As an independent scientific body, it proposes itself as a service provider open to the collaboration with national and European institutions, local administrations, welfare and health-care agencies, non-profit organisations, schooling institutions, Italian and foreign research centres, libraries and documentation centres, international.

Migration in Italy and in the EU are undergoing radical changes. In its Twenty-and looks at the new migration trends in Italy and Europe. has been at the core of the political agenda and debate in Italy. While the number of irregular migrants has drastically decreased in 2016 following the EU-Turkey deal that has de facto halted fluxes through Balkan route, the migrant crisis is far from being solved. The deep crises that hit several countries both in Africa and the Middle-East have leveraged migrant flows to Italy, which has once again become the main gate to Europe in the Mediterranean despite the steady labour, education), the Report provides an insight into highly topical themes such as the relation between EU and migration as well as unaccompanied
Our annual Report contains the results of the studies carried out by the research staff and collaborators of ISMU Foundation – Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity (Fondazione ISMU – Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità).


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ISMU Foundation ([www.ismu.org](http://www.ismu.org)) is an independent research centre founded in 1991. It is committed to conducting research, as well as providing consultancy, training and education, in the area of migration and integration. To develop a better understanding of these phenomena, it provides its expertise to research projects on all aspects of migrations in contemporary society.

It works with national, European and international organizations and institutions, in both the private and the public sectors. It is inserted in academic networks, it cooperates with welfare and healthcare agencies, and it exchanges with libraries and documentation centers in Italy and beyond.

ISMU organizes conferences and seminars on migration and produces a wide-range of publications. It has its own Documentation Centre (Ce.Doc.) which, over the years, has built a comprehensive collection of volumes, periodicals and audio-visual material to contribute to the sharing of information on migration.

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Chapter 1

FOR A PROPER KNOWLEDGE OF MIGRATIONS

Vincenzo Cesareo

1. The mission of ISMU Foundation
2. Arrivals and reception
3. Africa: a continent of massive emigration and transit migration
4. Immigration, public opinion and the European Union: the challenge of national elections

1. THE MISSION OF ISMU FOUNDATION

Ever since the very beginning of its activities, ISMU Foundation has continually worked in order to help build and spread a proper knowledge of migration with a view to promote a peaceful interethnic coexistence in Italy. With full regard to this goal, over the years it has been developing careful and detailed analyses, pointing out both the positive and the challenging aspects of migration processes.

As the phenomenon of migration has intensified in quantitative and complexity terms, our task has become increasingly demanding. In Italy, too, we can observe how the contrast between those who believe that immigration (i.e. the inflows of people) is certainly a positive phenomenon – hence underestimating its challenges – and those who consider it entirely negative, has become even sharper.

Also because of this growing polarization, ISMU – as an independent scientific research, documentation, and education and training institute – is firmly committed to doing its utmost to paint a realistic picture of this sensitive issue, rather than an ideological one. On account of this choice, the Foundation has been the object of some criticism, as it has been blamed for being either too open- or too narrow-minded about it.

In truth, these two diametrically opposed approaches are far from being the ones adopted by ISMU, as its core mission has always been to simply “spell out the facts”, looking at both the pros and the cons of the whole issue – this being the only efficient and rightful method for correctly depicting any social phenomenon, especially if said phenomenon is as complex as that of migration.

However, it is important to mention that our approach is by no means neutral, as it involves making choices that inevitably guide our actions and our work and that it is our duty to explain. Our first choice is to focus on people, better yet on every single person, regardless of their ethnicity, nationality, religious beliefs, attitudes, and political affiliation. More specifically, human beings are not seen as abstract and fungible individuals (i.e. merely as figures), but as a result of their own historical context, their
uniqueness, their real lives, their cultures, their evolution and their development through time. This perspective implies a mutual respect between immigrants and the receiving society, as well as the acknowledgement of the Other’s inherent human dignity, no matter their ethnicity or their cultural background.

The second choice, closely related to the first one, is to promote human rights, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, December 10, 1948) according to which, for the mere fact of being a member of the human family, each person is recognized equal and inalienable rights. As a result, migrants, too, are entitled to these rights and, at the same time, to the duties that these rights entail.

The third choice is to share a common trust in the principles of democracy – which represent a fundamental achievement for humankind. They in fact allow each State to guarantee every human being their own dignity, with the hope that migrants, too, will take active part in the functioning of the State – therefore becoming, thanks to universalistic procedures, its lawful citizens.

The fourth choice is about the type of integration that best fits with the other choices: we are precisely referring to interculturalism. Interculturalism plays a key role in enhancing the understanding of cultural diversity and the dialogue between different cultures, thus representing a great expression of universal human rights – on condition that said diversity does not intend to jeopardize those rights.

By choosing this option, we cannot help but distance ourselves from both a radical multiculturalism and a strictly mono-cultural assimilationism (Cesareo, 2017a: 53-57).

The fifth choice is about recognizing Europe’s crucial role, also with regard to the migration phenomenon, whose management should be a prerogative of the EU – even though the EU has not been able to handle it in the most efficient way, yet. Such a critical remark suggests that the old continent’s political and institutional structure should be more solid and cohesive, although the migration issue is a truly global one, as it is strongly related to the ongoing process of globalization.

Now that ISMU’s mission has been illustrated, along with the five choices that inspire our approach, here are a number of activities carried out by our five different Departments, as well as by our three Strategic Lines of Research (unaccompanied foreign minors, immigration and the future of Europe, the process of jihadist radicalization in Europe and, more specifically, in Italy).

As for interculturalism, the Foundation’s initiatives are conceived to improve the dialogue between different cultures, as well as to promote a deeper understanding of cultural diversity meant to avoid prejudice and stereotypes. To that end, ISMU encourages and valorizes associationism, especially if interethnic, and has undertaken a number of experimental initiatives in the domain of education – an area that is key to successful integration processes.

The Education Department is fully engaged in carrying out innovative educational and training projects within the framework of migration processes. Thanks to these projects, the Department plays an active role in facilitating the reception and the integration of foreign children, adolescents and adults in the education system. To that end, the Department adopts an intercultural approach by relying on all the positive aspects of
educational polycentrism. The Department also works in order to disseminate good practices relating to intercultural education by: compiling and providing full access to a database containing more than 2,000 projects; making use of cinemas and museums as resources to promote intercultural dialogue; developing educational programs for specific publics.

The *Economy and labor Department* is characterized by a pioneering attention to emerging topics by seeking to combine the demands of the economy with the need for sustainability – always keeping an eye on ethical concerns. From its very first studies on discriminations (such as gender-based discrimination) to its more recent commitment to invest in migrant human capital and to promote *Diversity Management* practices, its main purpose has always been to formulate specific intervention plans, conceived not only for institutional actors but also civil society actors and private companies. Each of these players significantly contribute to shape the role of migrant labor as well as the features of our future model of development.

The *Health and Welfare Department* has been monitoring the health status, the health habits, and the hospitalizations of migrants in Italy since its inception, having documented significant differences between regular and irregular migrants. The Department is engaged in the outlining of the new challenges facing social (and health-related) citizenship, especially in a transformed socio-economic context that demands a more efficient allocation of the (quite limited) current resources.

Ever since 2004, the *Family and minors Department* has addressed the issue of citizenship acquisitions in an unquestionably pioneering way (Codini, D’Odorico, 2004, and Codini, D’Odorico, 2007), namely through initiatives and studies that led to the formulation of specific proposals, which sparked off an intense debate, as well as some criticism. Indeed, some have considered these proposals as too restrictive, while others as too permissive. Furthermore, the dramatically large flow of unaccompanied foreign minors has urged the Foundation, in the framework of the *Family and Minors Department* activities, to create a strategic line of research concerning the migration of unaccompanied minors to Italy, and to set up a *Permanent observatory*, which monitors the reception of those minors. The *Permanent Observatory* also provides information about publications, research studies, normative changes and updates. Law No. 47, approved by the Italian Parliament in April 2017, contains amendments to the existing legislation. A number of these amendments aligns with what ISMU had been recommending – for instance the need for family custody to become a suitable alternative to the intervention of institutions, as well as the wish that reception be *only* an initial phase of the integration process, to be later tailored to the needs of each minor.

The *Religions Department* is focused on the study of migrants’ religious traditions and values, which is key to a truly intercultural approach to integration. To this end, many studies and initiatives have been carried out during the years with regard to migrant families’ religious practices and the intergenerational transmission of religious values, with specific regard to Islam. Through this approach, the Department is involved in a number of activities aimed at enhancing the mutual understanding, as well as the integration, of the different cultures and traditions of migrants residing in Italy.
The Law Department has outlined new proposals concerning the issue of citizenship acquisition for adult migrants by suggesting strategies both for accelerating lengthy procedures and for strengthening the process of civic integration along with the assessment of its achievement. The entire legislation on immigration has been the object of analyses and proposals as part of a major plan to manage the phenomenon in a way that is not only respectful of the principles relating to human rights, but also consistent with the ideas of sustainable migration and integration.

The Statistics Department provides regular updates on migration with the aim of spreading a correct knowledge of this phenomenon. This is in fact particularly useful as we can observe a growing gap between the actual statistics and the perception that Italians have of the size of the migrant population. ISMU has developed an “integration index” (Cesareo, Blangiardo, 2009), empirically tested at the national level and is also able to elaborate accurate estimates on the number of irregular migrants in Italy – which in 2016 accounted for nearly 500,000 units.

In this way, and in many others, ISMU is constantly committed to providing a picture of the general situation in the most rational manner, with a view to predict future trends and possible critical issues on the basis of an inductive methodology (i.e. where the collection of data represents the first phase of our work, followed by the interpretations we formulate on the very basis of these data) and not on a deductive one (i.e. where the collection of date serves to support previously stated assumptions).

2. ARRIVALS AND RECEPTION

2.1 FROM INCREASED TO REDUCED MIGRATION FLOWS

In 2017, too, the concerning number of refugees disembarking on our shores has been high on the political agenda, as well as the subject of an intense public debate.

Italy, in fact, had to cope with a heavy migratory pressure, which was undoubtedly higher than that registered in the previous decade. In 2014, the migrants who landed on the Italian coasts were over 170,000, in 2015 slightly less than 154,000 – with Greece ranking number one and counting more than 857,000 arrivals by sea – while 2016 was a record year for landings, as it registered the all-time record number of 181,000.

During the first half of 2017, the number of people who landed in Italy totaled 85,000, 10,000 of which were unaccompanied foreign minors. Since summer 2017, though, a counterrtrend has being observed: a considerable drop in the arrivals (we will explain the reasons behind these data in the third paragraph of this first section). The number of migrants who arrived between July and September 2017 were 21,336, namely 65% fewer compared to the same period last year. Thus, the amount of people landed on the Italian coasts is almost equivalent to that concerning the Greek islands, which saw a significant drop-off in migrant landings due to the March 2016 EU-Turkey deal.

Consequently, migrants started seeking new routes towards Europe: Spain, in particular, witnessed a considerable increase in arrivals by sea (10,886) and by land in
the Spanish enclave of Ceuta and Melilla (4,422). In total, migrants arrived in Europe via the Mediterranean Sea reached the 129,000 units.

In the last few years, the number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea has unfortunately risen (3,283 in 2014; 3,784 in 2015; 5,143 in 2016; 2,428 as of August 2017).

Among the people landing on Italian coasts, many were unaccompanied minors, exactly 15,779 throughout 2017.

We must however highlight that in the last couple of years the foreign resident population has remained generally stable, despite the importance of the above-mentioned flows. In particular, the overall number of arrivals by sea between 2014 and 2016 (505,000) was lower than the increase in the foreign population residing in Italy only in 2013 (when the recorded growth was of +534,000). In fact, as of January 1, 2017 the number of foreign citizens recorded in the Italian Resident Register was slightly higher than 5 million – a figure that remained fairly stable in comparison with the previous twelve months – with an annual growth of 21,000 units.

Even during 2015, the rise in the foreign population residing in Italy had been modest (+12,000) compared to the additional 92,000 units recorded in 2014 and, most of all, the 534,000 units of 2013.

In order to explain how the presence of foreign citizens on the Italian territory essentially remained unchanged, in spite of the widespread feeling of “invasion”, it is necessary to consider at least three different factors. The first is the limited number of legal arrivals. The second is the decrease in the number of births from non-Italian residents recorded in the Italian Civil Registry, which accounted for 69,000 in 2016 – thus observing a slight but constant decrease compared to the registered 72,000 of 2015, 75,000 of 2014, 78,000 of 2013, and 80,000 of 2012. This reduction results from the fact that foreign parents tend to adopt the Italian reproductive patterns, characterized by a low natality, and have often already acquired the Italian citizenship, therefore passing it on to their children. The third factor is in fact the acquisition of citizenship. While the number of foreign newborns in our Country is falling with time, that of citizenship acquisitions is increasingly rising: 202,000 in 2016 compared to 178,000 in 2015 and 130,000 in 2014. Italy is in fact the EU Member State with the highest number of immigrants acquiring its citizenship. Thus, the combination of these three factors (drastic reductions in entry flows, decrease in the number of foreign newborns, and rise in citizenship acquisitions) results in a more and more modest increase in the foreign population, despite the increment in arrivals, especially those by sea.

To complete the picture of migration flows in our country, we need to take into consideration the issue of repatriation and voluntary returns. According to Eurostat data, 2016 saw the repatriation of 5,715 people out of over 32,000 removal orders (i.e. 18%, compared to a 50% European average). With regards to the above-listed number of arrivals, it is plain to see how this measures turn out to be quite hard to enforce, besides the fact that they do not achieve the expected results, also in consideration of the high costs they entail.

Finally, assisted voluntary returns from Italy in 2016 were only 1,015 (compared to 18,000 returns from Poland and 9,000 from Sweden). The most common way to go back
to one’s home country is still, without any doubt, through an independent and out-of-one’s-own-free-will return: as a matter of fact, during 2016, the number of migrants not having kept Italy as their official country of residence was 42,553 (-4.8% compared to 2015). Undoubtedly, many have left Italy without giving any notice to the registration offices (as observed so far in the data collected by the decennial population census), and others have migrated to different countries or back to their country of origin without having ever registered as residents in Italy.

2.2 Three safe entry channels: resettlement, humanitarian corridors, relocation

Besides guaranteeing a fair reception system and an efficient process of integration, Italy has put in place some measures aimed at countering migrant trafficking by promoting programs meant to create safe entry channels.

Resettlement

During 2016, Italy went on with the implementation of its resettlement program aiming at transferring and taking charge of the beneficiaries of international protection from Sudan, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

This decision was taken in line with the European Commission Recommendation of June 8, 2015 and the Justice and Home Affair Council Conclusions of July 20, 2015, in order to resettle 1,989 refugees by December 8, 2017.

Humanitarian corridors

Humanitarian corridors are private sponsorship projects aimed at issuing visas to asylum seekers and refugees who are in a particular state of vulnerability in order to grant them the possibility to reach Italy safely, so that they will apply for asylum without resorting to perilous sea journeys. These projects are both a concrete answer to exclusion and an alternative to having to make arduous journeys across land and sea. Between February 2016 and July 2017, the asylum seekers and refugees in a particular state of vulnerability who legally and safely entered Italy accounted for 850. Thanks to these projects, over 1,000 people are expected to be received in a two-year period.

Relocation

As established by the EU Council Decisions 2015/1601 of September 22, 2015 and 2015/1523 of September 14, 2015, asylum seekers whose nationality entitles them to be granted international protection (i.e. Syrians) are allowed to apply for asylum in the country of their first arrival (i.e. Italy or Greece) and to be subsequently be relocated to one of the EU Member States joining the relocation program. This system should have concerned over 35,000 people within September 2017, as provided by the national AMIF program. However, this objective is far from being accomplished: as of September 28,
2017, only 9,268 people were actually involved in the program and relocated to other EU countries.

2.3 Reception

The reception system still appears largely inadequate to face the persistent migratory pressure with a pending final decision. National institutions are increasingly supporting reception as implemented by the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) – which is composed by a network of municipalities and local institutions that, by accessing the National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services and in cooperation with third sector organizations throughout the national territory, implement integrated reception projects for international protection applicants, refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary and humanitarian protection, and foreign unaccompanied minors. Besides providing for basic needs (food and housing), the integrated reception interventions implemented by the SPRAR system offer services that include the provision of information, guidance and training through the development of individual, tailored programs aimed at promoting socio-economic inclusion.

However, the number of places available within the SPRAR system is still very limited and only a tiny fraction of asylum seekers and refugees are accommodated in SPRAR structures. Indeed, the vast majority of migrants that arrive in Italy are taken to so-called “extraordinary reception centres” (CAS, Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria) that do not guarantee adequate reception conditions (whereas SPRAR structures guarantee high standards of reception conditions and result much more effective in ensuring the migrants’ integration process). While these reception centers should be aimed only at providing basic assistance in the very initial stages of the migrant’s reception, migrants who are taken there end up spending months or years in these centers. Indeed, despite the significant effort that Italy has made in order to increase the number of people taking part in the SPRAR system, the latest data regarding the national reception system (April 2017) show that a total of 177,000 migrants was accommodated in Italy, 78% of which in CAS reception centers, 13.5% in the SPRAR projects network, and the remaining 8% in the hotspots created by the EU and in the preliminary reception centers set up by the Southern regions (e.g. Sicilia) where most migrants land. As already mentioned, this is indeed an inherent fault in the system, as the fact of being “extraordinary” typically increases the costs and decreases the levels of protection; said fact, with reference to the single territories, usually offers solutions that are neither rational nor shared (Cesareo, 2017a).

To speed up the process of coming out of the emergency system, the August 2016 Decree of the Ministry of the Interior has made it easier for local authorities to be financed by the National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services. Specifically, authorities adopted an open management of the Fund in order to be able to grant municipalities the participation in the SPRAR system on a ongoing basis, therefore encouraging cooperation between the different levels of governance.
3. **AFRICA: A CONTINENT OF MASSIVE EMIGRATION AND TRANSIT MIGRATION**

3.1 **AFRICAN MIGRATIONS**

In paragraph 2, we tackled migration flows towards the European continent, with a special focus on the flows concerning Italy during the year 2017.

We will now discuss flows from the African continent by basing on the assumption that incoming flows are mainly the consequence of outgoing flows. These two are strictly connected to one another as they represent two aspects of the same process, which has been at the center of attention throughout 2017. However, the arrivals from the Middle East and Asia, too, (especially from Bangladesh) should not be ignored, as they are on the rise.

As it is widely known, the reasons why people choose to migrate are various and often intertwined. In this respect, we cannot help but mention the common, as well as still up-for-debate, distinction between *push factors* (i.e. those encouraging migrants to leave one’s homeland) and *pull factors* (i.e. those attracting migrants to Europe). Some push factors are civil wars, persecution suffered under certain dictatorships, crime and terrorism, corruption, poverty, lack of services from governmental institutions, food scarcity, lack of future prospects, and natural catastrophes due to climate change. All of these very different factors play a key role, especially in Africa, where a historically unprecedented demographic boom is taking place. In fact, from 1950 through 2016, the African population has grown from 221 million to 1.25 billion and is expected to rise to 2.8 billion in another century, that is by 2050, while the population of the other continents will presumably remain stable, or even decrease (UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, June 21, 2016). Consequently, if all of these causes are not effectively dealt with, migratory pressure from Africa to the near land of Europe will likely escalate, and at the same time it will be harder and harder to distinguish between forced migrations and economic migrations, as well as impossible to close borders, even though this measure is still hoped for by many.

Push factors are strongly correlated with pull factors, i.e. factors that attract migrants to Europe, such as the desire to live in democratic countries, the wish for efficient public services, job opportunities, a better quality of life, the presence of other family members, and the short geographical distance from the Middle East and Africa. Migrants sometimes happen to have excessively positive expectations about the countries of destination, therefore beginning an anticipatory socialization process by taking on typically Western behavior patterns.

While EU governments and citizens pay close attention to the phenomenon of migration towards Europe, the issue of internal migration in the African continent remains quite unknown, although not less relevant. It reveals, in fact, the presence of tragic conflicts, especially intertribal and interreligious ones, and the serious difficulties that African populations are currently faced with.
In addition to a persistent migration to South Africa from neighboring countries, the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has caused a high number of internally displaced persons (2.2 million) and refugees (550,000) who moved to neighboring countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Because of the civil war currently taking place, an estimated 2 million minors have already fled from South Sudan, while 530,000 people are living in the enormous refugee camp of the Gambella region (Ethiopia) near the border of that war-torn country, which started seeing several interethnic conflicts right after having achieved its independence. The crisis that has been hitting Somalia for decades is another cause for migration to neighboring countries, as it is Eritrea’s authoritarian regime, which is making migrants either move to neighboring countries or reach other continents, especially Europe.

