th>Immigrant balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2016</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

Indeed, whereas, on one hand, the acquisition of citizenship status contributes to redesigning the composition, and background, of the Italian population, the parallel development of new flows in the international arena has introduced, for some time now, elements of instability in the management of migrations and signals changes in the structure of the immigrant component. It is not coincidental that during the 4-year period 2014-2017 – when the phenomena of mass immigration on Italian coasts was greatest – the stock of foreign residents in Italy increased, especially in terms of persons coming from Central Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent (Table 3).

It is unsurprising, therefore, that in the 3-year period 2014-2016 places and beneficiaries of the SPRAR programme (System for the Protection of Refugees and Asylum Seekers) have more than doubled, and the number of immigrants present in dedicated shelters has more than trebled overall: 177,000 at the end of 2016, of whom 77% in Extraordinary Welcome Shelters (CAS). Their rise during 2017, however, has been much more limited: numbers have gone up to little more than 180,000 presences on December 31st, prevalently in CAS shelters. This is a change determined by the significant reduction in arrivals
by sea starting in July 2017. This phenomena brought the yearly balance of new arrivals to 119,000, with a fall of 34% compared with the same figure in 2016.

Even considering the fall of coastal arrivals, which seems most likely to persist in 2018, the common denominator of economic motivations seems to apply both to older and more recent immigrants in Italy. The national profile of those who arrived on Italian coasts in the 2014-2017 period highlights the progressive reduction of a Middle Eastern presence and a growth of those from Subsaharian Africa. Syrians, which in 2014 represented one fourth of total coastal arrivals, went down to 5% in 2015 and in 2016 disappeared among the main nationalities involved in this phenomenon. At the same time Nigerians reached the top of the list (from 5% in 2014 to 21% in 2016 with a slight decrease to 15% in 2017) as have Bangladeshis.

Table 3. National origin of foreigners registered as residents in Italy by macro region. On January 1st in 2014 and 2018 (values in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro regions</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Variations % (*)</th>
<th>Most represented countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU 28</td>
<td>1.442</td>
<td>1.562</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>Romania, Poland, Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Eastern Europa</td>
<td>1.131</td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td>-7,4</td>
<td>Albania, Ukraine, Moldavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-4,3</td>
<td>Switzerland, San Marino, Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>-3,0</td>
<td>Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>34,9</td>
<td>Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-2,9</td>
<td>Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Southern Africa</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>Cameroon, Congo RD, Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24,4</td>
<td>Georgia, Iran, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Southern Asia</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>16,1</td>
<td>India, Bangladesh, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>China RP, the Philippines, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>USA, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center and South America</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>-3,9</td>
<td>Peru, Ecuador, Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2,3</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, Papua N.G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.922</td>
<td>5.144</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Values have been calculated on data not rounded to thousands.

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

3. From the age of amnesties to the age of repatriations?

In the debate on immigration, dutifully and responsibly, one ought always to intervene with an adequate and objective knowledge of reality and its dynamics. The support provided by statistical data, therefore, is fundamental, both for those who want to back their argument, as for those who want to refute false affirmations whose sole basis are unreliable media sources. In what follows, the present chapter shall try, using appropriate statistical data, to offer elements on a particularly relevant and popular topic regarding the
contemporary migratory phenomena: the presence of irregular migrants on Italian soil and measures to ensure their control, also in quantitative terms.

As aforementioned (Table 1), the number of foreign citizens who live in Italy without a valid permit to stay is estimated in 533,000 units on January 1st 2018. This number reflects, for the fifth year running, a growth trend among the irregular component which began in 2013, when the mitigating effects of the last amnesty of 2012 came to an end. After the fluctuations generated as a result of 30 years of regularizations (some more “explicit”, other more “de facto”) which affected 2.8 million people (Bonuomo e Paparusso, 2018) – from the 5,000 cases of the Di Giesi Law in 1982 to the 99,000 of the DL.109/2012, passing by the 647,000 of the Bossi-Fini Law of 2002, without forgetting the 444,000 “newly regular” migrants generated by the extension of the EU in 2007 – the relationship between irregular presences and the total number of foreigners resident in Italy, seemed to stabilize around one number figures, reaching its lowest point at 6.7% at the beginning of 2013. Since then, however, there has been a continuous rise in the irregular stock which, albeit relatively limited in absolute terms, drove the aforementioned relationship over the symbolic threshold of the two-figure value (10.4% in 2018).

It seems reasonable to assume that, at the root of such a new “rise” in figures, we have the consistent flow of unauthorised arrivals by sea since 2014.

Table 4. Asylum application results in Italy. 2016 and 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result (*)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Variation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee status</td>
<td>4,940</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6,854</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary protection</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>5,796</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian protect.</td>
<td>18,801</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>19,541</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection (**)</td>
<td>55,425</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>47,839</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other results (***</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90,473</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80,203</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Applications examined in the given year independently from the application date; (**) Unrecognized + untraceable; (***) Includes renunciations.

Source: ISMU analysis on data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs

This phenomenon, combined both with the frequent lack of a formal demand for international protection – before there was a “clampdown” on checks at the border with Northern Europe, where many migratory projects were headed – and with the many cases of rejected applications due to a lack of necessary requirements, contributed to foster “irregular” presences.

In this regard, we ought to note that in 2017, when over 80,000 applications were examined (10,000 less compared with 2016), the results confirmed the lack of status for a significant number of migrants – six out of ten cases, for a total of 47,839 persons (including untraceables) – who were not granted any form of protection. Although the relative

2 “Informal” evaluations from ISTAT offer an estimate of 538,000 irregular immigrants on July 1st 2018. This is coherent both with our suggestions in the present chapter (at the beginning of 2018, and with the likely possibility of a rather limited rise of the phenomenon during the first trimester of 2018, following a decrease in coastal arrivals.

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weight of those who obtained an official refugee status has grown – in 2017 this contributed to 8.5% of application results whereas it was 5.5% the previous year – it is also true that, in parallel with the rise in the incidence of humanitarian protection (up from one case in five to one in four), subsidiary protection has seen a strong fall: in 2016 it was granted to over 11,000 migrants and in 2017 to just under 6,000 (Table 4).

In light of these evaluations on the consistency and the dynamic of the irregular component in Italy, the number of persons who have been asked to leave the country is relatively limited, and even more limited is the number of those who actually do. During 2017 the former have been just over 36,000, mostly male (94%); a figure which places Italy in fifth place among EU countries after Germany (97,000), France (85,000), the UK (55,000) and Greece (46,000). In terms of the nationalities, more than one fourth of the male component (28%) is Moroccan, followed by Tunisians (20%) then Albanians and Algerians (both over 6%). Regarding the female population, over one fourth of the (few) foreign citizens who were asked to leave the country are Nigerian (26%), followed by Chinese (10%) and Ukrainian (9%) women.

Let us bear in mind, however, that of the approximately 36,000 citizens who received an expulsion decree, those who have actually been repatriated are only 7,045 (equal to 19.4%), of whom 4,935 forcefully (FR) (Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Actual repatriations following an expulsion decree. 2014-2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A – Repatriations of foreign citizens following an expulsion decree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B – Number of foreign citizens who have been asked to leave the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of foreign citizens who have been asked to leave the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of repatriations in terms of the number of foreign citizens asked to leave: [A/B x 100]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Forced Returns (FR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis on data from EUROSTAT and the Ministry for Internal Affairs

Repatriations involved primarily citizens from Tunisia (2,070 cases, of whom 94% FR), Albania (1,230, of whom 62% FR), Morocco (1,005, of whom 66% FR) and Egypt (400, of whom 76% FR); these nationalities, overall, make up two thirds of the total.

The existence of a significant difference between foreign citizens who have been asked to leave Italy and those who have actually been repatriated is not only an Italian problem,

3 In relation to common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, the directive of the EU Parliament and Council of Europe n. 115/2008 states that that Member States may operate “forced returns”, via the “physical transportation out of the Member State”. Article 1 of the directive stipulates that this operation needs to happen “in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Community law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations”. Article 5, moreover, specifies that Member States shall take due account of: a) the best interests of the child, b) family life, c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned, all the while respecting the principle of non-refoulement, which consists of an interdiction on returns in cases where this might endanger the freedom or the life of the third-country citizen.
although in Italy it is takes on more significant proportions compared to some of the other major EU Countries. In 2017, foreign citizens who have actually been repatriated, compared to those who have been asked to leave, were 19.4% in Italy. This is a larger figure compared with France (18.5%), but significantly lower compared with Spain (39.4%), Germany (48.6%) and the UK (71%).

Let us also remember that, together with forced repatriations, Italy offers an Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) scheme, which offer economic, logistic and organizational support to those who, on a voluntary basis, want to return to their country of origin. The AVR offers aid in the procedure before leaving (through information, acquisition of travel tickets and necessary documentation), during travel (assistance both in the departure and in the arrival airport, a small sum of money for essential expenditures) and, in some cases, after arrival, through the creation of a project for labour and social re-integration in their country of origin.4

In the period between June 2009 and June 2014 Italy completed over 3,000 AVRs financed by the 2008-2013 European Return Fund. From the second half of 2014 there has been a significant fall in AVR procedures, as national financial resources allocated have been redirected to strengthening the overall system for asylum seekers. Consequently, AVRs, which were 919 only in 2014, went down to 435 in 2015 and to just 136 in 2016. It should be noted, however, that AVR procedures have recently been re-launched via projects supported by the 2014-2020 FAMI Fund.

4. Conclusions

The data presented in the chapter seems to confirm the relative numerical stability – or at best the slight growth – of foreigners in Italy. This has been true for quite some time now and is due both to a reduced attractiveness of Italy for labour-based immigration, and to a consistent rise in new citizenship acquisitions.

The size and variety of immigration from various countries, which had been recently amplified by coastal arrivals, has been rapidly diminishing from the second half of 2017 and seems to be following the same trend also for 2018. What the media often presents as “the risk of an invasion” can perhaps be considered (at least temporarily) no longer true – without forgetting, however, that its demographic, economic and socio-political determinants are all too real. The next step is working towards a system of governance for immigration which is able to manage both the effects of previous migration and to ensure, via greater cohesion at the European level and new forms of international cooperation, a future where migrations are balanced and sustainable.

4 On the basis of the Minstry Decree of October 27th 2011 which included the “Guidelines for Assisted Voluntary Return programmes”, those who can access the AVR procedures are: a) vulnerable subjects; b) victims of sex work and trade, persons with serious illnesses, who have applied for international protection or have been granted international or humanitarian protection; c) third-country citizens who no longer have the conditions to renew their permit to stay; d) third-country citizens, whose application for international protection has already been rejected or who already received an expulsion decree, who are retained in an Identification and Return Center; e) third-country citizens, who already received an expulsion decree but have been given a period for voluntary return.
In this sense, the availability of documented, objective datasets and studies, free from prejudice and ideology, seems like an objective we should never stop pursuing. This is especially true when tackling “hot” topics such as interventions to contain/reduce irregular immigration, which has been on the rise in recent years, or the choice of the best strategies to ensure the migratory presence in Italy is increasingly in line with the need of the productive and welfare system. Being clear, also, on immigration’s real contribution in maintaining certain nation-wide power balances, as well as on the ways we intend to foster full integration, which includes a reciprocal respect of the norms and rules of the labour market and, more generally, of society itself.

References

The basic policy document of the new MS5-Lega government that took office in June 2018 sets out important priorities in the matter of immigration: the introduction of new grounds for deporting asylum seekers in relation to criminal conduct, the implementation of “a serious and effective repatriation policy”, including through detention “for the entire period of time necessary to ensure that the removal is carried out” up to “a maximum of eighteen months”, and guaranteeing the “sustainability” of the social assistance granted to immigrants “taking into account the economic condition of the country”.

At the level of concrete measures the most important is undoubtedly Law Decree No. 113, moreover labelled as fundamental by the government and in particular by the Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini who pushed strongly for the legislation in question to the point that we can speak of the so-called “Salvini Decree”.

1. The Salvini Decree

By Law Decree No. 113 of 4 October 2018, converted by parliament into Law No. 132 of 1 December 2018, several changes have been made to the rules governing international protection and in general immigration as well as citizenship.

First of all, humanitarian residence permits have been abolished, marking a very clear change in the asylum scene also in quantitative terms if one considers that in the past few years twenty-five percent of applications for international protection ended up with a humanitarian permit being granted.

As for the process for examining applications for protection, the new law provides for a special procedure for foreigners accused of certain crimes. In that case the competent territorial commission will have to immediately consider the application and issue its decision straight away. In the event of rejection of the application, the foreigner will be under an “obligation to leave the country, even while an appeal against the decision is still pending”.

As for reception, it is provided that in the future the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR), which operates according to a logic not only of assistance but also of integration, will be able to host solely those who hold refugee status and the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (as well as unaccompanied foreign minors) because all asylum seekers are to be housed for the entire duration of the procedure in initial holding centres that focus purely on welfare.

With reference to immigration in general, it is envisaged that the maximum time for which irregular migrants can be held in repatriation centres will rise from ninety to one hundred and eighty days.
Changes have also been introduced with regard to the acquisition of citizenship. The deadline for processing naturalisation applications has gone from two to four years. Furthermore, acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation or by virtue of marriage is subject to “adequate knowledge of the Italian language, not lower than level B1”.

The first question that comes to mind is whether those provisions are consistent with the government’s own above-mentioned basic policy document.

Some of the issues match those priorities in that document, like repatriation after detention and the deportation of asylum seekers in relation to certain crimes. By contrast, others cannot be specifically found in that document but are somehow connected to it considering that there is talk of immigration as a phenomenon that has apparently become unsustainable for Italy due to the burden it entails. Worthy of mention in this regard is the adoption of integration measures solely for those whose refugee status or entitlement to subsidiary protection has been recognised, a change which on paper should lead to cost savings.

The idea that immigrants are apparently too numerous most likely underpins the cancellation of humanitarian permits: if it is true that, as mentioned above, in the last few years twenty to twenty-five percent of applications for asylum ended up with that type of permit being granted, it follows that cancelling such permits means a huge increase in the number of asylum seekers who upon the outcome of their application do not receive any permit at all and therefore must leave the country.

Then there are provisions that are definitely outside the government’s policy document, as in the case of those concerning citizenship, an issue that is not dealt with therein.

Turning now to consider the provisions in question, it should be noted that some may appear reasonable while others on the contrary raise serious concerns.

At least in principle it may appear reasonable that access to the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees, with its integration measures, should be reserved for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Of course, in doing so, there is a risk of even greater idleness on the part those who are awaiting a decision allied to the further risk of wasting precious time in relation to an integration process that is anything but short. Also of concern is that this approach accentuates the role of the initial holding centres, which in recent years have been at the centre of controversy because often too large, almost always “imposed” on local communities and on average offer poor value for money, while at the same time scaling back the role of the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees, which by contrast is welcomed by local authorities and is generally of a higher level. That said, if according to what is a government aim, processing times for asylum applications are actually speeded up (Law No. 132 envisages, among other things, the establishment of new sections of the competent territorial commissions), deserving applicants will move rather quickly into the protection system thereby overcoming in part some of the concerns expressed regarding the initial holding centres.

As mentioned above, many aspects of the new rules are not that persuasive.

This is the case as regards the increase from ninety to one hundred and eighty days of the maximum period of detention in view of repatriation. Since the goal is to increase the number of returnees, one would expect that longer deadline to be supported by data showing that lengthening the time of detention significantly increases the chances of repatriation (something that is not that obvious if one considers that often non-repatriation
depends on insurmountable obstacles such as the unwillingness of the destination country to accept the individuals in question). However, the report accompanying the legislation is silent on the matter and neither in general has the government provided any data on this aspect. This is due to a lack of attention to data, a defect often found in Italian lawmaking. However, it is worth stressing that point here due to the delicacy of the measure, which, in as much as it amounts to detention, is a limitation of freedom similar to that associated with imprisonment but with fewer guarantees and protections in Italy.

Another worrying provision in terms of respect for the rule of law is the obligation to leave the country in the event of rejection of the application for protection even while an appeal is still pending, in the event of the mere existence of an accusation in relation to certain crimes. The right to justice runs the risk of being frustrated, bearing in mind also that the persons concerned are asylum seekers, i.e. individuals who could suffer serious consequences in case of repatriation. The Constitutional Court will certainly be called upon to judge the provision in question.

As for the cancellation of humanitarian permits, it cannot be overlooked that the issuance of such permits in recent years has avoided a situation of tens of thousands of immigrants joining the ranks of irregular migrants by selecting from among those not entitled to international protection a group who deserve a chance for integration according to a logic that by no coincidence stems from European law (especially in the Return Directive) and that reflects the experience of other countries such as France. By cancelling humanitarian permits, there is a risk of having tens of thousands of more irregular migrants each year in a situation already marked by a decidedly excessive and growing number of such migrants with no chance of regularisation and whose repatriation appears implausible overall.

Furthermore, one cannot neglect the fact that in these past few years, the granting of humanitarian permits has enabled protection to be afforded to persons with rights of asylum under article 10 of the Constitution (a very broad provision) but not with rights under the law governing refugees and subsidiary protection as currently interpreted. In a letter to the Government, which unusually accompanied the signing of Law Decree No. 113, the President of the Republic emphasised the need to respect article 10 of the Constitution. It can only be hoped that the provisions recognising refugee status or subsidiary protection will be broadly interpreted, which would mitigate the impact of the abolition of humanitarian permits. Otherwise, there is a risk that the legislation will be declared unconstitutional to the extent that it is inadequate compared to the requirement of the aforementioned article 10 of the Constitution.

Finally, as regards the rules on citizenship, it is inconceivable that the checks and assessments associated with a naturalisation application require four years of work per se. It is true that application processing times are already lengthy today in actual practice, but this depends on the dysfunctions of a procedure that inter alia was designed as a centralised system when applicants were few and far between. However, nowadays it would be more reasonable to rethink the process by decentralising it as much as possible, just as France did a few years ago. By contrast, requiring knowledge of the Italian language at B1 level in order to become a citizen appears to be reasonable but as against this it should not be overlooked that language teaching programmes appear to be inadequate and no provision for remedying.
2. Italians first? The question of equality in relation to welfare

In 2018 the Constitutional Court repeatedly intervened in the matter of immigrants’ access to the welfare state.

One decision, judgment no. 107/2018, concerned nursery schools. A Veneto Region law provided that 15 years of prior residence of the parents in the region would grant them priority as regards the admission of their children to public nursery schools, with the clear purpose of excluding many immigrants through indirect discrimination. However, this provision was considered by the Court to be unreasonably discriminatory because it was contrary to the very rationale of the type of social benefit concerned. The Court observed that the law envisaged that nurseries would serve a dual social welfare and educational function and recognised that lawmakers are “allowed to introduce differentiated rules for access”, that is to say, to favour some compared to others, “in order to reconcile maximisation of the benefits in question with limited available resources”. However, the Court ruled that “the selection criteria adopted must in any case respect the principle of reasonableness” and in particular be “consistent and adequate” to tackle the situations of need referred to by the legislation. Therefore, in the case of nursery schools it is necessary to check whether there is any reasonable correlation between the requirement of 15 years prior residence and the social welfare and educational function of the service. The Court was of the view that affording priority to long-term residence as a factor for admission purposes leads to discrimination even against poor families, which is contrary to the social-welfare rationale of the service and, at the same time it is “obviously unreasonable to believe that the children of parents with deeper roots in Veneto have educational needs greater than others”. The Court thus concluded that there was unreasonable and therefore unlawful discrimination.

Two other important decisions have concerned public housing. In its judgment no. 106/2018 the Court declared that the provision of a Liguria Region law were unconstitutional on grounds of violation of the principle of equality in as much as they required non-EU immigrants to have resided in Italy for 10 years in order to be eligible for public housing. The Court observed that when it comes to “an asset of long-lasting enjoyment, such as housing” the law “may require guarantees of stability which serve to prevent an excessive turnover of renters from undermining administrative action and reducing its effectiveness” but requiring 10 years of residence appeared to be excessive and unjustifiably discriminatory because Italians and EU nationals are not subject to any conditions even remotely similar.

In its judgment no. 166/2018 the Court declared that the provision of a law were unconstitutional on grounds of violation of the principle of equality in as much as they required non-EU immigrants to have resided in Italy for 10 years or in the same region for 5 years in order to be eligible for state funds to help poor families pay rent. The Court noted that the rationale of the subsidy “is to support the poor so as to allow them to meet housing needs through recourse to the market”, in case of economic difficulties “related to limited periods”. Therefore, demanding that non-EU immigrants meet the abovementioned residence requirements is unreasonable: while it may well be true that in principle “social policies aimed at satisfying housing needs can take into account how well one has put down roots locally”, no reasonable link could be found between the rationale and effectiveness of aid linked to transient needs and 5-year or 10-year residency.
These decisions, which confirm the approach previously expressed by the Constitutional Court, are important far beyond the specific effects they have had in the cases considered. In fact, they demonstrate how difficult it is to discriminate against foreigners as regards eligibility for legitimate welfare benefits. If, as the Court puts it, a selective requirement will be admissible only if it reflects a greater need for the benefit or can be linked to greater effectiveness of the benefit, the room for discriminating against foreigners is really minimal.

Basically, therefore, the idea of applying the “Italians first” ethos to welfare benefits is constitutionally impractical in general.

This is emphasised because, as mentioned above, in the government’s basic policy document there is talk of a sustainability constraint intended to act as a barrier to immigrants’ eligibility for welfare benefits. However, constitutional constraints are such that in general foreigners cannot be denied benefits granted to Italians if their needs are the same. It is understandable that in a context of crisis in the welfare state, those who govern are tempted to “save” Italians and their rights, especially the poorest Italians, by discriminating against foreigners. But the principles of the legal system do not allow it.

3. Conclusions

References in a year like this one marked by the advent of a government that proclaims itself a standard bearer of a real demand for change (including in the field of immigration) and has just started to implement its policies, it would be inappropriate to give a final assessment at this early stage.

However, one cannot but voice deep concern about the fate of asylum seekers. There is a risk of seeing a rise in the numbers of those who will eventually end up without any residence permit, swelling the ranks of the large number of existing irregular migrants, without prospects for regularisation and for the most part unlikely to ever leave the country. Short of a mass amnesty like the one that ushered in the Bossi-Fini law, careful consideration is needed because the dignity of people, the proper functioning of the labour market and security in the country are all at stake.