3.2 The Central Mediterranean Issue

The aforementioned data indicate that Africa plays a central role as far as migrations are concerned, both as a land of departure and as a land of transit for millions of people – many of which aim at reaching Europe, with Italy being their first point of entry. In this respect, since 2014, the alarming number of people landing on the Italian shores has been the center of public debate, as well as a cause for clashes between political parties and a leading subject of media interest. In 2014, the migrants arriving on the Italian coasts were more than 170,000, in 2015 slightly fewer than 154,000, while in 2016 a record 181,000.

Consequently, it is useful to define the categories of people “interested” in “dealing with” the migrants. There are at least four of them.

The first category is made up of those who are only driven by humanitarian and philanthropic interests, as they are committed to rescuing people, assisting them, and helping them build a better life.

The second category comprises those who are interested in migrants only as a source of low-paid or undeclared work.

The third category is that of human traffickers and of smugglers who use migrants for their criminal business and who extort money from people fleeing their home countries. The victims are often enslaved, raped, forced to live in brutal conditions and to see their families being threatened in exchange for their own freedom.

The fourth category involves terrorists, who take advantage of migratory flows not only to find new financial resources, but also to relocate some of their affiliates.

Despite being deeply different in terms of aims and motivations, these four categories of subjects are nevertheless linked by one common interest: the same group of people, i.e. migrants. In particular, it is not hard to believe that humanitarian organizations are sometimes forced to negotiate with smugglers with the sole aim of rescuing asylum seekers.

It is safe to say that NGOs were responsible for as many as 22% of all rescues in the Central Mediterranean, as reported by the European Commission: 26% have been rescued by the Italian Navy and Custom Police, 20% by the Italian Coast Guard, 25% thanks to the operations Triton and Sophia, 8% by merchant marine vessels. To all those
who keep on carrying out these missions, we would like to express our deepest gratitude, as their precious, generous and altruistic work has helped save many people.

The latest report by the Italian Coast Guard concerning April 2017 indicates that around 40% of all rescues at sea are carried out by NGO ships: out of 12,590 rescued migrants, 5,015 were saved by Nongovernmental organizations and 3,523 by commercial vessels (fishing boats and merchant marine ships), therefore totaling 68% of all the rescues in the Mediterranean.

With each passing month, the situation in that area of the Mediterranean became more and more critical, thus leading the Italian Government, at the end of July 2017, to the adoption of a Code of conduct for NGOs involved in migrant rescues. After a few talks between the Ministry of the Interior and the convened NGOs, some amendments put forward by the latter were adopted in the final text, and most NGOs agreed to sign up to the Code. Specifically, the Code has bans NGO ships from Libyan waters and from communicating with smugglers, besides imposing limitations on transferring migrants to other ships as well as demanding financial transparency.

This initiative gave life to a vigorous debate in Italy, which saw a contrast between those supporting the Code and those against it – among the latter, a considerable portion of the Catholic world. After Italian State authorities and the Vatican met to discuss the Code, the President of the Italian Episcopal Conference, Gualtiero Bassetti, stepped in to clarify the Church’s stance on the matter (August 2017). He stated that immigration should be handled with “great compassion”, even though any form of “collaboration with the smugglers” should be refused, and that compassion could not exist without “responsibility”.

Despite all the practical difficulties and all the limitations introduced in terms of action, the Code of conduct, with its final text, is a tool that offers a compromise between NGO’s freedom of action and a proper conduct adhering to the rules established for bringing order to this tormented part of the Mediterranean, clearly out of control.

The adoption of the Code undoubtedly impacted the management of “search and rescue” operations in the Mediterranean, whose number decreased due to a series of initiatives undertaken to curb migration flows to Italy. First of all, the Italian government has engaged in intensive diplomatic activities since the beginning of 2017, when the so-called “desert diplomacy” started being implemented with the aim of stabilizing Southern Libya (Fezan) to both contrast human trafficking and fight against terrorist groups. In particular, the Italian Government and the Libyan authorities have reached a series of agreements according to which Italy, on the one hand, would deliver patrol vessels, and Libyan authorities, on the other, would take the migrants rescued at sea or about to embark, to reception camps, whose management, though, is very questionable in terms of respect of human rights.

Secondly, the Libyan Coast Guard has significantly intensified the interventions aimed at patrolling and intercepting migrants’ boats.

Thirdly, the reduction in arrivals in Italy has also been provoked, indirectly, by the Libyan Coast Guard, which threatened and attacked some NGO ships, thus making them interrupt or strongly reduce sea rescue operations.
The combination of these interventions has consequently caused the fall of outgoing flows from North Africa to Italy, which has recorded a significant contraction in the landings (from January 1 to September 15, the people landing on Italian shores were over 100,000, that is 20% less compared to the same period in 2016; August 2017 saw the greatest fall with a -80% compared to August 2016), while new routes from Morocco to Spain have been opened.

This new scenario raises a question that should be faced immediately, as it is of crucial importance, about the the fate of those who are taken back to the Libyan territory – which is running the risk of becoming a sort of huge refugee camp or, even worse, a concentration camp, because of an incessant political and military instability. The risk, of course, is real, as documented by the United Nations, NGOs and many correspondents from different newspapers who have reported situations of human trafficking, abductions, violence and torture also happening in refugee camps.

ISMU reaffirms the urgent need for a stronger UN presence in terms of control and management of these centers through UN agencies (UNHCR and IOM) and through NGOs, called upon to guarantee refugees a fair reception, as well as decent living conditions, thanks to the identification of objective criteria defining the different types of refugees and of migrants. It is also important to underline that a constant effort to manage migratory flows should be made not only by the countries of transit (e.g. Libya), but also and especially by the countries of departure, which should directly tackle the reasons behind many people’s final decision to leave.

Thus, it is clear that the current African situation is the determining one, while that in the Mediterranean, despite being crucial, remains largely dependent on the one concerning Africa and on the way the critical issues of the African continent are intended to be addressed – starting from the growing gap between rich and poor countries.

Besides, it inevitably takes a considerable amount of time to tackle the root causes of migration and results can be achieved only in the long run. In the meanwhile, it is easy to envisage that migration flows will remain just as intense and that will consequently have to be handled in the most efficient way possible – that is also by trying to reopen the borders to economic migrants, whose entry should be managed through a quota system, and by promoting safe transit of asylum seekers through humanitarian corridors.

Undoubtedly, action must be taken to tackle the serious problems that Africa is currently confronted with. This is necessary not only at the EU level, but also within the context of the United Nations, as well as with the help of other countries, such as Russia, China, and India, which have already shown their presence on the African territory with their numerous economic and business activities. However, this is a global issue, and Europe certainly has a major role to play, not only when it comes to migration.
4. IMMIGRATION, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS

Throughout 2017, migration-related issues managed to capture the attention of public opinion, as well as becoming one of the most decisive issues at the center of an intense political debate prior to all elections across Europe. In the next paragraph, we are going to focus on these two aspects, which will be discussed even more in depth in chapter 6.

4.1 THE INCREASING CENTRALITY OF THE MIGRATION ISSUE IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE

Migrations are becoming more and more relevant to public opinion in Europe. Some dynamics, which used to be typical of old immigration countries, are now starting to concern countries with a more recent immigration, as well as countries in transition from being countries of emigration to countries of immigration. Likewise, the importance of the migration phenomenon can be observed within the election programs of the different political parties (Alonso, De Fonseca, 2011).

The importance acquired by the topic of migration in public opinions across Europe varies according to whether a country is a Member State from the EU-15 or a new member. Older members, i.e. those from the EU-15, have always placed considerable emphasis on the issue. On the other hand, the States that have joined the EU more recently (in 2004 and 2007) started showing a stronger interest in 2013, while reaching a peak in 2015, when they registered a significant increase in incoming flows, especially through the Balkan route. It should be noted that, in the past, these countries had been characterized mainly by emigration, and not by immigration (Ortensi, 2016).

The often-divergent national attitudes towards migration have inevitably affected the European institutional framework. In fact, because of the very different views and the strong particularistic interests of the individual Member States, the legislation on immigration remains quite weak.

Jean Monnet used to wish for a European unity that would help the Old Continent leave behind two world wars, as well as its previous nationalistic tensions. He was hoping at least for the unification of national markets, as he believed that the States were not yet ready for a political union, even though it was indeed desirable and likely to be created in the near future. It is however true that the expansion of EU competences, directly affecting the everyday life of European citizens, could prove the concept of spillover true, as every decision taken by all EU members can be considered a step towards further integration. In other words, also by taking into account Europe’s current numerous ramifications, a EU disintegration would not be convenient as the price to pay would be too high for EU Member States, EU businesses and citizens (Rudloff and Schmieg, 2016). Nevertheless, history is to a certain extent non-linear, just as political entities are not always monolithic. Two years prior to the fall of the Berlin war, who would have expected the Soviet Union to disintegrate? Except for Amalrik, who had predicted its collapse in the book Will the

The Brexit Referendum could be seen as the first step in the dismantling of the EU. With Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union first introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, unexpectedly triggered for the first time ever, Eurosceptic parties saw a sudden surge in popularity. The centrality of the migration issue in the “Leave” campaign has clearly shown how fundamental it is to accurately handle the phenomenon, so that it will not pose any threat to the unity of the EU. We can in fact observe that the political parties pursuing a more restrictive stance on migration are also the most Eurosceptic ones.

The year 2017 was particularly relevant for the European Union, as it had to face several challenges (Pasini, 2016). The elections that took place in some of the most important EU States – such as Austria (December 2016), the Netherlands, France, Germany, Czech Republic and Slovenia – along with the significance, at a national level, of the migration issue in the EU, has cast a shadow on the future of the Union. On account of this, to paraphrase Amalrik, we cannot help but wonder: will the European Union survive until 2025? This issue is also explored in the White Paper on the Future of Europe, presented by the European Commission in March 2017.

4.2. European issues, national elections

In addition to the recent migratory pressure (whose nature has partially changed compared to the immigration of the past few decades), the tragic terrorist acts executed especially in 2016 and 2017 in cities across Europe (Paris, Brussels, Nice, London, Manchester and Barcelona) have raised public concerns within European societies and drawn urgent attention to a number of crucial issues. In particular, the integration of minorities and of populations of Islamic faith. As national governments and European institutions fail to find a specific way to deal with those issues, stronger anti-immigration and anti-European sentiments have started to spread across Europe. This led to the success of Eurosceptic political parties at both national and EU level. With the historic 2016 referendum on Brexit, Britain voted to leave the EU, therefore showing how anti-EU political forces successfully managed to use the issue of migration to their own advantage – which was by strictly connecting Eurosceptic programs to highly restrictive positions on immigration.

The results of the 2017 general elections held in the Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, and Germany provide a picture of the current state of affairs concerning attitudes towards the EU and towards migration. With reference to each of these countries, ISMU has carried out an analysis of the main parties’ electoral programs, precisely focusing on attitudes towards the European Union and attitudes towards migration.

It remains to be seen, however, if these issues will manage to become more relevant than the traditional Left-Right political cleavages – which are increasingly being given less consideration by voters and by public opinion. Still, they coexist, and the first tend to affect the latter, making those cleavages either deeper or weaker.
In the four countries analyzed, the electoral outcome reveals the percentages of votes obtained by both the parties in favor of immigration and those against it. The three resulting categories are: parties in either strong or moderate opposition to immigration; parties not clearly pro or against immigrations; parties moderately or strongly in favor of immigration.

In relation to the migration issue, the seven parties taken into consideration from the Dutch general elections are reported having gained more than 80% of favorable votes. Out of these, the relative majority (34.4%) pertained to anti-immigration parties (PVV and VVD), while only 27% expressed a preference for self-proclaimed (with or without caveats) pro-immigration parties (PvdA, D66, GL). The parties seeking middle ground (CDA and SP) obtained 21.5% of the votes.

France saw a more polarized situation. Almost half of French voters (49.95%) opted for candidates who did not regard immigration as a negative phenomenon (Macron, Mélenchon, Hamon), while 41.31% voted for candidates who were either against or moderately against immigrants (Le Pen, Fillon).

The elections in the UK painted yet another different picture. The six parties analyzed obtained more than 95% of all votes, even though the relative majority (44.1%) voted for anti-immigration parties (UKIP, Conservative Party) and only 12% cast their vote in favor of pro-migrant parties (Liberal Democrats, SNP, Green Party). The remaining 40% went to the Labour Party, whose views stood somewhere in between.

The results of the federal elections held in Germany on September 24, 2017 are not easy to understand immediately. On the one hand, Chancellor Angela Merkel won the elections; on the other, she lost 65 seats (around 20% as compared with the 2013 elections). SPD lost 20% of the seats, too (exactly 40 out of 193). Those seats mainly went to two parties, namely the ones that remained unrepresented in the Bundestag in 2013: the liberals (FDP), with 80 seats won, and AfD, with 94. Both the Left (Linke) and the Greens (Grünen) gained a handful of seats. However, AfD, a far-right party with strong anti-immigration and eurosceptic views, could claim a resounding victory, while traditional parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) remained the most voted, despite losing ground. As a result, Angela Merkel’s party, despite being the one winning the election, actually suffered heavy losses in terms of consensus (and seats).

Then again, if we consider the parties’ attitudes towards the EU, the results appear to be different. In each of the four cases observed, the percentage describing pro-EU parties is higher than that concerning anti-EU political groups, or even higher than the absolute majority.

In the Netherlands, 45.9% of the voters chose parties supporting Europe in their electoral programs (VVD, CDA, D66), while only 22.2% voted for Eurosceptic parties (PVV, SP). Finally, 14.8% cast their vote for parties that had not taken a clear stance on the EU (GL, PvdA).

In France, slightly more than the absolute majority of voters opted for pro-European candidates (Macron, Fillon, Hamon), whereas 40.88% supported the two Eurosceptic candidates (Le Pen, Mélenchon).
The same polarized dynamics can be noted in Great Britain, where 52% of voters chose pro-EU parties (Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, SNP, Green Party), while the Conservative Party and UKIP received no more than 44.1% of the votes.

Lastly, in Germany, if we read the results in terms of attitudes towards migration and towards Europe, we can see that 62.4% of the votes went to pro-EU parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Grünen), whereas only 21.9% to either moderately or strongly Eurosceptic parties (AfD, Linke). As far as immigration is concerned, the situation is less unbalanced. In fact, if 12.6% of the electorate voted for AfD, a party with strong anti-immigrant leanings, almost half of the votes (49.4%) went to pro-immigration parties (SPD, Grünen, Linke).

In the four countries where national elections have recently been held, the political forces with anti-immigration and anti-EU beliefs have, as a matter of fact, lost. However, in the Czech Republic, the party led by Andrej Babiš (ANO) won the election with 20.9% of the votes, therefore tripling the votes obtained by its contenders: the Civic Democratic Party (ODS 11.3%) and the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD 10.6%), both with outspoken Eurosceptic views.

As a result, it is plain to see that the attitudes towards migration, as well as those towards the EU, are two unmistakably crucial issues.

### 4.3 Open Society vs Closed Society

It is a fact that, over the years, the European Union has progressively changed, thus causing a transformation of its existing framework – both internally, since the Maastricht Treaty came into force, and internationally, with the end of the polarized era, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the meantime, the principal socio-political cleavages, too – as the pioneering work by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) observed – have changed, therefore demanding a new analysis. Such critical divisions have indeed characterized the development of the party system for the last two centuries, both at a national and at a European level. More specifically, with regard to the National Revolution, they pertained to the dichotomies Center–Periphery and State–Church, while, with reference to the Industrial Revolution, they concerned the oppositions City–Countryside and Capital–Labor. Today, it is worth noticing another cleavage resulting from the dichotomy between open societies and closed societies, caused by issues that are still unsolved and whose epicenter lies in the effects of globalization – such as a growing social, economic, cultural, and political interdependence. Hence, the inability of EU societies to overcome the new main problems arising in the political, economic, and social agenda, both at a national and at a European level. This additional post-industrial cleavage creates a manifest contradiction between the single market, by definition knocking down national boundaries, and the single Member States, responsible for the development of concepts such as citizenship and welfare, and now trying to strengthen the idea of a national political community. Therefore, we find ourselves wondering: “Who is winning and who is losing in the context of globalization?” The formation and the consolidation (not only because of the electoral result) of protest parties, also called neo-populist parties, provide evidence that cleavages that used to be important in the past are no longer so. Indeed,
they signal a division between the “losers” of globalization, as well as of a failed European integration (which are Europeans and migrants coming from outside the EU who would rather go back to a closed society) and those who aspire to a more cosmopolitan culture. At the root of this cleavage, in fact, there is a growing anti-migrant and xenophobic prejudice, along with a series of nationalistic values clearly against the idea of a society that is multiethnic and open.

To conclude, we would like to propose a few remarks about feelings of belonging and identities. Considering a categorization of cultural differences at a global level in terms of European values, as elaborated by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2012), it is of essence to investigate some core concepts, as well as their effects on Europe. As for the relationship between citizens, national States and the European Union, the main cultural elements we should take into account are the following: a sense of subnational, national, or supranational pride affecting the development of a collective identity thus creating a sense of belonging (micro-territorial values vs nationalistic values vs cosmopolitan values); either trust or mistrust in local, national, and European institutions; either xenophobia or tolerance towards different values, different patterns of behavior and different people coming from different places. Furthermore, it is crucial to pay attention to new religious and ethnical cleavages causing not only cultural changes in terms of sociopolitical representations, but also concrete actions against political, economic, financial, and bureaucratic elites. As a consequence of all the above, European citizens are more likely to adopt a critical orientation, or even feel a certain level of disorientation, when it comes to European institutions. It is because of this widespread disorientation – a sort of frustration – that new social movements against the EU, and especially against the complex phenomenon of migration, are arising. In order to tackle these new dangerous nationalist tendencies, it is strictly necessary for EU institutions to issue decisions and launch initiatives aimed at facing both the old and the new cleavages discussed above. This approach is also essential to face, with more resolution, the growing disorientation of EU citizens and to restore their confidence in the possibility (as long ago hoped for by ISMU) of a stronger and more united Europe.

Only if a significant number of Member States is willing to work towards the achievement of that goal, the migration issue will finally be dealt with in a really effective way. In short, as also suggested in our former reports, migration is a global issue and, as such, it must be addressed by the whole Union – and not only by its single States. A stronger EU will in fact be able to play a leading role on the global stage – which is constantly evolving – and will manage to respond to the increasingly significant challenges posed worldwide at a macro-regional level. This is why, in a more and more globalized world, the relevance of the migration phenomenon is becoming greater and greater.
REFERENCES


Cesareo V. (2017a), Uno sguardo d’insieme alle sfide poste dalle migrazioni, in Fondazione ISMU, Ventiduesimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2016, FrancoAngeli, Milano, pp. 7-68.


Chapter 2

STATISTICAL ASPECTS

Gian Carlo Blangiardo

1. A POPULATION OF ALMOST 6 MILLION

On 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2017 the foreign population in Italy is estimated at 5,958,000 units. Of these, 85\% are residents, regularly registered in their local council’s Registry Office, whereas 420,000 are – presently – regular non-residents and 491,000 have an irregular immigration status (Table 1).

Comparing these numbers with those recorded on the same date in 2016 we find an increase in presences both in terms of absolute numbers (+87,000), and in terms of population density, which has gone from 9.58\% to 9.72\%\textsuperscript{1}. This latter result is affected also by the further decline in the total number of overall residents registered in Italy during the course of 2016 (-76,000).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
Type of migrant & 1 Jan 15 & 1 Jan 16 & 1 Jan 17 \\
\hline
Resident (registered at the Registry Office) & 5,014 & 5,026 & 5,047 \\
Regular non residents & 401 & 410 & 420 \\
Irregular & 404 & 435 & 491 \\
\hline
Total present & 5,819 & 5,871 & 5,958 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Foreigners in Italy on 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2015-2017 by type}
\end{table}

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

As we had observed in 2015, in 2016 the slight positive variation in foreign presences in Italy seems to be due mostly to the growth of irregular immigrants (+56,000), resulting mainly from those who, after arriving illegally by sea, remain on Italian soil and have not been able or have not wanted to seek a permit to stay\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} The relationship between the number of foreigners present and what EUROSTAT defines “usually resident” is estimated in 61,293,000 units (from the 61,303,000 indicated by EUROSTAT at 01.01.2016 we have to subtract 76,000 residents (without distinction of nationality) at the end of the year and add 66,000 foreigners among regular non residents and irregular immigrants.