Another matter for concern is that despite the emergence of shortcomings in Italy in recent years concerning the integration of asylum seekers, the government is making no effort to create a more structured and effective pathway to integration capable of successfully incorporating foreigners into the productive fabric of the country and more widely into society. Consequently, there is a clear risk of having thousands of young people in the coming years (mainly asylum seekers) with a permit but without prospects, called upon to live an independent life without really having the necessary tools therefor. It is hence necessary that lawmakers intervene now to design pathways and mobilise resources (including the business world) to transform into a source of wealth people who otherwise are in danger of becoming a dramatic burden with serious consequences on several levels, including from a security standpoint.

One must also point out that the subject of labour market immigration needs to be seriously addressed. Many of the asylum seekers who arrive in Italy are actually economic migrants who have no chance under current Italian rules of entering the country legally. Millions of young people will move from Africa to Europe in the near future in search of
better job opportunities against a backdrop of a demographic crisis in the Italian population that will lead to a shortage in human resources in the coming years. Hence the need to devise new labour market immigration rules that provide for realistic and mutually beneficial opportunities for entry. Indeed, after years of experience there is a lot of data on hand to evaluate what did not work with past rules.

And then there is the issue of citizenship. Hundreds of thousands of foreigners will acquire it over the next few years. Faced with this tidal wave that will change the make-up of the Italian people, it seems truly reductive to forge ahead with fragmentary provisions such as those of the Salvini Decree. The challenge is to safeguard and develop freedom and democracy, in an already difficult context, dealing with this influx and making it a resource rather than a problem, which implies an extraordinary effort of substantial civic integration. Consequently, the rules on obtaining citizenship must be rethought, casting an eye on how Germany has radically changed its law in the face of mass immigration.

Finally, as regards access by immigrants to the welfare state, it is necessary for those in power to shift their attention from a constitutionally unviable attempt to exclude immigrants and instead concentrate on devising other ways to manage and overcome shortcomings in protection and conflicts which cannot be ignored, are real and dramatic and risk plunging the country into a battle of the have-nots. At this level, moreover it is not so much immigration law that needs consideration but more the structure of the welfare state in general.
The Labour Market
Laura Zanfrini

1. Migrants’ participation in the Italian labour market

As a result of its age composition, significantly younger than the Italian one, the foreign working age population (15-64 years old) has reached, in 2017, the number of 4 million – up to about 5 million foreigners staying in the country –, corresponding to just over 10% of total active-age residents. From the data shown in table 1 it is possible to calculate that the incidence of foreigners is over 12% of the labour forces, 10.5% of the employed workers, and about 14% of the unemployed.

Table 1. Italian and Foreigner residents by occupational condition, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>EU Foreigners</th>
<th>Non-EU Foreigners</th>
<th>Total Foreigners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed people</td>
<td>20,600,095</td>
<td>800,599</td>
<td>1,622,265</td>
<td>2,422,864</td>
<td>23,022,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15 years and more)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in search of</td>
<td>2,501,067</td>
<td>122,020</td>
<td>283,796</td>
<td>405,816</td>
<td>2,906,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>job (15 years and more)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive people</td>
<td>12,236,803</td>
<td>327,013</td>
<td>822,268</td>
<td>1,149,281</td>
<td>13,386,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15-64 years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rilevazione continua sulle forze di lavoro, 2017

Considering the data on flows, almost 20% of the job contracts activated in 2017 involved a foreign worker, while among the companies that made new hires in 2017, almost a third (31.5%) recruited at least one foreign citizen.

As in the previous years, in 2017 foreign employment continued to increase (+0.9% compared to 2016), within a context characterized by the consolidation of the recovery – although the occupational effects have been more modest than those expected –. This increase is definitely the lowest among those observed in the last five years (between 2013 and 2016, the average growth was in fact 3.3%); moreover, for the first time after several years, the employment of Italians recorded an increase rate (1.2%) higher than that of foreigners. A signal, the latter, of “normalization” of the Italian labour market, after the sustained growth, in some ways exceptional, registered by foreign employment before and especially during the long economic crisis that began in 2008.

In any case, the employment rate of the foreign population is still higher than that of Italians (Table 2), a circumstance that makes Italy a unique case among the largest European immigration countries. As a matter of fact, the positive gap has been gradually reducing over time (from over 10 percentage points recorded in 2005 to the current 3), leaving a glimpse of alignment with the general trends. A tendency supported by the trend in the activity rate, which has been progressively reducing for the foreign population (except for a slight fluctuation last year) and constantly increasing for the Italian one. While
for Italians the employment rate is now slightly higher than that recorded on the eve of the crisis, for foreigners the negative gap remains significant (5 percentage points), exclusively because of the negative trend in the male rate (which decreased by almost 9 percentage points): a situation that certainly has to do with the structure of opportunities, but perhaps even more with the quantum-qualitative transformation that immigration has known in the meantime.

Foreigners’ unemployment, too, confirms the trend of the past few years, recording a reduction for the third consecutive year, but more significant both in absolute values (over 30 thousand) and in percentage terms (-7.1%). This trend was certainly influenced by the sharp contraction in the new entries of economic migrants (considering that the effect of recent asylum seekers’ entrances is not visible yet in labour market statistics). As for the unemployment rate, after the considerable growth of 2016, a reduction of over one percentage point has allowed a slight recovery of the negative gap against Italians. The relative unemployment rate, given by the ratio between the foreigners’ rate and the Italians’ one, which was 1.2 in the early days of the crisis, reached 1.5 in 2011, and then fell back to 1.3 in 2016 (data unchanged in 2017). Moreover, in all the years considered, the relative rate is higher for women than for men.

Table 2. Activity rates, employment rates, unemployment rates; Foreigners and Italians, 2005-2017 (some years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Italians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISTAT - Rilevazione continua sulle forze di lavoro, various years

Data provided by the last Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour (Direzione Generale dell’immigrazione e delle politiche di integrazione, 2018) document the further consolidation of the ethno-stratification of the Italian labour market.

The first indicator is represented by the distribution of the immigrant labour within the occupational hierarchy, with a concentration in blue collar – 76.3% – and low skilled jobs, which at times reflects phenomena of real segregation, even at sectoral level (the most striking case is that of house-helpers). The independent employment, already undersized among foreigners, is further reduced and, in 2017, it accounts for only 13.1% of
foreign workers (compared to 24.4% of Italians). In particular, the incidence of entrepreneurs is less than a third of that recorded among Italians (0.4% vs. 1.3%), while foreign freelancers (many of whom are probably from developed countries) are less than one-sixth compared to the Italian ones (1.1% vs. 6.7%)

The second indicator is the presence of ethnic and sectorial specializations, to which the high – sometimes the extraordinary – employability of some immigrant communities must be ascribed: Filipinos are certainly the most eloquent example, with an employment rate close to 80%, however associated with a strong concentration in domestic work. The same process of ethnicization has to do with the phenomena of working marginality, which affect the most vulnerable groups, pushing them towards the less advantageous occupational segments, if not towards hidden economy. On the other hand, new contracts activated in 2017 confirm the usual inventory of “migrants’ jobs”: at the top of the list we find agricultural workers (over half a million recruitments, almost all for a fixed term), personal assistance staff, waiters and house-helpers, unqualified personnel in catering services, porters, cooks, unskilled workers, cleaners.

The third indicator is represented by migrants’ occupational insecurity, since they are largely concentrated in sectors (such as domestic work and small business) that make them more exposed to the risk of dismissal. Finally we can observe how, being overrepresented in routine and low-skilled jobs, immigrants are more exposed to the risk of becoming redundant in the 4.0 Revolution scenario.

These phenomena contribute to the wage penalization suffered by foreign workers, whose average salary is 35% lower than that of Italians (data provided by the national pension institute, and referred only to non-EU workers). In addition to making foreign families particularly vulnerable – and exposing their children to the risk of intergenerational transmission of this disadvantage, as I explored in last year’s report (Zanfrini, 2018) – it goes without saying that low wages inhibit the contribution of foreigners to GNP and to the welfare system (not to mention the consequences for their future pension, in the framework of a contributory system).

The tradeoff between the immigrants’ high employability – broadly due to their adaptability and cheapness – and the sustainability of the Italian integration model appears even more evident if one considers the over-qualification phenomenon, which continues to constitute, decades after the Italian migratory transition, one of its “qualifying” traits. The aforementioned Report of the Ministry of Labour focuses on the holders of “STEM” degrees (i.e. in science, technology, engineering and mathematics), notoriously considered the most exploitable on the labour market (as well as the most easily transferable from one country to another). Indeed, over 90% of Italians in possession of this kind of title practise a profession consistent with their educational background, but this percentage is reduced to 26% among foreign workers. In the case of non-EU immigrants, almost one in two is occupied in a low-skilled job: an impressive phenomenon of waste of human capital, all the more singular in the contemporary scenario characterized by competition for the attraction of the “talented immigration”. Without counting a potential “collateral effect” – discussed in previous editions of this Report –, constituted by the particular attractiveness that Italy exerts towards the less educated immigrants, so as to encourage the most qualified migrants to look for alternative destinations. Indeed, if the over-qualification of foreigners can be observed in many countries, it is Italy that holds the record: in OECD countries, the differential
between the rate of over-qualification of foreigners and that of natives is on average 12 percentage points, but it reaches 34 points in Italy (OECD, 2018b), although also several Italians are affected by this problem. Moreover, Italy’s negative differential is confirmed, albeit to a small extent (15 vs. 23 percentage points), even after taking into account the level of linguistic and mathematical competence and the demographic characteristics of the two populations (ibidem). According to the calculation proposed by OECD researchers, more than a third of employed foreigners should move to a different type of job to make their distribution more similar to the Italians’ one. An outcome that today sounds almost surreal, but that should be the normal situation in a market governed by non-discriminatory principles and by the goal of exploiting human capital and individual skills.

Lastly, the singular “geography” of immigrant labour in Italy is confirmed. Grafting itself onto the ancestral North-South dualism and onto the extraordinary heterogeneity of Italian local production systems, migrants’ inclusion has produced further lines of segmentation within the labour market. In South Italy, the foreign population, too, suffers from more vulnerable conditions – for example, the share of families without any source of income is much higher – but its presence is, in some ways, “blurred” by worrying occupational picture. Only 5 out of 100 unemployed are foreigners, and in the landing regions, immigration has ended up being a source of revitalization of local economies or even, according to some, a reason for a surprising increase in employment, especially women employed in the reception system (Ferrera, 2018). On the other hand, in the Northern regions immigrants represent a quarter of total unemployment (while their share on the labour force is around 12-13%) and a significant component of the recipients of welfare benefits (the incidence of poor families among foreigners is often two-three times higher than that recorded among Italian families).

Finally, the local level constitutes an indispensable “filter” for the analysis of economic integration even within the geographical macro-areas. The distribution of employment opportunities, but also the specificities of the local labour demand, are shaping not only the characters of economic inclusion – the phenomena of ethnic specialization, the evolutionary trajectories of local districts, the processes of generational turnover in certain productive sectors (up to the point of generating, in some cases, an occupational dynamic exclusively linked to the foreign component) – but also the forms of integration tout court, drowing the future of inter-ethnic coexistence. At the provincial level, the most striking case is that of Prato, where in 2017 one out of two hirings involved a foreign; Bolzano, Cuneo, Latina, and Foggia also record incidences of more than one third. By zooming in on the municipal and sub-municipal level, it is even possible to find places where foreigners cover 9 or more out of 10 of the new hirings.

2. The issue of women inactivity

The substantial immobility of the phenomenon of migrants’ participation in the Italian labour market must not impede us from grasping that something is changing. In some respects, in fact, the long economic crisis, and then the refugee crisis, have marked a wathershave divide in the Italian experience. First of all, entrances in Italy are now almost completely independent from the planning of the labourforce demands. In 2016 (latest
available year), only as few as 5.7% of the new residence permits were issued for work reasons (in 2007 they were 56.1%). The same entrances for family reasons, which in recent years had come to represent the prevailing category – supporting the growth of the inactive component – in the latest available year were just 45.1%. Conversely, the number of entrances for other reasons (49.2%) has been growing dramatically, mainly because of the high number of asylum seekers. The implications of this extraordinary change on the participation of immigrants in the labour market are still to be assessed.

Actually, flows of entrances independent from official caps certainly are not a new phenomenon: the recent flow of asylum seekers, in fact, constitutes a functional equivalent of those migrants who, in the past, used a different "side door" to access the Italian labour market (for example a tourist visa), thus contributing to nullify any planning attempts. As it is well known, official quotas have not generally been used to authorize legal entries, but to regularize undeclared labour relations, while providing undocumented migrants with a stay permit. The new phenomenon is rather represented by the growing number of arrivals that are independent not only from the planning decrees, but from the work demand. This circumstance is a real challenge for the achievement of the goals of the European strategic programs, which encourage the growth of labour market participation rates by paying particular attention to the categories at risk of exclusion. And immigrants – or at least some types of immigrants – are certainly one of these categories.

As it is well known, in many European countries it is the female population with a migrant background to raise the greatest concerns because of the low activity rates and the low employment rates characterizing some immigrant communities (due also to the persistence of patriarchal family models). This phenomenon is now clearly visible in Italy too.

In overall terms, the most important cleavage for the analysis of female participation in the labour market is that distinguishing EU and non-EU citizens. The activity rate (67.8% for EU immigrants, 56.1% for non-EU immigrants, and 55.4% for Italians) accounts for a strongly positive differential for European immigrants, whereas non-European ones show levels of participation slightly higher than those, particularly low, of the Italian women. In turn, the employment rate shows differential performances and it is positively correlated with the activity rates. We can in fact observe a particularly high incidence of unemployed precisely in those groups that record the lowest activity rates, thus confirming how the opportunities’ structure is strongly shaped by ethnic networks, i.e. by the level of “familiarity” with the Italian labour market reached by each national group.

More in detail, female behaviors mirror the variety of both migratory and family patterns. It is also possible to hypothesize that migration itself reinforces the asymmetry of gender roles – when it is the man to first emigrate –, making even more complex, for migrant wives and mothers, the work & family balance. The disaggregation by nationality – focusing the attention on the female component of some non-EU nationalities (Table 3) – highlights the groups in which the net prevalence of the entrances for family reasons is associated with both high inactivity rates and unemployment rates dramatically above average, not to mention the very high incidence of girls not in employment, in education or training.
Table 3. Entries for family reasons (%), inactivity rates, NEET (%) and unemployment rates among the women of given non-EU nationalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% entries for family reasons</th>
<th>Inactivity rate</th>
<th>% of NEETt</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Direzione Generale dell’immigrazione e delle politiche di integrazione, 2018

3. Migrants for protection reasons: an extraordinary test of economy’s inclusiveness

Although this does not yet emerge from labour market statistics, experts agree that the latest refugee crisis, for the countries most involved, will cause a worsening of the migrants’ occupational condition, posing a significant challenge to businesses and local economies. In fact, almost all experts agree that the timing and outcomes of working integration are crucial variables in determining the long-term impact of migratory flows. The occupational inclusion of refugees and other holders of protection is a goal whose fulfilment has always had to face a series of barriers widely documented by international literature: linguistic and cultural barriers, difficulties in obtaining recognition of qualifications and certification of the previous experience, scarce knowledge of the receiving society, weakness of social capital, the need to process traumas related to forced migration, just to quote a few (BertelsmannStiftung, 2016; OECD, 2018b). However, in the contemporary European context, the challenge of inclusion must also deal with a delicate tradeoff that reflects the growing porosity of the categories on which the management of migration has traditionally been based, starting from the debatable distinction between economic migration and migration for protection reasons. Until recently, the need to reaffirm this distinction – and to oppose to the improper and instrumental recourse to the asylum application – has induced many governments to restrict asylum seekers’ access to the labour market. Today, however, a growing awareness of the consequences of their exclusion from an active participation – the loss of motivation, the obsolescence of professional skills, the inclusion in the underground economy, the prolonged dependence...
on welfare benefits, etc.– has encouraged various processes of legislative and procedural innovation aimed to facilitate their rapid transition to an active role in the economy and society (OECD, 2018b). These processes, in turn, have to face a second tradeoff, between the aim to support the rapid autonomy of asylum seekers and the risk of seeing them sucked into “bad” work, thus compromising both their professional development and the sustainability of the inclusion processes. At the confluence of these two tradeoffs, there is also the need to manage an increasing number of immigrants whose asylum applications have been rejected, without encouraging the improper recourse to the request for protection. Moreover, given a context still sharply marked by the economic crisis, the management of recent flows of asylum seekers must also face a public opinion that is strongly concerned about the reception’s costs and the effects on the natives’ wages as well as on job opportunities. Hence, a further problematic tradeoff has emerged around the issue of economic and material benefits for refugees and asylum seekers, and the risk that they may discourage the search for a job and for economic independence, or push them back towards the submerged economy (a way to maintain these benefits).

The Italian experience can be considered exemplary for all these aspects.

Regarding the first tradeoff, beyond the various interpretations of the phenomenon, the difficulty to trace a clear boundary between economic migrations and those for humanitarian reasons is evident. The high incidence of denials, the very high percentage of appeals, and the widespread recourse to the subsidiary protection and above all “humanitarian protection” (frequently acknowledged to the migrants who lack the criteria to obtain a different status of protection, but who cannot be expelled\(^1\) are tangible indicators of this difficulty. Some experts understand this situation as a clear demonstration of the widespread instrumental recourse to the request for protection; some others as the demonstration of the unethical restrictions on the right to migrate.

In any case, the Italian law allows the asylum seeker – as well as the appellant against refusal decisions – to be regularly hired after 60 days from the presentation of the application (one of the shortest periods of time in Europe), and even to start an independent activity (Italy is one of the very few countries to contemplate this possibility). Furthermore, until the advent of the new rules approved by the “yellow-green” government, support for job placement has been one of the main objectives of the first reception services, while the level of integration achieved (measured through indicators that have a lot to do with employability) became one of the main criteria for obtaining the humanitarian protection. Finally, in the case of unaccompanied minors (who are numerous in Italy), the law establishes the possibility to remain in Italy beyond reaching the age of majority (regardless of the “real” reasons for protection) in order to complete the personalized projects of school and work inclusion.

In the first phases of the refugee emergency, Italy was mostly perceived as a transit country; also for this reason, the interventions to support job placement have been implemented later on – and they had been largely neglected by the studies carried out by various international agencies between 2015 and 2016 (see, for example,

\(^1\) With the approval, in November, of the decree 840/2018, (the so-called “security and immigration decree”), important changes were introduced in the management of asylum seekers. In order to reduce the wide discretion of the commissions, the humanitarian protection was abolished and the possibility to obtain a permit for humanitarian reasons is now limited to specific categories of migrants.
Bertelsman Stiftung, 2016; OECD, 2016). As a matter of fact, the SPRAR system (Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees) can be counted among the best practices at the European level, and it is within this system that the most interesting projects have been implemented.\(^2\)

Unfortunately, only a minority of applicants have had access to the SPRAR (and only after the approval of the request for protection, whose iter requires very long times). Most of them are hosted in a CAS (Center of Extraordinary Reception) where, beyond some virtuous experiences (which include, for example, the activation of traineeships and job grants), the required standards are of lower quality, and the level of personalization is reduced. Finally – but this is the most worrying aspect – a significant proportion of asylum seekers see their own request definitively rejected. This circumstance accentuates the uncertainty of investments to support integration – bringing us back to the heart of the first tradeoff mentioned above – and discourages companies from hiring and investing in the training of this category of human resources.

Going into more detail, the National Plan for the integration of beneficiaries of international protection opts for a multi-level governance model, which encourages the initiative of local autonomies, intermediate bodies, and civil society organisations (consistently with contemporary international trends: OECD, 2018a), rooting itself in the rich experience gained in the recent past, strongly anchored to the local level and to the ability to network among public institutions, third-sector organizations and work organizations (Ministero degli Interni, 2017). In some ways, this experience supported the definition of the model then institutionalized through the establishment of the SPRAR. The initiative of local actors and the partnerships built to have access to the Integration Funds have stimulated the development of collective learning processes, which could possibly benefit an audience wider than immigrants.

With the aim of increasing the visibility of these experiences, promoting their transferability, maximizing their positive impact, and also identifying the weaknesses that have not been addresses yet, ISMU has launched the construction of an online repertoire.\(^3\) From this investigation, which is still ongoing, some indications can already be found.

A first group of initiatives intercepts asylum seekers in the early stages of the reception process, supporting their activation through the strengthening of their linguistic skills and orienting their path of employment research. For their implementation, they use both public funds dedicated to the reception system, and the resources obtained through participation in tenders launched by European institutions or philanthropic organizations, not to mention the commitment of volunteers. Of particular interest, in this field, are the initiatives for the assessment of skills, based on innovative methodologies aimed at making migrants more aware of their resources and able to build a professional project appropriate to the local context.

A second group of projects aims in an even more direct way to the occupational inclusion, that is to the transition to a real autonomy; a phase not yet regulated by

\(^2\) The new rules introduced by the decree 840/2018 foresee that the SPRAR is reserved for migrants who have already obtained a status of protection and for unaccompanied minors.


A provisional analysis of the emerging results can be found in Sarli, 2019. This report is also the source of the data commented in the following lines.
The Labour Market

legislation, and therefore substantially based on the initiative of local actors. The strategy on which they are mainly based is the establishment of networks and the formalization of partnerships between the various actors involved, particularly employment services and brokerage agencies, trade unions, and the business sector. The resources come from participation in European tenders, or are otherwise made available by local authorities, philanthropic organizations, and in a few cases private companies; the intervention of the bilateral bodies is also important. Through empowerment courses, professional training, and the activation of internships, these projects aim to favour the inclusion in sectors (from catering to logistics, from gardening to beekeeping, etc.) characterized by professions whose level of competence that can be acquired in a short time, preferably on the job. Furthermore, in several cases, the interventions focus on particularly vulnerable categories, who are more at risk of occupational exclusion (e.g. physical or mental disabled, rather than victims of trafficking or single mothers), thus combining ethical aims and profit goals, possibly intercepting emerging sensibilities in the business world.

Beyond some weaknesses emerged from the study (including the need of a more accurate assessment of the occupational impact of the inventoried initiatives), it should be emphasized that what has taken shape on the wave of the refugee emergence is an extraordinary laboratory of social innovation. While focusing primarily on the activation of local actors, local resources and local opportunities, it prefigures solutions and models of intervention that can be at least partially standardized, with a view to creating an institutionalized model capable of managing the reception of asylum seekers in ways that favour the entry into the labour market and a real autonomy, thus overcoming the main weakness of the Italian experience. Moreover, these initiatives have allowed to experiment new intervention paradigms, useful to favour greater inclusiveness tout court, especially when the type of intervention implemented, and the forms of involvement required to the various actors involved, explicitly aim at favouring a cultural and organizational growth; that is to favour a real ethicisation of HRM practices, as well a greater sensitivity for the value of interculturality and respect for individual differences.

Nevertheless, this significant mobilization has not been sufficient to counteract the effects evoked by the second tradeoff mentioned above, due to the limited number of migrants involved, and the low percentage of paths that culminate with a regular hiring. Despite the commitments undertaken through the memorandums of understanding signed by Confindustria (2016)⁴ and by Unioncamere (2018),⁵ Italian companies have not yet identified in this field a further target of their CSR’s engagement.⁶ This is maybe due to an overall climate that is not very “migrant-friendly”, or even to the fear of being exposed to the accusation of reverse discrimination, given that many polls denounce how Italians are increasingly oriented to demand a privileged lane in accessing resources and

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⁴ *Accordo quadro sulle modalità di collaborazione per favorire percorsi di integrazione dei beneficiari di protezione internazionale ospiti del sistema di accoglienza nazionale* signed by the Ministry of Interior and Confindustria, 22 June 2016.

⁵ *Accordo quadro sulle modalità di collaborazione per favorire percorsi di integrazione dei beneficiari di protezione internazionale ospiti del sistema di accoglienza nazionale* signed by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, the Italian Union of the Chamber of Commerce, 25th January 2018.

⁶ See, on this regard, the initiative launched by UNHCR in order to acknowledge the firms engaged in this field, assigning them a specific logo *(Welcome. Working for Refugee Integration)* which they can valorise in their internal and external communication ([https://bit.ly/2HYACVJ](https://bit.ly/2HYACVJ)).
social opportunities, above all work-wise. Besides, it is also due to the lack of awareness of the added value that migrants and refugees can bring to the business, precisely thanks to their migratory itineraries and the complex adaptations they have entailed; hence, the importance of learning how to give value to non-standardized paths and skills that cannot be certified according to established procedures.\footnote{This challenge is at the core of the project “DIMICOME”, currently managed by ISMU (see http://www.ismu.org/progetto-dimicome/)}

On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence of how the beneficiaries of international protection leaving the reception system – and even more so those who have seen their request for protection rejected – risk being handed over to labour exploitation or falling into a condition of dramatic poverty, as evidenced by their growing presence among the users of services for the poor and homeless. Just as there are numerous cases documented by the direct testimony of the operators and by journalistic investigations describing how reception centers have turned into places where it is possible to recruit a workforce that accepts a salary that is even lower than the one normally received by immigrants employed in the underground economy.

As noted by many observers, the demographic impact of recent flows of asylum seekers is definitively soft, both on the resident population and on its active-age component, and certainly does not justify the alarm that hovers in large sectors of the public opinion. However, the impact becomes much more significant once confronted to that segment that could directly suffer from its competition. This is in particular the low-skilled male population; and, even more specifically, immigrants already residing in Italy. Not to mention the workers employed in the informal and submerged economy, who are the most exposed to competition both among those who remain in the national territory even after the definitive rejection of their asylum application and among the circa 350 thousand young people “interned” in CAS (estimate provided by the Corte dei Conti), often abandoned to themselves and not involved in any training activity.

An “exemplary” case – among the many that could be reported – is that of asylum seekers recruited as agricultural labourers, involuntary agents of a wage dumping effect that ended up nullifying the modest progress achieved thanks to the struggles of recent years.\footnote{See, for example, the case of Terracina, in the Latium, reported by the newspaper “Avvenire” (22 July 2018). In spring 2017, the daily salary perceived by Sikh labourers had grown, thanks to a strike, from 2.5 euro to 4.5 (against 9 euro envisaged by the collective agreement). Because of the arrival of African asylum seekers (hosted on a free basis at the reception centres), the daily salary fell back to 3 euro.} In its drama, this example leads us to face the greater weakness of initiatives to support inclusion. Certainly valuable in reinforcing the employability of migrants and their ability to intercept the available opportunities, these initiatives are not however equally effective in reorienting the labour demand and, more in particular, in countering the temptation, always lurking, to look at immigration as a reservoir of a hyper-adaptable workforce, made even more adaptable by the need to find a job as soon as possible.
4. The costs of the “bad” work and of the lack of work

As I observed in the previous edition of this Report (Zanfrini, 2018), it would be really risky, from a political and a cultural point of view, to support the idea that asylum seekers must be welcomed because of the alleged advantage that immigration produces for the labour market and the pension system – according to a narrative largely used by Italian pro-migrant coalitions. First of all because this advantage is not at all obvious: the international experience shows how difficult and long the working inclusion of the holders of international protection can be, and the OECD itself (2018b) admits that the refugee crisis will produce an increase in unemployment in the countries involved, far beyond what has been recorded so far by official statistics. And a fortiori, because the right to international protection cannot be reduced to a concept of economic convenience, thus ending up, more or less consciously, supporting a selective philosophy, inevitably destined to penalize the most vulnerable among the vulnerable.

After having reaffirmed this concept, we can however state that the issue of occupational inclusion of refugees and asylum seekers reflects, and indeed amplifies, the weaknesses of the Italian integration model, soliciting us to come to terms with the fundamental trade-off between the predominantly complementary function carried out by immigrant labour, on the one hand, and the long-term sustainability of integration processes on the other.

In recent months, also because of the frequent incidents and tragedies, the labourers managed by the system of “caporalato” have emerged as an emblem of the immigrants’ “bad” work. A series of police and journalistic investigations have torn the veil over the contexts of profound civic decay, low culture of legality, connivance, and contamination with the criminality in which practices of serious exploitation are rooted and which involve even minors. This is a very well-known phenomenon, and it is not solely connected to the processes of international labour mobility. Certainly, there are instruments to contrast it, starting with the law n. 199/2016, which tightens the sanctions against those who recruit and employ agricultural workers under exploitation. That law has recently begun to produce its fruits. Two aspects, however, deserve to be underlined.

Firstly, despite an overall growing attention to it, the aforementioned phenomenon continues to have an intolerable diffusion for a civilized country, as well as an insufficient space in the agenda of both public authorities and civil society organizations. Secondly, we have to consider the difficulty in tracing a sharp boundary between the infernal circles in which the new slaves work and die, and the many degrading processes that have caused the decline of the workers’ rights and of their working conditions. These processes involve even the noblest expressions of the Italian capitalism: for example, cooperatives initially formed for the emancipation of vulnerable people and for the promotion of a sustainable economy have ended up turning into reservoirs of underpaid workforce, wage dumping

9 The most impressive cases were register in the summer 2018 in the province of Foggia, where 16 labourers died during their daily journey to the work place because of the incidents in which the mini-buses which were transporting them have been involved.
– even through practices such as fictitious outsourcing in countries with lower labour costs –, and mechanisms of distortion of competition.\(^\text{10}\)

In this scenario, today’s asylum seekers seem to be a sort of functional variant of that flexible and cheap labour reservoir that immigration – and not just the irregular one – still represents for a series of phenomena characterizing the current accumulation regime. Only to name a few: the processes of commodification of labour that have accompanied the advent of post-Fordism production models; the outsourcing processes that have given a strong impetus to the subcontracting chains and to the (often improper) recourse to self-employment and on call work; the processes of commodification of care work; and the new methods for organizing agricultural activities, which aim at the compression of the costs mainly through the worsening of working conditions and of wages. On their turn, these processes have been favoured by rules and practices that support the need for labour flexibility and for labour cost containment – practices such as the improper recourse to cooperatives and freelances, the exploitation of sub-supply chains (in which a significant role is now played by the micro-entrepreneurship created by immigrants), and a widespread tolerance towards irregular employment. It is in this context that the phenomenon of exploitation of immigrant labour must be placed. Indeed, as documented by a detailed report of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, 2015), despite the progressive strengthening of sanctioning instruments, such exploitation continues to find a wide social acceptance in Europe and to benefit from a chronic lack of inspections. We can in fact observe a tendency towards “trivialization”, especially in sectors where foreign workers are concentrated, which is gradually eroding the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable work, also because of the extraordinary adaptability of migrants, their social isolation, and their fear to denounce their employers. Besides, these tendencies, as I repeatedly highlighted in the previous editions of this Report, are fuelled by a societal propensity to represent migrants as the ideal candidates to cover jobs that are placed under the threshold of the “normal” level of social acceptability.

One of the most problematic aspects in the relationship between immigration and the Italian labour market, as we have seen, is the over-qualification that marks the occupational destiny of many educated immigrants; the importance of this phenomenon for the long-term sustainability of inclusion paths is clear. However, even more relevant is the issue of the overall quality of employment, i.e. a “bad” quality, especially when it comes to manual and law-productivity jobs. According to available projections, in the coming years, a significant share of new recruitments will concern low-qualified jobs. This circumstance leaves hope for the possibility of offering jobs to poorly educated migrants – who are, on average, less educated than Italians of the same age are. However, it also stresses the importance of a more effective labour market governance and control.

Over the past few months, the new arrivals and the issue of territorial distribution of asylum seekers have caused a widespread concern for the impact of immigration. Nevertheless, if we look to the future, we will have to worry about phenomena such as irregular employment, low salaries, an increase in the category of working poor, occupational segregation, as well as a lack of opportunities for professional mobility. But this is not all:

\(^\text{10}\) See, for example, the report provided by Censis-Confcooperative which describes how these kinds of phenomena involve even a “virtuous” region such Lombardy (“Corriere della Sera”, 14 April 2018).
other concerning phenomena are, as a matter of fact, the low levels of female participation in the labour market, the numerous early school leavers, the high incidence of the NEET among immigrants’ offspring, the intergenerational transmission of social disadvantages, and the growing polarization of the society.

In this regard, EU statistics show how, even because of the higher incidence of low labour-intensive families, almost half (48.6%) of non-EU migrants residing in the Union are at risk of poverty and social exclusion. Moreover, among them, the incidence of poor workers is about three times higher than among nationals (26.9% vs. 8.7%; 14.1% is the incidence among immigrants coming from another European country). The structural disadvantage of immigrant families, which reflects on the destinies of their children (for children with at least one foreign parent the risk of poverty doubles compared to minors with both native parents), is the main stumbling block on the sustainability of integration models. This is because it can in fact accentuate not only the concern for the “cost” of immigration on the welfare systems, but also the concern for the “diversity” that immigration brings with it (Zanfrini, 2019).

In Italy, these problems can be observed in the “wars between the poor”, which break out, for example, when it comes to accessing public housing or other types of services – thus causing some tensions at the local level, together with some rough attempts to introduce discriminatory criteria in order to favour historical residents (generally subsequently removed by the courts). However, these risks have so far been overshadowed by the relatively high levels of participation in the labour market (due to an age structure still concentrated in the active age groups: 78.4%) and by a rather widespread perception regarding the functionality of the immigrant work for the Italian economy and society (certainly fuelled by the experience of many families who directly employ immigrants as house-helpers and care-givers). Nevertheless, in the absence of decisive changes, we can predict a growing public concern, as the most recent surveys clearly indicate (see Valtolina, infra): in comparison with the other main receiving countries, in Italy the appreciation for the contribution that refugees could bring through their work and their talents is lower, and the concern for competition in the access to work and social benefits is higher (Pew Research Center, 2016).

According to current estimates (Directorate General for Immigration and Integration Policies, 2018), more than 13% of foreign families (almost twice as many as the Italian families) have no source of income from work-salary or pension. The medium-long term consequences of this kind of situations will probably be more important than the costs of asylum seekers’ reception. The vulnerability of foreign families is also accentuated by the high incidence of households with only one working member: this pattern affects both the communities in which one-person households prevail (e.g. in Ukraine), and the communities based on the traditional male breadwinner model – which run the risk of not having any source of income if the head of the family loses his job, as they can count only on the (modest) income of the working person of the family. This could happen to 80.2% of the families coming from Bangladesh, 75.5% of those coming from India, 74.6% of Pakistani families, 73.6% of Egyptian ones, and 69.9% of Tunisian households.

As noted by the president of the Italian Institute of Social Security (INPS), the demographic scenario unfolding in Italy describes immigration as a structural resource. However, the valorization of this resource should not be taken for granted. For immigrants as well as for all citizens, in fact, on the one hand the labour market can represent the main
channel of inclusion and of participation in the creation of the collective well-being, but on the other it can turn into an instrument of individual exclusion and of impairment of social cohesion. Although this may seem obvious, we believe it is fair to point it out.

References


ISMU Foundation has for a long time analysed the multicultural context of Italian schools, considering the difficulties and disparities that characterize the educational paths of students with a non-Italian citizenship (NIC). At the same time, a growing number of NIC students have begun to distinguish themselves through excellence in academic performances, and have increasingly been investing in medium-to-long term education, with the support of families and teachers.

Drawing upon this data, the chapter presents the characteristics of a phenomenon that, after approximately two decades, has now come to “a standstill phase”, after a rapid growth and a subsequent slackening of this trend across all educational levels (Colombo, 2018). The last official report published by the MIUR’s Statistical Office (March 2018) highlights that in 2016/17 there has been a relatively stable presence of approximately 826,000 students, who represent 9.4% of the total school population. After the “no growth” of 2015, foreign students rose by 11,000 units, especially due to the presence of second generations (foreign nationals born in Italy) and with a parallel, continuous reduction of Italian students, whose number has fallen under 8 million units.

1 The school population with an immigrant background in Italy

In the context of a progressive reduction of the Italian school population, the number of NIC students has also not risen as much as we have seen in the past.

This is what emerges also by the 2016/17 figures, which register a small incremental rise (Table 1). In the last decade, presences have risen by approximately 300,000 units: from 501,000 NICs in 2006/07 to 826,000 in 2016/17 (9.4% of the total). The yearly increment has declined significantly in the following decade (2006-2016): the largest rise in NIC students took place in 2007/08 (+72,000 units compared to the previous year), whereas the smallest increase was registered in 2015/16.

The multicultural evolution of Italian schools can be tracked by focusing on some particularly significant years, which show the transition from an initial phase characterized by the arrival of a small group of NIC students, culminating in a period of great increase, which has then lead to the recent stabilization of presences. 1988/89 was the year when the threshold of 10,000 foreign students was surpassed; in 1999/2000 over 100,000 presences were registered and in 2006/07 over 500,000 NIC students were enrolled.

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1 This perspective is well illustrated in the MIUR/ISMU’s National Report, 2013/14, Students with non-Italian citizenship. Challenges and successes, 2015.
2 All dates refer to the school calendar year.
Table 1. NIC students in the Italian school system. 2006/07-2016/17. A.V., % incidence, increase in A.V.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>100 students</th>
<th>Increment in A.V.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>501,420</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>574,133</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>+72,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>629,360</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>+55,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>673,592</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>+44,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>711,046</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>+37,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>755,939</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>+44,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>786,630</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>+30,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>803,053</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>+16,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>814,208</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>+11,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>814,851</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>+643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>826,091</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>+11,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data

As emphasised in previous Reports, the reduction in the rise of NIC students depends not only on the deceleration of immigration to Italy, but also on the fact that many foreign minors are still outside the school and educational system, either because they have not gained access or because of early drop-out. For example, as the MIUR has highlighted (2018), only 77% of NIC children aged between 3 and 5 attends early years education, compared with 96% of Italian children. School attendance in upper secondary schools also falls to 64.8%, in the 17-18 age range (compared with 80.9% among Italians). If we consider also school dropout (cf. the recent MIUR 2017 focus), 3.3% of foreign students leave education during lower secondary school, 5.7% in the transition from the first to the second educational cycle, and 11.6% in upper secondary school. Finally, we must also consider the consistent group of unaccompanied minors (approx. 17-18,000 recorded in 2016 and 2017) who meet various types of obstacles in accessing ordinary education.

The limited increase, moreover, may be influenced by the growth in “new” Italian citizens among the under 20 age group. Indeed, it is among this cohort that the rate of Italian citizenship acquisition is highest – 60 acquisitions per 1,000 residents – compared to other cohorts of foreigners (Menonna, 2017). All acquisitions were obtained either by election, at age 18, or by parental transmission, if parents obtained an Italian citizenship status before their children’s 18th birthday.

As we know, primary schools have the largest number of NIC students (Table 2), followed by lower and upper secondary schools. The latter – compared with the previous year – surpassed the early years cycle in terms of number of presences. Primary and early years host 10.8% and 10.7% NIC students, respectively, followed by 9.7% in lower and 7.1% in upper secondary. In the past 10 years, upper secondary schools emerged as the most dynamic educational segment over a longer period of time. Likewise, the significance of early years has also risen.

In terms of national origin, Romanians, Albanians and Moroccans continue to represent the largest minority groups in primary and secondary education, something that has been true in the past decade. In 2016/17 Romanians were 158,428 (almost 20% of NIC students, and growing), followed by Albanians (112,171; 13.6%) and Moroccans (102,121;
12.3%). Among the top 10 nationalities we also have Asian countries (China, the Philippines, India, Pakistan; MIUR, 2018), other Eastern European countries like Moldavia and Ukraine, and Egypt.

Table 2. NIC students in different educational levels. 2006/07 and 2016/17. A.V. and %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.y.</th>
<th>Pre-school</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Upper Sec</th>
<th>Lower Sec</th>
<th>Pre-school</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Upper Sec</th>
<th>Lower Sec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>94,712</td>
<td>190,803</td>
<td>13,076</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>164,820</td>
<td>302,122</td>
<td>67,486</td>
<td>91,663</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data

The surge in second generations has increased to over 500,000 presences in 2016/17: for the past four academic years, they have represented the majority of NIC students (60.9%; Table 3). Between 2007/8 (the first year data on second generations was recorded by the MIUR) and 2016/17, there has been an exponential growth of second generations across all educational levels from early years to lower secondary schools. They have become the majority of NIC students. The only exception is in upper secondary education where they are still a minority (approx. 27%).

Table 3. Second-generation students by educational level. 2007/08 and 2016/17. A.V. and %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school</td>
<td>79,113</td>
<td>140,671</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>89,421</td>
<td>221,643</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Sec.</td>
<td>22,474</td>
<td>89,129</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Sec.</td>
<td>8,111</td>
<td>51,520</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>199,119</td>
<td>502,963</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data

Another group who received attention in the past few years is that of students who entered the Italian school system for the first time, whose presence has oscillated in recent years. There has been a decrease of over 23,000 units in the 2007/08-2012/13 period, followed by another increase. Currently, this is a small group of approx. 23,600 students – which represents almost 3% of all NIC students in the first and second educational cycle.

Table 4. NIC students who entered the Italian school system for the first time. 2007/08 and 2016/17. A.V. and %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>23,650</td>
<td>9,303</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Sec.</td>
<td>12,064</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Sec.</td>
<td>10,440</td>
<td>6,751</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46,154</td>
<td>23,654</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data
Compared to the previous academic year, this group fell by more than 10,000 units and its percentage incidence on the NIC school population halved (5.3% in 2015/16), especially in primary school.

The alternating trends among new arrivals are connected with the recent increase of unaccompanied migrant minors. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, who has been monitoring the situation, their number was 18,000 in 2017 (to whom we must add 6,000 missing minors), prevalently male and approximately aged 16-17, mostly from the Gambia, Egypt, Albania, Guinea, Nigeria, Bangladesh, the Ivory Coast, and Eritrea. A minority – about 1,000 – is made up of girls, mostly from Nigeria and Eritrea.

There is currently no systematic dataset on unaccompanied minors and their access to the educational system, although we do know that the Italian law protects their right to education, especially after the Zampa Law n. 47/2007 was approved. At the same time, the relatively few studies conducted so far highlight that unaccompanied minors rarely manage to access ordinary education and are prevalently redirected to Provincial Centres for Adult Education (CPIAs), in adult learning courses (Grigt, 2017; Augelli et al., 2017; Save The Children, 2018). We will return to these issues, without forgetting the possibility of aspiring to and gaining access to a high quality education.3

2. Multicultural schools in local contexts

It is a well-known fact that NIC students are not distributed evenly across the country, but are present in specific areas, in some larger cities and medium/small towns, and in specific schools – such as the 691 schools whose student population is made up of over 50% of foreign students.

Lombardy remains the region with the largest number of foreign students, reaching almost 208,000 presences, followed by Emilia Romagna and Veneto (with 98,000 and 92,000, respectively), Lazio and Piedmont (78,000 and 76,000). If we consider the relationship between foreign students and the total school population, however, Emilia Romagna comes first with 15.8 NIC students per 100 students, followed by Lombardy (14.7) and Umbria (13.8). Overall, the regions of Northern and Central Italy with a percentage incidence of NIC students higher than the national average of 9.4% are 11.

In 2016/17, in 13 Italian regions, second generation students are the majority, whereas in the remaining 7 regions (South and Islands) those born abroad are still prevalent. Overall, 8 regions (2 from the Centre, Tuscany and Umbria, and 6 from the North) have percentages of second-generation students over the national average of 60.9%.

If we observe the previous graph, we can see two extreme cases represented by Calabria, where 70% of NIC students are born abroad and have a direct experience of migration, and Veneto, where 67.9% of NIC students are born in Italy. At the provincial level, in

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3 In this perspective, the ISMU Foundation supported the creation of a poetry and filmmaking workshop in the “Affori - Villa Litta Library”, in Milan. A group of 15 young people (Italian girls and boys from a lyceum in Milan and unaccompanied minors from various parts of the world) explored and documented in a video the connection between personal experiences and literature. The workshop was conducted in collaboration with the “Affori Library”, the “Sheb Sheb” association and the association “La Tenda”, and is part of the four-year European project “YEAD - Young European (Cultural) Audience Development” (2015-2019).
2016/17 the numerical ranking of NIC students is the same compared to previous years. The province of Milan comes first (85,000 NIC students), followed by the provinces of Rome (over 62,000), Turin (almost 38,000) and Brescia (almost 33,000).

Graph 1. First and second-generation NIC students by region. 2016/17, %

If we consider the percentage incidence, Prato (24.5 NIC every 100 students) and Piacenza (21.6) lead the way, followed by Mantova (18.4), Brescia (17.7) and Asti (17.4). Brescia continues to be an emblematic example of multicultural schools: it is the fourth province in terms of number and percentage incidence of NIC students (Barabanti, 2017).

Table 5. Cities with the greatest % incidence of NIC students. 2016/17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin with the greatest % incidence</th>
<th>NIC Students A.V.</th>
<th>NIC every 100 students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania (28.4)</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (27.9)</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (23)</td>
<td>2,528</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (13.5)</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (13.6)</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania (28.4)</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (26.3)</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (14.2)</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania (19)</td>
<td>4,202</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (55.4)</td>
<td>7,964</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (60.4)</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (37.2)</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (30.9)</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data
If we consider cities with the largest presence of NIC students, Rome comes first (41,000, of whom 27.5% of Romanian origin), followed by Milan (38,000, with 19.5% of Filipinos) and Turin (24,000 students, 34.9% Romanians). Then we have Genoa, Bologna and Florence (approx. 9-10,000), Brescia (12.5% Pakistanis) and Prato (approx. 8,000 students), Verona and Padova (6-7,000).