\textsuperscript{2} During the course of 2016, considering 181,000 non authorised entries, it is estimated that 58,000 immigrants have not presented an asylum/protection application and that, among those who did, 33,000 were rejected. Considering an estimate of approximately 6,000 repatriations for various reasons, if we hypothesise that only half of those who did not apply managed to relocate to another country, we can estimate the number of irregular immigrants generated from arrivals by sea during 2016 in 56,000 units.
In any case, we must bear in mind that in 2016 the increase in foreign residents has been largely curbed by a dramatic increase of those who have achieved Italian citizenship status, a phenomenon that has led to 202,000 cancellations from the Foreign Registry Office in 2016 alone. Indeed, on the basis only of natural (births-deaths) and migratory (immigrants-emigrants) movements, the rise in foreign residents in 2016 would not have been of merely 21,000 units, as the global difference suggests, but rather of 223,000, thus indicating a rise of 289,000 units. The “actual” variation of the latter should thus be corrected as follows: from a modest +1.5%, deriving from the increase in their number on a strictly mathematical basis, we would rise to +5%, including the losses due to a change in status (Table 2). A variation which is in line with the data from the previous two year period (2014-2015), excluding new citizenships, and which is equivalent to a significant growth rate: a figure which could potentially lead to the doubling of the correspondent population over the course of approximately 20 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2. VARIATION IN THE FOREIGN POPULATION PRESENT IN ITALY (2014-2016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(thousands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A-</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of whom:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident (registered in the Registry Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular non residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B-</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective rise: A+B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondent effective variation in %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

In the longer term, the likelihood of such an intense growth does not seem (or no longer seems) probable for Italy’s future. Or rather, it does not seem like a probable outcome should the dynamics which we have recently observed persist. According to the data generated by the ISMU Foundation – extrapolating trends from the 2014-2016 period – it is estimated that the rise in Italy’s resident foreign population (regularly registered in Civil Registry Offices) will be increasingly reduced, reaching a maximum of 5,374,000. Assuming this figure as the size of the rise in the stock of irregular immigrants we can hypothesise that other forms of entry (overstayers, clandestine entries by land, etc.) have found compensation in exit flows of equal number among those without a valid permit to stay (return to their nation of origin or relocation elsewhere).
units at the end of 2033, only to then begin a phase of relative stability at around 5,300,000 residents.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that, according to the same source, the most significant variations projected for foreign residents in Italy according to age are, on the one hand, the significant growth of a more “mature” cohort, starting from age 50 but peaking particularly around age 65; on the other hand, a significant reduction both of the 35-49 cohort and among under-15s. Indeed, whereas the area of growth indicates that we are seeing the first signs of the demographic aging process, which has clearly not spared the foreign population; conversely, the reduction in the number of young adults and children is likely the result of massive citizenship status acquisitions either through “naturalization”, in the 35-49 age range, or via “transmission” from parents to children (ex art.14 law 91/1992).

**Graph 1. Foreign resident population in Italy by age on 1st January 2017-2037 (a)**

(a) The value in parentheses is the percentage of citizenship status acquisitions within each age range in the three-year period 2013-2015 (EUROSTAT).

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

The significant rise in the number of new citizens is thus a process which is amply underway and seems destined to continue in the next few years even without any changes in the current legal framework (Graph 2). According to an estimation model recently developed by the ISMU Foundation we expect 620,000 new citizens in 2017-2019 and slightly more than 2,000,000 new citizens in the decade 2017-2026. Overall, according to the estimates on the foreign resident population and the components that determine its developments, we can observe how in the 2017-2026 period, even allowing for a slight increase in the net flow of immigrants compared to the past three years (but in line with
the estimates of both ISTAT and EUROSTAT\textsuperscript{3}), changes in citizenship status are effectively “capping” the rise in foreign residents over the 6 million benchmark (Table 3).

**GRAPH 2. ANNUAL NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS WHO ACHIEVE ITALIAN CITIZENSHIP. HISTORICAL DATA 2002-2016 AND ESTIMATES 2017-2026 (VALUES IN THOUSANDS)**

![Graph showing annual number of foreigners who achieve Italian citizenship from 2002 to 2026](image)

*Source: ISTAT and ISMU Foundation*

**TABLE 3. COMPONENTS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC BALANCE AMONG THE RESIDENT FOREIGN POPULATION IN ITALY. YEARLY AVERAGE 2014-2016 E 2017-2026**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>2014-2016 (thousands)</th>
<th>2017-2026 (thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net balance Civil Registry Office registrations – cancellations (a)</td>
<td>+146</td>
<td>+181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic balance (births – deaths)</td>
<td>+66</td>
<td>+58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total balance</strong></td>
<td><strong>+212</strong></td>
<td><strong>+239</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident foreigners now Italian citizens</td>
<td>-170</td>
<td>-212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rise in resident foreigners</td>
<td>+42</td>
<td>+27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Includes movements abroad, internal movements and other registrations/cancellations.

*Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data*

\textsuperscript{3}The most recent ISTAT forecasts (median value hypothesis) estimate an average of +150,000 annual units the rise in migration from and to other countries in the decade 2017-2026 (www.demo.ISTAT.it). A value which, if referred only to foreigners, must certainly be augmented given that, as we know, among the Italian component emigrations are significantly more than repatriations. Similar to what we are hypothesising here is also the net migratory figure forecasted by EUROSTAT for the same period (EUROSTAT Database, Population Projection). In baseline projections, the average annual value 2017-2026 of net migration for the Italian population is indicated as 166,000 units.
2. IMMIGRANT NATIONALITIES: A NEW PROFILE?

Examining the different nationalities of immigrants who have come to live in Italy through an overview of Civil Registry Office data (updated on 1st January 2017), we find, once again, that Romanians maintain the first place, with 1,169,000 residents (23.2% of total presences). To follow, we have approximately 450,000 Albanians (8.9%) and 420,000 Moroccans (8.3%); in both cases with a decrease of 15-20,000 residents compared to the same date in 2016. The ranking then counts 283,000 Chinese (5.6%) and 234,000 Ukrainians (4.4%), before including Filipinos (3.3%), Indians (3%), Moldavians (2.7%), Bangladeshis (2.4%) and Egyptians (2.2%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1,081,400</td>
<td>1,131,839</td>
<td>1,151,395</td>
<td>1,168,552</td>
<td>17,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>495,709</td>
<td>490,483</td>
<td>467,687</td>
<td>448,407</td>
<td>-19,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>454,773</td>
<td>449,058</td>
<td>437,485</td>
<td>420,651</td>
<td>-16,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R. of China</td>
<td>256,846</td>
<td>265,820</td>
<td>271,330</td>
<td>281,972</td>
<td>10,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>219,050</td>
<td>226,060</td>
<td>230,728</td>
<td>234,354</td>
<td>3,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>162,655</td>
<td>168,238</td>
<td>165,900</td>
<td>166,459</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>149,434</td>
<td>147,815</td>
<td>150,456</td>
<td>151,430</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>142,453</td>
<td>147,388</td>
<td>142,266</td>
<td>135,661</td>
<td>-6,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>111,223</td>
<td>115,301</td>
<td>118,790</td>
<td>122,428</td>
<td>3,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>96,008</td>
<td>103,713</td>
<td>109,871</td>
<td>112,765</td>
<td>2,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,922,085</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,014,437</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,026,153</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,047,028</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,875</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data*

In order to understand the striking variations it is fundamental to bear in mind changes in citizenship status, especially among certain nationalities (Table 4). Indeed, the significant fall in the number of Albanian and Moroccan residents is understandable in light of the large number of Italian citizenship acquisitions among these two groups: 35,000, in both cases, in 2016. A characteristic which, albeit reduced and not significant enough to curtail growth, we find also among Romanian (with 13,000 new Italians in 2016), Indian and Bangladeshi residents (9,000 and 8,000, respectively).

If obtaining an Italian citizenship is one of the great factors in redesigning the geography of foreign presence in Italy, we must nonetheless not underestimate the parallel development of new international migratory flows which, on the basis of different emigration projects, steer migration towards Italy. In this respect, the variation of foreign residents according to macro-regions of origin in 2014-2016 indicates three great trends (Table 5). On one hand, migrations originating from Europe and North Africa seem to have reached a maturation process which, as suggested, increasingly seems to end with the acquisition of an Italian citizenship status and, consequently, in the containment/decrease...
in the corresponding number of residents. Generally slower, but in the same direction, is the maturation process of migrations from Asia – with the Indian sub-continent in the forefront – whose numerical growth, still persistent, continues to reflect family-based settlements and whose status is still focused on achieving a permanent permit to stay.

TABLE 5. MACRO REGIONS AND NATIONAL ORIGINS OF FOREIGN RESIDENTS IN ITALY. AT 1ST JANUARY 2014 AND 2017 (THOUSANDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro regions</th>
<th>1.1.2014</th>
<th>1.1.2017</th>
<th>%Variation</th>
<th>Most represented countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union 28</td>
<td>1,442</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Romania, Poland, Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>Albania, Ukraine, Moldavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (other)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>Switzerland, San Marino, Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Cameroon, Congo RD, Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>Georgia, Iran, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Sub-Continent</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>India, Bangladesh, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>PR of China, Philippines, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>USA, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>Peru, Ecuador, Brasil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, Samoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,922</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,047</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data

Migrations from West Africa have certainly been more dynamic in terms of growth and with characteristics quite unlike the family settlement model of other nationalities. There has been a rise in residents originating from Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana, but of those also from less represented countries, such as Gambia or Mali, fuelled by the influx of asylum and humanitarian aid seekers among the half a million persons who have disembarked on the Italian coastlines over the past three year period.

Italy, in general, continues to represent a largely more developed and attractive place compared to migrants’ countries of origin, although most recent migrations seem to be characterized by an average development profile “upon departure” more dissimilar from that of the destination country. A distance which, in the case of asylum seekers, appears enormous and increasing over time. It thus appears legitimate to say that the change in immigrants’ nationalities which has taken place over the course of the past few years is bringing to Italy persons with increasingly different experiences compared to their new host context and that, in all likelihood, their full integration and inclusion in the host society may turn out to be longer and more complex.

Therefore, after having saluted with satisfaction the growing trend of Italian citizenship acquisitions mentioned above, and having recognized the widespread
stabilization and settlement process, confirmed also by an increase of long-term over short-term permits to stay (Graph 3), the challenge the Italian migratory system still faces is that of managing immigration flows, especially those based on economic motivations, originating from the poorest African countries.

**GRAPH 3. NON-EU FOREIGNERS REGULARLY PRESENT IN ITALY BY TYPE OF PERMIT TO STAY. 2011-2016**

![Graph showing non-EU foreigners by type of permit to stay (2011-2016)]

*Source: ISMU analysis on ISTAT data*

In any case, we must bear in mind that, although the pressure from the South of the world deserves our attention – also in terms of the causes which produce it – and requires an effective management, it is true also that, if we consider Italy’s foreign population overall, immigration levels have remained relatively stable compared to the recent past. The fall in the number of “regular/traditional” immigration registrations, which has taken place almost uninterruptedly from 2007 to 2014 has found compensation in the “non authorised” arrivals by sea. Part of whom, after the necessary status checks, have later been included in the official count of immigration entry flows (ISTAT, 2017) which, unsurprisingly, are relatively stable for the 2014-2016 three year period (Graph 4).

As we have seen, the quantitative data on foreign presences in Italy – like those on immigration density – does not seem to highlight dynamics or perspectives which are cause for concern. The problems, which certainly exist, are qualitative for the most part. There is no reason, at present, to speak of invasion, but it is worth highlighting a change in migrant presences. Those who have completed their migratory journey, going from “trailblazer” status (migrant worker) to member/creator of a family settlement (migrant population) are exiting the scene, leaving way to those who arrived by sea, with a much less defined migratory project and an educational/training background which is typically poorer compared to the previous “generation” of immigrants.
On the other hand, what both “old” and “new” immigrants have in common is, once again, an economic motivation. Looking at the various countries of origin of those who have disembarked on Italian coasts in the three year period between 2014-2017 (up to 22 August 2017) official data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs – based on information declared by immigrants themselves – show a significant reduction in persons of middle-eastern origin and a rise in those coming from Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Table 6. Migrants who have disembarked on Italian coasts by (declared) country of origin. 2014-2016 and 2017 (at 22nd August)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis on data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs
Syrian immigrants, which in 2014 made up approximately 25% of all arrivals, went down to 5% in 2015 and in 2016 do not appear among in the list of the main nationalities. At the same time, Nigeria has significantly risen in rankings (from 5% in 2014 to 21% in 2016, further confirmed by 17% of 2017) as has Bangladesh (Table 6).

Rather than evoke scenarios of invasion without any numerical evidence to support such a claim, the message that seems to come from the latest data on arrivals in Italy is a strong rise in a component – African mostly but not exclusively – that reflects the explosive combination of wars, persecutory regimes and (above all) conditions of extreme poverty. All of this in contexts of intense demographic growth, led by a young population which, in a globalized world, appears increasingly aware of the lack of perspectives and the existence of other opportunities elsewhere, despite the fact that such places, such as Italy, don’t have – or hardly have – any formal channels of entry open for work purposes.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Despite the media clamour and the lively debate surrounding these issues, the statistical data show that the foreign presence in Italy has not undergone major variations in recent years. A major part has been played by recent Italian citizenship acquisitions; and this takes place, paradoxically, while there is a much lamented lack of legislation and changes are invoked all round.

Future perspectives seem to confirm, at least in the short term, a certain stability, generated by a weak attractiveness for “traditional” immigration and a significant maturation of older immigration components, accompanied by changes in status. The contrast between “old” and “new” immigration and the different degrees of settlement in the host society are very evident in the dynamics relative to the number of presences in terms of national origin: Europeans (and North Africans) have become Italians, Asians have settled down while they too wait for a new (Italian) citizenship status, whereas Sub-Saharan Africans are still looking for a place to settle down and live.

All this is happening while discussions rage, often fomented by partial visions and/or ideological positions, that construe immigration either as an extreme threat to eradicate or as the “magic solution” to all of Italy’s problems: from empty cradles to a rise in GDP (Centro Studi Confindustria, 2016).

But reality is much more complex than what we can or want to see. Immigration remains a phenomenon that involves persons and families and as such it needs to be approached with care and understanding. A thorough understanding of the reality of migration is the best way to manage it and seize its value. And statistical data, if taken objectively and at face value, can help us do just that.
REFERENCES

2017 witnessed the introduction of many new rules in connection with immigration, whose objective was mainly to respond to the flows of asylum seekers.

The most wide ranging piece of legislation was certainly Law No. 47 (so-called ‘Zampa Law’), concerning unaccompanied foreign minors, which made a series of changes to existing law with a view to improving protection (D’Odorico, Di Pascale, 2017). An innovative law for sure but one that nonetheless has adopted a traditional approach: for that reason and the fact that the specific issue is one of the least divisive in Italy in the field of immigration, the legislation did not arouse much controversy.

Controversy that by contrast surrounded the other fundamental piece of legislation introduced in 2017, i.e. Law-Decree No. 13 (so-called ‘Minniti-Orlando Decree’), converted by parliament into Law No. 46, which touched upon very sensitive aspects of the rules governing the entry and stay of foreigners.

1. THE LAW PROTECTING UNACCOMPANIED FOREIGN MINORS

Law No. 47 as aforesaid adopted a traditional approach. Against the backdrop of the New York Convention of 1989 in accordance with which all actions concerning children must be taken with the latter’s best interests in mind and the principles set forth in the Convention must be applied to all children without discrimination.

On that basis Law No. 47 provides first and foremost that unaccompanied foreign minors enjoy “equal treatment” with Italian minors without prejudice to the application of special protection on account of their “greater vulnerability”.

The law also confirms the trend adopted by the legal system of treating unaccompanied foreign minors uniformly irrespective of whether or not they are asylum seekers, bearing in mind that the large flow of asylum seekers was undoubtedly a factor that prompted legislative change.

There continue to be rules governing solely asylum-seeking unaccompanied foreign minors, especially as regards the procedure for examining their application and the status of the said children if their application is granted. But in general the law adopts a model of regulation affording uniform protection for all unaccompanied foreign minors whereas previously the idea that there should be a channel reserved exclusively for child asylum seekers had held sway (as was the case with Prime-ministerial Decree No. 535 of 1999). Emblematic is the provision that all unaccompanied foreign minors are to be housed in facilities dedicated to them specifically by the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and
Refugees (SPRAR), whose overall capacity must be commensurate with demand: in the
event of a temporary shortage of space in those facilities, the unaccompanied foreign
minors are to be put up in the municipal accommodation devoted to Italian or foreign
children who become separated from their families for any reason.

The law lays down general rules for the entry, identification, reception and stay of
unaccompanied foreign minors.

The law forbids the return of unaccompanied foreign minors at the border and allows
deportation solely for serious reasons of public order and security provided that such
does not entail “a risk of grave harm” and subject in any case to a decision by a children’s
court.

As soon as the child enters into contact with the authorities, the first step is
identification with a view to also establishing that the person is actually a minor, an issue
that is not only delicate but often complicated due to the lack of documentation and the
fact that frequently the individual will be aged sixteen or seventeen. The deadline for
identification is ten days (whereas before there was no time limit). Crucial in this regard
is a statutory interview handled by qualified personnel at the initial reception centre
under the direction of the municipal authorities. If doubts remain as to age, a medical
examination may be carried out. And if doubts still persist, the individual concerned is
presumed to be a minor.

An asylum-seeking unaccompanied foreign minor will obtain a residence permit in that
capacity. Alternatively, the individual will receive one as a child or on family grounds if
taken into foster care or entrusted to the care of an adult. This latter type of permit allows
the individual to work while it is not clear whether a residence permit granted solely on
grounds of being a child grants that right: an important question considering that the life
plan for an unaccompanied foreign minor often envisages work even if not in the short
term.

As regards civil protection, unaccompanied foreign minors are equated with
abandoned Italian children. Until such time as a guardian is appointed, the children are
under the care of the head of the reception centre, failing which guardianship is exercised
by the municipality in which the child was rescued or found.

The law provides that also the initial reception centres must be ad hoc ones for
unaccompanied foreign minors. Currently, the standards for those centres are set out in a
ministerial decree from 2016, chief among which is that maximum capacity may not
exceed thirty places. The law further provides that unaccompanied foreign minors may
not remain in initial reception centres for more than thirty days (previously the limit was
sixty days), a provision that addressed the concern that otherwise they might end up
being ‘parked’ in initial reception centres due to the difficulty of transferring them to
dedicated facilities (because of a shortage of places and other problems).

It was mentioned before that the law provides that unaccompanied foreign minors are
to be housed in dedicated facilities run by SPRAR or in the accommodation that
municipalities have for children. However, that solution is adopted solely for want of a
better alternative. In this regard, it is envisaged that “family inquiries” be carried out and
“should family members be identified [in Italy] capable of taking care [of the child] that
solution must be preferred to accommodation in a community”. Moreover, there is an attempt to boost foster care, i.e. the solution that the Italian legal system contemplates for all children who for whatever reason are temporarily separated from their own family. In this respect the law provides that municipalities are to promote “awareness and education of carers to facilitate foster care in families [for unaccompanied foreign minors] in preference to accommodation in facilities”. However, foster care is in crisis in Italy because the number of people willing and able to provide that type of care falls dramatically short of demand.

As regards accommodation in facilities, there is a concern that they are often unsatisfactory for the children, who thus on occasion flee from them and consequently end up without aid and in grave danger. The law provides that during the interview the child’s characteristics and expectations are to be assessed in order to identify the most suitable facility. However, still unresolved is the issue that often it is not only the facility in itself but the whole context that can be found wanting, for example, as regards the frequent desire of the child – often aged sixteen or seventeen – to find a job as soon as possible, a desire that at times is not adequately fulfilled by schools, vocational training or job centres.

As for the issue-problem of children running away from facilities, worth mentioning is the provision to the effect that those in charge of interviewing the child must also compile a so-called ‘social chart’ for the minor, the data in which is to be input in the national database maintained by the Ministry of Labour. The system should provide not only an overall picture of the drop-out rate but also a tool to immediately reconstruct the child’s previous record in the reception system when the minor is located after having run away.

Finally, the law address what happens when the child exits the special protection system in order to return home for family reunion purposes or reaches the age of majority. As regards family reunion, it is provided that subject to hearing the child a children’s court may order assisted repatriation if, also following an investigation in the country of origin, it proves to be “in the best interests of the child”. Since 2012 it is the Directorate General for Immigration of the Ministry of Labour that conducts the investigation alongside an NGO affiliated with the Ministry. In any case, repatriation is ruled out if the family behaved in a manner detrimental to the child or if an application for asylum is pending. As regards reaching the age of majority, the law make provisions for the possible issuance of “a residence permit for the purposes of study, access to work, a job as an employee or self-employment”.