According to the MIUR (2018), among those cities with over 1,000 foreign students and a percentage incidence of over 10%, there are 92 towns/cities of various sizes. Focusing our attention on cities with over 20 NIC students every 100, the number decreases to 13 cities in 7 regions, of which 3 are larger cities (Prato, Piacenza, Alessandria), with a school population that goes from almost 8,000 students in Prato to 679 in Umbertide.

The ranking of municipalities in terms of percentage incidence (from greatest to smallest) goes from Pioltello in Lombardy (over 33 NIC students every 100 students), followed by 5 municipalities prevalently in Central Italy that remain in the 25-28 NIC students per 100 range (Fucecchio, Monfalcone, Prato, Campi Bisenzio, Umbertide). Finally, we have 7 municipalities that remain in the 20-24 students every 100 range (Romano di Lombardia, Cinisello Balsamo, Cologno Monzese, Sesto S. Giovanni, Piacenza, Arzignano, Alessandria).

If we consider schools with the highest percentage of NIC students, in 2016/17 there were 3,171 school whose student population was made up of 30% or more NIC students (5.6% of total schools). This figure is larger compared to the previous school year and especially compared to the previous decade: of these, 691 schools can be considered “prevalently attended by foreign students”.

Table 6. Italian schools by percentage of NIC students. 2006/07 and 2016/17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NIC students</th>
<th>Not present</th>
<th>&lt; 30%</th>
<th>&gt; 30%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data

If we exclude second-generation students, however, classes with over 30% of foreign-born NIC students are only 0.7%. 42,237 Italian schools (3/4 of the total) have a percentage of NIC students that is under 30%, whereas there are 10,929 schools (approx. 20%) who are unaffected by migration.

3. Difficulties and novelties in foreign students’ educational choices and careers

After illustrating the multicultural change that is taking place in Italian schools, it is worth shifting our attention to inequalities in the educational choices and academic careers of NIC students. We shall consider different indicators that describe the persistent challenges that such students have to face, highlighting their vulnerabilities in the educational realm: educational delays, which accumulate over time; secondary school dropout; lower results and fewer competences at the end of the mandatory school cycle; higher risk of marginalisation for NEET’s and unaccompanied minors. These are overall “negative indicators” which describe the inequalities faced by NIC students. At the same time, however, there are also other descriptors, which are more ambivalent and indicate that future
forecasts could be more positive, and some evidence of improvement does exist, especially for second generations and in the first cycle of education.

The first and more worrying indicator of complex educational careers among NIC students is educational delay. It is significant because it includes not only those who are repeating a school year but also those (born abroad) who are not attending the right grade in terms of age, as they have been kept back when they were first enrolled in the Italian school system. Although this phenomenon has dropped significantly in the last decade (over 10 percentage points, Table 7) and in upper secondary school, it remains quite high for NIC students, especially in the second educational cycle, where 59% of NIC students are in delay compared to 21% of Italians. The delay is considerable, however, also in the first mandatory cycle: 33% in middle school and 12% in primary school. Educational delay, as many studies have shown (Hippe, Jakubowski, 2018), can lead to school failure, shorter educational careers and early drop out from school or VET. Compared with Italians, moreover, the percentage of delayed NIC students is 7 times that of Italians in primary school, 5 in middle school, and 3 in high school.

Table 7. Italian and NIC students, delay (per 100 students) per school level. 2007/2008 and 2016/17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007/08</th>
<th></th>
<th>2016/17</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>Non-Italians</td>
<td>b-a</td>
<td>Italians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Secondary</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data

School delay, as aforementioned, can lead to interruption in school frequency (during the school year and in the transition from one year to the next) and to a temporary or definitive drop out of education, both during compulsory education and before obtaining a diploma or professional qualification. The data on school dropout, analysed in a recent MIUR report (2017), highlight the different pieces that make up the puzzle (in lower secondary school, in the transition between school cycles, in upper secondary school), showing once again the greater disadvantage among foreign students compared to Italians in determining earlier school dropout.

School dropout affects foreigners more already in lower secondary school, where the percentage of NIC students who leave school is 3.3%, compared to 0.6% of Italian students. Those born abroad (4.2%) seem to be in an even worse situation compared to those born in Italy. In the transition from lower to upper secondary school, the percentage of NIC students who drop out grows even further (5.72%, compared with 1.2% of Italian students).

It is in upper secondary schools that the phenomenon gets worse: the percentage of foreign students who dropped out of school at this level is 11.6% (12.6% among those born abroad) compared with 3.8% of Italians.
Table 8. School dropout in secondary school by nationality. 2015/16 and transition to 2016/17. %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>Non-IT</th>
<th>Born abroad</th>
<th>Born in Italy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dropout in lower secondary school</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout in the transition from lower to upper secondary school</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout in upper secondary school</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data

If we consider Early School Leavers (ESLs), namely the percentage of the population between 18 and 24 who does not have a secondary school diploma or professional qualification and who is not in any educational programme, there has been much progress in Italy and a significant fall in numbers in the past few years (ISTAT, 2018). The percentage of ESLs in 2017 was 14% (580,000 young people), a figure which rises and gets worse for foreigners (33.1% compared with 32.8% in 2016), and is almost 3 times the quota of Italian ESLs (12.1%).

According to the survey on young people in the job market, conducted by ISTAT (2017), Italians and foreigners have different reasons for leaving education. The number of foreigners who consider their level of education sufficient is greater, compared to Italians; likewise, family and economic motives leading to dropout are very strong (more than twice as frequent, compared to Italians). This should be seen both in terms of a greater sense of responsibility towards the family, but also as the lack of support/encouragement by family members (cf. Santagati, Bonini, 2018). ESLs are a preoccupation also because of the positive correlation between higher levels of education and a greater inclusivity in the job market: the rate of unemployment among ESLs was 31.5% in 2017; the foreign component had a higher level of employment (39.5%) compared with Italians (29.4%; cf. ISTAT, 2018).

A further indicator of early school leaving is the lack of basic competences and skills, indicated by the rate of low performers, based on INVALSI data. This refers to that percentage of students who do not reach a sufficient level of Italian and Mathematics and show difficulties in demonstrating their knowledge and in using it in different situations. If we consider data gathered among students attending the second grade of upper secondary school (Barabanti, 2016), the percentage of students with below average levels of Italian and Maths is pretty low among Italian students (approx. about 10% for Italian and 6% Maths); becomes higher among second generation NIC students, especially in Italian (19.7%, whereas the figure for Maths is more limited at 9.3%); and is worst among first generations (27.7%, compared with 12.5% in Maths). A specific weakness, therefore, are Italian language skills among first generation students. This confirms preoccupations for those students who have recently arrived in Italy: adolescents with few linguistic skills, who often received scarce basic linguistic education in their country of origin.

In terms of the phenomena of young people who are Neither in Employment nor in Education and Training (NEETs), it is estimated that in 2017 in Italy those aged 15-29 who fall in this category are 2,189,000 (24.1%), the highest figure among EU Member States. The number of NEETs in Italy has been rising since the beginning of the economic crisis, reached a peak in 2014, and then began falling once more, as the economy began to grow again in 2015. Whereas, previously, NEETs were typically young people with low educational levels, since the beginning of the economic crisis this condition has come to
affect also young people with medium-high qualifications (albeit, this is also diminishing in recent years). The incidence of NEETs is significantly higher among foreigners (34.4% compared with 23% of Italians). This difference is certainly due to the feminine component (23.7% e 44.3%, respectively, among Italian and foreign young women). If we consider the male component, conversely, there is hardly any difference (ISTAT, 2017).

Among the challenges faced by NIC students, one final note ought to be made regarding unaccompanied minors, whose number has grown rapidly in the past few years, with the rise in migrant arrivals on Italian coasts. Although we do not have much available data, different studies emphasise the challenges, if not the impossibility, faced by these minors in accessing the public school system to complete compulsory education (Asnada, 2018). Save the Children (2018) highlights that the most frequent problems concerns school enrolment among over 15s, who represent the major cohort of unaccompanied minors present in Italy.

The problems are mainly due to bureaucratic and administrative reasons (arrival during the school year, lack of available places, lack of adequate knowledge Italian upon arrival, illiteracy, lack of time for educational planning before turning 18, etc.). Fifteen year-olds are rarely offered a place in lower secondary education, as they are deemed too old. Nevertheless, neither are they offered a place in upper secondary education, because they are considered unable to sustain the requirements of such an educational route. Until age 16, in theory, they cannot even access CPIAs. Linguistic (and cultural) education are, in the best cases, offered informally by NGOs, volunteer organisations, etc., through activities where the focus is the acquisition of language skills (Huddleston, Wolffhardt, 2016).

A study currently being conducted by the Educational Sector of the ISMU Foundation, entitled “Rights and obligations: Unaccompanied minors in the Italian education and training system”, aims at mapping the presence of unaccompanied minors in the CPIAs of some significant areas in the country. The first phase of the research, based on consolidated collaborations, aimed at collecting data on the presence of unaccompanied minors in the CPIAs of Lombardy and Sicily (the regions which host the largest number of unaccompanied minors) in 2016/17, using a questionnaire.

The data gathered indicates that approximately 800 unaccompanied minors are enrolled in Lombardy in 19 CPIAs and 4,500 in Sicily in 10 CPIAs (5 times those present in the Lombardy centres). They are prevalently male (only 6-9% of females), with a significant quota of under16s in Sicily (almost 18% of unaccompanied minors enrolled) and with many who had just turned 18 (400 approx. in Lombardy and 3,500 in Sicily).

In Lombardy CPIAs, there are students with 18 different nationalities, especially from North and Sub-Saharan Africa: Egypt (over 200 minors), the Gambia (approx. 90), Guinea, Albania, Senegal e Somalia (30 to 50 presences). In Sicilian CPIAs 9 nationalities were mentioned: the Gambia (over 1,200 minors), Nigeria and Senegal (approx. 450), Guinea and the Ivory Coast (approx. 300), Bangladesh (just under 150), and Mali (almost 70).

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4 A team made up of Alessandra Barzaghi, Erica Colussi, Margherita Squaiella, Cristina Zanzottera, under the scientific supervision of Mariagrazia Santagati, conducted the research.

5 We would like to thank for their support in our research: the USR of Lombardy; the UST of Milan; the CPIA 5 directed by Prof Cavagna, the collaboration with Prof Augelli; all the CPIAs in Lombardy; the University of Catania and the support of the USR of Sicily, managed by Prof. Liana Daher; all CPIAs in Sicily.
Table 9. Unaccompanied minors enrolled in CPIAs in Lombardy and Sicily, compared with other types of users. 2016/17. A.V.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lombardy</th>
<th>Sicily</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unaccompanied minors enrolled in CPIAs</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>4,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under16s</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccompanied minors enrolled in literacy courses</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>2,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-A1 level</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recently turned 18 enrolled in CPIAs</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>3,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC minors enrolled in CPIAs</td>
<td>1,804</td>
<td>1,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian minors enrolled in CPIAs</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC adults enrolled in CPIAs</td>
<td>29,655</td>
<td>9,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian adults enrolled in CPIAs</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>1,956</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU data

In terms of courses attended, most unaccompanied minors are enrolled in literacy courses, with many attending pre-A1 level courses, which indicate relatively low linguistic skills (especially in Lombardy). The rest are concentrated mainly in first level courses (prevalently in the module for the obtaining of a lower secondary school licence). Unaccompanied minors represent approx. 30% of under18s in CPIAs in Lombardy, but this figure rises to approx. 70% in Sicily. Foreign minors, who are present with their families and attend CPIAs, unlike unaccompanied minors, are distributed more uniformly across literacy and first level courses. Most Italian minors attend first level courses (in Sicily, for example, they represent almost all of this sub-group).

We can add another piece to the puzzle by comparing unaccompanied minors in CPIAs with adult users. Foreign adults, who prevalently attend literacy courses, represent a large number especially in Lombardy (almost 30,000 NIC students), where there is a more limited number of minors attending CPIAs. In Sicily, by comparison, adults are approx. 9,500 compared with 6,000 foreign minors.

4. Educational success among the new generations of immigrant origin

Over and beyond indicators of educational disadvantage, we ought to identify the successes achieved by foreign students in the Italian educational and training system, especially among second generations born in Italy. Many are the evidences of overall improvement and positive scenarios: the growth of presences in lyceums and technical institutes; the improvements in basic competences in Italian language and Mathematics; the presence and (albeit slight) rise in foreigners among top performers and excellent and resilient students (cf. Barabanti, 2018); the increase in access to higher education.

Despite the traditional “canalization” of NIC students towards VET, the long term trend (Table 10) shows that, over the past decade, foreigners have consistently enrolled in technical institutes (where they represent approx. 37% of total students), whereas their presence in VET has gradually decreased (-6 percentage points in 10 s.y.) and their number in lyceums has increased (+6 pts.)
Differences between natives and first-generation foreigners remain, but second generations appear increasingly similar to Italian students in their upper secondary school choices. Indeed, second generation NIC students tend to choose technical institutes and lyceums, whereas those born abroad prefer VET and, as a second choice, technical institutes. (MIUR, 2018). In 2016/2017, 38.9% of second-generation NIC students attended technical institutes, 33.5% were enrolled in lyceums, and the remaining 27.5% in VET. For those born abroad, the distribution is different: 37.6% attend VET courses, 37% technical institutes and 25.4% lyceums.

In terms of school results, if we consider the results of INVALSI tests in Italian and Mathematics in the second class of upper secondary school and at the end of compulsory education (Table 11: cf. Barabanti contribution in the various ISMU/MIUR reports), we continue to see strengths and weaknesses in NIC student’s academic achievements. If we consider Italian language scores, Italians tend to have better results compared with second-generation students, whose results, in turn, are better than their first-generation counterparts are. The distance is more relevant in Italian scores, whereas differences are more limited in Mathematics, if we compare Italians and second-generation students.

If we consider the data from a longitudinal perspective, overall, performances are stable over time: in the past school year (2016/17), the distance, in Italian scores, is of 15 points in favour of Italians, compared with second generations, and goes up to 23 points if we compare Italians with first generations. In Maths, the situation is a bit better, with Italians only 7 points above second generations and 13 above first generations.

Here, where there are less linguistic and expressive difficulties, there are more achievements in learning and schools seem to be better able to integrate, at least academically, NIC students of different generations (Santagati, Zanzottera, 2018).

Using INVALSI scores, we can also identify the group of so-called top performers, i.e. students with excellent results (> 90th percentile): this is a significant indicator of success. Top performers account for 5.7% (in Maths) and 4.1% (in Italian) of all second generation

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### Table 10. NIC students in different upper secondary schools. 2006/07 and 2016/17. %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006/07</th>
<th>2016/17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lyceums</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical institutes</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VET</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data

### Table 11. Average points in Italian and Mathematics in Grade II of upper secondary school. INVALSI tests by citizenship. 2013/14-2016/17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Mathematics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis of INVALSI data
NIC students, compared with 9% of Italians. It is certainly not a large number, but it does attest to the fact that excellence can be found also among foreigners.

Over and beyond top performers, INVALSI data and other international studies (see OECD-PISA), allow us to identify the existence of students who manage to excel despite the double disadvantage of a low socio-economic status and an immigrant background. These are called resilient students (in the INVALSI test they belong to the first quartile of the ESCS value but score within or above the 90th percentile in various subject areas).

The following graph suggests that the disparity among different students is not great, even when comparing natives and first generation NIC students, especially in Mathematics. It is interesting, however, that second generations have higher percentages of resilient students compared with natives (17.4% in Italian and 16.6% in Mathematics). As different studies on school success among students of immigrant background in Italy have suggested (Santagati, 2018b), these young peoples’ educational career is complex and multifaceted, and academic successes are often connected with skills and motivations that develop as a result of the challenges faced during the migratory process.

Migration thus appears, at the same time, as a traumatic experience, but also a potential resource. Young people experience suffering and failure, but this can become a learning experience. They acquire the possibility of reflecting on unsuccessful experiences and develop a newfound awareness of disadvantage; an experience where one learns and strengthens character traits such as strength, courage, determination, perseverance, patience, etc. which are strong predictors of educational success (Santagati, 2018c). Indeed, much empirical evidence indicates that academic success is possible for students of immigrant origin. In 2015, in OECD countries, on average 24% of disadvantaged immigrant students were considered resilient, able to obtain high results despite their disadvantage (OECD, 2018).

The Italian situation compared also with other OECD countries, is marked by a limited distance between resilient natives (27%) and non-natives (23.7%), testifying to a school system that can support students academically, despite different types of disadvantage (socio-economic, cultural, ethnic, etc.).

Italy, with France, Estonia, Luxemburg, the UK, Greece, and the Netherlands has a below-average disparity between resilient foreigners and natives (6.5 pts) for OECD countries. The disadvantage in terms of ability to retain foreigners despite difficulties and academic and other failures is markedly higher in Spain, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, Slovenia, Sweden (over 10 pt. difference among the two groups of resilient students: cf. OECD, 2018).

One final element to complete the success profile of NIC students is related to educational choices after upper secondary school (cf. Bertozzi, 2018; Bozzetti, 2018). The available statistics suggest that, among those who obtained their diploma in 2015/16 and 2016/17, that same year 33.9% enrolled in a university degree programme.

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6 We are referring, in particular, to the Su.Per. project, Successo nei PERcorsi formativi degli studenti di seconda generazione (Success in Educational Paths of Second Generation Students), promoted by the CIRMiB Research Centre of Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (and directed by M. Santagati, 2018a). The project is based on a set of written autobiographies, based on a self-interview outline, collected in 2017 among a group of 65 students of immigrant origin who attend 11 upper secondary schools and VET institutes in the larger Brescia area.
Graph 2. Resilient students in Italian and Mathematics in Grade II of upper secondary school. INVALSI tests by citizenship. 2015/16

Source: ISMU analysis of MIUR data

The percentage is lower compared with their Italian counterparts (51.1%), but it does indicate, nonetheless, that almost one third of NIC young people chose to invest in longer educational paths and in higher education.

5. Conclusions

The current picture of the Italian school system is still characterized by multiple paradoxes, with an extremely protective legal framework in terms of rights to education for all minors, even the most vulnerable, during compulsory education and training. The full enjoyment of these rights, however, is not always ensured and applied to all. It is still necessary to reflect upon and suggest targeted actions in order to support disadvantaged students and other, who are facing specific difficulties, in order to motivate them, retain them and encourage them to understand the importance of education in the present and for their future life choices.

In a recent study on school dropout, conducted by ISMU Foundation in Milan (Bonini, Santagati, 2018), secondary school teachers represent schooling as “Pandora’s vase”: a context that contains – like in the Greek myth – the “evils”, challenges and suffering of foreign (and non-foreign) students and their families, together with the struggle of those who teach and try to support learning for disadvantaged subjects. Schools, however, also try to foster positive elements, abilities, and hope among pupils, considering individual intelligences and talents and trying to help everyone find their place in the world (over and beyond the educational system).

“According to Article 34 of the Italian Constitution, all those under age 16 should attend public schools. Yet we see this is not so. Many under 16s do not attend public schools. We want schools
to be open to all minors, even if they are not Italian, even if they do not know how to read or write... Open for us means not only in terms of entry for all, but for everyone to learn successfully... it means not being cast aside, having equal opportunities, being involved and doing extracurricular activities with all the other students. Open means being with our classmates, making new friends and improving our Italian. Being in an Italian classroom with Italian kids makes learning easier at our age... We must get in because we all have some potential to develop. We are resistant, independent, songwriters. When we go to school, we bring our eyes, our ears, our books, and our heart. We bring our ideas, our feelings, our questions on what we don’t understand” (Asnada, 2018).

The “Letter to Public Schools”, presented in June 2018 and developed within the school for adolescents of immigrant origin that the Asnada Association manages in Milan, aptly concludes the arguments put forth in this chapter. This contemporary “letter to a teacher”, written by minors who have come to join their families in Italy, unaccompanied minors and young Italian educators, denounces the impossibility, for many minors, to attend and remain in public schools. At the same time, it reminds institutions and adults in general (parents, teachers, school managers, educators, etc.) of their responsibilities, in order to ensure those equal opportunities, which the legislation states should by duly protected. Finally, it urges schools to continue in their effort – which must never be taken for granted – to recognize and foster the different talents that reside in each child and adolescent, avoiding dangerous selection mechanisms and without leaving anyone out.

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MIUR (2017), La dispersione scolastica nell’a.s. 2015/16 e nel passaggio all’a.s. 2016/17, Ufficio Statistica e Studi, Rome.
MIUR (2018), Gli alunni con cittadinanza non italiana. A.s. 2016/17, Ufficio Statistica e Studi, Rome.
6. The 2018 Italian General Elections: Focus on Immigration
Nicola Pasini and Marta Regalia

1. Introduction

The previous report of ISMU Foundation (Fondazione ISMU, 2018) analysed the relationship between immigration and politics in light of the results of the political elections that took place in 2017 in a number of European states (France, Germany, Holland and the United Kingdom). Similarly, this chapter will present some results from the analysis of the electoral programmes of the main competing parties in the Italian elections of 4 March 2018. We will focus particularly on two issues: attitudes towards migration and the European Union. After presenting the electoral results, we shall analyse the same issues within the so-called “government contract” drafted and signed by the two political forces, the M5S (the Five Star Movement) and the Lega (the League) that, at the beginning of the legislature, formed a new and unprecedented majority.

2. Immigration in the electoral programmes of the parties and coalitions: where and how much?

What are the main political proposals on immigration and the European Union? We shall analyse the programmes of the main parties: Partito Democratico/the Democratic Party (PD), +Europa/More Europe, Liberi e Uguali/Free and Equal (LeU), the centre-right coalition (Forza Italia/Forward Italy, Lega/the League, Fratelli d’Italia/Brothers of Italy and Noi con l’Italia/Us with Italy) and the Movimento 5 Stelle/the Five Star Movement (M5S).

In its own electoral programme submitted to the Ministry of the Interior, the PD makes no mention of immigration except for a reference to “ius culturae” (p. 8), a call for Europe to “take responsibility of the issue of migration” and the warning that “without solidarity in how it manages migration, there can be no solidarity in the next European budget” (p. 9). It does, however, dedicate ample space to the European Union, recommending a development model leading to the establishment of a “United States of Europe”.

+Europa is the only party to have dedicated an entire paragraph to immigration. The party intends to radically alter the current Italian legislation on immigration (the “Bossi-Fini” law): “We must introduce various immigration-for-work mechanisms, starting with a temporary residence permit for the purpose of seeking employment” (p. 22). An improvement of the reception system is also proposed, with the exclusive adoption of the SPRAR (Protection System for Asylum and Refugee Seekers) model. At the European level, it recommends changing the Dublin Regulation to “introduce legal and secure channels of
immigration for work purposes, including non-qualified labour.” (p. 22). The position of Emma Bonino’s party on European matters may be taken as given. Indeed, the electoral programme opens with the following statement: “Now is the time to say that in looking ahead to Italy’s future, we do not need less Europe. On the contrary. In order to see – including in Italy – more growth, more rights, more democracy, more freedom, more opportunities, more security, more respect for the environment, we need More Europe” (p. 2). The model of Europe is not, however, that of a “European super state”, but a light-weight federation.

*Liberi e Uguali* recommends the “rational management of migration, abolishing the “Bossi-Fini” law and introducing a jobseekers’ permit and mechanisms for legal immigration, promoting the creation of a single European system for seeking asylum that transcends the criteria of the country of initial arrival and includes humanitarian channels and rescue missions” (p. 12). The party also favours a model of widespread reception in the style of the SPRAR and *jus soli*. On the European Union, *Liberi e Uguali* takes a decidedly Europeanist standpoint, proposing to “fight the technocratic shift that has taken hold in Europe, restoring life to the vision of a single European people. (...) We must overcome the intergovernmental dimension that dictates duties and fails to guarantee rights in imposing policies of severe austerity. We want to give a greater role to the European Parliament, which elects a true government of the citizens of Europe, so that they can once again inhabit their home” (p. 2).

The parties of the centre-right coalition (*Forza Italia*, *Lega*, *Fratelli d’Italia* and *Noi con l’Italia*) submitted a common programme that recommends, with regard to immigration: “taking back control of our borders, intercepting disembarkations by facilitating returns, stipulating treaties and agreements with economic migrants’ countries of origin, (...) repatriating all illegal immigrants” (p. 6). On the European Union, they promised “fewer constraints from Europe, no to policies of austerity, no to excessive regulations that stand in the way of development, revision of the European treaties” (p. 4).

The *Movimento 5 Stelle* dedicates no.8 of its 20 points to “Stopping the business of immigration”, proposing the “immediate repatriation of illegal immigrants” and “10,000 new appointments in the territorial commissions so that, like other European countries, Italy can assess a migrant’s right or not to stay in Italy within one month” (p. 1). No stand is taken on the European Union.

When comparing the space each party dedicates to immigration and the European Union in their own political programmes, it is clear that these issues have different levels of importance for different parties. On this matter, the *Cattaneo Institute* has conducted a content analysis of the electoral programmes of the main political parties, adopting the guidelines of an international research programme, the Comparative Manifesto Project1. The Institute analysed and codified all the quasi-sentences (lexical units that express a single political concept) contained in the texts of the parties’ programmes, in order to survey the importance each party assigns to the various policy sectors. In general, the Cattaneo Institute analysis (Istituto Cattaneo, 2018a) found that 24.8% of all quasi-sentences refer to welfare and education, and 17.2% to the economy and taxation, whilst “in third place in terms of the importance of the various policy sectors, we find security and legality

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1 https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/.
which also partly reflects the degree to which public opinion is focused on immigration and the migrant crisis of recent years” (p. 4). The European Union occupies the last place (10.4%), after institutional reform (11.9%), work (11.3%) and the environment (10.6%). This overlooking of the European Union could derive from the parties’ lack of interest in European matters, or reflect the weak cohesion of the pre-electoral alliances – especially the centre-right – which failed to find a common platform with regard to the EU. However, the Cattaneo Institute data (Graph 1) reveal significant differences with regard to the importance assigned to each policy sector by the programmes of the parties considered in the study. Whilst, on average, 13.7% of the quasi-sentences concern security and legality, this issue is allotted the most space by the centre-right coalition (20.3%). A different analysis by Cavallaro, Salza and Zanetti (2018) demonstrates that “of all the typical terms [in the M5S programme], the most frequent (11 occurrences) is immigration” (p. 74). The programmes also vary in their emphasis of European matters: at one extreme, the centre-right devotes no more than 7% of its quasi-sentences to the issue; at the other, the equivalent figure for +Europa is 13.2%. M5S came out in the middle with 11.2%, and 10.4% and 8.1% for PD and LeU respectively. However, according to the Cavallaro, Salza, Zanetti data (2018) the party giving the least weight to the European Union was M5S (the term “Europe” appears only six times).

Graph 1. Composition of the electoral programmes based on seven distinct policy sectors (percentage values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Economy and taxation</th>
<th>Europe and foreign policy</th>
<th>Institutional reforms and PA</th>
<th>Welfare and education</th>
<th>Security and legality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRE-RIGHT</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+EUROPA</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEU</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5S</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cattaneo Institute data processed by the authors

3. The results of the vote on 4 March 2018: which proposals proved a success with voters?

If we interpret the results in terms of attitudes to immigration and the European Union (Graph 2), we can see that only 24.7% of the votes were won by parties in favour of the European Union (PD, +Europa and LeU), with Eurosceptic parties winning a good 37% of
the vote (the centre-right coalition). Finally, M5S, with its ambiguous position, won around one third of the votes. The situation is even more unbalanced in terms of immigration. 37% of the electorate voted for the strongly anti-immigration centre-right coalition and a further 32.7% for the moderately anti-immigration M5S, amounting to a total of almost 7/10 voters. Only 24.7%, represented by the pro-Europe parties, voted for parties with favourable positions towards immigration (LeU, +Europa and PD). So it seems that the winds blowing against immigration blew even more forcefully than those against the European Union.

Graph 2. Position of the Italian political parties on immigration and the European Union

4. The government contract between Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle: the migration issue

After almost three months of unsuccessful negotiation and failed attempts, an executive led by Giuseppe Conte and supported by M5S and Lega was installed on 1 June 2018. The agreement between the two parties became a “Contract for governing change” stipulated by the leaders of the two parties, Di Maio and Salvini. What does the agreement say on the topic of immigration? The contract addresses immigration in point 13 of 30, entitled “Immigration: repatriations and stopping the business”. As the title indicates, therefore, on the topic of immigration at least, the contract is more aligned to the Lega’s position than that of M5S. The introduction is unequivocal: “The current migration issue is unsustainable for Italy, given the costs and the associated business, fed by national public funds, often managed with little transparency and susceptible to infiltration by organised crime” (p. 26). To resolve the issue, “which goes as far as to put the Schengen system at risk” (p. 26), Italy must play a leading role in European negotiations on asylum and immigration policies to reduce migrant flows and revise the Dublin Regulations. The ultimate
The goal is equal responsibility to be endorsed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU “with the mandatory dispersal of asylum seekers throughout the EU Member States” (p. 26). Like other European governments, the so-called “yellow-green” government intends to tighten up and expedite procedures for verifying or revoking asylum seeker status. In this regard, it states that “the assessment of admissibility of requests for international protection must take place in the countries of origin or transit, with the support of European agencies, in structures that guarantee full protection of human rights.” (p. 27). Finally, it calls for what it deems the necessary implementation “of bilateral agreements between Italy and the European Union with third countries, to clarify and expedite repatriation procedures” (p. 27), deemed non-deferrable and urgent. To this end, it recommends identifying temporary custody and repatriation centres (at least one per region) where illegal immigrants may be detained for a maximum of 18 months while procedures for their effective repatriation are completed. These initiatives must be funded using a portion of the resources allocated to receiving migrants. Proposals are made concerning security and public order, such as “defining specific crimes that, when committed by asylum seekers, result in immediate removal from national territory” (p. 27) or the necessity to “demolish the smuggling business and (...) dismantle international criminal organisations engaged in human trafficking” (p. 27), or, to “make it possible to investigate and immediately close all radical Islamic associations, including mosques and places of worship of any denomination found to be illegal” (p. 28). Several references are made to the current system for managing migrants, which is deemed non-transparent. The proposal is made to replace the current system run by private companies, and involve public institutions to a greater degree by entrusting the running of the centres to the Regions. An analysis by the Cattaneo Institute (Istituto Cattaneo, 2018b) found that “the most concrete political proposals in the “contract” between M5S and Lega relate to the sector defined as “law and order”, i.e. issues of security, immigration control and increasing the penalties for certain crimes. (...) The political contribution of the Lega’s positions on “security” is particularly evident here, the latter being transposed directly into the government contract, making it easier for voters to judge the degree to which promises are actually kept” (p. 2).

5. The immigration and security decree and the recommendations of the President of the Republic

On 24 September 2018, the Council of Ministers unanimously approved the so-called “Salvini Decree” on immigration and security. Under three headings, the decree addresses three issues: reforming the right to asylum and citizenship; public safety, and preventing and countering organised crime; administration and management of goods sequestered and confiscated from mafia organisations. President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella signed the decree on 4 October, whilst simultaneously sending a letter to the President of the Council, Giuseppe Conte, in which he advocated adhering to the Constitution on the rights of foreign nationals. Here is a summary of the provisions made on immigration. The first article of the decree contains new measures on political asylum and, in fact, revokes the provision of protection for humanitarian reasons introduced in Italy in 1998 under the Testo Unico (Consolidated Law) on immigration. The Salvini Decree doubles (from 90
to 180 days) the maximum term for which foreign nationals may be held in centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio (custody and repatriation centres) or CPRs, formerly known as CIEs. The decree also stipulates that asylum seekers may be detained for a maximum of 30 days in so-called “hotspots” for the purpose of ascertaining their identity and citizenship. The current standard reception managed by Italian municipalities – the system for receiving asylum seekers and refugees (SPRAR) – is limited to cases in which individuals are already beneficiaries of international protection or to unaccompanied foreign minors.

More funds are also being allocated to repatriation: 500,000 euros in 2018, 1.5 million euros in 2019 and a further 1.5 million in 2020. The decree also extends the list of crimes that result in the revocation of refugee status and subsidiary protection, to include, among others, production, possession and trafficking of drugs, theft, domestic burglary, armed robbery and extortion, threatening or assaulting a public official and sexual violence.

6. Conclusions. The development of the Italian party system: immigration and Europe, two connected issues

As the various analyses and interpretations of our Foundation in its studies on the relationship between immigration and politics have shown, we can, once again – in relation to the elections in Italy – reaffirm that the interwoven issues of Europe and immigration are strongly divisive, both in terms of electoral campaigns and governmental decisions. In relation to immigration and, consequently, the identity of the European Union as well, the challenge arises of sharing a common cultural horizon. As with the 2017 elections in many European countries, the outcome of Italy’s political elections on 4 March 2018 points to the strengthening of widespread opposition to immigration feeling, and a highly sceptical attitude towards Europe. This is more than a trend: Europe and immigration, seen with negative connotations, occupy the political stage with a highly significant electoral consensus. This has inevitably changed the current and even future political agenda of national and EU government. The 2019 European elections will surely serve as a testing ground for the robustness of the European political system.

References


7. Attitudes Towards Immigrants and Refugees in Italian Society

Giovanni Giulio Valtolina

In the next European elections, the issue of immigration will probably decide the future of Europe. Despite the decline in the landings of migrants on our coasts, which all statistics record, the migratory phenomenon withstands to be central to the political debate. The relevance of this theme can be attributed largely to the next electoral transition foreseen by the European elections of 2019, from which the new power relations of the next European Parliament will emerge, which will determine the characteristics of the Union and even the conditions of its own survival. To avoid that anxiety and insecurity – real or perceived does not matter – push millions of EU voters into the arms – only apparently comforting – of sovereignism, it is therefore necessary to understand what are the mechanisms that govern the complex processes that lead to the building of attitudes.

But the centrality that the migratory presence continues to occupy in public opinion must also be attributed to the fact that the landings and presences of foreigners in our country continue to be richly overestimated. As noted in an international study (Duffy, 2018), conducted on a sample of over 50,000 interviewed, in 13 countries in the world, Italians are those who present the highest level of distortion of social events, followed by US and French. From the unemployment rate to the number of immigrants, Italians show they have a very distorted perception of the social world around them.

In the present paper, we will first present a study, conducted in a national context, on the mind-sets of Italians following the case of the Italian Guard Coast patrol “U. Diciotti”, who has been stationed for several days off the coast of Sicily, before being authorized to disembark the immigrants it had on board. Subsequently, the results of some surveys conducted at international level on the orientations of European citizens will be highlighted, also with regard to aid and development cooperation in the countries of origin of immigrants.

1. The trouble caused by the case of the Italian Coast Guard patrol “U. Diciotti”

An event that involved and divided Italian public opinion during 2018 was, in particular, the case of the Italian Coast Guard patrol “U. Diciotti”, which had rescued 177 migrants, but which had been temporarily denied the opportunity to land them. A survey conducted by Ipsos (2018), a month after the landing of all the migrants on board the ship, pointed out how the affair was followed with great attention by the public opinion: just under 90% of the interviewees were to the current and more than 60% had followed the story in detail, with the highest point of attention among the elected representatives of the center-left, where it reached about 80% of well informed. Over 60% of those
interviewed said they appreciated the position of Minister Salvini, while only a quarter of the voters declared themselves critical. It was a widespread consensus, which was maximized among the Lega Nord voters (86%), but also very high among the Cinque Stelle voters (74%), and majority even among those who voted Forza Italia and FdI (72%). On the other hand, the opposition of the center-left voters is high (70%), even if almost a quarter appreciates the work of the Minister.

The researchers also point out that even among Catholic voters support for Salvini was prevalent: among those who attend religious services at least once a week, critics reach 33% but the consents are 57%, only 4 points less than average.

And even in front of the rather harsh tone used by the Minister, in relation to the news of the opening of an investigation against him, the majority of respondents say they are on his side: 56% share the Minister’s line, while the percentage of those who criticize it rises to 31%. Once again compact the Lega Nord and the Cinque Stelle voters. Also in this case, among the center-left voters there is a not insignificant share – almost 20% – that sided with Salvini. And so also 55% of Catholic voters.

Despite this climate, apparently contrary to the reception of immigrants, since the populist front in the elections won, crimes against foreigners have not grown, but have actually decreased.

Given that the indication of the criminal aggravation of a crime is established by the judge only at the end of a trial, it is in any case interesting to note that, during 2018, there has not been an increase in damage of migrants. This is clearly showed by data from the Ministry of the Interior’s Public Security Department (2018), which indicates a decrease, with peaks in the first half of 2018, of violent or criminal actions against non-Italian citizens.

In particular, in the two months of the Conte government – in the period between 1 June and 31 July 2018 – crimes against foreigners (of which almost two thirds, according to a consolidated trend since 2016, concern non-EU citizens) decreased by 20%, compared to the same period of 2017: in detail, the attempted killings decreased, from 54 to 44 (-18.7%), the malicious lesions, 1,858 against the 2,402 of June-July 2017 (-22.6%), the offenses of beatings, 372 against the 447 of the two-month period corresponding to the previous year; and even the threats dropped from 1,692 to 1,291 (-23.7%).

Even analyzing a wider period, namely the semester between the ending of the Parliament and the first month of the Conte government, there is a decline in crimes that have as victims immigrants: if from 1 January to 30 June 2016 had been committed about 65,000 crimes against foreigners, and in the same period of 2017 were registered 59,074, in the first six months of 2018 there are 49,806. This semester has represented the hottest period from the point of view of political debate on immigration issue, given that it conceded with the electoral campaign, the victory of the populists in the parliamentary elections of March 4 and the appointment of Salvini as Minister of the Interior.

Analyzing in detail the individual crimes, in particular those more characterized by a discriminatory matrix, it can be noted the same decremental trend. For example, the malicious lesions decreased by a quarter: if in the first half of 2016 there were around 4,850 – out of a total of 9,753 – in the first six months of 2017, 4,366 were recorded, and fell to 3,631 from 1 January to June 30, 2018. The same is noted for the offenses of beatings against foreigners from non-EU countries: 890 in the first six months of 2016, remained almost unchanged in the same period of 2017, to suffer a contraction quite consistent in
the first semester of this year (minus 720). In the same way, verbal violence, discrimination acts characterized by insults, abusive epithets or intimidating expressions also diminish. If the threats against foreigners were about 3,280 in the first six months of 2016 (out of a total annual of 6,562 cases), crimes of this kind dropped to 2,883 between January and June 2017, and to 2,316 in the first half of 2018.

Even the most abject crimes against immigrants, such as sexual violence and attempted murders, in the first half of 2018 make a decline. The foolish shootout of Luca Traini in Macerata does not seem to indicate, according to data from the Ministry of the Interior, a new social climate, poisoned by xenophobia. In the first half of 2016, the attempted killings against non-EU foreigners had been 120, while in the same period of 2017 there were 113 and 100 in the first six months of 2018, coinciding with the episode of Macerata. The same crime of massacre against other ethnic groups does not register soaring: 6 cases in 2018, as in 2016. And even for sexual violence against foreign women, there is a decline: from 329 violence in the first half of 2017 to 282 of the first six months of 2018.

2. An international perspective

With regard to the distorted perception of the presence of immigrants in Italy, an interesting analysis conducted by the Istituto Cattaneo (2018) has to be mentioned. The study related the NIM index with the error of perception among “real” immigrants and those “perceived” by respondents in all European countries for which both data were available. The researchers point out that there is a positive correlation between the erroneous perception of the migratory phenomenon and the attitude towards immigration. In other words: as hostility towards immigrants increases, the error in the assessment of the presence of immigrants in one’s own country also increases. Italy is – on both fronts – the country placed in the most “extreme” position, characterized by the greater level of hostility towards immigration and religious minorities. Naturally, from this correlation – the researchers point out – it is not possible to establish any cause-effect nexus. In the sense that the strongly negative attitude towards immigration could be the cause of an overestimation of immigrants present in society, as it could be the consequence (who believes that immigrants are “too many” could be induced to mature a feeling of hostility towards the immigrants themselves). In any case, it is clear that the question of perceptual error in reference to the migratory phenomenon does not derive only from a problem of little information, but from different worldviews that inevitably influence its perception.

A large survey commissioned by The Social Change Initiative (2018), in partnership with More in Common, examines, instead, the national political debate, the dynamics of public opinion and the response of civil society in five countries: Germany, France, The Netherlands, Italy and Greece. In Italy the research was carried out by Ipsos and has put in a number of interesting elements. First of all, the researchers underline how, despite the concerns about the management and the impact of the migration phenomenon, most Italians do not adopt an extremist position towards migrants. Many Italians remain welcoming to foreigners, including immigrants and refugees: the overwhelming majority (72%) support the principle of political asylum and the right of these people to find refuge in other nations, including their own (only 9% are adverse).
On a personal level, the Italians who are more sympathetic to refugees (41%) are more than those who are hostile (29%), with 27% of neutrals. The feelings towards migrants in general are instead slightly more lukewarm (32% are supportive, 33% adverse). Italian respondents reject extremism: most of them (61%) say they are worried about the growing climate of racism and discrimination, and only 17% deny being alarmed.

While, in general, about migration public opinion expresses concern: most of the population think it has a negative impact on the country, especially in light of the scarce job prospects for Italians. Only 16% consider the impact of immigration to be positive on Italy, while 57% consider it to be negative overall. Concern for the negative economic repercussions is partly linked to the belief that immigrants – compared to Italians – are often willing to work harder for a lower wage.

Again according to the survey, the negative feeling towards immigration is exacerbated by fears for security and by the perception that Italy has lost control of its borders, as well as the inability of the authorities to effectively manage the migratory phenomenon. Many people think that too many are coming to Italy, that the situation is therefore unmanageable, that Italy has been left alone to face the crisis and that – given the current situation – the country can no longer afford to welcome other migrants. The profound frustration of Italians on these issues is reflected in their propensity to consider extreme measures.

According to researchers, behind the negative emotion of Italians towards immigration and the erosion of national identity, deeper fears linked to integration lie hidden. When asked whether it is true that immigrants in general strive to integrate into Italian society, 44% declare themselves in disagreement and only 29% agree (25% are uncertain).

As in many other European countries, the relationship between Italians and Muslim groups living in the country is problematic. The fear that people with an Islamic cultural background cannot integrate into Italian society is confirmed by 40% of the interviewees, according to whom Italian identity and Islam are completely incompatible.

Unlike other European citizens, however, Italians feel more free to express their ideas on controversial subjects. The perception of the politically correct or the idea that there are taboo issues is almost entirely absent, and the free debate on cultural sensibilities does not seem to be subject to any limitation. This is a very important factor for researchers, as they underline how the presence of repressive attitudes is often exploited by far right political groups to direct public opinion against the values of cosmopolitanism: an approach that - according to the researchers - have less chance of success in a public, direct and explicit culture like the Italian one. Another notation is reserved for the religious identity, considered important by the Italians: for almost half of the population, in fact, the Catholic cultural background influences the conviction of having responsibilities towards others, including migrants and refugees. 42% confirm that, as a Catholic country, Italy must take on the needs of those who arrive in Europe as a migrant (while 28% are adverse and 27% are neutral). Alongside this spirit of hospitality towards the others, there is also the fear that Italy is losing its Catholic identity: 48% believe that the national religious heritage must be protected by foreign beliefs.

The research has identified seven segments in Italian society, with different ideas on identity and belonging, and “open” or “closed” values regarding immigration, refugees, diversity and national identity. Then, people have been grouped into “open” (28%: cosmopolitan Italians and humanitarian Catholics), “closed” (24%: culture defenders and
hostile nationalists) and “mixed” (48%: moderate disengaged moderates, neglected and worried for security), according to their values and their positions.

This is a higher degree of diversification in opinions than the other four countries involved in the study. Within the more open and more closed segments, segmentation identified two distinct groups (whereas in Germany, France and the Netherlands, the analysis revealed only an open and a closed group). Within the central “mixed” segments, on the other hand, three groups emerged (in this case, the result is similar to that of France and Germany).

Those who belong to the “closed” group are sceptical about the benefits of immigration, they almost always criticize the country’s elite and tend to have a very narrow vision of their national identity. Who is in the “open” group has more often an international perspective (although this does not necessarily lead to the consideration that globalization has had positive effects for the country) and wants Italy to be a country open, which welcomes immigrants and refugees. The “mixed” group, on the other hand, is characterized by heterogeneous positions and driven by different concerns, which may include the economic and cultural aspects of immigration, issues related to security or the total lack of interest in these issues.

A survey conducted by Eurobarometer (2018a) on the integration of migrants in the EU reveals different orientations of citizens towards immigrants, with both positive and negative implications.