2. **THE MINNITI-ORLANDO DECREES**

The other important piece of legislation from 2017, i.e. Law-Decree No. 13 (so-called ‘Minniti-Orlando Decree’), would appear to be an omnibus law characterised by a piecemeal approach. It is not easy to grasp its rationale although as a whole it would seem informed by a desire for efficiency. It contains provisions that range from the examination of asylum applications to how to treat foreigners facing deportation and from the setting up of specialised court sections dedicated to immigration disputes to the employment of
asylum seekers in community service type work. As mentioned above, the solutions would seem to have been adopted with a view to ensuring efficiency: reorganise and simplify.

Some provisions refer exclusively to asylum seekers, others no. That said, the government’s decision to resort to a law-decree as opposed to other types of legislation hints at a link with the difficulties stemming from the increase in asylum seekers in 2016.

First and foremost the Decree seeks to reduce the waiting times for a final decision on the right to international protection. In effect in 2015-2016 those times turned out to be quite long, a question of many months if not years. That is detrimental for applicants, who are forced to live for a long time in a climate of uncertainty, with various negative consequences also as regards the chances of finding work since it is problematic to “invest” in a person who may turn out to be irregular as regards their stay in the country if their application for asylum ends up being rejected. And it is also problematic for public authorities that have to assist for lengthy periods people who then turn out not to be entitled to asylum.

The new provisions seek to streamline administrative procedures before the competent local administrative commissions and likewise any subsequent disputes that there might be by considering hearings as the exception rather than the rule and by abolishing appeals. Those measures have given rise to heated debate: while it is true that the Italian Constitution allows trials without hearings and does not always envisage an automatic right of appeal, it would appear unreasonable to remove those safeguards from a dispute like that involving asylum, which is especially delicate due to the rights at stake and difficulty in establishing them (Asgi, 2017).

Equally symptomatic of the need to reduce decision-making times is another provision in the Decree, i.e. the setting up of specialised sections of courts dedicated to immigration disputes. In this case it is not just asylum but immigration in general that is covered. That said, without doubt it was the increase in disputes concerning international protection that provided the impetus for legislative change. The creation of specialised sections of courts moreover attests to a strategy aimed not only at speeding up but also improving the quality of judgments in a sector with special features that seem to call for the development of particular skills and approaches.

The Decree also contains provisions on identification with special reference to hotspots, although the rules are still inadequate (Asgi, 2017). But above all there are new provisions on the deportation of illegal aliens, who in the future will mainly be asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected. They are likely to amount to tens if not hundreds of thousands considering the high number of asylum applications and the fact that the relevant commissions reject the majority of them. In this latter regard an appeal to the courts offers some hope in certain cases and furthermore the massive recourse to residence permits on general humanitarian grounds has led to many cases being resolved.

The most significant measure is the relaunching of detention centres for those awaiting deportation. In these past years the said identification and deportation centres (CIE) have proved to be more a hindrance than a help: too many people detained without deportation ever actually going ahead. There has been strident criticism of that inefficiency and more
in general the living conditions in the centres, often worse than those to be found in prisons. It was also for this reason that the centres had been downsized in recent years: there were 13 in 2011 with a capacity of almost 2,000 places but by January 2016 only 4 were truly operational with an effective capacity of less than 400 places. By contrast the Minniti-Orlando Decree has relaunched the detention centres, now called repatriation centres (CPR), which are supposed to be smaller in size that in the past and distributed throughout the country. There should be one repatriation centre per region, with an overall capacity of 1,600 place, costing about 13 million euros to build initially and 18 million euros to run every year.

As regards the impact of the change on the plan for the number of actual repatriations, the government is expressly relying on measures not contemplated in the Decree, in other words, new agreements with the countries of origin.

As for living conditions in the centres, the reduction in size could in itself contribute to raising standards. Another important provision is equating repatriation centres with prisons as regards accessibility and external inspections like those conducted by parliamentarians in the exercise of their powers of oversight.

Finally, worth mentioning is an aspect of the Decree that has caught attention, i.e. the employment of asylum seekers in community service type work. In the face of criticism about the costs of receiving asylum seekers and the idle condition in which they often find themselves, it is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of the provision. Indeed, the experience gained from doing community service could in some way facilitate asylum seekers’ entry into the labour market. However, in the implementation stage great care must be taken to avoid certain risks. Firstly, that of measures that end up being more costly than productive and, secondly, that of exacerbating the climate of a “battle of the have-nots” that is already in the air. The truth is that nowadays there is a whole world that survives on the edges of the market thanks to government contracts, for example, awarded to worker cooperatives. One must avoid a situation where in a context dominated by a need to cut public spending, the migrants doing community service type work end up competing against low income Italian workers.

3. Conclusions

Ever apart from the specific points made in the preceding two sections regarding the legislative changes made in 2017, it is now time to consider what the priorities for new legislation in 2018 will be.

Firstly and once again the topic of asylum. The concerns about the huge increase in applications and the need to provide some form of assistance in any event has pushed the question of integration into the background when in reality it should be an absolute priority going forward. In the coming years Italy will have hundreds of thousands of people (for the

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\[ Data \text{ from 2017 Report to Parliament of the National Authority for the Rights of Persons Detained or Deprived of Personal Liberty, in } \text{www.garantenazionaleprivatiliberta.it.}\]
most part young men from sub-Saharan Africa) to integrate into society. An arduous challenge. It will be necessary to carefully revise the rules on reception and what comes after, conscious of the existence of clear difficulties that have already come to the fore such as poor education, from language learning to professional training and finding a job, meaning that the need for aid will still persist. In this regard, a priority must be to better coordinate the action taken by central government, the regions and local authorities and to involve the business world to a greater extent encouraging it to invest in the integration of asylum seekers.

Then there is the question of economic immigration. The fact that some asylum seekers are in reality economic migrants raises the old unresolved issue of regulating the entry of foreign workers into Italy. Nowadays, legal immigration for work reasons is rare in Italy, not just because of the absence of quotas but also because of the inadequacy of the regulatory framework. For some time now ISMU has been advocating that the whole topic be revisited taking into account the needs of the various sectors as regards training and matching supply and demand.

Finally, there is the question of citizenship. In the current parliament attention is focused on granting citizenship to the children of immigrants. But the current legal framework needs to be overhauled as advocated by ISMU for some time now. The issue is not, as is sometimes believed, that of granting or not citizenship to immigrants and their children. The problem is how. Current law provides for delayed naturalisation together without any serious effort at civic integration and does not afford the adolescent children of immigrants a proper chance. It is hoped that in the next parliament the issue will be addressed in a holistic manner.

REFERENCES

Chapter 4
WORK
Laura Zanfrini

The so-called refugee crisis, currently at the centre of the political and media arena, has also overwhelmed the question of immigrant work and its impact on the Italian economy and society.

In a scenario strongly influenced by concern for the volume of arrivals and the reception costs, the president of INPS (the national pension’s institute) fervently solicited an opening up to the new entrances of migrants and asylum seekers. According to him, there are reasons of an “instrumental” nature, even more important than those based on issues of humanitarianism and solidarity, to encourage the adoption of policies favouring the arrival and integration of new migrants, considered essential to the sustainability of “our” welfare, and in particular for the social security system, put at risk by the aging process investing Italian society.

As I will illustrate in this chapter, this stance exemplifies the distance separating the plan of analysis based on demographic and macroeconomic scenarios –substantially agreeing in asserting the convenience of immigration, if not even its indispensability– from the plan of the daily experience of people and local societies, where immigration is often associated with an increase of the situations of economic vulnerability and social exclusion, the problem of unemployment, the tensions created by the competition – real or merely perceived – between immigrants and natives in access to work and welfare benefits.

Filling this gap is a complex mission, calling into question multiple levels of responsibility and interventions, far beyond those of policies directly targeted towards immigrants. In these pages, through the “filter” of the analysis of labour market participation, I will identify some critical issues that need to be taken into account if we want to avoid that immigration, from a potential rebalancing element, will over time put at risk the sustainability of the Italian social model.

1. THE IMMIGRANT LABOUR MARKET: THE MOST RECENT TRENDS

As documented in the “Seventh Report on Foreigners in the Labour Market in Italy” (Direzione Generale dell’Immigrazione e delle politiche di Integrazione, 2017a), immigrants are now present in all categories of actors of the Italian labour market, from trainees to workers in administration, passing through the recipients of benefits and the various types of self-employed and “parasubordinati” workers. In this chapter, we will only consider the main trends, referring to the above quoted report for a deeper analysis.
The analysis of the most recent trends firstly signals a positive figure, that is, the recovery – albeit slight – of the employment volume that, for the first time in a number of years, involved in 2016 both the Italian component as well as the immigrant one. More precisely, migrants accounted for almost a sixth of the growth in employment between 2015 and 2016. However, it is useful to point out that the growth of foreign employment should not be interpreted as the effect of better performance, but rather it is due to demographic trends that have seen the population of working age increase over time (compared to a decrease in Italians in the same age group). Not by chance, the positive employment surplus translated into a weak growth in the foreigners’ employment rate (Table 1), which, as I have already noted in the previous editions of this Report, has been influenced by the uninterrupted growth of both the foreign resident population and the foreign labour force. More precisely, while the activity rate was substantially stable between 2015 and 2016 (and even steadily decreasing in previous years), foreign labour forces have continued to increase, until reaching in 2016 a volume of 2,828 thousand. The significance of this trend can be appreciated if compared with other European immigration countries, as Italy is the only one to have registered an unstopped growth in labour market entries.

The fact remains that with more than 2,400 thousand people, foreigners have come to represent, in 2016, 10.5% of total employment.

On the same date, foreign unemployed people are 437 thousand, including 212 thousand males and 225 thousand females. The figure shows a decrease compared to 2015 – when there were 456 thousand unemployed foreigners – and 2014 (466 thousand), mainly due to the re-absorption of male unemployment. The shrinking number of unemployed foreigners has also been accompanied by a significant reduction in the number of foreigners who benefit from unemployment benefits and mobility allowances. A picture therefore seemingly favourable, but it should not deceive. Indeed, if we compare the number of unemployed foreigners with the one recorded in 2008 (conventionally referred to as the year of the beginning of the crisis), we can observe that it almost tripled (ranging from 157 thousand to 437 thousand), whereas that of men grew by 236%. The presence of a significant stock of unemployed foreign workers seems therefore to have become a structural aspect of the Italian labour market, which becomes particularly visible in the northern regions of the country, where the foreign labour force is concentrated: in the North West and North East regions, immigrants actually account for almost one-third of total unemployment.

1 For the Italians, however, there has been an increase in participation levels, especially for women and those over 50, also due to the reform of the pension system which has postponed the retirement age.

2 In order to appreciate the actual volume of migratory processes, it should also be considered that in recent years a significant number of foreign residents have acquired Italian citizenship, and an equally important number has moved to a foreign country or has returned to the home country. Between 2008 and 2015, 238 thousand foreigners (out of a total of 792 thousand people) have been deleted from the archives of Italian Municipalities to move abroad. The data includes both active and inactive individuals, but most of the departures are probably due to the repatriation of Eastern European citizens, driven by the reduction of job opportunities (Osservatorio Statistico dei Consulenti del Lavoro, 2017).
### Table 1. Activity, employment and unemployment rates, by sex and nationality (foreigners and Italians). Some years between 2005 and 2016 (%)

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>87.5</td>
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<td>81.7</td>
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<td>Women</td>
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<td>59.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Employment Rate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
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<td>81.9</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>75.4</td>
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<td>49.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>65.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>57.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>62.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>56.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>56.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>59.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>57.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>10.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Rilevazione continua sulle forze lavoro, various years*

As a matter of fact, in order to properly understand the phenomenon of unemployment affecting immigrants, it is indispensable to consider the persisting growth of the workforce registered in the last years. The reduction in the number of unemployed foreigners has been much less modest than the increase in the number of employed ones because, during the same time, the volume of foreign labour continued to expand. The most patent evidence in this regard is represented by the unemployment rate in 2016 which, although significantly lower than in 2015 (for the male component), is almost seven percentage points higher than the pre-crisis level (and almost eight for men).

Foreigner unemployment reflects, as discussed in previous editions of this Report, the heterogeneity of individual situations, so as to be in many aspects paradigmatic of the challenges that today’s policies aimed to support employability have to face. But, at the same time, and beyond the interventions that should certainly be implemented to support individual careers, it tells us of a “recovery” still insufficient to bring unemployment rates to pre-crisis levels, for both Italians and, particularly, foreigners. And it is in the light of this macro-economic framework that we must think about the tremendous challenge represented by the working inclusion of international protection beneficiaries who will enter the Italian labour market in the coming months.

Finally, let us focus our attention on the phenomenon of inactivity. Out of 2,149 thousand inactive foreigners estimated by ISTAT (the Italian National Statistics Institute), 1,181 thousand are in their active age (15-64 years). Of these, 72% are women. This figure, basically stable over the last twelve months (1,175 thousand inactive foreigners in active age surveyed in 2015), has, however, experienced a remarkable expansion over time: the 467 thousand registered in 2005 became 673 thousand in the first year of the crisis, 942 thousand in 2013 and up to a million in 2013.
Some might think that the growth of the inactive population has to do with the migration policies adopted by Italy, with the substantial zeroing of official entries of “economic migrants”, which inevitably resulted in the greater burden of arrivals for family and other reasons. Referring to the last year for which data is available, out of the 238,936 entries authorized in 2015, less than ¼ were for work reasons, while the preponderant part (40%) reported family reasons and 36% other reasons. However, if we focus on active age groups, it can be seen that the growth of the inactive population is primarily attributable to the European Union component, which is exempted from the limitations laid down by immigration laws.

Indeed, at least as far as people in their active age are concerned, migratory policies only partially explain the phenomenon of inactivity, since the rules preventing the access to the labour market for family members and applicants for international protection have been gradually removed. The growth of the inactivity rate is, therefore, mainly due to the behaviours of potential labour forces, and particularly of women and youth. I will focus attention on the latter in the final section. As for women, the picture that we deliver on statistics compels us to deal with the variety of migratory and family patterns, which has became increasingly evident with the process of migrants’ stabilization. In the common perception, the prevalent icon was for a long time the female immigrant worker, often the main breadwinner of her family; a very “familiar” figure to the Italians because she is mainly employed in the domestic and home-based care sector. This profile continues to be prevalent among EU-foreign women, who register activity and employment rates significantly higher than those of Italian women (who in any case certainly do not shine on the international scene for their level of participation in the labour market). But it is increasingly less pertinent to describe the reality of non-EU immigration.

The phenomenon of female inactivity affects, in particular, less educated immigrants (see Table 5), similar to what happens with Italian women. But, above all, it is very worrying in certain national immigrant communities, reaching 92.9% among Pakistanis, 82.8% among women from Bangladesh, 82.3% among Egyptians, 76.8% among Indians, 69.1% among Moroccans and 67.6% among Tunisians. Moreover, in some cases – particularly Egypt, Tunisia, and Bangladesh – this figure is also associated with a particularly high female unemployment rate. What is even more worrying, the phenomenon of inactivity affects younger women as well, to the point of characterizing the NEET issue, that is the phenomenon of youth not engaged in education, employment or training. As Table 2 shows, women are more numerous than men within the category or foreign NEET (differently from what happens in the Italian subgroup, where there is a slight male preponderance). Moreover, while male rates are basically aligned with those of Italians, the feminine ones are definitely higher for the immigrant component. Already in the 15-24 age group, the inactive component – that is the component “voluntarily” outside the labour market, not because unemployed – is for immigrants more than twice that recorded among their Italian peers, with a distance of more than 11 percentage points; a distance that almost duplicates if we extend the calculation up to 34 years. On the contrary, the incidence of unemployment is quite similar in the two groups, both for
males and for females, so it is necessary to discard the hypothesis that foreigners are more exposed to discrimination when they look for a job.

**Table 2. Percentage of NEET on resident population by sex and nationality (foreigners and Italians). Year 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational condition</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>15-24 years</th>
<th>15-34 years</th>
<th>15-29 years</th>
<th>15-34 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NEET</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU elaborations on ISTAT data, 2016*

Even more interesting is the distribution according to the role within the family (by limiting here, to consider the roles of son/daughter, spouse without children and parent), which confirms how family responsibilities affect the behaviour of women in a very different way for indigenous and immigrant girls. Nearly 700 thousand Italian NEET aged 15 to 29 are "daughters", that is more than three times more than those that are already "mothers", while the percentage of "spouses" is almost irrelevant (evidence of the fact that the trade-off between work and maternity is the most critical one). On the contrary, amongst their foreign peers, the number of "mothers" largely exceeds that of the "daughters", and the volume of "spouses" is definitively more significant. If we extend the observation to up to 34 years, the number of foreign-born NEETs married but without children is higher than the number of "daughters", the number of "mothers" being six times as much; among the Italians, on the contrary, the "daughters" continue to prevail.

**Table 3. Percentage of youth NEETs, by sex and role within the family (some modalities), by nationality (foreigners and Italians). Year 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sons/ Daughters</th>
<th>Spouses without children</th>
<th>Parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-34 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU elaborations on ISTAT data, 2016*
Lastly, looking at future trends, we can expect a further expansion of the area of inactivity due to the growth of the elderly population. At present, there are only 97 thousand inactive foreigners, female in just under two-thirds of cases. But the process of settlement will lead, inevitably, to the growth of the component approaching retirement age. Indeed, though the foreigners’ hard-working careers tend to be longer – by virtue of the penalties they face in a contributory system, being concentrated in low-paid jobs – the slow pace of approach to the Italian population age structure has now begun, and it will produce, over the next decades, a rise in the share of retired foreigners. Between 1995 and 2005, the incidence of foreign workers over the age of 45 has more than tripled as a consequence of the gradual aging of resident immigrant stocks (Inps, 2017). This means that the “rejuvenation” of the active population, more than relying on already residing immigrants, will mainly depend on new arrivals from abroad.

2. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT WORK

In the analysis of the impact of immigration on the labour market, a first aspect to consider is represented by the consequences that this phenomenon produces for indigenous workers. In this respect, one of the “irreversible” legacies of the last years is the considerable increase of the importance of foreign employment: from the eve of the crisis to today, the rise in the number of jobs occupied by foreigners (slightly lower than one million) has been almost equivalent to the decrease of that of Italians (Table 4). However, it is important to emphasize, based on the analyses provided by the Ministry of Labour (Direzione Generale dell’Immigrazione e delle politiche di Integrazione, 2017a), as this result is more due to demographic dynamics than to differential employment performance. In other words, we cannot understand this as the consequence of the displacement effect exerted by immigrant labour forces at the expenses of the autochthonous ones. However, the question of how the Italians’ participation and performance would be redesigned in a hypothetical zero-immigrant scenario remains open, and substantially irresolvable.

What we can record today is how the substitution effect has occurred in the trade sector and, above all, agriculture; however, the variations between 2015 and 2016 also signal an expansion of indigenous employment, so it will be necessary to wait for the consolidation of the occupational recovery to be able to formulate any more trustworthy consideration. Based on the available data, we can only state that agriculture is the only sector in which the process of ethnicization has continued uninterruptedly over the decade, bringing the incidence of foreigners in total employment from 5.3% at the beginning of the period to the current 16.6%.

Despite this extraordinary quantitative growth, little has changed in the “quality” of immigrant employment. Most migrants are employed as dependent workers (86.6% of the employed compared to 74.8% of Italians) and blue collars (76.6% compared to 30.7% of Italians). Only 8.6% of foreign employees are clerical workers, compared to 35.9% of Italians.
Managers and executives, once summed up, do not even get 1%. Among self-employed workers (which represent 11.9% of total foreign workers), the vast majority (over 80%) are individually self-employed, while only 2.5% (i.e. 0.3% of all employed migrants) are entrepreneurs. The incidence of entrepreneurs is, for foreigners, about ¼ of what is recorded among Italians, a figure that, so to speak, brings us back to reality with respect to the “celebration” we often witness of the phenomenon of so called ethnic entrepreneurship. Finally, considering the new contracts signed in 2016 (census through the Statistical Information System for Compulsory Communications, Sisco), among the first qualifications that affected foreign workers, there are the typical “migrant jobs” such as agricultural labourers, domestic workers and home-based caregivers, waiters and similar. This composition of migrant labour demand is consistent with Italy’s attractiveness towards less educated migration (Table 5): within the European Union, now involved in the international competition to attract “talented” migration, Italy is among the countries where highest is the share of foreigners who have not gone beyond primary education and lower the share of foreigners with a tertiary education level (Frattini et al., 2017). Moreover, the high employability of foreigners is not so in an absolute sense, but only when compared to the native one, which is lower than the European average. So, in order to identify the possible tensions generated by immigration, we have to focus our attention on the lowest ladders of the professional hierarchy.