One of the main findings shows that about 60% of Europeans interviewed interact with immigrants on a weekly basis and a substantial minority of Europeans has close links with immigrants, in the sense that they have both as friends and as members of the family. Many Europeans feel misinformed about immigration and integration issues; less than 40% say they are well informed. There is also a significant lack of awareness of the real extent of immigration, with many Europeans overestimating the number of immigrants in their country. On average in the EU, the proportion of immigrants is overestimated by a ratio of 2.3 to 1. The largest overestimation occurs in Slovakia, where the percentage of immigrants is overestimated by a ratio of about 14 to 1, while in Italy it is 3.6 to 1. Overall, in the different EU countries, respondents with lower levels of education have provided higher estimates of the proportion of immigrants in their country.

With respect to perceptions and general attitudes towards immigrants, the data collected by Eurobarometer show that Europeans are significantly divided on the question of whether immigration represents an opportunity or a problem. 41% of the interviewees, in fact, see immigration as a problem, while about 20% see it as an opportunity; almost 30% see it as both.

There is a clear distinction between countries on this issue, with over half of respondents in Hungary, Malta, Greece, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Italy seeing immigration as a major problem, while significant minorities of respondents in Sweden, Ireland and the United Kingdom consider it primarily an opportunity. There are also significant differences even between age and qualifications. Younger respondents and those with higher education are more likely to consider immigration as an opportunity, while older respondents and those with lower levels of education are more likely to see it as more of a problem. The overall image that emerges is therefore ambiguous: considering immigration a problem – according to researchers – does not necessarily mean hostility against migrants, but rather the perception that governments do not adequately handle the issue of immigration.
Most Europeans agree that the integration of immigrants is a necessary long-term investment for their country. There is also a clear majority which believes the role of the EU as important and has a positive view of the actions that could be taken by the EU to support the integration of immigrants.

As for personal experiences with immigrants, more than half of Europeans say they feel comfortable with them, like friends, neighbours, work colleagues or in other roles. However, in some countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Hungary – they are very little inclined to feel totally comfortable in these situations. Respondents in these countries are less likely to have direct experience of immigrants: indeed, many respondents in Central and Eastern Europe have low levels of contact with immigrants in all circumstances. This is understandable because of the fact that there are significantly less immigrants from third countries living in these countries. In addition, older respondents, those with low levels of education and respondents living in rural areas and small cities are less likely than young people, the more educated and those living in big cities to have frequent contacts with foreigners.

There are also significant differences when considering the perception that the integration of immigrants in European countries is a success and the perception that immigrants have had a positive or negative impact on the host countries. For example, while in Ireland more than three quarters of respondents see the integration of immigrants as a success, only about a fifth of respondents in Bulgaria do so. In Sweden and the Netherlands, there is an overall positive view of the impact of immigrants on society, while in Hungary and Bulgaria it is generally believed that immigrants have had a negative impact. However, the researchers point out that, in countries with a low percentage of immigrants in their population, respondents are less likely to see integration as a success.

Finally, there is a general consensus on the most important factors contributing to the success of integration. More than 90% of respondents believes it is particularly important for immigrants to be able to speak the language of the country where they live. The respondents also think that both economic and cultural factors are important for successful integration: a significant majority of European citizens agree that making contributions to the welfare systems of the host countries is important for integration, as well as acceptance of the values and norms of the host society. Although there is a broad consensus on the importance of these issues, the extent to which they are considered important varies, with fewer citizens favourable in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Overall, the researchers emphasize two aspects emerging from the survey, both of which give reason for optimism regarding the potential for the integration of migrants in EU countries. First of all, the majority of Europeans have direct or regular contacts with immigrants and a significant minority has close ties with them and interacts with them at least once a week. Secondly, Europeans are largely tolerant and accept immigrants and tend positively to take steps to ensure that the integration of immigrants is successful. But this general framework conceals a significant range of differences between countries. It is therefore likely that in countries where the proportion of immigrants is currently significantly lower, attitudes towards immigrants and positive assessments of the prospects for integration will improve with the accustoming of the citizens of these countries to their presence. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that younger generations and those with higher levels of education are more likely to welcome immigrants, to see their impact
as positive and more willing to consider integrating them into their lives as friends and colleagues

A last study worth mentioning is that of Eurobarometer (2018b) on aid and development cooperation in the countries of origin of immigrants, conducted on about 30,000 European citizens. More than 1,000 Italians were interviewed face-to-face between June and July 2018. Compared to 2016, year of the last survey on this issue, respondents in Italy have become more favourable to many aspects of development cooperation (+ 5%); there is also growth in those who argue that providing financial assistance to developing countries is an effective way to tackle irregular migration (75%, + 2%). The number is above the EU average which stops at 69%. Instead, the data on the willingness to support cooperation and aid to third countries are controversial. On the one hand, Italians are more likely that institutions invest more resources in cooperation (+ 10%) but – at the same time – declare to support less and less the NGOs (minus 5%, compared to 2016, minus 12% compared to the average EU) and to feel less and less personally involved (-8%).

More than two thirds of Italian respondents (69%) agree that tackling poverty in developing countries should be one of the main priorities of the EU: an increase of four percentage points since 2016. Almost 60%, instead, believe that addressing poverty in developing countries should be one of the main priorities of the national government too: an increase of seven percentage points since 2016. Almost nine out of ten respondents – 86% – think that helping people in developing countries is important. 80% of Italian respondents also believe that the private sector should play an important role in the sustainable development of developing countries.

And yet, more than seven out of ten Italians – 74% – think that providing financial assistance to developing countries is an effective way to tackle poverty. There is also an increase in those who wants to raise the financial support for developing countries (23%, +10 percentage points), while 48% think that spending should remain at current levels and 17% say they should be spent less money in this area.

In Italy, 53% of respondents agree that everyone can play a role in the fight against poverty in developing countries: an increase of three percentage points from 2016. However, less than a third – 32% – claims to be personally involved in helping developing countries.

Taking into account data at European level, the report shows that almost 9 out of 10 EU citizens continue to think that it is important to help developing countries and most want to maintain or increase the level of helping. But the results vary consistently from country to country. In Sweden, for example, 96% of the citizens interviewed believe that it is important to help the countries of origin of immigrants, compared to 68% of Estonia, where 18% of people believe that it is not important. The number of people who said they gave money to NGOs (-5 percentage points from 2016) also fell in other countries.

The vision of citizens on the link between aid and the fight against immigration is also variable: from the 2016 survey, consensus grows in 14 countries, including Malta, Greece, Italy and Bulgaria. In Sweden, which in 2015 accepted the majority of asylum seekers per capita in any European country, only 63% of people concurred that the aid was effective in tackling migration, down from 75 % in 2016.
In recent years, Europe has faced a profound crisis linked to the arrival of an increasing number of migrants and the continent is thus faced with a dilemma: on one side, any migration policy that wants to be moral and practicable, according to the founding principles of Europe, it will not enjoy, at least for now, a real democratic support; on the other hand, any policy that has popular support will probably be immoral and hardly practical. The problem does not depend on the fact that Europeans are particularly favourable to immoral policies, but from the way in which, in the last thirty years, the issue of immigration has been presented by the politicians of all the parties: as a necessity and as a problem with which we must necessarily make the accounts.

Many of the events that have marked the current year convey the feeling of a continent at war. Contradictory needs and desires have resulted in an inconsistent series of policies, paradoxically exacerbated by the rules on free movement within the European Union. The dream of free movement in the EU has at the same time generated a true paranoia. In the wake of the Schengen area, in fact, a “fortress Europe” was created, a citadel protected from immigration by a high-tech surveillance system, made up of satellites and drones.

More welcoming migration policies can be implemented only with the consent of the public, not opposing it. Large numbers of public opinion have become hostile because they have ended up associating immigration with unacceptable changes. This is why, paradoxically, the debate on immigration cannot be won only by talking about immigration, in defensive terms. The current fears of European citizens, as researches show, are an expression of a wider feeling of disorientation, to which they very often react with hostile attitudes. Until this problem is addressed, the arrival of migrants on the Italian, Greek and Spanish coasts will continue to be considered a crisis.

References

1. Introduction: understanding Brexit

Despite a widespread fear that the majority of UK citizens would choose to leave the European Union (EU), the results of the June 2016 vote came mostly as a surprise. Calling for a referendum to leave or stay in the EU, David Cameron, then PM, was aware it would not be a simple choice, and that his political future would depended on it. Yet he also believed that most of his influential friends in the Party would back him and he would emerge victorious. And, like him, many others felt sure things would pan out differently than they did.

According to a survey conducted a few weeks before the vote among 600+ experts – including academics, journalists and political opinion experts – 87% believed that the majority of British citizens would choose to stay in the EU; only 5% believed Leave would win; and the remaining 8% felt unable to respond (Jennings, Fisher, 2016). The prevailing expectation was that the electorate would choose the status quo to a situation marked by uncertainty. Moreover, many felt that Project Fear – as the Remain campaign came to be known – based on the catastrophic economic consequences of leaving the EU, would prevail on Leavers’ pretentious and often far-fetched promises. Never has a forecast been so wrong.

What led 51.8% of British voters to choose Leave, against all expectations, leading the UK down a path whose consequences are still now unfathomable, two years down the line? Given also that negotiations are still in progress, as both sides don’t know exactly what to negotiate on. The main reason can be summed up in a rising nationalistic surge condensed in the slogan Take the Country Back. This slogan was largely used during the referendum campaign and was very effective in mobilizing feelings and votes. Consequently, the themes that dominated the referendum debate were the costs of European institutions, the alleged interference of the EU and the European Court of Justice in the UK Parliament, and the complete management of the UK’s natural resources such as the Northern Sea (Oliver, 2018).

But it was especially the issue of immigration management and national boundaries that steered the vote and represented, for Britons, the idea of regaining control and reclaiming their country. The context in which the referendum took place facilitated this use of immigration. In 2016 Europe was in the middle of the so-called Mediterranean migratory crisis, with more than a million migrants and asylum seekers reaching European coasts over the space of a few months. It was easy for Leave forces to feed on the fear that migratory flows would soon reach the UK. On the other hand, the vote took place after twelve years of continuous, and partly unexpected, flows from various coun-
tries of Eastern Europe that fed into the perception of immigration as out of control (Goodwin, Milazzo, 2017).

In this context, not only have anti-immigration sentiments increased – fuelled also by relentless media campaigns against immigrants from Eastern Europe – but they have become more widespread. As has a deep resentment towards the EU, considered responsible for the lack of control on immigration. In this sense, Brexit and the nationalist (or supposedly “sovereign”) sentiments it represents, is an expression of this dual hostility, and demonstrates – perhaps for the first time in Europe – how this explosive mix of anti-immigration and anti-European sentiments can be politically effective.

This chapter will examine the relationship between Brexit and immigration from various points of view. It will try to pinpoint and discuss, on the basis of available data, the first effects of the June 2016 referendum. In particular, the chapter will analyse: the data on immigration that preceded the referendum and how this has impacted on voting results; how immigration flows have changed, more generally, in the two years following the referendum; and how economic immigration to the UK is changing. Finally, it shall look at how status and rights are changing for residents in the UK before Brexit becomes definitive on March 29th 2019.

2. The role of immigration in the referendum vote

Despite being often denied by those politicians who have pushed for the referendum, it is undeniable that immigration was a determining issue in steering the vote. There are various polls which back this hypothesis, highlighting how for at least 10 years immigration was at the centre of many British peoples’ preoccupations, over and above other “popular” issues such as security or the economy. According to IPSOS-MORI, in the year that preceded the referendum immigration was constantly mentioned as the most important issue for the UK and in June 2016 it was indicated as the country’s main problem by 48% of those interviewed (Blinder, Richards, 2018).

The monthly surveys conducted by Essex University (Essex Continuous Monitoring Surveys), which monitor the attitudes of the British public opinion towards the EU, demonstrated how attitudes on immigration not only determined the vote but also influenced the extreme volatility of opinions and approval towards the EU (Clarke, Goodwin, Whiteley, 2016). Finally, the British Election Study has highlighted the connection between immigration and anti-Union sentiments, suggesting that the great majority (88%) of those for whom immigration was the most important issue voted Leave. (Swales, 2016).

Brexit scholars disagree on the reasons which have influenced the electorate’s opinion the most. Some interpret the Leave vote as a reaction to demographic changes in the past few years, especially after the extension of the EU in 2004, as a defence of the UK’s national identity. In this perspective, such rapid and profound demographic changes fuelled fear and uncertainty in British public opinion and were felt as a menace for national identity (Goodwin, Heath, 2016). In the areas where Leave won, immigrations was perceived as an “invasion”, something out for control that is changing the face of the country.
Eric Kaufmann (2018), in his emblematically titled book, *Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities*, emphasises that Brexit and recent political changes connected with the rise of populism are related to an “existential” identity crisis among the “white majority” in the face of the waves of new immigration from countries under strong migratory pressure. Similarly, the influential scholar and opinion leader, David Goodhart (2017), attributes Brexit to a populist, identity-based reaction to mass immigration: the revolt of those who have roots against those who do not, be it migrants or European elites. Finally, Goodwin and Eatwell (2018: 20) also link the rise of “national populism” to the people’s will to “to reassert cherished and rooted national identities over rootless and diffuse transnational ones”.

According to a different approach, Brexit can be explained in terms of material differences, thus using the category of a popular or social, rather than a populist or identity revolt. Immigration remains the primary reason for the vote, but not as a threat to national identity; rather it is an effect and multiplier of globalisation processes and its negative consequences on British people’s quality of life. The accent thus shifts from territorial distribution (Goodwin, Milazzo, 2017) to the socio-economic composition of the vote.

The core of Leave voters, in this view, are the lower classes and those who have been “left behind” (Ford, Goodwin, 2014, that is to say those who have fewer tools to face globalisation processes, and see in foreigners their main competitors in the job market and in access to Welfare. It’s the white working class, non-qualified British workers with a low level of education who are continuously at risk of being left out or marginalised (Montagna, 2018; Wilson, 2017). For these voters immigration and the EU are two faces of the same coin and the social resentment they felt found in Brexit a mode of expression (Seidler, 2018).

Immigration was not only at the top of the British public opinion’s preoccupations, it also dominated the referendum campaign. An analysis conducted by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee for the British Parliament in July 2018 on the use of Facebook in the weeks preceding the referendum has demonstrated that immigration was the main argument in messages sent via this important social network. Out of 1,200 Leave ads, 45% focussed on immigration whereas “only” 30% dealt with the main sovereign issue of funds sent to the EU and the use of these resources to finance the National Health Service (NHS). Moreover, of the nine ads that received over 5 million clicks, five were on immigration, often portrayed as a disorderly invasion of the masses that, through Europe, would soon occupy the UK, with devastating consequences on public services. One of the most popular ads suggested that over 5 million “Immigration is out of control and our NHS can barely cope as it is. If we stay in the EU we face an unprecedented migration of 5.23 MILLION new immigrants into the UK. WHEN WILL THIS STOP?”.

In the Leave campaign, hostility towards immigration was a particular aspect of a more general position against elites, especially among the more populist components of pro-Brexiters. In a radio interview released after the referendum Nigel Farage highlighted the pivotal role he felt immigration had played in the British people’s decision to leave the EU and connection between anti-immigrations sentiments and the populist agenda against the elite: “It was gradually people saw their way of life was changing, their quality of life was deteriorating, and they kept being told by their leaders ‘oh don’t
worry about it because our GDP is going up so all immigration must be a good thing’. Where we struck the chord is yeah, our GDP may be going up through mass immigration but who’s benefitting? It’s the big businesses getting cheap labour who are benefitting” (Gutteridge, 2016) Such a narration, on the one hand, raises a core issue for populist movements: fighting elites, as the only ones who take advantage of “mass immigration”; and, on the other hand, tries to gain the sympathies of British workers, presenting them as victims of a cut-throat competition with foreign workers.

3. How immigration flows have changed after Brexit: numbers and statistics

After highlighting the central role of immigration on the referendum result, let us see how immigration flows changed in the two years after the Leave vote. The first figure to note is the reduction of net migration between the UK and EU countries after the referendum, due to a constant decrease in arrivals and an equally constant decrease in departures. The net migration rate in 2017 is of 101,000 units, well below the peak reached between June 2015 and July 2016, month of the referendum, and the lowest since Romanian and Bulgarian citizens have been able to move without border restrictions. To get a clearer idea of this decline, it is interesting to compare it with extra-EU immigration, whose net rate in December 2017 was 227,000, in rise again after years of relative decline, reaching its highest levels since 2011 (Graph 1).

Graph 1. Net migration rate in the UK, December 2009-December 2017

Looking specifically at different countries of origin, the data published by the Office for National Statistics (2018c) show that the net migration rate of the eight countries
which entered the EU in 2004 – Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia – dropped from 42,000 in the year preceding the referendum to approximately 6,000 in December 2017, whereas that of countries with a longer period of immigrations, such as Germany, Spain or Italy, decreased by over a third, from 73,000 in 2016 to 46,000 in December 2017. Even more recent immigration such as that from Romania and Bulgaria, whose citizens can move and work without restrictions since 2014, is following suit. After the peak of 64,000 net units in the period between September 2015 and September 2016 there was a constant decrease to 40,000 in December 2017. Albeit representing more than a third of the total net rate of EU citizens, it is still a very significant fall that confirms a tendency already registered immediately after the referendum (Graph 2).

Graph 2. Net migration rate from the EU to the UK, by country of origin, December 2009–December 2017

Source: Office for National Statistics, July 2018c

Graph 3. Stock di EU and non-EU immigrant workers, June 1998–June 2018

Source: Office for National Statistics, August 2018d
If we observe the stock of occupied EU workers, we can note a continuous rise until September 2017, a little more than year from the referendum. From then until June 2018 the stock began to fall and has fallen overall by approximately 100,000 units, going from 2.37 million in September 2017 to 2.27 million in June 2018. It’s been many years that such a fall hadn’t taken place, and represents a counterrtrend compared to the rise in non EU workers, which has risen to 1,27 million (Graph 3).

Two processes concerning the flow of workers complicate the picture. Firstly, not all nationalities have decreased in these last two years. Whereas the number of Europeans who entered the EU in 2004 fell to 117,000 units between June 2017 and June 2018, reaching 880,000, the number of Romanian and Bulgarian workers has continued to rise and reached the record number of 391,000 in June 2018 (Office for National Statistics, 2018d). Secondly, whereas the number of EU citizens who arrived in the UK looking for work between 2015 and 2017 halved, going from 77,000 a 37,000, that of those who arrived on call remained stable, indicating that the uncertainty of Brexit acts as a disincentive for explorative economic immigration.

Finally, it is interesting to observe a similar process to those listed above, regarding citizenship status requests. Whereas net immigration rates are falling, there has been a significant rise in citizenship requests by EU citizens, which have more than doubled in 2017, going from 12% to 26% of total requests compared to the previous year (Blinder, 2018). It is an effect of the uncertainties generated from the referendum results and of the fear of losing rights to which EU citizens are currently entitled to, should negotiations take a negative turn.

These figures indicate that the attractive force of the UK is high overall but is declining among EU citizens. Brexit and the uncertainties on the outcomes of the process have certainly contributed to this but are not the only causes. Factors such as the Pound’s devaluation, the positive economic trend in Western European countries and the fall of unemployment in countries such as Spain, Portugal and Poland, may have also reduced people’s interest in the UK. Over and beyond the fact that immigration had reached such unusually high rates since 2005 that a decrease was in some way to be expected.

4. How has EU economic immigration changed and its effects

The consequences of the fall of immigration are already evident also in the job market and agriculture is certainly one of the sectors which has been most impacted. In November 2017, various newspapers reported that the lack of seasonal workers from the EU had led to millions of tons of unpicked fruit and vegetables, left to rot in the fields. According to the press, moreover, the reduction in foreign labour had, in some cases, reached 15% but the economic loss was estimated in various million pounds.

Indeed, the agricultural sector is based on a combination of permanent and seasonal labour, most of which is covered by EU workers – albeit a precise number is difficult to estimate as there is no official statistic designed to investigate this particular aspect of the labour market. According to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), in 2017 the whole sector employed 476,000 persons. Of these, approximately 80,000 were seasonal workers, 75% of whom came from Romania and Bulgaria, and the rest mostly from countries that came into the UE in 2004. However, these numbers can
change noticeably according to the time of year or specialist sectors. Dairy and poultry sectors, for instance, have an above average presence of foreign workers compared to other sectors (Office for National Statistics, 2018a).

The National Farmers’ Union (NFU), the main organization of English and Welsh farmers, reported that, due to the fall in seasonal workers, 17% of positions offered between January and May 2017 was not covered with a peak of 29% in September, and an annual average of 12.5% (Carrington, 2018). According to a recent journalistic enquiry on the difficulties faced by agencies in Romania to recruit seasonal labour for the UK (Gillet, 2018) and a report published by the Confederation of British Industry, this trend is continuing in 2018 (Confederation of British Industry, 2018). In this case also, the positive economic trends of some Eastern European countries, including Romania, and the Pound’s devaluation compared to the Euro, another consequence of the referendum, have acted as a disincentive for many workers from Eastern Europe to work seasonally in the English countryside, despite the fact that British wages are above average in this sector.

Another sector where we can see the first signs of “Brexitodus” – the fleeing of foreign workers as a consequence of the referendum – is the public health service (NHS). Here also EU workers are many and in various positions: 17% of dentists, 10% of doctors and 7% of carers, physical therapists, social workers and nurses (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2018). The NHS is currently under stress due to both an increasing demand for services and a difficulty in covering vacant positions, independently from the referendum. With Brexit the sector was further penalized and the latest figures available show that since June 2016 increasingly less workers from the EU enter the NHS while more are leaving it. The largest emergency is the recruitment of nurses which fell by 87%, from 6,382 to 805, in the period between April 2017 and March 2018 (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2018). In perspective, the Department of Health expects a fall of 28,000 workers in the whole NHS in different roles in the five years following Brexit (Department of Health, 2017).