In this respect, it is interesting to consider data regarding retributions. All foreigners, but non-EU workers more than EU-workers, suffer a salary penalty in comparison with Italians, which further accentuates the traditional gender-based discrimination (so that the gap is even more significant for females).
### Table 5. Foreign labour forces and employed workers by sex and level of education. Year 2016 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Labour forces</th>
<th></th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary licence or no title</td>
<td>11.06</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>8.73</td>
<td>10.94</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>8.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school licence</td>
<td>44.63</td>
<td>34.51</td>
<td>39.99</td>
<td>44.15</td>
<td>34.01</td>
<td>39.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>36.69</td>
<td>44.27</td>
<td>40.20</td>
<td>36.90</td>
<td>45.44</td>
<td>40.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree or post graduation</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>15.21</td>
<td>11.06</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>11.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rilevazione continua sulle forze lavoro, 2016

The foreigner/Italian gap becomes even stronger in the Southern regions and within non-commercial sectors. It also strengthens with the worker’s age and particularly involves those who have reached a clerical position. Lastly, as far as the non-EU component is concerned, the gap with the Italians has steadily increased in recent years, despite the generalized increase in the level of wages. In addition to its “ethical” implications and those related to the possible risks of wage dumping, the phenomenon of salary discrimination must be considered with concern, as it reduces the potential migrants’ contribution to the fiscal system and makes migrants and their families more vulnerable, as we will see in the next section.

An interesting insight into this can be made from the analysis proposed in the latest INPS (the national pension institute) Report (2017). Considering average monthly wages, it is clear that migrants suffer a salary penalty if compared with Italians; moreover, this penalty has significantly increased during the crisis. However, the gap is strongly reduced if we compare migrants and natives of the same age, same sex and employed in the same sector, same profession and with the same contract. This circumstance confirms two critical aspects of the Italian integration model, which I have repeatedly denounced in the previous editions of this Report.

The first aspect concerns the occupational segregation, which produces the concentration of migrants in roles and sectors where wages are more modest and, in particular, in low-skilled professions. Indeed, if the effects of immigration on the employment and wages of other workers (natives and already present immigrants) are subject to conflicting assessments, an aspect on which virtually all the available analyses converge is that it is the less skilled workers who normally risk a penalty.

The second aspect calls into question the contractual solutions which are beneficial to employers, but penalize workers, and that are sometimes improperly used, to the point of falling into “black work” (unreported employment), or even forms of neo-slavery.

These aspects make wage discrimination an opaque phenomenon, in some ways even more insidious and difficult to counteract than direct and intentional discrimination. Even more so if one considers that the adaptability of immigrants to the less prestigious and lower paid jobs continues to be one of the main arguments employed to lobby in favour of policies that encourage migration. And even more so in view of the possible scenarios
that are opening up because of the large influx of asylum seekers in recent months, which are strongly geared towards finding a job opportunity as soon as possible, whatever it is. In addition to the eventual competitive dynamics that could occur in the labour market, the influx of asylum seekers raises heavy concerns about the costs associated with the “refugee crises”. Not by chance, it has given new impetus to the debate on the benefits/disadvantages of immigration. In 2016, it was Confindustria (the main Italian Employers Association) that encouraged the launch of new active schemes to attract migrants, through a paper stating that immigrants were a precious opportunity for the Italian economy – in particular thanks to their contribution to the creation of GNP –. In 2017, the most emblematic declaration came from the president of the national pension’s institute. Significantly, a large section of the Institute’ yearly report (INPS, 2017) is devoted to documenting the migrants’ contribution to the pension system. With respect to the payment of social security contributions, whose total value in 2016 was 181.1 billion euros (241.2 billion euros in the hypothesis of long-term interest rate revaluation), foreign workers who possess a contributory position have accumulated a current value of pension benefits of 144.6 billion – 184.9 if we consider also those workers who do not yet have the required seniority to access old-age retirement benefits –. The difference between these two values, according to the Report, corresponds to the net contribution that the migrant community is offering to the Italian social security system: 36.5 billion, or 96.6 billion if valuation is calculated according to long-term interest rates. What make immigrants so profitable, despite their modest wages, is their status as “new entries” in a system that maintains ample “pockets” of acquired privileges. The sustainability of the system is therefore based on the contribution of the workers channelled in the contributory model. This is exactly the case of many migrants, since they are on average younger than Italian workers and entered the Italian labour market more recently.

These kind of arguments prompted the president of the Institute to welcome new migrants and, to a certain point, even new mass regularisations, considered a useful way to maximize the immigrants’ contribution to the fiscal, pension, and welfare systems. The analysis of the employment and wage dynamics of migrants regularized in 2002 and 2007 shows that most of them have maintained a regular status over time, also thanks to their attitude to move around the territory and intercept new employment opportunities. It is hard to argue for the reliability of these calculations, often controversially exploited in the political dispute. However, an analysis of the impact of immigration cannot be confined to them, especially when discussing such a sensitive issue as migration for reasons of international protection, for a number of reasons. Significantly, it is the same OECD Annual Report (2016a), traditionally voted to encourage less restrictive policies towards immigration, to signal a partial change of route. The authors observe how evidence based on demographic and macro-economic data are not necessarily useful to undermine public distrust, fears about cultural distance with newcomers and for the competition in access to work and social benefits; fears that particularly affect less qualified workers and disadvantaged social classes. In more explicit terms, the extensors of the Report, on the basis of a copious set of empirical evidence, point to some obvious, but too often overlooked, data on which pro-immigrant rhetoric is often based: the impact
of immigration is not the same for all. Beneficial to the national budget – on the basis of arguments similar to those outlined above – it often produces tensions in local communities called to address the challenges of reception and everyday coexistence; useful to the “rich”, immigration can, however, penalize the “poor” – if only in their perception – for which arguments based on demographic scenarios and labour needs sound abstract and far from their everyday experience, especially when immigration is associated with processes of urban degradation, growing tensions in the access of welfare services, and worsening trends in the labour market.

It is with this awareness in mind that the reactions, sometimes irrational, that often accompany the arrival of refugees in the local communities should be understood. And, particularly, it is with this awareness that we need to think about their working integration. The experience of many operators involved in their reception highlights the delicate trade-off between the need to support the early self-sufficiency of migrants and refugees – currently strongly advocated – with the risk of sucking them into undeclared or otherwise “bad” jobs; as well as between the need to accelerate the integration process with the sustainability of integration models in the medium-long term.

On the other hand, it could be risky, at a political and cultural level, to support the idea that refugee reception should be legitimized by virtue of the alleged economic benefit of immigration. First of all, because this advantage is not at all sure, all the more in the light of the data which, as we shall see, signal the consolidation of a structural disadvantage for migrants and their children. Moreover, the calculation of the benefits and disadvantages, or even only of the costs and benefits, should include items very difficult to quantify: the contribution to the fiscal and pension systems, certainly, as well as the expenses in the form of allowances and subsidies to foreign families; but also, for example, the cost share of all the services from which immigrants benefit (from childcare to juvenile courts, from family counselling to local transport, and obviously to school and healthcare). Furthermore, addressing such a delicate topic as the one of the right to international protection according to the register of economic convenience is definitely incautious, as well as morally unsustainable.

This is not the place to discuss whether and to what extent the distinction between economic (that is voluntary) and forced migration is still appropriate and applicable to the complex reality of contemporary human mobility. In the context of an analysis about the role and the impact of immigration, it is rather necessary to take by the horns the challenge of employment and social inclusion of refugees and asylum seekers. This implies, first of all, considering policies to support employability (in the field of training, assessment of skills and abilities, individual empowerment) not a mere cost, but an investment, much more precious in the current demographic situation, which requires increasing both the rates of participation in the labour market and labour productivity, for indigenous people and for immigrants as well, for younger and older workers, for women and for men, for first and for second generation migrants (Zanfrini, 2017b).

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Monitoring Systems (EMN, 2017) describe a reality made of hundreds of projects – mostly funded through European funds – that deal synergistically and creatively with the objectives of literacy, skills assessment, support for self-employment and micro-entrepreneurship, job placement through work grants and internships. Mainly developed around the SPRAR\(^4\) network, these projects fail to cover the needs of all asylum seekers, whose number has consistently exceeded the available places, despite their progressive increase. In addition, despite their impact – sometimes modest, other times more significant – and their innovative approach, these projects struggle to be systematized and institutionalized. And it is this episodic nature that incubates the risk of being perceived as a form of reverse discrimination. On the contrary, as I have repeatedly pointed out in previous editions of this Report, the challenge of including the most vulnerable among the vulnerable – as in many respects humanitarian migrants are, according to what international experience teaches – should be a propitious opportunity to make an overall “leap of quality” to our systems of policies supporting employability and the matching between labour offer and demand. And this is precisely because of their paradigmatic condition, in a society that, for reasons of economic sustainability, even before those of solidarity, can no longer leave too many people at the margins of the process of production and social participation. Just to give an example, the need to recognize educational titles and credentials in the absence of formal documentation – that often refugees cannot provide – paves the way for new opportunities for recognition also for all those who for various reasons do not have formal titles, prefiguring fruitful interweaving between different learning contexts and new opportunities for enhancement and strengthening available human capital (for a closer look see Sarli, 2017).

However, policies in support of individual employability are only one of the cornerstones of an overall strategy that can never lose sight of the goal of creating new jobs, and above all, good jobs. Forecasts tell us about an economy that could grow without generating new jobs, or even reducing labour demand, and further raising the bar of competition for accessing the most skilled positions. A scenario in which much of immigrant work seems to be destined to enter servile positions, only partially replaceable with technology and robotics. Positions in which they would enjoy a singular competitive advantage because of their adaptability and their reserve wage (probably lower than that of Italians). Focusing on the conditions of less-paid jobs and the level of wages will be increasingly necessary to counteract those degrading phenomena that are already visible in many niches of Italian labour market, which inevitably fuel the risk of inter-ethnic conflicts and reduce openness towards the newcomers.

\(^4\) Protection system for asylum seekers and refugees (SPRAR) is the service of the Ministry of the Interior that in Italy manages the projects of reception, assistance and integration of asylum seekers at the local level. The service was established by law July 30, 2002, n. 189.
3. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: WHAT IS THE OCCUPATIONAL FATE FOR THE MIGRANTS’ OFFSPRING?

The tormented debate for the approval of the reform of the Law on Citizenship, in the part dealing with the so-called second generations, has conferred to the latter an unprecedented visibility. These “global citizens” are endowed with “an extra march” in the scenario of an increasingly pluralistic and interconnected society (Zanfrini, 2018); however, from another perspective, they are the predestined victims of the condition of structural disadvantage which characterizes, in Italy and many other European countries, the existence of immigrants and their descendants. This is just an inevitable outcome of migration and inclusion patterns that favoured the influx of low-skilled workers, concentrated on low-paid jobs, often socially and politically “marginalized”.

The latest ISTAT Report on the Country Situation (2017b), thanks to a new way of classifying social groups, provided, for the first time, data on the conditions of immigrant families; of those, in particular, falling within the definition of “low-income families with foreigner members”. A category that does not cover all immigrant households, many of whom enjoy well-off conditions; but which certainly reflects the situation of most of them and that it is above all useful to explore the prospects of second generation immigrants born and raised in a low-income family or, in order to resume the results of the classification, with a net median family income of a third lower than that of families composed of only Italian members.

In addition to being over-represented among the families in a condition of relative poverty, immigrant families are strongly exposed to the risk of absolute poverty, affecting 12.7% of Italian families, 19.4% of mixed families and 30% of foreign families. They are also particularly numerous in the sub-group of families with only one job revenue (over half of those with foreigner members), those with no income (incidence is over twice as much as Italians) and among those who experience the worst quality of work. Finally, they have experienced a sharp decline in their income status as a result of the recession, so they are overrepresented among the beneficiaries of subsidies.

In addition to and beyond the problems faced by the children of the newly arrived immigrant households, and by those who were reunited with their parents when their school-education had already begun, these status features are equally in play in explaining the disadvantage affecting immigrant students (see Chapter 5 of this book), indicated by phenomena that relate both school performance and learning levels, as well as the

5 During 2017, the Italian Parliament discussed a reform of the law on citizenship aimed at making its acquisition easier for second generation migrants born in Italy or arrived before turning 18.

6 The classification classifies households resident in Italy primarily from the equivalent income available, leading to the identification of nine groups, apart from a homogeneous income level, from a specific combination of other variables considered (gender, age, study and professional situation of the reference person, number of members of the family, presence of foreigners, type of residence), thus determining the distinctive elements.
duration and type of study course undertaken (and, above all, the phenomena of early abandonment of training systems).

As for the elite of second-generation youths reaching tertiary education, they not only begin university at a more advanced age (more than half with at least one year of delay compared to “normal” age) and having obtained at the secondary school graduation exam a lower grade than the average, but already in the first year they accumulate a negative differential in the number of acquired credits, and a higher share of the media decides to abandon studies prior to graduating (Zanfrini, 2017a). And, besides school and academic careers, the socio-economic status of immigrant households affect the chances of youths getting a not atypical job, getting a job of good quality, accessing a qualified profession (only 7.4% of youths born from an immigrant family, compared to 63.1% of children of the ruling class).

As a result of all these factors, young people belonging to low income household with one or more foreign members are far more often than others likely to reach only a secondary education level (in about half the cases); if they have a degree, it is much more likely that they will find a job for which they are over-educated (in 59.6% of cases); are less educated than immigrant adults; if they are women, even graduates, they are much more likely than Italian females to be in a condition of inactivity. Finally, although only a minority of immigrant children are ambushed or fit to fill a “migrant job”, it is significant to note that only the young members – first or second generation – of families with foreigner members are likely to access the home-based services sector (in 7.4% of cases, against 0.9% of the total) and find themselves copious in the same professions as migrant adults (waiter, dishwasher, porter, domestic worker).

This data is the result of a classification process that needs to be refined and therefore they are not generalizable, but they are anyway sufficient to support the presumption that the children of immigrants are becoming paradigmatic about the intergenerational transmission processes of social disadvantages which, among other consequences, affect their performance on the labour market.

### Table 6. Incidence of Employed and Unemployed Persons Aged 15-34, Comparison of Foreigners and Italians. Year 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Man</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 Years</td>
<td>Employed incidence on whole population</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed incidence on labour force</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed incidence</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 Years</td>
<td>Employed incidence on whole population</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed incidence on labour force</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed incidence</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU elaborations on ISTAT data*

---

The values shown in this table are not provided by ISTAT but calculated by the ISMU statistical service on the basis of the absolute values relating to the different employment conditions.
In this regard, official labour market data allows us only to isolate the condition of young foreigners (Table 6), regardless of whether they are members of the first or second generation, thus reflecting different situations.

They tell us, in any case, that how to distinguish foreign youths from their Italian peers is above all the earlier transition to the labour market (due to an earlier leaving of the education system), which determines higher employment rates. At the same time, if we consider the incidence of employed people on the labor force and the incidence of the unemployed, young foreigners do not seem to suffer a systematic disadvantage. On the contrary, male foreigners aged 25-34 are actually far less subject to the risk of unemployment than their indigenous peers.

Nevertheless, the condition of young immigrants would seem to reflect the weakest character of the Italian model of migrants’ inclusion, where relatively easy employability is in some respects an antecedent of a condition of structural discrimination from the point of view of the working roles and wage levels. In that context, to penalize the second generation could be its “inadequacy” to cover the typical “immigrants’ jobs”.

Lastly, special attention should be paid to young people who are not engaged in either employment, education or training (NEET). In almost all European countries, youths with a migratory background are largely over-represented among NEETs.

Indeed, Italy does not only record one of the highest incidences of NEET (the 3,276,720 young people who do not study or work recorded in 2016 represent just under a quarter of 15-34 year olds), but is also one of the countries with the greatest gaps between autochthonous and foreigners. As I have already commented on, the higher incidence of NEET among foreign 15-34 year olds (35%) is due to the female component, where it reaches 47.3%, 20 percentage points above the indigenous one. It is especially for young foreign women that the condition of NEET risks becoming the premise of a permanent exclusion from the labour market, often in accordance with a patriarchal pattern of gender roles. However, it is significant to note that even among young male aliens a minority but not insignificant share are already married or are fathers (see again Table 3 above), a circumstance that accentuates the level of vulnerability.

The fact remains that although for sometimes different reasons and with sometimes more serious consequences, young immigrants share with Italian peers a condition of massive exclusion from income generation processes, thus denouncing Italy’s inability to exploit the potential of cohorts that go beyond the thresholds of adulthood, though so precious if we consider the need of a demographic turnover that unfolds on the horizon of Italian society. Finally, it is on the capacity to create new occupational opportunities and, first of all, to create “good” jobs that both the social cohesion and the quality of inter-ethnic coexistence will depend.


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The presence of students with non-Italian citizenship in the Italian school system has been a matter of interest for some time now: over the last twenty years, the phenomenon has become a structural feature and a specific target of educational policies. The recent bulletin published by the Statistical Office of MIUR (Ministry of Education, Universities and Research) (2017) shows a picture of foreign students in S.Y. 2015/16 highlighting a stable presence of about 815,000 students corresponding to 9.2% of the total school population.

This group of students, which has not grown in recent years, is however a component in transformation, given the constant increase of students with non-Italian citizenship born in Italy from migrant parents, which today represent the majority of non-Italian students at school; but also in the light of new arrivals and emergencies – as highlighted by the growth, uninterrupted since 2012, of students entering for the first time in the Italian school system (+11,000 presences in three years).

In this changing scenario are set the educational trajectories of students with an immigrant background, characterized by the “usual” difficulties and disparities with respect to natives: substantial delay rates, low basic competences (i.e. reading, mathematics, sciences), concentration in technical and professional institutes for upper secondary schools, greatest risks of early school leaving and of becoming NEET (Colombo, Santagati, 2016). At the same time, there are good results and successes that occur in the learning process, and that bring an increasing number of students – especially those born in Italy or fully educated in the host country – to invest in long-term education paths. This chapter seeks to illustrate in a synthetic way the main characteristics of this group of students, with a look at the educational trajectories and at the outcomes of students with an immigrant background in Italy.

1. THE “ZERO GROWTH” OF STUDENTS WITH NON-ITALIAN CITIZENSHIP

In the context of a gradual decrease in the school population that characterizes Italy, even non-Italian students are not increasing as happened in the past; moreover the exponential increase in students of the last two decades seems to have stopped.
### Table 1. Foreign students in the Italian educational system. S.Y. 2005/06-2015/16. A.V. and %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Per 100 students</th>
<th>Increase in A.V.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>431,211</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>501,420</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>+70,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>574,133</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>+72,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>629,360</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>+55,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>673,592</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>+44,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>711,046</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>+37,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>755,939</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>+44,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>786,630</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>+30,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>803,053</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>+16,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>814,208</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>+11,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>814,851</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>+643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data*

This is highlighted by the data related to the S.Y. 2015/16, which recorded an increase of just 600 units compared to the previous year (Table 1). However, in the last decade students with non-Italian citizenship have more than doubled, in absolute values and in percentage incidence, going from 431,000 in S.Y. 2004/05 (about 5% of the total school population) to almost 815,000 in 2015/16 (9.2% of the total).

The annual increase, in absolute terms, was however significantly reduced: over the period considered (2005-2015), the greatest growth took place in 2007/08 compared to the previous year (+ 72,000 foreign students), while the smaller increase was recorded in the last school year that was taken into account for our contribution.

This does not mean that the school-age foreign population is decreasing, since it is also necessary to consider the children who are currently outside the school-training system; for example, those who do not attend nursery schools, who avoid compulsory education or leave school before obtaining a qualification or a diploma (Anpal, 2017), as well as unaccompanied minors who encounter various obstacles in the access to education (Ministry of Labor and Social Policies, 2016).

Moreover, the reduced growth can be traced back to the strong increase in the acquisition of Italian citizenship among many of those belonging to immigrant communities of earlier settlement, who acquired the residence or naturalization requirements (Albanians and Moroccans lead): 40% of the new citizenships obtained in 2015 concerned young people up to the age of 19, born in Italy or reunited to the family, having become Italians through automatic transmission from parents or by choice at the age of 18 on the basis of the procedures envisaged by legislation (Fondazione ISMU, 2017).

About the distribution in different school levels, primary school has always welcomed the highest number of non-Italian citizens (obviously being compulsory and five-year...
schooling: see Table 2), followed by upper school second degree, by kindergartens and finally lower secondary schools.