The impact of the referendum on the labour market in other sectors of the British economy is still unclear. What is certain is the UK’s dependence EU labour and workforce. In the construction sector, in 2017 foreign workers represented 15% the whole UK workforce; half of these come from Eastern Europe and in particular from Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. In London this figure rises to 28% (Construction Industry Training Board, 2018; Office for National Statistics, 2018b). Equally, in the finance sector EU workers are 17% and cover positions at all levels, from junior financial analysts to CEOs of important companies, and the possibility of a continued inter-European mobility, even for brief periods, is of vital importance for the growth of the sector. A report on the role of immigration in financial services emphasises the risks for the sector should restrictions for EU citizens be applied and how this could lead to a reduction of qualified labour and of the City’s leading role on the world stage (The City UK and EY, 2018). Other sectors such as education, scientific research and catering also depend very much on EU labour. How the British government will resolve the issue of EU citizens’ rights, starting from residency rights, will define whether the UK will continue to count on their contribution among the British workforce.
5. Status and rights of EU citizens after Brexit

One of the key issues of the entire process which will end with the definitive exit of the UK from the Union is the status of the approximately 4 million EU resident citizens and their future rights. Already in current negotiations these have often been contentious, and in some moments it seemed they had become bargaining chips by parts of the British government to obtain better conditions. At the moment the prevalent desire, on both sides, seems to be to avoid frictions and ensure a reciprocity of rights: both for EU citizens in the UK and for British citizens – most of whom are retired – in the EU.

With the current regime European citizens enjoy similar rights to those of British citizens and consequently the majority has not deemed it necessary to register as resident nor to request an *indefinite leave to remain*. With the UK’s exit from the EU this situation could change. Equally, the status of those who will arrive before or after March 29th 2019 – the day when, both for the British government and for Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, Brexit will become effective – will almost certainly be different.

In relation to the status and the future rights of EU citizens there are two main issues on the negotiation table and these will need to be solved in order to have a frictionless relationship. The first concerns the necessary criteria to obtain an indefinite leave to remain. A first agreement between the EU and the UK was reached in December 2017 and stipulates that these will remain the same if the request is made before March 29th 2019. This means that applicants will need to have five years of continuous residence, excluding cases of serious crime which took place before the referendum, and extending the right to apply to spouses, partners and children. Moreover, the rights of EU citizens will be protected by British Law and the EU Court of Justice can exercise its jurisdiction only for eight years from the date of leaving. Finally, EU citizens will have access to social security, the NHS, education and work just like any other British citizen but will lose their right to stay should they leave the country for five years or more. Both parties have convened that the procedure for permanent residency must be “clear, easy and as simple as possible” (De Mars et al., 2018).

As a result, in December 2018 the government introduced a pilot scheme for some selected categories, including academics and NHS workers, to ease the application process. Indeed, the previous procedure had been widely criticised for its complexity, cost and length. The applicant had to produce all the necessary documents and prove he or she is resident in the UK for at least five years. The aim seemed to be that of hindering applications for the non-deserving rather than facilitating those who have a real chance of producing the necessary documentation. The result has been that fifteen months after the referendum approximately 34,000 (14%) applications were rejected and another 20,000 (9%) deemed incomplete or invalid (Sumption, 2017a). On the contrary the aim of the new, simpler procedure, which is now in place and open to every EU citizen, is to help those applying for a permanent permit to stay and, especially, to foster successful applications rather than rejections (O’Carroll, Grierson, 2018).

However, and this is the second issue, even if the procedure is simplified, some categories of EU citizens risk not obtaining a leave to stay and slipping into a sort of limbo. Those who will not be able to demonstrate they have lived in the UK for the past five years, such as those employed in the informal economy or without a regular contract, for instance, may find it difficult to put together the necessary documentation. Or those who
may believe they do not need to apply for a permit to stay, such as long term residents and who believe they are not entitled to apply. Others may face various barriers: technological (such as access to the internet), economic (high application costs) or cultural (limited knowledge of English or of application procedures). A further category includes complex cases such as those who have been absent for a long time or do not have all the necessary requirements but may benefit from specific rights.

Although these are not easily quantifiable categories, overall they make up a minority and there is the real risk that thousands of EU citizens become invisible. Something similar to what happened to hundreds of Afro-Caribbean immigrants who arrived in the UK between 1948 and 1971 – the so-called Windrush generation – might take place: being expelled after having lived in the UK for decades because they weren’t able to put together the necessary documentation to demonstrate their date of arrival. It was a heartfelt case, which resonated widely through the country and generated deep emotions and solidarity, and ultimately led to the resignation of the Home Secretary, Amber Rudd. The role of the Government will thus be to ensure that all those who are entitled to apply can exercise their right to remain, without discriminations or bureaucratic impediments.

6. Conclusions

This chapter emphasised the central role of the immigration debate on the process that is leading the UK to leave the EU and the first effects of the June 2016 vote on migration flows. In the whole of Europe the immigration debate is producing significant political turmoil and redesigning the structure of the continent. Brexit is probably the most clamorous case so far, whose effects are still completely uncertain; as uncertain are the future immigration policies for EU citizens. The British Government has always said that reducing immigration is a priority for the UK and the referendum vote is largely a request by the British electorate to put this into action. Reaching this objective will thus be one of the guiding principles of future policies. Whereas it appears almost certain that a soft approach will be adopted for those who apply to remain before the official leaving date, it is likely that things will be more difficult for those who arrive afterwards, especially for low or medium skilled workers, in order to offer more job opportunities for Britons (Sumption, 2017b).

We are, however, in the field of speculation and the publication in December 2018 by the Government of a White Paper should offer some clarification regarding the direction the UK will take. Whereas Leave voters continue to ask that promises made during the referendum campaign, such as closed borders, be maintained, other parts of the electorate would prefer an agreement which preserves free circulation. Among these are business associations of all sectors, for whom free access to the EU labour market is too precious to give up.

References


Brexit and Immigration: the Debate, Migratory Flows and Policies


9. The European Union and Africa
Luca Merotta

1. The statistical framework

1.1 Data on African migrations

Due to its current and future geopolitical role, Africa has become a key continent in the European political debate on migration. In order to fully understand its centrality, it is worthwhile looking at the data provided by the World Bank and the United Nations.

First and foremost, the stock of African migrants. The number of African citizens living abroad has increased steadily over the past few decades. On the one hand, in absolute terms, this figure has increased by about four times in fifty years, getting from 8.1 million in the 1960s to almost 36.3 million in 2017 (European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018). On the other hand, however, it should be noted that in relative terms the number of African citizens living abroad in relation to the total African population has remained considerably stable over the years (between 2.6% and 3.2%, compared to the 3.3% global average in 2017). The absolute growth in the number of African migrants is therefore in line with the general demographic growth of the continent. From a sub-regional perspective, the share of North Africans living abroad remain the highest and is growing faster than the share of Sub-Saharan Africans.

The African migrants’ choice of destination continents has progressively diversified. While Europe continues to be the main destination (9.1 million African migrants in 2017), especially in the case of North African nationals, Asia comes second (4.4 million African migrants in 2017), with Egyptian migrants and migrants from East Africa tending to move to the Gulf countries and to Jordan for temporary work.

Data on intra-African migration is particularly relevant as 53% of African migrants (19.4 million people) leave their country while remaining within Africa. This data is high in West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa and low in North Africa. This suggests that a considerable part of the migration from Africa remains in Africa, a trend that can not only be explained by geographical proximity but also by the existence of regional agreements such as those of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the East African Community (EAC).

The situation of refugees and internally displaced persons is in line with the continent’s migratory trends. In 2016, Africa hosted approximately 5.3 million refugees from African countries (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2017). Most of these have found refuge in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and DRC. At the same time 12.6 million Africans were internally displaced, mostly in Sudan, DRC, Nigeria, South Sudan and Somalia. This data becomes particularly relevant when compared to the ne of the EU, where the asylum applications filed in 2017 were around 705,000 (Eurostat, 2018a).
1.2 Regular migration decreasing, irregular migration increasing

In the 2000s most of migratory flows from Africa to Europe occurred through regular channels, i.e. through visas and residence permits issued before arrival. Since 2008 this trend has gradually weakened, the number of African citizens regularly settled in EU member countries dropped from 442,000 to 270,000 in 2012 and then settled since. In the period of reference (2008-2016) the most significant reduction was recorded among migrants from North Africa (-40%), especially in Libya (-72%) and Morocco (-52%), while among sub-Saharan African migrants the decline was 31%.

Family reunification remains the most used regular migration tool, with 167,000 residence permits issued in 2008 and 180,000 issued in 2016. The very characteristics of family reunification are changing, unlike the '70s and '80s when the spouses and children of economic migrants were reunited, today it is second and third generations who are reuniting with distant spouses and relatives living in African countries (Penn & Lambert, 2009). On the other hand, residence permits issued for work reasons fell by 70% (from 83,000 in 2008 to 26,000 in 2016).

The reduction in regular flows was coupled with a substantial increase in irregular arrivals which characterised the three-year period 2014-2016 and the so-called "European migration crisis". The increase in asylum applications filed in the 28 member states confirms this, between 2008 and 2012 asylum applications filed by African citizens were 75,000 per year, reached 212,600 in 2016 and settled at 140,000 in 2017. The most represented African countries are Nigeria, Eritrea and Guinea (Eurostat, 2018b). The increase in irregular entries can largely explain the increase recorded in 2016, while the strengthening of control activities in Libya contributed to the decrease in 2017.

From a nationality perspective, Frontex data from 2017 indicates that most of irregular entries involve Nigerians (18.309), Ivorians (12.913), Guineans (12.801) and Moroccans (11.387).

While resettlement is internationally considered as an instrument of regular migration, operational capacity in the EU remains very low. According to the Eurostat data of 2017 (Eurostat, 2018c) the number of resettlement of citizens from the seven most relevant countries of origin2 (DRC, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Burundi) was around 3,000 in 2017, a number still far below the 50,000 resettlement pledged by the European Commission for 2019 (EUObserver, 2017).3

1.3 Future trends: internal migration triggered by climate change

On a global level, climate change has become an increasingly more structuring factor of migration. Before affecting international, inter-regional and intercontinental flows, climate change will likely lead to greater migration flows within countries. According to a World Bank report by 2050 and in the absence of concrete action on climate and development, 143 million people (about 3% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin

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1 Data refers to the first statistical quarter of 2018 (October, November, December 2017).
2 With resettlements of at least 50 units in 2017.
3 This data refers to refugees present in Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and Sudan and includes all nationalities.
America and South-East Asia) could being forced to move within their own country as a result of climate change (Rigaud et al., 2018).

The report outlines three scenarios that differ in type and combinations of development and greenhouse gas emissions and that are characterised by different numbers of climate migrants. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the total number of so-called “climate migrants” are estimated upwards in all scenarios.

- The pessimistic scenario (high greenhouse gas emissions and unfair development) estimates climate migrants to 85.7 million, or 4% of the regional population, as a result of the region’s high vulnerability to climate change, especially in arid areas and coastal areas, and the structure of the agricultural sector that employs a large workforce and is heavily dependent on rainfalls.

- The inclusive scenario (high greenhouse gas emissions and inclusive development) foresees that fewer people (53.3 million) will become “climate migrants” as the climatic vulnerability of their territory of origin will be mitigated by internal migration, population growth and urbanisation.

- The most climate-friendly scenario (lower combined greenhouse gas emissions with unfair development) predicts the lowest number of climate migrants (28.3 million) as a result of better greenhouse gas reduction and resilience policies, which will increase the livelihood of the population enabling people to remain in their territory of origin.

1.4 Data on migrants’ remittances

Migration flows within Africa and to other continents play a very key role in the development of countries of origin. The money transfers (“remittances”) of the diasporas living around the world have historically represented an important financial source for countries of origin, often largely exceeding the Official Development Assistance (ODA). From a global point of view, in 2017 remittances to low and middle income countries were worth $466 billion compared to $146 billion spent in ODA (World Bank, 2017, World Bank, 2018a, OECD, 2017). Interestingly, the flow of remittances has started to increase again (+8.5% between 2016 and 2017, +0.8% between 2015 and 2016) after several years of stagnation and decline (World Bank, 2016a, 2016b, 2018b).

Remittances to sub-Saharan African countries have followed this global trend, getting from $33 billion in 2016 to $38 billion in 2017 (+11%) (OECD, 2017, World Bank, 2017), partly due to the economic recovery in developed and high-income countries (World Bank, 2016b, World Bank, 2018b). This figure remains well above the ODA targeting the same region, which got from $24 billion in 2016 to $25 billion in 2017 (+3%) (World Bank, 2016a, OECD, 2017).

Although the financial flows provided by the diasporas towards the countries of origin largely exceed ODA, the persistence of some barriers reduces their impact. The cost of sending money to sub-Saharan Africa remains indeed the highest in the world (9.5% for sending $200 in the last quarter of 2015) (World Bank, 2016b).
2. The EU initiatives in Africa

2.1 The policy framework: the Valletta and the Abidjan Summits

In response to the increasing flows of irregular migrants, the EU has progressively outsourced its migration policy by integrating some aspects into its various foreign policies, including development aid. For historical and geopolitical reasons, Africa has become the privileged continent for this new approach.

The current strategic framework on this is the European Agenda on Migration launched by the European Commission in 2015 and supported by an Action Plan signed by the European and African Heads of state and government at the Valletta Summit on Migration (November 2015). The Agenda is based on a dual approach and aims to give a political response in the short and long term. On the one hand, internally, it claims that the EU should manage arrivals in an orderly manner and saving lives through the fight against trafficking in human beings, the relocation of refugees between Member States and the adoption of the hotspot approach. On the other hand, on an external level, the EU must address the structuring causes ("root causes") of irregular migration in partnership with the countries of origin.

The tools through which the European Agenda has been implemented in its external and African dimension are multiple, involve a variety of actors and adopt different approaches. The following paragraphs propose a state of the art implementation of these tools and the main issues encountered.

Two years after the Valletta meeting, the EU Heads of state and government and EU institutions met their African counterparts during the 5th African Union-EU Summit (European Council, 2017) in November 2017. The meeting aimed to define the future guidelines of cooperation between the two continents and led to the adoption of a joint declaration containing the common priorities of the partnership in four strategic sectors: economic opportunities for young people; peace and security; mobility and migration; cooperation on governance.

Besides reiterating the debate on the root causes of irregular migration, the discussions also touched on the issue of inhuman treatment of migrants and refugees in Libya, thus cementing the idea that Libya is no longer a safe country for the management of irregular flows and the reception of asylum seekers.4 With this in mind, the AU-EU summit led to the establishment of a joint migration task force with the African Union and the UN tasked with protecting the lives of migrants and refugees, especially in Libya; accelerating voluntary repatriation in the countries of origin; accelerating the resettlement of persons in need of international protection.

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2.2 Migration at the core of EU-Africa partnerships

Faced with increasing migratory pressure towards some Member States along the Central Mediterranean route (such as the Libya-Italy route), the Commission has given greater importance to migration in its agreements with third countries.

Published in 2016, the Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries\(^5\) can be considered as a pilot initiative featuring a reinforced modus operandi under the European Agenda on Migration. Building on the EU-Turkey agreement, the Communication involves the leverage of instruments from different EU policies, from trade to development, from migration to security and energy. This approach has a strong conditionality component through positive and negative incentives under the “more for more” approach in the management of irregular flows by third countries.

So far, the EU has adopted the so-called migration compacts with five pilot countries: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. Although the Communication targeted especially African countries, its implementation is expanding to the major countries of origin of Asian migrants such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Castillejo, 2017). In particular, the partnership with Niger is considered as a great example of this new approach to international cooperation. (European Commission, 2017a).

As indicated by the Nigerien case, the return of irregular migrants plays a key role in the partnerships between the Commission and African countries. In the context of the European Agenda, the Commission drafted a Return Action Plan\(^6\) in September 2015 following the recommendations of the European Council. By recognising the relative ineffectiveness of the EU return system, the Action Plan aims to improve its effectiveness by strengthening cooperation with countries of origin and transit. Besides addressing the procedural aspects of repatriation within the EU (detention and alternatives to detention, mutual recognition of return decisions etc.) and political relations with third countries (readmission agreements), some actions of the Plan aim to directly create favourable conditions in countries of origin and transit for the effective return of irregular migrants. The idea is that since voluntary return remains the preferred option in the case of irregular migration, the EU should accompany the reintegration of irregular migrants in order to consolidate their position in the countries of origin and discourage further irregular entries.

The implementation of the Plan highlighted a series of problems. One year after its adoption, the Commission published an updated version that draws some lessons. This “Renewed Action Plan”\(^7\) emphasizes that while planned actions were implemented or are being implemented, the overall impact on return at EU level remains limited due to internal and external factors. In particular, disparities between the return standards of different Member States may not only influence the destination chosen by irregular migrants,

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\(^5\) Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the European council, the Council and the European investment bank on Establishing a new partnership framework with third countries under the European Agenda on migration, COM(2016) 385 final, 7.6.2016.


The European Union and Africa

it could also affect the return rate in third countries, as governments may prefer migrants repatriated from Member States offering the most advantageous packages. Furthermore, bilateral agreements concluded between Member States and African counterparts on re-admission are very heterogeneous in terms of geographical coverage, while at EU level there is no exhaustive list of African partnerships integrating those launched with the five pilot countries (with the exception of Cape Verde).\(^8\)

Faced with a slow implementation of returns and general migratory pressure, EU policy-makers have progressively favoured a more multilateral management of EU migration policy by giving greater importance to the transit countries.

The outcome of the 28-29/06 European Council effectively illustrates this desire for outsourcing. The Council conclusions proposed to set-up “controlled centres” on the EU territory and “disembarking platforms” in third countries to reduce the pressure of irregular flows, assess individual cases and adopt relevant measures (asylum application for those who qualify for international protection or return). Both concepts have been further elaborated in a proposal by IOM and UNHCR on regional cooperation agreements for the management of migrants rescued in the Mediterranean (IOM-UNHCR, 2018).

In the aftermath of the meeting, however, several Member State governments excluded the possibility of hosting the controlled centres on their territory, suggesting that disembarkation platforms in third countries would be the way to go. The Commission took note of this orientation focusing on the feasibility of external platforms (European Commission, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). This approach initially aims to identify potential partners by providing economic incentives and avoiding the use of detentions and camps. The collaboration of international organizations such as UNHCR and IOM would guarantee the protection of migrants in accessing the asylum procedure or being returned and reintegrated in their countries of origin. The impossibility to access the resettlement procedure after disembarkation would deter migrants from accessing the platforms through irregular venues.

Migration has also played a key role in cooperation frameworks between the EU and other international organizations as well as on the multilateral level. Between 2015 and 2016 the EU has launched important partnerships with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has become the preferred partner in voluntary return and reintegration programmes and in migration management programmes in the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa (IOM, 2016). The IOM also supports the implementation of the Joint Task Force program with the African Union and the United Nations on the situation of migrants in Libya. In particular, the IOM is responsible for assisting voluntary returns from Libya and supporting reception and reintegration in the countries of origin.

On the multilateral level, negotiations on the cooperation framework between the EU and the countries of the Africa-Pacific-Caribbean area (APC) will soon start in view of the expiration of the Cotonou Agreements in 2020. The attempt to put migration at the centre of the partnership has already met significant resistance at the EU level. In March 2018, Member states failed to reach a consensus on the European Commission’s negotiating

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\(^8\) The EU has signed re-admission agreements only with Cape Verde, while negotiations are underway with Morocco (since 2000), Algeria (since 2002), Tunisia (since 2014) and Nigeria (since 2016). Forms of non-standard and legally non-binding agreements have been closed into with Ghana, Guinea and Gambia (Casino, 2018).
mandate due to internal divergences on the role of migration. In particular, some countries demanded a particularly broad margin of manoeuvre in the field of return and readmission of irregular migrants (Euractiv, 2018).

2.3 Migration at the core of the EU-Africa financial instruments

In light of the so-called “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, the EU has decided to adopt increasingly more instruments dedicated to Africa’s development in line with the rhetoric on addressing the “root causes of irregular migration” featured in the European Agenda.

The European Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (hereafter “Trust Fund”) is one of the most important tools to implement the actions proposed in the Valletta Action Plan. It is designed to respond to crises in Africa, contribute to better migration management and address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. These goals will be achieved by promoting resilience, better and fairer economic opportunities, security, development and human rights. The main beneficiaries of the programs are refugees, displaced persons, returned migrants, host communities and other vulnerable or marginalised groups (victims of trafficking, young people, women, etc.).

In terms of geographical coverage, the Trust Fund finances projects in three regions: the Sahel and Lake Chad region (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal); the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda); North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt).

Several critical issues arose in the implementation of the Trust Fund, in particular with regard to the strategic decision-making process and the impact of the programs financed.

The governance underpinning the Trust Fund is perceived as considerably unequal, with contributing Member states defining the overall strategy in the Strategic Committee chaired by the European Commission and selecting the projects to be funded for each regional window (only Member states that invest at least three million euros have the right to vote)\(^9\). As a result, partners in African countries participate in both bodies only as observers and do not have any decision-making power, as is the case with other European development funds (such as the EDF, the European Development Fund). In addition, almost two-thirds of the funds guaranteed by the Trust Fund are aimed primarily at public bodies and/or international organizations (EPRS, 2018a), which makes it difficult to provide direct support to non-state actors such as NGOs and private stakeholders.

In terms of content, there are issues in implementing regional and national programs that promote balanced partnerships that are truly oriented towards local development. A study conducted by Concord Europe (2017) on the implementation of the Trust Fund in three case studies (Niger, Libya and Ethiopia) highlighted the difficulties in matching the related interventions with an effective development strategy in the medium and long term.

\(^9\) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. For more information see: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/donor.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/donor.pdf).
At the request of the European Council, the Commission proposed an ambitious External Investment Plan (EIP) in order to provide a political and financial response to the challenges of the so-called long-term “migration crisis” (European Council, 2016).

After the official announcement by the President of the Juncker Commission at the 2016 State of the Union, the EIP was quickly approved during 2017 and so was the respective financial instrument, the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD).

More precisely, the EIP consists of three elements:

1) The first pillar: a European Fund for Sustainable Development to support investment made by financial institutions through a guarantee fund drawn from the EU budget.

2) The second pillar: a technical assistance program to help local authorities and companies develop a high number of sustainable projects that attract investors and stimulate the private sector.

3) The third pillar: initiatives improving the investment environment and the general policy context in partner countries.

Considered as the equivalent of the Trust Fund in the private sector, the EIP adopts the same approach as other blending instruments, a type of instrument increasingly used in the context of international development and considered by the Commission as the model for other instruments of the EU budget for the period 2021-2027. This approach is based on the experience of the Investment Plan for Europe (the so-called “Juncker Plan”) and consists of the use of EU funds not as a grant but as a guarantee for loans and other operations of international financial institutions.

The EIP responds to the European Commission’s desire to strengthen the role of the private sector in the sustainable development of developing countries and is in line with other EU and national initiatives. Some examples are the extension of the mandate of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to non-European countries (EPRS, 2018b), the Marshall Plan for Africa (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2017) launched by Germany and the G20 Compact for Africa (Hackenesch & Leininger, 2017). The President of the European Investment Bank Hoyer reiterated this concept by specifying that the idea of being able to “do everything with grants is over” (POLITICO.eu, 2017).