**Table 2. Students with non-Italian citizenship by school level. S.Y. 2005/06-2015/16. A.V. and %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.Y.</th>
<th>A.V.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-primary</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>81,577</td>
<td>164,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>166,428</td>
<td>297,285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data*

In the last ten years, primary school has been able to receive from about 39% of the total foreign school population in 2005/6 to 35.8% in 2015/16, while a trend of the opposite sign has been registered in upper secondary schools during the same period; from 19% to 23%, a segment – the last one – characterized by greater growth and a long-term dynamism.

With respect to the origin of the students, in the S.Y. 2015/16 Romanians are always the most numerous (157,806), followed by Albanians (111,029) and Moroccans (102,179), which are countries of historical emigration to Italy. Among the most frequent nationalities present in Italy, Asians are confirmed (China, Philippines, India, Pakistan: Miur, 2017). The differentiation of citizenship, over 200 citizenships are present in the Italian school system, is associated with cultural, linguistic and religious differences which are present in the school-training system: as shown by ISTAT research (2015) on "religious belonging and practice among foreign citizens", 60.4% of immigrants in Italy between 6 and 17 years (and therefore probably attending Italian schools) do not belong to the Catholic religion; the majority is Muslim (30%), followed by Catholic (23.2%), Orthodox (19.6%) and, at a distance, we can see the presence of Buddhists (3.6%) and Protestants (2.4%).

Moreover, foreign students born in Italy, constitute the majority of students with non-Italian citizenship (as early as 2013/14) and represent a group that continues to grow. In S.Y. 2015/16 they represent nearly 60% of students with non-Italian citizenship (around 480,000) (Table 3).

**Table 3. Students with non-Italian citizenship born in Italy by school level. S.Y. 2007/08-2015/16. A.V. and %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-primary</td>
<td>79,113</td>
<td>141,864</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>89,421</td>
<td>213,003</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary</td>
<td>22,474</td>
<td>80,845</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Secondary</td>
<td>8,111</td>
<td>42,810</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>199,119</td>
<td>478,522</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data*
Between 2007/8 (the first year in which this figure was collected by MIUR) and 2015/16, there has been an exponential growth of births in Italy in all schools of all levels: from kindergartens to lower secondary school, this component is the most relevant within the group of students with non-Italian citizenship. Only in upper secondary school native born students without Italian citizenship are still a minority (around 20%).

However, we must not forget the students who entered for the first time in the Italian school system: they decreased by over 12,000 units in the period 2007/08-2015/16; actually, they started to grow again starting from 2012/13, the year in which 23,000 presences were recorded. Currently, it is a small group but to be considered carefully, of about 34,000 students, who make up 5% of students with non-Italian citizenship attending primary school, lower and upper secondary schools.

Table 4. Students with non-Italian citizenship entered in the Italian school system for the first time S.Y. 2007/08 e 2015/16. A.V. and %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A.V. (2007/08)</th>
<th>A.V. (2015/16)</th>
<th>Foreign students entering the Italian school system for the first time every 100 foreign ones (2007/08)</th>
<th>Foreign students entering the Italian school system for the first time every 100 foreign ones (2015/16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>23,650</td>
<td>16,075</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>12,064</td>
<td>8,290</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary</td>
<td>10,440</td>
<td>9,683</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46,154</td>
<td>34,048</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data

The dynamism of this group is connected, above all, to newly arrived minors in Italy, especially the unaccompanied foreign minors who have grown rapidly in numbers since 2014 onwards. According to the monitoring of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies, there were around 11,600 presences of unaccompanied foreign minors at 30 April 2016, many of which are untraceable, mostly males, concentrated in the 15-17 age group, half coming from Egypt, Albania, Gambia and Eritrea. We do not have specific data on integration of these minors into the educational system. A systematic mechanism of data collection and monitoring which could be able to carry out a mapping related to the scholastic integration of unaccompanied minors and refugees is still missing. This mechanism should be also able to produce a systematic mapping of educational institutions in geographical areas that present structural needs related to the number of registered minors.

It is widely known that those who are placed in reception facilities (88% of the total at 30.4.16), can access both vocational education and training systems: in 2016, over 600 SPRAR projects (SPRAR stands for The Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees enrolled 1,310 minors in the school system and 595 minors in vocational training courses (Giovannetti, 2016). The little research carried out so far shows that unaccompanied minors mostly access courses to learn Italian or courses to obtain the lower secondary
degree (Grigt, 2017, Augelli, Lombi, 2016). However, the educational projects addressed to them often clash with projects for a quick socio-professional integration (CNR-IRPPS, 2017) and with the multiple and contradictory needs they express (assistance, protection, increase of knowledge and skills, autonomy, realization of one’s life project), which necessarily require integrated interventions (Triani, 2016).

2. TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION AND CONCENTRATION OF FOREIGN STUDENTS IN ITALIAN SCHOOLS

Considering the territorial distribution, the data confirms an uneven presence of students with non-Italian citizenship on the Italian territory. This presence is a characteristic of some geographical areas (especially in the North and the Center), in particular in large cities such as Rome, Milan and Turin, but also in small-medium towns, such as Brescia, Prato, Piacenza. Moreover, the presence of foreign students is concentrated in some schools, as in the case of the 602 schools with a percentage of foreigners above 50%.

Lombardy is still the first region with the highest number of foreign students, almost 204,000 presences, followed by Emilia Romagna and Veneto (over 90,000), Lazio and Piedmont (over 70,000). At a provincial level, in the S.Y. 2015/16 the ranking by number of students confirms the same ranking of previous years and still sees the province of Milan in first place (80,000 foreign students), followed by the province of Rome (over 60,000), Turin (almost 38,000) and Brescia (over 32,000). Among the first 10 provinces there is a prevalence of territories of the Northern part of Italy, 5 regional capitals (Milan, Rome, Turin, Florence, Bologna), as well as many provincial entities (Brescia, Bergamo, Verona, Treviso, Vicenza). If we consider the percentage incidence of foreign students, once again Prato (23.2 non-Italian students every 100 pupils) and Piacenza (21.3) open the ranking.

A specific focus on the main metropolitan cities (Table 5), based on the 2016 reports of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies, confirms the highest percentage of foreign students in Bologna and Milan, together with Turin, for a percentage of students with non-Italian citizens born in Italy above the national average and over 60%. In absolute values, the unaccompanied minors are particularly numerous in the metropolitan area of Rome (over 600) and Milan (almost 600), corresponding to 4.5% and 4.2% of the total.

Finally, as regards to schools with a high percentage of foreign students, at the Italian level, in the school year 2015/16, 5.3% are schools with 30% and more foreign students (up 0.2 percentage points from the previous year), while 74.4% of Italian schools are characterized by a percentage less than 30% presences. There is still a 20.1% of institutions in which foreign students are not present. It should also be noted that, in the main metropolitan areas, Bologna shows the highest percentage (around 14%) of schools with 30% and over of foreign students. On lower levels, but in any case higher than the national average, we also find Turin and Milan: only Rome is slightly lower than the Italian average (5.1 versus 5.3).
CHAPTER 5 – EDUCATION

TABLE 5. CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN MINORS AND OF SCHOOLS IN MAIN METROPOLITAN AREAS. S.Y. 2015/16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign students A.V.</th>
<th>Foreign students every 100 students</th>
<th>Native born students without Italian citizenship every 100 foreign ones</th>
<th>Unaccompanied minors V.A.</th>
<th>Unaccompanied Minors %</th>
<th>% schools with 30% and more of foreign students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>81,977</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>61,172</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turin</td>
<td>37,980</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>20,494</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>12,873</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU elaboration on MIUR and Ministry of Labour and Social Policies data (Reports on the presence of migrants in metropolitan city and areas, 2016)

3. TRAJECTORIES AND OUTCOMES OF STUDENTS WITH AN IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND

If we examine the educational paths and choices of foreign students in Italian local contexts, on the one hand we notice the persistent difficulties and disparities due to study delay and scholastic outcomes of foreigners with respect to natives. On the other hand, while the group of foreign students born in Italy grows, there is an improvement in the scholastic paths, with a decrease in delays and scholastic failure even if these phenomena remain relevant for those born abroad (Miur, 2017).

The academic delay (which includes also those who have been placed in classes below their age and those who fail/ do not succeed) in the last decade has been significantly reduced (Table 6); especially in the first compulsory cycle of education: it still remains at very high levels, however, with over 60% of foreign students in delay in upper secondary schools and over 35% in lower secondary schools.

TABLE 6. STUDENTS WITH NON-ITALIAN CITIZENSHIP IN DELAY (EACH 100 STUDENTS) FOR SCHOOL LEVELS. S.Y. 2005/2006-2015/16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005/06</th>
<th>2015/16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italians (a)</td>
<td>Foreigners (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data
If we compare it with the group of Italian students, then, the percentage of students in delay is triple among foreigners compared to Italians in upper secondary school and five times higher than average in lower secondary schools.

The official statistics continue to monitor, in addition, the distribution in the various upper secondary school types, given the historical “channeling” of foreigners to technical-professional institutions. The long-term trend (Table 7) shows that foreign students have remained in the last decade a stable component in technical institutes (37.1% in S.Y. 2015/16), gradually reducing their presence in professional institutes (-4.7 pt percentages in 10 school years), while the presence in upper secondary schools has progressively increased (+5.5 pt). On the other hand, among Italians there was a clear tendency to choose a lyceum (49.7% of Italians are enrolled in this type of school in 2015/16), while we see a downward tendency in the share of the students attending professional institutes (to date 19%).

**TABLE 7. STUDENTS WITH NON-ITALIAN CITIZENSHIP IN VARIOUS TYPES OF UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOLS. S.Y. 2005/06-2015/2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>2015/16</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>2015/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyceum*</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical institutes</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional institutes</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* in lyceums there are classical, scientific, linguistics and pedagogic studies.

Source: ISMU elaboration on MIUR data

As for metropolitan areas, we can see a significant component of foreign students enrolled in upper secondary schools – lyceum in the Roman context (40% of the total), a considerable number registered in technical schools in Milan (42%), but also an over-representation of foreigners in the professional institutes of Bologna and Genoa (over 40-45%).

**TABLE 8. STUDENTS WITH NON-ITALIAN CITIZENSHIP IN UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOL IN THE MAIN ITALIAN PROVINCES. S.Y. 2015/16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Students with non-Italian citizenship in lyceum</th>
<th>% Students with non-Italian citizenship in technical institutes</th>
<th>% Students with non-Italian citizenship in professional institutes</th>
<th>Tot.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turin</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISMU analysis on MIUR data
For what concerns scholastic outcomes, the data of the latest INVALSI standardized tests on learning in Italian and in Mathematics (2015/16: Tab. 9) confirm the score gap between natives and students with an immigrant origin. First generation foreign students show greater difficulty than second-generation students and than natives. On the one hand, the gap between foreign students born abroad who systematically obtain lower results in Italian than Italian students is confirmed, on the other hand there is a significant improvement in students with non-Italian citizenship born in Italy with less linguistic and mathematical difficulties. The difficulties for foreign students are relevant above all in Italian, but also in Mathematics, even if the lower scores concern first generations foreign students attending the second year of upper secondary school, the year in which even the second generation students show the worst performance.

**TABLE 9. GRADE POINT AVERAGE IN ITALIAN AND MATHS IN THE III YEAR OF LOWER SECONDARY SCHOOL AND IN THE II YEAR OF UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOL. INVALSI TEST BY CITIZENSHIP. S.Y. 2015/2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>I generation</th>
<th>II generation</th>
<th>Italians</th>
<th>I generation</th>
<th>II generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III year Lower sec.</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II year Upper sec.</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU analysis on INVALSI data*

The international PISA OECD survey, which reached its sixth edition in 2015 (OECD, 2016), also confirms the results of national research, adding further elements of analysis: in Italy, the presence of foreign students in classes does not seem to cause any worsening in general results. Moreover, the downward gap in the scores of students with a migrant background is almost entirely explained by socio-economic differences: those with the same socio-economic status are only 11 points lower than Italian students. Further, Italy is among the countries where the high presence of immigrants (in the North part of the country) is associated with better test results. These results show a light and shade picture, with inequalities that are confirmed over time and not only limited to students with immigrant backgrounds, but rather related to the socio-economic status of families and the resources/opportunities offered by the territories in favor of educational integration of the most disadvantaged.

Two other indicators can be used to support the analysis of the broader problem of social and educational inequalities in the Italian system; a particularly serious gap can be seen between autochthonous and non-native population: the analysis of percentages of early school leavers (ESL) and NEET (young people neither in employment nor in education or training) among foreigners is fundamental if we want to understand at what point we are in terms of equal opportunities in the social and educational field for young people with an immigrant background.

As regard to the ESL – i.e. the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 who do not hold a upper secondary or higher education qualification and who are not enrolled in educational/training courses – there is a lowering trend from 2010 to 2016 among the natives (-4.5 pt) and even more among foreigners (-11.3 pt).
Despite the improvement of the situation in a diachronic perspective, it can be noted that the percentage of ESL among foreign students is still much higher than among natives (about three times): in 2016 in Italy among the autochthonous there are 11.9% of ESL, this data rises to 32.8% among foreigners (see Bonini, Santagati, 2016).

With regard to the phenomenon of young NEETs – if we consider the 15-19 age group among which it is more probable to find subjects who have abandoned their studies early, poorly qualified and therefore particularly at risk of social and professional exclusion (Alfieri, Sironi, 2017) – there is a decreasing trend among both Italians and non-Italian people. We can find a different situation among NEETs aged between 15-29 years old where we can note a slightly growing trend from 32.8% in 2010 to 34% in 2016 among foreigners and from 20.8% in 2010 to 23.2% in 2016. The relevant figure, however, does not concern the trend over time, but the strong consistency of young foreigners in this category at risk, compared to a smaller percentage among the natives. Despite the European trend of substantial stability, in Italy we report the presence of 10% of NEET among foreign 15-17 year olds and 15% among foreign 15-19 year olds. This data indicates a lack of inclusion of a large share of young foreigners in the training and professional system and, consequently, the ineffectiveness of policies of social and labor integration, incapable of enhancing the human capital of the new generations, as well as unable to recognize formal and informal qualifications and competences acquired in other States (Lodigiani, Santagati, 2017).

**Table 10. Early school leavers and NEETs in Italy by citizenships, %, 2010-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Early school leavers</th>
<th></th>
<th>NEETs 15-17 years old</th>
<th></th>
<th>NEETs 15-19 years old</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ISMU analysis on EUROSTAT data*

**References**


Chapter 6

IMMIGRATION AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

Livia Ortensi, Nicola Pasini, Marta Regalia and Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem*

A. MIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION

1. MIGRATION HISTORIES: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES

Europe’s migration history is fundamental to understanding public discourse on migration, but speaking of a common European migration experience is somewhat of a stretch, for that, each and every European Union (EU) member state has its own migratory past. Gropas and Triandafyllidou (2014) propose a useful typology of EU countries to understand the phenomenon and its political implications. They cluster member states into four categories: old host countries, recent host countries, countries in transition and small island countries. The first category refers to northern and western member states, which display the evident structural effects of a long migration history: the proportion of natives without foreign origin is between 60 and 70%, whilst a significant share of the population with a migration background is made up of so-called second generation migrants (Table 1).

The second group is that of southern European countries along with Ireland and Finland. Their migration history as destination countries started in the post-1989 period and is characterised by a rapid growth of foreign population, which also happens to be more varied, with respect to countries of origin, than the previous immigration experiences. The speed and dynamism of the phenomenon, together with the lack of political foresight when it came to manage influxes, generated high numbers of irregular migrants and gave rise to regularisation waves in the period prior to the economic crisis (Triandafyllidou e Ambrosini, 2011; note that Ireland and Finland were, however, less concerned by such a phenomenon).

In these countries, the proportion of natives without a foreign background is about around 85% and foreign residents are chiefly first-generation migrants. The main issues for public opinion are generally first-generation migrants’ settlement difficulties and second generations, still young, in the education and health system.

* This chapter is divided into two parts. Part a. was written by Livia Ortensi and Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem; part b. by Nicola Pasini and Marta Regalia.
Chapter 6 – Immigration and the Future of Europe

Table 1. Categorisation of EU countries according to their immigration history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Migration history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, the UK</td>
<td>Old host countries</td>
<td>• Long migration history and large population with a migration background&lt;br&gt;• Migration originally for economic purposes, followed by migration for family purposes&lt;br&gt;• Currently: preferential rules for highly skilled migrants&lt;br&gt;• Advanced integration and citizenship policies&lt;br&gt;• Politicised public discourse, centred on the choice between multiculturalism and assimilationism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Finland</td>
<td>Recent host countries</td>
<td>• Countries located around old host countries&lt;br&gt;• Transition from emigration to immigration countries in the post-1989 period&lt;br&gt;• Large populations of foreigners, which grow all of a sudden&lt;br&gt;• Absence of a consistent migration policy (ad hoc regularisations, etc.)&lt;br&gt;• Limited or stammering integration policy&lt;br&gt;• Public debate focused on border control, security and national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia</td>
<td>Countries in transition</td>
<td>• Central and Eastern Countries, formerly part of the Soviet Union&lt;br&gt;• They receive and send migrants at the same time&lt;br&gt;• Good economic growth and successful transition to market economy and democracy&lt;br&gt;• Smaller foreign populations regularly resident but potential increase of irregular stayers from Eastern Europe&lt;br&gt;• Inconsistent migration policy&lt;br&gt;• Public debate focused on border control, security and national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta, Cyprus</td>
<td>Small island countries</td>
<td>• Small islands undergoing growing influxes of migrants and refugees&lt;br&gt;• Ad hoc migration policies and limited integration policies&lt;br&gt;• Still have outflows&lt;br&gt;• Public debate centred on fears of being invaded by foreigners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014)

Table 2. Population composition by migration background. EU28, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>First generation immigrants</th>
<th>Second generations</th>
<th>Natives with native origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Born in the EU</td>
<td>Born outside the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU28</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moreover, these countries, because of their geographic position, were exposed to renewed influxes further to the Arab Spring and war in Syria, a pattern similar to that of the little island countries (Malta and Cyprus) which were at the forefront of the reception of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. With regard to countries in transition, they underwent great changes in terms of migration trends from the 1990s onwards: emigration countries, EU membership, economic growth and arrival of non-EU citizens. Yet, still more than 95% of the population is made up of natives without a migration background, which, in passing, confirms how much the invasion rhetoric has nothing to do with the actual breadth of influxes. True, this also suggests that such countries may be ill-prepared, logistically and culturally, to manage consistent and unplanned influxes. This may, in turn, spur fears in public opinion. Hungary is a case in point.

2. IMMIGRATION, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

With the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, EU member states set out to build an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) as a corollary to the achievement of the single market and free movement of workers. The construction of a free movement area necessarily pushed the EU’s borders to its outer ends, which, in turn, implied a common migration policy. Immigration and its management at the EU level are sensitive matters though. Firstly, immigration may resound in public opinion as a phenomenon that endangers national culture, stability and public order. This is, at least partly, due to the
social and political construction of immigration as a threat through discourse and policies centred on security (Huysmans, 2000). Secondly, speaking of immigration at the EU level means questioning a constitutive element of the modern state: sovereignty. In the Weberian tradition, the state is defined by the presence of a specialised body governing a people on a given territory. The creation of an EU immigration policy naturally alters one of the state’s dimensions: its territory and the control of its borders.

Over the past few years, the relationships immigration-public opinion and immigration-Europe have become particularly salient, notably with the increased influxes from the Middle-East and the incapacity of the EU (member states) to respond in a concerted and orderly manner to such inflows. Numerous were the countries to reintroduce systematic border controls at their frontiers, if not erect institutional and/or physical barriers to the entry of protection seekers. With the development of an EU competence over the years and especially with the elections across Europe in 2017, the aforementioned two relationships merged into one, underscoring the nexus between opinion, immigration and the EU.

2.1 Immigration in European Public Opinion

The 2017 elections in various EU member states underlined the importance of immigration and questions of national identity in public debate. It is not a new phenomenon in essence but its breadth is certainly unprecedented. Graph 1 traces the importance of immigration in public opinion over the past ten years. The data is presented for the four groups of countries outlined above.

**Graph 1. Importance of Immigration in Public Opinion across Europe; 2006-2016 (%)**

Note: Spr = spring; Fall = fall
Source: own elaboration on Eurobarometer data
When asked what are the most important issues facing their countries, EU citizens appear to consider the issue important in the beginning of the period; e.g. from spring 2006 to fall 2007. The public’s attention then decreases before soaring up from spring 2013 to peak in fall 2015. Such a decrease could be related to the economic crisis that hit the Union in 2007, as graph 2 suggests.