The last step in the EU financial landscape for Africa, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2017 has recently entered the institutional debate. Under the current proposal, international development funds would result from a simplification of the EU’s external financial instruments, which would be reduced from 12 to 6 and aggregated under a single large instrument called the “Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument”. At the geographical level, funds to sub-Saharan Africa would experience the greatest increase compared to the previous scenario (+23%), while the highest increase in terms of theme would involve humanitarian funds (+55%).

Although it is still early to gather all the reactions on criticalities of the Commission’s proposal, some civil society actors have expressed their concern about the incorporation of several development-themed tools under a single budget heading. While this financial optimisation partly solves confusion that characterised the previous financial framework, such as Turkey drawing funds from 18 different European stakeholders (2016), on the
other hand there is the risk that development aid will become subordinated to short-to-medium-term objectives in EU foreign policy, namely the control of migratory flows and security (Center for Global Development, 2018). This would in turn divert the attention of the EU from achieving the real objectives of the international development agenda such as the fight against poverty, which is referred to in the UN Agenda 2030 (Concord Europe, 2018).

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10. The Crisis of the European Asylum System and the New Italian Government

Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem

1. Introduction

The year 2018 has been an eventful one for the European Union’s (EU) migration policy. Whereas 2017 was characterised by numerous national elections that, in many instances, resulted in sovereignist and anti-migration parties in office, 2018 was the year of harsh clashes between EU member states on the “issue” of migration. While the asylum crisis started to wear off, the member states of the EU were called to set together the bases of a renewed common migration policy. At the same time, they were also to start negotiations on the definition of the next European multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027. Given member states’ diverging positions on European solidarity and migration matters, achieving the one and the other task have proven, and may prove in the forthcoming months, hard undertakings.

In this context, the formation of the new Italian government, which showed its determination to force its partner’s cooperation – to the detriment of the elementary rules of EU diplomacy –, has contributed to increase tensions between member states, thus heralding a tumultuous period for the Union. This chapter proposes to go through last year’s main developments relating to migration policy in the EU. The first section focuses on the attempts to recast the European common asylum system, centred on the apparently impossible reform of the Dublin Regulation. The second section describes the position of the new Italian government on migration matters and emphasises the risk it bears to lead the country to isolation in Europe. Finally, the third section briefly illustrates the innovations brought about by the multiannual financial framework currently being negotiated and its implications, for European solidarity in general, for Italy in particular.

2. Dublin died like Jon Snow

2.1 Reforming the European Asylum System

“This Dublin looks like Jon Snow stabbed on a table and dead for a couple of days”.1 So Frans Timmermans, European Commission’s vice president, announced the end of Dublin III – the limits of which have been clearly pointed at during the asylum crisis – and his intention to reform the Regulation in the near future.

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In case it still needed to be introduced, the Dublin Regulation is the ensemble of rules that defines the criteria for the attribution of responsibility between member states in the evaluation of asylum claims. Responsibility falls upon the first state that has had its border crossed by the asylum applicant. From the outset; that is, since the signature of the Dublin Convention in 1990, this ensemble of rules has pursued a twofold purpose: guaranteeing that every single applicant could actually lodge their asylum claim; avoiding the possibility a same claimant could lodge several applications in different member states to increase her/his chances of success, the so-called “asylum-shopping”. Starting therefrom, the consequences of this set of rules in case a crisis emerges are rather clear. Depending on the geographical location of a political crisis, ensuing movements of people are to concern the member states located at the nearer outer end of the EU. Exposed to incoming fluxes, they shall bear the responsibility of handling their borders, which have become the EU’s borders with the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) with the Treaty of Amsterdam.

This is rather close to what happened over the past few years. With the surge of asylum seekers attempting to reach the EU, some member states found themselves struggling with the burden of controlling borders and ensuring a right to asylum at the same time. The uneven distribution of inflows and the calls for more solidarity that remained unanswered generated tensions among member states. Consequently, while some countries opted for a waive-through strategy; i.e. letting migrants cross their territory to reach other destinations, some others responded to the situation by resuming systematic controls at their borders, thus suspending the application of the Schengen Borders Code (Ortensi et al., 2018). In this manner, it is the whole common migration policy that has shown its limits.

Unlike Jon Snow – a character of the famous American TV-show Game of Thrones – who came back to life after a couple of days, Dublin seems to be still agonising on the table. After the failure of the Commission’s proposal to create a refugee quota system (Zaun, 2017) and the relative failure of the temporary relocation mechanism (Ortensi et al., 2018), the Dublin IV reform proposal seems to be heading the same way. Notwithstanding, Dublin IV provides a series of new rules that could improve solidarity amongst member states. The staple of this proposal is the creation of a permanent and mandatory relocation mechanism intended to enforce burden-sharing in cases in which a member states faces a disproportionate number of asylum claims. More precisely, the Commission proposed that an “adequate” proportion of the total asylum claims in the EU be estimated for each member state as a function of the weight of its GDP and population compared to the total EU GDP and population. Graph 1 illustrates such a distribution.

In reality, the Dublin system provides for a hierarchy of criteria to determine the competent country (see art. 8 through 13, Regulation 604/2013/UE). Even so, the first-border-crossed criterion is de facto the most relevant.
Graph 1. “Ideal” distribution of asylum seekers according to the calculation rules set in Dublin IV for the year 2016 (%)

A share of asylum applications exceeding the calculated proportions would trigger the relocation mechanism and applications would be distributed amongst the member states whose own proportion is under the threshold. Following these rules, Germany would ideally be responsible for 22.6% of the claims lodged in the EU in a given year (considering 2016’s GDP and population), Italy for 14% and Hungary for 1.6% (Graph 1).

This proposal poses a series of problems, especially regarding its application and its insertion into the general economy of EU migration policies. Leaving those aside (for a detailed analysis, see Van Wolleghem, 2018), for the purpose of this chapter, we shall concentrate on one of them, the mandatory aspect of it and the responses it set off, notably by the Visegrád group countries; i.e. Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which denounced a violation of national sovereignty.

2.2 The Eastern front: the Visegrád Group

If there had ever been a common migration policy, it has always been significantly limited by member states’ competence on the matter; the strong opposition to relocation on the part of the Visegrád Group, led by Victor Orbán, bears witness to it. In October 2016, the Hungarian Premier had already organised a referendum to prevent the relocation of some 1,200 asylum seekers in his country. Two years after, his opposition to any kind of relocation mechanism has not weakened. Together with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, Hungary clearly stated its position: what is needed is reinforced controls at the EU’s external borders and cooperation with Libya to stem influxes; they even unilaterally offered some €35 million for that purpose. In their joint statement, outcome of their summit in Budapest in January, the V4 declared:
“The Visegrád countries will contribute to the ongoing debate on a comprehensive migration policy, based on the principle of an effective, responsible and enforceable external border protection to avoid obligatory quotas to be applied which are ineffective and have already divided Europe”.

Immigration has become a central issue in these countries’ public opinion over the past few years. As graph 2 shows, the importance of the issue has soared and peaked in 2015, before decreasing to yet greater values compared to most of the period covering 2006-2014. The Hungarian elections held in April 2018 confirms the figures: Orbán was re-elected for a third mandate after a campaign insisting on the country being invaded by migrants and the ensuing risk of dissolution for the Hungarian culture.

Graph 2. Importance of immigration in Visegrád Group’s public opinions and EU 28 average, from 2006 to 2017 (%)

2.3 The Bulgarian Presidency’s compromise meets a widening opposition

The EU had programmed a very ambitious year, perhaps too much so. The Commission’s Roadmap for the reform of the asylum system was intent on finding an agreement on the entire migration package by June 2018 (European Commission, 2017). By the end of 2018 no agreement had been found and the reforms of the various aspects of the common asylum system were still on the negotiation table, with Dublin as the bone of contention. The Dutch, Slovak and Maltese Presidencies of the Council have all tried to find a compromise in vain. The task was then left with the Bulgarian Presidency in the beginning

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of 2018. As ambitious as the Commission, the Bulgarian Presidency attempted to elabo-
rate a compromise text that was to be adopted before the end of its term. The text was
discussed on the occasion of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council of 5 June 2018
held in Luxembourg. Instead of gathering consensus though, the proposal enlarged the
opposition to the reform, expanding the front to southern Europe. Cyprus, Spain, Greece
and Italy manifested their joint discontent in a position paper\(^4\) released in May as Bul-
garia’s proposal foresaw major flexibility in the allocation of asylum seekers between
member states. Whereas the Commission’s proposal – Dublin IV – provided for a *mandatory*
relocation mechanism, Bulgaria’s proposal, in an attempt to bring the Visegrad Group
countries back to the negotiation table, referred to a *voluntary* mechanism. The same pro-
posal also featured an unpalatable provision to countries of first arrival. If the system in
force provided for responsibility for asylum claims to last six months (a way to prevent
an asylum seeker to lodge a claim in another country), Bulgaria’s proposal extended this
responsibility to ten years. This point stirred the ire of the member states facing the Med-
iterranean. Another fundamental aspect expressed in their position paper regarded the
effort made by these countries in controlling the EU’s external borders and in rescuing
migrants at sea; efforts they deemed disproportionate and not taken account of in Dublin
IV’s burden-sharing mechanism.

3. Italy, the Mediterranean and Europe

3.1 The new Italian government

In the meantime, the formation of the new Italian government, which took office on 1
June, translated into renewed criticism of the reform of the common European asylum
system; a disapproval manifested through positions that are little conventional, somehow
hostile in the context of European diplomacy. Firstly, the arrival at the Ministry of the In-
terior of the leader of the Lega (formerly known as Lega Nord, Northern League, now the
League) has put more emphasis on Italy’s demand for more solidarity amongst EU mem-
ber states. On the one hand, the opposition of the Minister to the Dublin reform\(^5\) and its
alliance of convenience, although without clear contours, with his German and Austrian
counterpart has generated doubts on the capacity of the incumbent Presidency to reach
an agreement by the end of June. On the other hand, the closed-ports policy launched with
the Acquarius boat but since then reiterated with other boats (and yet again with the Ac-
quarius) gave rise to a tug of war between Italy and its European partners, somehow

\(^4\) The position paper can be downloaded from Politico.eu through the following link: https://www.polit-

\(^5\) Italy manifested its dissent on the proposal advanced by the Bulgarian Presidency at the JHA Council of 5
June 2018. The Minister declared: “We opposed the text and other countries backed our position, we’ve
smashed the front. This means that it is not true that one cannot affect European policies”. Author’s trans-
lation, for the original version, see ANSA: http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/europa/2018/06/05
/migranti-con-la-riforma-del-patto-di-dublino-cominciata-la-battaglia-nellue_09ef2e37-40b7-4418-b201-
1240aa91edb4.html. Note that the following countries opposed the Bulgarian Presidency’s compromise
text on the same occasion: Spain, Germany, Austria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia
and the Czech Republic.

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forced to cooperate in the reception of migrants rescued at sea. Italy’s refusal to open its ports to boats operating search and rescue (S&R) missions in the Mediterranean, even in cases in which they were operating in Italy’s S&R area. The boats stranded at sea ended up disembarking their passengers in other countries, in derogation to maritime law.

The unorthodox diplomatic approach endorsed by the Italian government was also clearly manifested at the European Council summit at the end of June. Premier Conte presented an ultimatum to the leaders of other EU member states, warning them that this European Council could very well end “without the approval of shared conclusions” if no satisfying agreement was found, a threat in a venue in which the search for consensus is the rule. Giuseppe Conte, after few weeks in office, thus blocked any decision on the economy, security, and other topics at the opening session of the encounter in Brussels. The position declared by Italy seemed to be guided by the motto “no agreement until we don’t agree on everything”. Last but not least, the discussion on the Italian contribution to the budget of the EU in August 2018 confirmed the conflicting approach of the yellow-green government. Let alone the inexact figures mentioned, the government threatened to suspend the Italian contribution to the EU budget, waving the possibility of a veto on the latter if no solution was found on the redistribution of migrants between member states.

### 3.2 Italy in Europe

The conflicting approach displayed by Italy in the European arena presents particularly interesting characteristics. Last year, we wrote in Fondazione ISMU’s Twenty-third report that, in a sense, the fact that EU policies may encounter resistances at national level when it comes to implement them is little surprising (Ortensi et al., 2018). We wrote that a member state has a double responsibility: before its citizens; and before the EU or, more precisely, before the other member states. In this sense, there may exist a tension between what the state does for its citizens and what it decides to do in a concerted manner with its European partners. The two kinds of responsibility are not necessarily contradicting one another but may in some instances go in opposite directions. The Italian government appeared to have found a way to face such a tension by privileging domestic interests (or, more precisely, by doing what it thinks it was elected for) to European ones. Such an approach cannot go without creating problems in a political system as integrated as the EU (common market, borderless area, etc.) with such a high level of interdependence between members. If the decisions made by Italy generate too negative externalities for its partners, it is probable that Italy finds itself isolated and loses some of its negotiating power in the European arena.

That being said, three years of influx of asylum seekers have indubitably contributed to increase the politicization of migration. The elections held in Europe in 2017, but also

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6 So reports the Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/ebf90128-7aaa-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d.
7 Ibidem.
8 Whereas the Vice Premier Di Maio mentioned a contribution tantamount to €20 billion per year, the European Budget Commissioner Oettinger proposed a more contained figure, circa €15 billion, with a net contribution of only €3 billion per year. See Politico.eu: https://www.politico.eu/article/luigi-di-maio-gunther-oettinger-mff-italy-threatens-certain-eu-budget-veto-over-migration-demands/.
the Italian, Hungarian and Swedish ones in 2018, have marked a turn to the right in nu-
merous EU countries; a turn which will likely affect the orientation of EU policies. Italy’s
opposition to Dublin IV and its calls for a reinforced fight against irregular migration have
found support with German Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer and with the Austrian
government. Kurz’s Austria, which took the Presidency of the Council for 2018’s second
semester, even proposed the constitution of an “Axis of the Willing”, guided by the three
countries; i.e. Italy, Germany and Austria. Beyond the unfortunate choice of words, the
three countries would contribute to increase the importance of reinforcing border con-
trols within the more general debate on the reform of the common asylum system, which
would by no means fix the problems of the European asylum policy itself. The compromise
adopted by the European Council at the end of June 2018 is, in a sense, the proof that it is
easier to find an agreement on stronger border controls than to share responsibility on
asylum within the Union. The press release issued by the Austrian Presidency after the
informal JHA Council held on 12 July 2018 in Innsbruck bears witness to it: it reads that
“protection of EU external borders” through regional disembarking platform is of the ut-
most importance, and represent a true “paradigm shift”.

Despite the appearances, the alliance between the three countries’ ministers of the In-
terior was indeed a weak one. If they agreed on stemming flows of people crossing the
Mediterranean, they expressed diverging positions when it came to cooperating once mi-
grates are in the EU. Whilst the Italian Minister of the Interior demanded the burden of
arrivals in Italy be shared – because, as repeated several times by the Minister, “who ar-
rives in Italy arrives in Europe” –, Seehofer and Kurz proved to be chiefly interested in
controlling secondary movements and wanted Italy to work in this direction. Italy
though responded in the negative.

The strategy played thus far by Italy, centred on closing its ports, may have reaped the
expected results in the first months of office but the rigidity displayed by the government
to the other member states, even to its few allies, could well reveal itself counterproduc-
tive. Derogations to international law (or debatable interpretations of the latter) and op-
positions in principle cannot become the ordinary practice of a state resting on the Rule
of Law and inserted in an integrated political organisation like the EU without generating
reactions, not to say retaliations, from its partners. Even though Italian Prime Minister

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9 It is interesting to see in this respect that one of the three priorities of the Austrian Presidency is the fight
against irregular migration. For more on that, see: https://www.eu2018.at/.
10 Which recalls in a way the Axis powers in WWII.
11 For more on the conclusions of the European Council held on 28-29 June 2018, see the chapter by Cesareo
and that by Di Pasquale, this volume.
12 The press release is available at: https://www.eu2018.at/latest-news/news/07-12-EU-home-affairs-
ministers-in-Innsbruck.html.
migranti_salvini_germania_innsbruck-201506606/.
14 As Seehofer and Kurz suggested, see Reuters: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-austria-
germany/germany-and-austria-plan-talks-with-italy-to-shut-southern-migrant-route-idUKKBN1JV1WN.
Conte felt at some point that “Italy is no longer alone”, the country could very well end up isolated if its government stick to its hostile stance.

4. The 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework

Italy’s demand for more solidarity as well as its threats to suspend its contribution to the EU’s budget took place in a context marked by the negotiation of the forthcoming multiannual framework, covering the years 2021-2027, and presented by the European Commission in May 2018. Even though this may appear little relevant, a closer look reveals that the financial framework to come is narrowly connected to solidarity on migration matters. Two fundamental questions ought to be treated here: the first has to do with the distribution of the budget between the various EU policies; the second one regards the criteria for the distribution of resources between member states. Needless to say, these two points will be intensely debated in the months to come.

Concerning the distribution of the budget between EU policies, the next multiannual framework foresees a significant increase of the resources allocated to the EU’s migration policy as a whole. Whilst the amount dedicated to the latter in the 2014-2020 financial framework amounted to about €13 billion, the amount for 2021-2027 is, for the time being, set at €34.9 billion; that is, 2.6 times bigger than the previous one (European Commission, 2018a). The increase touches on all the aspects of the EU’s migration policy, even if the two most significant increases are border controls and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Graph 3).

Graph 3. Comparison between 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 financial frameworks and allocations for migration policies

Source: European Commission, 2018a: 16

Over the years, the EU’s budget has stabilised around 1% of the EU’s GDP. For instance, it represented 1.25% of it for the period 1993-1999 and 1% for the period 2014-2020. According to forecasts, it should amount to about 1.11% of the EU’s GDP for 2021-2027 (European Commission, 2018a: 24). Given such a stability, the increase of the amounts dedicated to migration policies necessarily implies significant reductions in other policy fields, as for instance, the Common Agricultural Policy or the Cohesion policy. In other words, this is a significant change in the EU’s priorities for the years to come.

A second fundamental aspect, as stated earlier, is the distribution of the resources between member states. If the proposals for the Regulations with provisions specific to the various EU funds are not available as of yet, the proposal for the Regulation with provisions common to these funds hint at greater solidarity on migration-related policies (European Commission, 2018b). It is notably the case for the European Social Fund Plus – that includes amongst its various priorities the social and economic integration of vulnerable groups – but it is also the case of the European Regional Development Fund and, more importantly, the funds linked to the Cohesion policy. The Cohesion policy has for a long time (at least since 1988) been organised around economic disparities between European regions. Accordingly, national allocations were decided as a function of macro-economic features. For instance, in the 2014-2020 period, the main criterion for redistribution was the regions’ relative wealth: regions with a mean wealth level lesser than a given percentage of the European average would receive more funding. The proposal for the next financial framework put forth by the Commission introduces new distribution criteria, among which the number of migrants arrived in the regional territory since January 2013 (see European Commission, 2018: Annex XXII). In this way, allocations should contribute to improve solidarity on migration issues and should translate into a significant increase of Italy’s share of the funds flowing from the EU’s Cohesion policy (Donati, 2018). Of course, this is still a proposal and negotiations could lead to alterations of these criteria. It remains that the priorities established by the Commission display a greater awareness that more solidarity is needed on migration questions.

5. Conclusion

Migration and asylum have now been on the agenda for quite some time, be it for the EU, the member states or national public opinions. With the so-called “asylum crisis”, the relevance of these issues have reached their climax. The relative failure of the member states and the Union to handle the crisis in a coordinated fashion have urged the need to reform the system in place. In 2016, the Commission had elaborated a series of proposals to be adopted by 2018. This ambitious plan however collapsed with the national elections of 2017, which in several cases brought anti-migration and Eurosceptic political formations in office. The reform of the Dublin system became a bone of contention in the EU arena, raising member states’ opposition that, despite diverging opinions, agreed on one thing: Dublin IV is just not good.

At the same time, the elections in Italy brought the yellow-green coalition in office; a coalition that opted for an aggressive approach to European diplomacy to demand greater solidarity. The inflexible stance defended by the new government may seem to bear fruit in the short run inasmuch as the boats stranded at sea as a result of Italy’s closed-ports
policy are eventually granted entry in other countries. However, such a practice is hardly sustainable in the medium and long run and Italy will have to be able to count on its partners to find a solution that is both durable and worthy of a State (or Community) based on the Rule of Law. That being stated, the assertion by Federico Fubini, according to which the two parties in government “have wrong answers but right questions”\textsuperscript{16} deserves attention. Even though those are not new questions at all, finding the right answers to the right questions appears to be a more and more pressing imperative.

The Commission’s proposal for the forthcoming multiannual financial framework seems to go in the right direction (as far as migration policy is concerned), with a greater allocation of EU money for migration and allocation criteria favourable to countries receiving a higher share of migrant. Two limitations though ought to be pointed out. Supposing the Commission’s proposal is adopted unaffected, the implementation of the next multiannual financial framework will start in 2021 and the effective use of EU money probably the year after (if not later). Such a timing is not in line with the immediate need for more solidarity and will surely not be able to reassure public opinion. From another standpoint, as the conflicts that erupted in 2018 suggest, financial solidarity is by no means enough to soothe tensions between member states. Sharing the burden would need to manifest through relocation within the Union to satisfy the countries of first arrival. However, such a solution appears impossible in the near future if one judges by the position defended by the Visegrad group.

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\textsuperscript{16} Corriere della Sera of 24 August 2018: https://www.corriere.it/opinioni/18_agosto_25/i-populisti-senza-piu-complessi-10a9b6a4-a7d1-11e8-8398-449c93d620be.shtml.
Over the course of 2018, immigration became one of the main issues facing the European Union and its constituent countries, a development reflected in the significant media coverage of the issue, as well as by its increasingly central role as a topic of political debate and among public opinion.

While estimating Italy’s foreign population on 1 January 2018 at 6 million and 108 thousand individuals, this 24th ISMU Foundation Report analyses migratory flows and the various phenomena associated with the new immigrant presence, starting from the observation that immigration is receiving more attention and is being exaggerated and exploited to a greater degree in a year when the number of migrants reaching Europe has fallen significantly.

As well as the traditional areas of interest (demographics, legislation, labour and education), the Report examines a number of other current phenomena related to migration: the attitudes of Italians towards immigrants; the relationship between Europe, Africa and immigration; the outcome of Italy’s 2018 political elections; the Brexit debate; and the crisis of the European asylum system.