**GRAPH 2. SIX MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING ONE’S COUNTRY IN PUBLIC OPINION ACROSS THE EU; 2010 TO 2016 (%)**

Note: Spr = spring; Fall = fall.
*Source: Eurobarometer 86 (2016)*

In a different manner, when asked what are the most important issues facing the EU (Graph 3), immigration is, by far, the most important issue from 2015 onwards (58% of the respondents in fall 2015), more salient than the economic crisis or terrorism (respectively 21 and 25% on the same date).

Read together, graphs 2 and 3 suggest that, for EU citizens, immigration is a European concern. A large majority of EU citizens support the existence of a common policy on migration\(^1\) (Graph 4). In fall 2014, 71% of the respondents were in favour of a common policy; 67% of them in spring 2016. Alternatively, 20% of the respondents were opposed to a common policy rising to 26% two years after.

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\(^1\) The graphs presented are aggregates and therefore hide country-to-country variation. See Eurobarometer 82, 2014: 175; Eurobarometer 85, 2016: 48, for more detail.
CHAPTER 6 – IMMIGRATION AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

Graph 3. Six most important issues facing the EU in public opinion across the EU; 2010 to 2016 (%)

Note: Spr = spring; Fall = fall.
Source: Eurobarometer 86 (2016)

Graph 4. EU citizen support for a common European migration policy

Source: Eurobarometer 82 (2014) and 85 (2016)

Talking about public support for an EU common migration policy remains a vague statement as this does not specify what EU policy is being supported. Member states, too, may agree on the idea of a common policy, but they may disagree on its substantive
aspects. Considering that EU policies in this policy realm are henceforth adopted by qualified majority, there exists the possibility that some member states have imposed on them decisions they have not voted for, an issue highly relevant when it comes to the most sovereign competence of all. An interesting example is that of the refugee relocation quotas from Greece and Italy as provided for by Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015. Four member states voted against, namely Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. A year after, Hungary, refusing to implement such a Decision, held a referendum to consult its citizens on the matter.

2.2 Europeanization of Migration Policies

The idea of a common policy on immigration makes a lot of sense in a space made up of interdependent political entities. The construction of an area within which one can move without controls at internal borders necessarily entails greater coordination for the management of external borders (which have thereby become common borders). Yet, the transfer of competences to the EU has required time, long negotiations, heated debates and hard compromises. From 1957 to the mid-1990s, issues relating to migration were dealt with in the inter-governmental fashion; e.g. with a very limited role for EU institutions and wide discretion for member states (Geddes, 2003). With the Treaty of Amsterdam and the AFSJ as an objective, the EU obtained a say in migration-related policies that would, however, remain limited inasmuch as decisions would still be adopted by unanimity. On this basis, a first generation of Directives was adopted, some of them were discussed for 3 to 4 years and ended up emptied of their most significant provisions (de Bruycker, 2005; Hailbronner, 2010; Luedtke, 2011), allegedly a side effect of unanimity voting. The passage to qualified majority voting for migration-related policies in 2004, 2 together with the extended role of the European Court of Justice on the same matters with the entry in force of the treaty of Lisbon, created the institutional conditions for a common policy. However, the breadth and complexity of the new flows along with their distribution concentrated on some member states, a phenomenon reinforced by the Dublin regime, have contributed to make member states’ preferences diverge. For instance, to the difficulties encountered by some member states in handling their borders, the other member states responded by restoring controls at theirs, thereby suspending the Schengen Agreements. Let us recall here that the EU is not a state and its competence on the matter remains fairly limited. Bearing witness to it is the implementation of the temporary mechanism for the relocation of asylum seekers, which provided for the relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers3 by 17 September 2017. As of 4 September 2017, the European Commission counted 27,695 effective relocations out of the 98,255

2 See Council Decision 2004/927/EC.
3 Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601.
foreseen;\textsuperscript{4} so an actual relocation rate of about 28.2\% (COM(2017)465final). The fact that EU policies on migration encounter resistance at the national level is not so surprising if we look at the chain of responsibility. The national state is accountable to its citizens and to the EU (and, to be precise, to its national counterparts: failure to implement may entail negative externalities for other member states). In this manner, the year 2017, with its numerous elections and the saliency of immigration in public opinion, has put the EU to the test.

\textbf{B. The issue of immigration in 2017 elections}

In 2017, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom and Germany went to the polls to elect their representatives in parliament. In this part of the chapter we present an analysis of the electoral manifestos of the main political parties (or candidates in the case of France) standing in the elections, chiefly focusing on two issues: attitudes towards immigration and the European Union (EU). Finally, we show the results of the elections, hypothesizing their possible consequences on the future of the EU and on migration policies.

\textbf{3. The electoral campaigns of 2017}

In addition to the many issues in domestic politics, two important issues have characterized the electoral campaigns in all the countries considered: immigration and the EU. The importance of these issues have not exactly replaced the traditional right-left cleavage but it is undeniable that they place themselves side by side, sometimes making the cleavage deeper and more divisive, sometimes attenuating it.

In this section we analyse the positions on immigration and the European Union in the countries listed above. In the Netherlands, about 30 political parties took part in the elections last March. Among them, seven parties obtained more than 5\% of the votes: the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the Party for Freedom (PVV), the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), the Democrats 66 (D66), the GroenLinks (GL), the Socialist Party (SP) and the Labour Party (PvdA).

The first round of the 2017 French presidential elections was held on April the 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2017. Since none of the candidates won an absolute majority, a run-off election between the two most voted candidates (Macron and Le Pen) was held on May 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2017. We will analyse the attitudes toward immigration and the EU of the five main candidates that, together, collected more than 90\% of the votes: Emmanuel Macron (Forward!,

\textsuperscript{4} And not 160,000 as initially envisaged. This because about 54,000 asylum seekers will be relocated from outside the EU to the EU instead of a relocation within the EU, in accordance with the EU-Turkey Declaration of 18 March 2016.
independent), Marine le Pen (National Front), François Fillon (Republican party), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Unsubmissive France, independent), and Benoît Hamon (Socialist party).

The United Kingdom went to the polls in 2017, too. The snap general elections were called by Prime Minister Theresa May due to a lack of consensus within the current parliament following the trigger of Article 50 and in order to secure a legitimate parliament and government throughout the negotiation process with the EU. The elections in the UK were held on June 8th, 2017. The six parties collecting more than 1% of the votes were the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the UK Independence Party (UKIP), and the Greens.

Finally, general elections were held in Germany on September 24th, 2017, to elect all the members of the Bundestag, the lower house. The House of Representatives is composed of 598 seats (but the number is not fixed). Although 38 parties have managed to get to the ballot in at least one state, only six parties either exceeded the threshold of 5% or won a single-member constituency: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), The Left (Linke), Alliance 90/The Greens (Grünen), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and Alternative for Germany (AfD).

4. Migration and the European Union in the Electoral Campaigns

The issues of immigration and the EU characterized the electoral campaigns of all the countries going to the polls in 2017. All the parties considered devoted a significant part of their manifestos to these two issues. But what attitude they show toward immigration and the EU?

The political parties who were strongly against immigration are the PVV in the Netherlands, the National Front in France, UKIP in the UK and the AfD in Germany. On less extreme positions, but always in favour of limited immigration, are VVD in the Netherlands, François Fillon in France and the Conservatives in the UK. The CDA and SP in the Netherlands, Labour in the UK and the CDU/CSU in Germany hold intermediate positions. The electoral manifestos of the PvdA in the Netherlands, Hamon, Macron and Mélenchon in France, the Liberal Democrats in the UK and the SPD, Grünen and FDP in Germany present a more open attitude toward immigration. Finally, the parties whose positions are favourable to immigration are D66 and GL in the Netherlands, the SNP and the Greens in the UK and the Linke in Germany.

Regarding the second issue; e.g. attitudes towards the EU, the four parties that observe a very negative position towards immigration tend to be more Eurosceptic: the PVV in the Netherlands, the National Front in France, UKIP in the UK and AfD in Germany. Eurosceptic positions, although with different proposals, are also promoted by the SP in the Netherlands, by Mélenchon in France, by the Conservatives in the UK and by the SPD in Germany. On an intermediate position we can place the GL and the PvdA in the Netherlands and the FDP in Germany. The VVD in the Netherlands, Labour in the UK and
the Greens in Germany are moderately in favour of the European Union. Finally, full support to the European project (even if with some criticisms) is offered by the CDA and D66 in the Netherlands, by Fillon, Hamon and Macron in France, by the Liberal Democrats, the SNP and the Greens in the UK and by the CDU/CSU and SPD in Germany.

5. ELECTION RESULTS

What do the results of the elections in the countries considered tell us about immigration and the European Union? The following graphs show the percentages of votes collected by the parties with positive/negative attitudes towards immigration (Graph 5) and European Union (Graph 6). The parties have been divided into three categories: the darker colour refers to parties strongly or moderately against immigration/EU; the intermediate colour refers to parties neither favourable nor unfavourable to immigration/EU; the clearer colour refers to parties moderately or strongly favourable to immigration/EU.

Looking at positions on immigration (Graph 5), in the Netherlands, the seven parties considered have collected more than 80% of the votes. Among them, the relative majority (34.4%) went to anti-immigration parties (PVV and VVD), while parties whose manifestoes showed favourable attitudes toward immigration collected only 27% of the votes (PvdA, D66 and GL). Parties with intermediate positions (CDA and SP) only obtained 21.5% of the votes.

In France the situation seems more polarized. The five candidates considered collected more than 90% of the votes. About half of French voters (49.95%) voted for candidates that do not consider immigration as a negative phenomenon (Macron, Mélenchon and Hamon), while 41.31% of the voters did vote for candidates strongly or moderately against immigration (Le Pen and Fillon).

In the United Kingdom the six parties analysed collected more than 95% of the votes, but the relative majority (44.1%) voted for parties against immigration (UKIP and Conservatives), while only 12% of the voters voted for parties in favour of immigration (Liberal Democrats, SNP and Greens). The remaining 40% was collected by Labour, on an intermediate position.

In Germany the six parties analysed collected about 95% of the votes. The only party overtly and strongly anti-immigration, the AfD, collected 12.6% of the votes. The CDU/CSU, in a more neutral position, collected about one third of the votes, while the four parties favourable or moderately favourable to less exclusive immigration policies (Linke, SPD, FDP, Greens) gained little less than the absolute majority of the votes.

Attitudes toward the European Union (Graph 6) show different results. In all the analysed cases, the percentage of votes to parties moderately or strongly favourable to the EU is higher than the percentage collected by Eurosceptic parties, and, in some cases, it exceeds the absolute majority.
In the Netherlands, 45.9% of the voters voted for parties favourable to the EU (VVD, CDA and D66), while only 22.2% voted for Eurosceptic parties (PVV and SP). About 14.8% voted for parties with a more neutral position (GL and PvdA).

**Graph 5. Voters’ attitude toward immigration, percentage of the votes**

![Graph 5](image1.png)

*Source: Own elaboration on official electoral statistics*

**Graph 6. Voters’ attitude towards the European Union, percentage of the votes**

![Graph 6](image2.png)

*Source: Own elaboration on official electoral statistics*
In France, slightly more than the absolute majority of the voters chose candidates in favour of the European Union (Macron, Fillon, Hamon) while only 40.9% voted for the two Eurosceptic candidates (Le Pen and Mélenchon). The same bipolar dynamic is observed in the United Kingdom, where 52% of the voters voted for parties in favour of the EU (Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP and Greens), while the Conservatives and the UKIP reached a sheer 44.1%.

In Germany, almost two thirds of the voters (62.4%) gave their preferences to parties with positive attitudes toward the EU (CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens). The Linke and AfD, moderately and strongly against the EU, collected slightly less than 22% of the votes, while 10.7% preferred the intermediate position expressed by the Liberals.

6. CONCLUSIONS

While national elections reflect domestic dynamics that differ from one national context to another, it is possible to sketch general tendencies or see important signals relating to both the present and future of the EU, and to the electoral consequences of member states’ migration policies. The immigration issue is becoming more and more central on national political agendas and, oftentimes, elections are won or lost because of parties’ standpoints on migration. As we have seen in this chapter, and others in this volume, the twine Europe-immigration is central and strongly divisive in both public opinion and political parties as well as in the decision-making process, from the supranational to the local level. The formation of governments (be they coalitions or not) and the majority/opposition dynamic in the relationship between government and parliament must take into account, more and more, this new dimension (more of a cleavage for some analysts) that relates to the pairings Europe yes – Europe no and immigration yes – immigration no.

From the analysis of the voting results in the four countries considered, movements and parties strongly anti-immigration were not able to become part of the government. However, and the case of AfD in Germany shows it clearly, if we look at the salience of the issue, those political forces – even taking into account the peculiarities of each country – did occupy the political agenda gaining a significant approval from the electoral point of view. Keywords such as “people”, “identity”, “sovereignty”, “borders”, “anti-Islam West” are now central in the political manifestos of a number of political parties. Those concepts reflect themselves also strongly on the preferences and choices of voters regarding both the future of the European Union and the solutions proposed by national governments regarding immigration policies.
REFERENCES

In European countries, the phenomenon of unaccompanied minors (UAMS) has assumed an increasing quantitative consistency in recent years. In Italy, the policy of reception of these children has been defined as a “young” policy, which is being defined at the very moment in which the phenomenon is revealed. Moreover, it is an occurrence that changes incessantly, shifting extents and features, within a framework of EU policies that in turn affect the national arrangements.

In such a fluctuating and unstable picture, there are many aspects that require specific considerations. So much so that the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on the reception, identification and expulsion system, deemed it appropriate to fix the state of the art in a document with respect to the condition of UAMS in Italy, with the aim of understanding what has been done, what it would be useful to do and how it could be done, in order to better respond to this emergency.

In this chapter, we will first provide a picture of the presences and characteristics of the UAMS present in the EU countries, and in particular in Italy, to then illustrate the main innovations introduced by law 47, approved on 7 April 2017. Subsequently, some initiatives – aimed at the reception and integration of UAMS – will be presented; specifically, those considered ground-breaking in the current national scene.

1. Presence and Nationalities

On August 31, 2017, the UAMS in Italy were 18,479: 17,210 males (93.1%) and 1,269 females (6.9%) (Graph 1).

Regarding their age, 93.0% of them are 15-17 years old, 6.4% are 7-14 years old; 0.6% are 1-6 years old.

Regarding their nationalities, they are more than 40. UAMS in Italy are mainly from Northern and Central Africa (over 70%).

Most of them came to Italy through the Mediterranean Sea: since January 1 to August 31, 2017, more than 13,000 UAMS alighted on the Italian coasts. They are many, but, comparing the data for the same period of 2016, there is a decrease of 21.6%. Considering the data on a monthly basis, it should be noted that the reduction concerns in particular
the three summer months, with a decrease in landings respectively of 12.0% in June, of 60.7% in July and of 81.9% in August.

Graph 1. UAMS in Italy (by sex)

Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, 2017

The percentage of UAMS from the total of foreign minors who alighted on Italian coasts, however, remained almost stable: between 80-90%, confirming a predominantly individual migration, mainly composed of young adult males, mostly coming from Africa.

As is well known, however, often Italy is not the final destination of their journeys, but only the transit country to reach other European countries. In fact, there are relatively few minors who apply for international protection in Italy, while those who leave the Italian reception facilities continue to be many. As of October 31, 2017, there were 5,509 missing UAMS.

On the other hand, with regard to applications for international protection, as on September 15, 2017, compared to over 18,000 UAMS in Italy, only one out of three (6,455) applied: 9% of applications were accepted (international or subsidiary protection) and 70% were suggested for humanitarian protection.

2. A NEW LAW (L. 47/2017)

On April 21, 2017, law n. 47 introduced a series of amendments to the current legislation, with the aim of defining a unitary organic discipline on UAMS, which at the same time strengthens the protection instruments and seeks to ensure greater uniformity in the application of the law throughout the national territory. Until that time there was not even a regulatory system for the national protection and reception of UAMS, and most of the rules used to guarantee the protection of this group of minors were neither thought nor written taking into account the fact that they are minors with specific needs.

As regards the content of the law, the main changes concern: measures for the reception of UAMS and, more generally, the strengthening of rights and protections towards them. The regulations contained therein apply to minors who do not have Italian or European Union citizenship, who are for any reason in Italy or who are otherwise subject to Italian jurisdiction without assistance and representation from their parents or of other adults legally responsible under the law in the Italian legal system (Article 2). The principle is stated according to which, regardless of the intention to apply for international protection, unaccompanied foreign minors are holders of protection rights with equal treatment to minors of Italian citizenship or of the European Union. All the regulations of the law are therefore applied to unaccompanied foreign minors, due to their condition of greater vulnerability.

Among the principles, the new text, on the one hand, explicitly introduces an absolute ban on rejecting UAMS at the border, rejection that cannot occur in any case. On the other hand, it modifies the regulation concerning the prohibition of expulsion of foreign minors who, according to the current legislation, can be derogated exclusively for reasons of public order and state security, further establishing that, in any case, the deportation order can be adopted on the condition that it does not involve a risk of serious harm to the minor. It is also specified that the decision of the Juvenile Court, which has the competence in the matter, must be taken promptly and in any case within the 30-day time limit.

Furthermore, to complete the current legislation, the new text introduces a new article in the legislative decree n. 142/2015, aimed at regulating in a uniform manner on the national territory the procedure for identifying the minor, which constitutes the fundamental step for ascertaining the minor age.

This procedure includes: an interview of the UAM with qualified personnel, under the direction of the services of the local authority; the request for a personal data document in case of doubt about age and, possibly, of socio-health tests, with the consent of the minor and in the least invasive way possible; the presumption of minor age in the event that doubts about age remain even after the assessment (Article 5).

The new legislation also establishes the national information system for unaccompanied minors (SIM) in the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, implementing Article 19, paragraph 5 of Legislative Decree no. Decree 142/2015. The establishment of the SIM at the Ministry is grafted and reinforces the database provided for in articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Dpcm 535/1999. With a view to qualifying the reception procedures, the social record of unaccompanied minors is also drawn up by qualified staff, who interview the UAM in the first reception. The social folder is sent to the social services of the Municipality of destination and to the public prosecutor's office at the Juvenile Court.

To enhance the effectiveness of the UAMS’ protection, the new law intervenes on further aspects of the discipline.

Another area of intervention concerns the changes to the discipline of the so-called assisted voluntary repatriation, which consists of the repatriation of the UAM aimed at guaranteeing the right to family unity of the same. Dispositions can only be taken if, following a specific investigation into the family of origin of the UAM applying for
international protection, repatriation is considered appropriate in the interests of the minor. Family surveys for unaccompanied foreign minors requesting international protection are carried out by the Ministry of the Interior.

In this regard, the recently approved law makes the activation of family surveys more rapid and introduces a criterion of preference for foster care with regard to placement in the host community. Furthermore, the competence to adopt the repatriation measures has been transferred from the Ministry of Labour to the Juvenile Court, which already decides on extradition orders.

To promote projects that envisage family foster care instead of admission into a community, the new law assigns to local authorities the task of sensitizing and training trustees able to welcome UAMS in their home and provides for the compilation of lists of voluntary guardians, available to assume the legal protection of UAMS.

Some regulations of the new legislation are then aimed at strengthening individual rights already recognized for UAMS. In particular: the full guarantee of health care to UAM is extended by providing for their registration with the National Health Service, which the current legislation considered mandatory only for minors holding a residence permit; the adoption of specific measures by educational institutions and training institutions is encouraged to favour the fulfilment of compulsory education and training, also by means of agreements aimed at promoting specific apprenticeship programs, as well as the preparation of specific projects involving cultural mediators; procedural safeguards for the protection of the UAMS are implemented, by means of psychological assistance to the parents in any stage of the procedure and by recognition of the right of UAM to be informed of the advisability of appointing a legal counsel, also through the appointed guardian, and to avail themselves of legal aid at the expense of the State in any step of the procedure.

Finally, some regulations introduce special protection for specific categories of UAMS, in consideration of the particular state of vulnerability in which they are, such as UAMS who are victims of trafficking.

3. BEST PRACTICES

The analysis of the innovative practices tested before the promulgation of the new law on UAMS allowed revealing the presence of positive experiences, that anticipated the legislation, allowing - in a way - a prior empirical verification of the effectiveness of these measures. We will present some of these practices, as they were collected in the construction of the repertoire of the Permanent Observatory on the reception of UAMS in Italy, established at ISMU Foundation in 2017.

Before Law n. 47/2017, in Italy, family fostering of UAMS has already been activated, both with Italian families and with families of the same nationality of the UAMS (homocultural foster care). Already in 2006, in fact, the National Table for Foster Care
published a document,\(^2\) which specified some of the characteristics of UAMS foster care with respect to traditional foster care. First of all, it pointed out that this fostering had purposes that were in part different than the fostering of Italian minors: the goal, in fact, is not the reintegration of the minor into the family of origin, which – thanks to the placement of the child in the foster family – can be accompanied in a process of solving the problems that led to his fostering. In essence, there is no parallel path to support the natural family: the whole project is focused on the UAM and has as its purpose “the offer of a warm, affective context, aimed at supporting a future autonomy project that, in some cases, also extends beyond the eighteenth year of age” (National Table of Foster Care, 2016: 2). Another peculiar aspect concerns the age of the UAMS: they are adolescents, often very close to 18 years old. This requires that specific paths of foster care should be implemented with the fundamental aim of accompanying UAMS to autonomy, in the transition to the adult condition. Furthermore, it is necessary that the execution of bureaucratic procedures related to the permanence in Italy of the UAMS are not to be borne by the foster family alone, but with the support of other public or private social subjects.

For UAMS, three types of foster care are possible: with a family member (this solution is the preferable one), with an autochthonous family (hetero-cultural foster care) or with a family having the same culture of the UAM (homocultural entrustment). The repertoire of practices collected by the ISMU Observatory shows a lively activity, carried out in partnership between local authorities (specifically, social services of the Municipalities) and organizations of the Third sector (social cooperatives, family and volunteer associations), that have allowed experimentation of innovative family foster care practices, paying attention to the child’s best interest. In particular, the presence in many Italian cities of homocultural foster care has now become a consolidated practice, with respect to which a scientific understanding has now also been consolidated.

The two projects we are going to present are located in Cremona and Verona: both have the feature of taking a step further than the traditional forms of foster care (homo or heterocultural), implementing innovative reception and integration strategies. However, it has to be said that there are many good practices spread across Italy on this particular form of caring of UAMS.

The Cremona experience starts from the activity carried out by the Cooperative Nazareth,\(^3\) originally active with a reception centre for UAMS through a housing community. Since 2008, the cooperative has experimented with forms of “strengthened foster care”, because it provides support to the foster families first of all through the “Giona day center”, which is part of the cooperative, which accompanies UAMS during the day with literacy courses. At the Giona day centre there are workshops, maintenance and cleaning activities. Other important leisure activities for integration in the social context are carried out in collaboration with the parishes, which involve UAMS in post-school


activities, mini-basketball training and in the summer, activities for children. This model of foster care, created in partnership with the municipality of Cremona, also includes volunteer organizations: among these, we report the association “Girasole”, an association of foster families that have experimented innovative forms of foster care, have developed know-how on the processes of sensitization and support for foster families, and that therefore bring to the project a very rich know-how. Individuals and foster families are often foreigners who are successfully completing their migration project in Italy. The identification, evaluation, matching and supporting of foster families is carried out by the Nazareth cooperative, together with the Municipality of Cremona.

In addition to fostering in Italian families or other nationalities, the project provides for the possibility of former UAMS who are now adults, who have successfully completed their journey, to become guardian of UAMS. This opportunity can have at least a twofold value: on the one hand, it means exploiting the potential of the former UAMS, who are offering their services for the wellbeing of the community, and therefore recognize their full integration into the local community, where they live. On the other hand, it is obviously an important resource for the UAMS who can compare themselves with people who shared a similar migration journey, sometimes even the same provenance, language, culture and religion and that represent for them an example of success and a significant landmark, close to their age.

Lastly, Cremona’s “reinforced foster care” represents a solution that is also economically advantageous for local authorities: it costs an average of 40% less than the “classic” placement of UAMS in the community.

Another interesting experience concerns the Association of Linguistic and Cultural Mediators, Terra dei Popoli, operating in Verona. This project highlights the path that led to the promotion of homocultural foster care. In this case, in fact, there is an intense collaborative work, first of all between the Municipality social services and the Association, an expression of active citizenship of people coming from different cultures. It is important to underline how the cultural mediators of the Association consider their mediation activity not only as a tool to promote dialogue between different cultures and the integration of foreign citizens in Italy, but also as a means for promoting the participation of migrants in the public life of the host country: this means promoting the empowerment of immigrants, considered as active subjects in the production of well-being in the communities to which they belong.

Thanks to European funding from the European Integration Fund, the two promoters have activated and stabilized a path of study on the care and protection of minors of different cultures, creating a permanent laboratory, involving social workers of the Municipality, cultural mediators and numerous foreign communities. This is very important, as it is not possible to assume that on these issues there is a homogeneity between the different ethnic groups living in Italy: working on culturally homogeneous family requires abandoning the claim of an ethnocentric perspective in favour of an

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understanding of the migrant families, which are not seen only as a risk, but also as a resource. The aim of the project was to identify foreign families willing to become foster care families, thus becoming part of the circuit of family resources available to the Social Services for the temporary reception of minors in difficulty.

The process involved 200 foreign citizens, including several community leaders, who supported the process of sensitization of their own groups. Seven working groups have been set up, that trained 30 foreign families, in order to welcome a UAM. The innovative peculiarity of this project is double: the focus on the cultural dimension given not only for the UAM, but also for the fostering family, which is supported in understanding the peculiar meaning of taking care outside a family relationship with the child; the importance given to the leaders of the communities, who represent important mediators to reach the communities themselves and therefore should be involved more systematically.

Precisely the experiences that preceded – and partly stimulated – the introduction of this measure in Italy have shown how rich family foster care can be, when it is not exclusively a merely bureaucratic fulfilment. The idea that headed the different experiences is well explained in the experience of Reggio Emilia, where it is stated that “the guardian is not only a representative figure or a bureaucratic administrator, but the one who primarily plays a role of care so much that this must characterize the quality of the relationship with the minor he must deal with”.

For this reason, the projects have provided not only a training path, but the State has taken on the burden of accompanying and monitoring the activity of voluntary guardians. In some cases, private social organizations have also been involved in the processes, as in the experience of Bologna and Ferrara which, in addition to the Municipalities and the Regional Guarantor for Children and Adolescents, saw the collaboration of the Camelot social cooperative. In this case, the training path focused on the knowledge of territorial services, on the learning of skills for listening to UAMS, for the reception and management of the traumas these children have experienced. The experience of Bologna and Ferrara has also highlighted the importance of building accurate matching between guardian and UAM: in particular, precisely to guarantee the advocacy, every match has been made executive only after having been certain of the complete acceptance of the guardian by the UAM. Unlike the experiences when the guardian was the Mayor, having no real and incisive relationship with the UAM, in the new model guardians play a key role in the path of UAMS towards full autonomy: it is important to create a relationship of trust, in which all the necessary decisions can be taken jointly, in the best interests of the UAM. From the experience of the Veneto region, active since 2000, it is possible to draw inspiration on the need to build and maintain a close link between the regional level and the local realities. This link was guaranteed by the territorial referents, identified among the professionals of social and health services. They, after having followed specific courses at the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the minors of the Veneto region, sensitised the local community on legal protection of UAMS, the finding of volunteer guardians, the organization of training paths

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6 http://www.asp.re.it/Struttura.jsp?id=34.
and the coaching and monitoring of the guardians in their activities. This perspective is very interesting mainly because on the one hand it promotes the empowerment of the communities, which recognize themselves as competent carriers of resources, and on the other allows the guardian to face a Social Service system that he/she already knows. Furthermore, it allows the guardian to carry out his/her activities in a context which also includes the resources of the third sector and of voluntary work with which he/she can more easily interact.

Another interesting project is that of the Veneto Region, where, in agreement with the municipal capitals and the Guarantor of individual rights, has been tested since 2016 and renewed in 2017 the reception for UAMS with the possibility of apartment-groups, in partial autonomy. As explained by the regional Councillor for Social Policies, this is a different answer than the traditional community for minors, determined by the need to face a constantly evolving reality, linked to new migratory flows, and to respect and protect the different needs of foreign minors: they are youngsters aged between 16 and 17 years old, with a strong sense of autonomy, often more mature than their age, with a personal and family experience completely different from that of Italian minors welcomed into the community. It is evident that this choice is part of a clear individualized project of taking charge of the UAM, aimed at choosing the most suitable opportunities for his/her characteristics. It provides, for a first reception of the UAMS, a community accommodation for up to sixty days: here a multidisciplinary team has the task of making an assessment of personal history, socio-demographic characteristics, problems and resources. After this period, the UAMS who have been assessed as able to have good autonomy skills are located in apartments, that can accommodate up to six unaccompanied minors, according to a personalized educational project. The structure has the presence of educators and cultural mediators for two hours a day and the constant night presence of an educator. The students hosted in these facilities are obviously involved during the day in education, training and work activities in specialized structures and centres.

Similar experiences are also present in other regions, but often do not represent an alternative to the community: it is instead a step after the community, in which the UAMS close to the age of majority are accompanied in a path of progressive autonomy.

Innovative practices are also reported on the activities that complete the taking charge of the UAM: the learning of the Italian language, the recovery of one’s own history, the expression of their abilities and interests. Experiences of expressive workshops are also implemented, in which narration or theatre become a vehicle to reread the migratory experience with all its hardships.

Finally, the dissemination of peer education practices as a strategy for supporting UAMS has to be highlighted: one example among many is the “Parole alla pari” project, an experimental volunteering project born of a network agreement. Between the Councilorship for Social Cohesion, Health, Welfare, Integration and Citizenship of the

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7 https://www.regione.veneto.it/web/guest/comunicati-stampa/dettaglio-comunicati?_spp_deta ilId=2970403.
The Municipality of Modena, the San Filippo Neri Foundation and the regional company for the right to higher studies Ergo, which has undertaken to promote the activity of volunteering for scholarship students, in particular those resident in Modena and enrolled in Education and Anthropology. The commitment of young university students consists in supporting UAMS for 8 months, favouring the learning of the Italian language and knowledge of the city and its services, through the construction of interpersonal relationships. The company for the right to study deals with the selection of students who receive ad hoc training from the San Filippo Neri Foundation, while the social services of the Municipality deal with the planning of the individual management, monitoring and identification of the UAMS to be included in the project.

The practices described above, which represent only a partial, but emblematic, breakdown of the innovations present on the Italian territory in terms of efficient and effective management of the UAMS, deserve to be more widespread to allow those territories that have not yet implemented projects for UAMS, to grasp its suggestions in order to produce a system of taking charge that is increasingly sustainable and at the same time attentive to the complexity of the phenomenon.

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Drigo C., Santamaria F. (ed.) (2009), Tutori volontari e bambini. L’esperienza del Garante per l’infanzia nel Veneto, Guerini Studio, Milan.
The current migration process in the United States is entering into a difficult time of controversy, hostility, and lack of understanding. This is due mainly to the fact the international migration is both: multi-factorial and extremely dynamic and sensitive to political-policy conditions. The multiple factors that are involved in the institutional process of migration, from pulling to pushing factors and the wide range of legal, political, social, economic and cultural conditions makes it of very high complexity. The dynamic condition derives directly from the individual migrant circumstances which may be responding to external-structural conditions that may affect them directly or internal conditions derived from personal family dynamics. Both, however, can be impacted by any shift on the American political forces, as the country has witnessed with the 2016 Presidential Election. The political rhetoric of nativism and anti-migrant displayed by the Republican candidate made clear that the opportunities for migrants whether legal or undocumented were about to change if Mr. Trump would be elected. Now we know that each month there is a high level of unpredictability about migration White House policies. Under national conditions of change and volatility, this chapter presents data and analysis until mid-August of 2017, or close to the first six months of Mr. Trump in the Presidency.

The conditions changed dramatically for migrants in the United States with the election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency. Mr. Trump has proposed several measures including: the increase of border patrol officers, the increase of immigration officers across the country, the reduction of the number of legal migrants per year, the migration and visa restrictions for seven predominantly Muslim countries, and the elimination of undocumented family reunification programs approved by President Barack Obama. 2017 is a year when the situation of many migrants in the United States is not only unclear by legally detrimental to them. Just by August 19, President Trump approved an executive order requiring the Department of Homeland Security to end the Obama Program to protect from deportations millions of undocumented migrants whose children are U.S. Citizens or permanent residents. With states currently challenging the law before Federal Courts, this would create the end of a program that has protected close to 1 million migrants who arrived in the U.S. as children or those who were born in America from undocumented parents (Wolf, 2017).
The reversal on previous Presidential migration policies is not just on legal rights but on judicial process. On July 31, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a memorandum to all migration judges urging them to grant fewer time extensions to defense lawyers. Typically, lawyers in preparing their cases before the migration judge require documents that usually are not of easy reach because they may be in other country, state, or municipality. In addition, those offices also have their procedural times, which needs to add to the time in the U.S. for translation and notary certification. This creates an unnecessary pressure to migration lawyers to properly accumulate materials and prepare the strategies for an appropriate defense. On average, a migration case in Florida, California or Texas may take more than year and a half (Berenson, 2017). While the main argument of the Department of Justice is expediency to make the process faster, the likely intention is to show that the Trump Administration is faster to deport “illegal aliens.”

The conditions of migration in the United States are moving from a policy issue needing attention to a national crisis of critical proportions. On the one hand, the forces of conservative President Trump to reverse any type of protection to undocumented migrants and their families offers no significant solutions but rather it offers massive deportations. On the other, the arrival of untapped political forces with strong ethno-nationalist, ethnocentric, and nativist perspectives have openly declare the need to make America a country that does not welcome migrants. Even conservative Republicans as Senator John McCain from Arizona (a state with high number of undocumented migrants and on the border with Mexico) has expressed his disapproval of Trump’s governmental actions that lack social understanding of the realities of migrants and their families. At the end, the political tensions in Washington only generate one casualty: the migrant community.

Under these complex and dynamic conditions, this chapter shows the current status of migration in the United States in terms of migration enforcement, employment and crime (issues being argued by the current Trump administration). Then the authors analyze the migration reforms passed in the last 30 years and the issues related to family reunification such as the conditions of the young adults who arrived in the United States as children without proper documentation (DACA), and the situation of parents of U.S. Citizens and permanent residents threaten to be deported because they arrived without documents or abused their visa (DAPA). Then the authors describe public opinion divisions and polarization that Americans have exhibited in recent polls. Finally, the chapter presents some scenarios about policy reform and the role of the news media.

1. America’s Current Conditions of Migration

More than 43 million foreign-born individuals live in the U.S. which reflects about 13% of the total U.S. population (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). About 25% of the foreign-born are undocumented, as they either entered the country without proper documentation or committed visa violations. The population of undocumented migrants increased from 1990 to 2007 by almost nine million and today that number has leveled off to about 11
million (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). About less than half (45%) are undocumented migrants from Mexico, around 40% are from Central American countries and the rest are from Europe, Canada, and Asia.

While the highest portion of undocumented migrants within the U.S. are from Mexico, in the last ten years the largest increase is among Hondurans, El Salvadorans, and Guatemalans migrating through the Mexican corridor (Krogstad, 2016). The increase is reflective of several conditions in those countries, including: poor economic environment, increase violence, and a desire to reunite with family members already in the U.S. (Krogstad, 2016). The increase in South American migrants offset the decrease in Mexican migrants over the past several years resulting in a steady population since 2009 (Lopez & Bialik, 2017; Mitchell, 2016; Warren & Kerwin, 2015).

As the economic conditions in Mexico improved over the past several years, fewer migrants moved to the U.S. (Krogstad, 2016). Migrant population increased between 2009 and 2014 in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington due to arrivals of non-Mexican nationals, while only Louisiana saw increases in the number of Mexicans entering the state (Passel & Cohn, 2017). The number of Mexicans within the U.S. declined by more than a million since 2007, when nearly seven million Mexicans were living illegally in the U.S. (Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, 2017). That number dropped to 5.8 million by 2014 (Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, 2017). Current migration trends reflect migration has leveled as fewer Mexicans are entering the United States and others are returning to Mexico (Mitchell, 2016).

California, Texas, New York, and Florida have the highest concentrations of undocumented migrants (Passel & Cohn, 2017). Among those states, New York City and Los Angeles are home to the largest populations, with more than a million living in each city (Passel & Cohn, 2017). Slightly more than a half-million undocumented migrants live in Houston, making it the third highest concentration within U.S. cities (Passel & Cohn, 2017). Those numbers reflect both border and visa violations.

Populations of undocumented migrants decreased in seven states between 2009 and 2014 (Passel & Cohn, 2017). Those include California, Georgia, Illinois, Kanas, Nevada, South California, and Alabama. The numbers reflect a decrease in the number of migrants from Mexico, while the number of migrants from other countries remained mostly steady (Passel & Cohn, 2017).

As mentioned before, most of the undocumented are in the U.S. by crossing the Southern border or by violating their entry visas. Yet, the U.S.-Mexico corridor remains one of the most traveled in the world, which today reflects the prevalence of Central American migrants passing through Mexico to enter the U.S. (Krogstad, 2016). In 2016, more than 400,000 undocumented migrants were apprehended trying to cross the southwest border, approximately 390,000 were from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala (CBP, 2016).

The focus of migration enforcement, as government message to the public, remains at the U.S.-Mexico border, yet high levels of migration control have been operational at airports, other ports of entry, and the border with Canada. Approximately 98% of the 415,816 enforcement apprehensions nationwide in 2016 occurred at the border (CBP,
U.S. Migration enforcement apprehended more Central and South American migrants at the border than Mexicans between 2014 and 2016 (Krogstad, 2016). In 2016, apprehensions of Mexican nationals decreased by 17%, while those from Central America decreased by 13% over the previous year (CBP, 2016). For the most part, those numbers indicate fewer attempted entries into the U.S.

Despite the leveling of apprehensions, the number of deportations remains unsteady. Overall deportations at U.S. ports of entry increased each year from 2002 through 2013. Deportations reached a decade low in 2015 falling from 435,000 in 2013 to 333,000 in 2015, reflecting the lowest level in a decade (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). Those declines also reflect fewer attempts of unlawful entry (CBP, 2016). In 2016 the number of deportations increased slightly to 344,000 (DHS, 2016).

Part of the increase in deportations or removals since the early 2000s reflects a change in migration enforcement policy. The U.S. ended a “catch and release” policy on migrants detained at the border in 2006 and replaced it with a policy that required documentation and the registration of deportees before they were either returned or detained (Krogstad, 2016). In addition, under the Obama administration the U.S. increased jail space to house undocumented migrants while they awaited court dates (Alden, 2016). Efforts to limit illegal or undocumented migration continues to place little emphasis on those who commit visa violations and who entered the country through other ports of entry, since in reality these were more common than those who crossed the border from 2008 to 2012. (Warren & Kerwin, 2015). Data shows that contrary to popular belief, the highest numbers of deportations took place during the two terms of President Obama.

Graph 1 is based on the most recent data available from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and it is clear that removals are increasing as returns decrease. Returns refer to immigrants who are turned away at the border (or Port of Entry as in the case of international airports), whereas removals refer to immigrants who are returned to their country after entering the U.S. via deportation or exclusion. As seen in graph 1, the removals and returns during the first fifty years from 1892 to around 1946 were relatively flat. A spike starting in 1950 resulted from repatriation due to the end of World War II. The number of returns in the U.S. peaked at 1,675,876 in the fiscal year 2000. However, the highest number of removals occurred in fiscal year 2013 when 434,015 immigrants were removed from the country.

Graph 2 shows more closely the changes in the decline of returns of those migrants who were sent back at any Port of Entry or border after they were caught. The likely change in the decline of returns is a combination of less people crossing the border during the Great Recession of 2007-2009 when employment opportunities were low, and the change in immigration enforcement policy that made full registration of returns in the Homeland Security System as deportations or removals. In the pick year of 2000, there were a record more than 1.5 million migrants returned at a Port of Entry or border at the time of the detention. Naturally, the increase of border protection at all borders and the new requirements of valid passports to cross into the U.S. were the result of the attacks of September 11.
CHAPTER 8 – CURRENT MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

GRAPH 1. HISTORICAL REMOVAL/DEPORTATION AND RETURN TRENDS, 1892-2015


GRAPH 2. HISTORICAL REMOVAL/DEPORTATION AND RETURN TRENDS, 1990-2015

The most recent data released by U.S. Department of Homeland Security\(^1\), show in graph 3 the number of returned migrants and their country of origin. The most returns in recent history occurred in the 2009 fiscal year with 582,596 total returns, almost 80% of those or 468,672 were of Mexican migrants. This figure has decreased significantly since 2009 by almost 90 percent; in other words, the decline of Mexican migrants was very dramatic, as they were not crossing to the U.S. In a period of six years, the decline and proportion of Mexican migrants to the U.S. is very significant, which contradicts the rhetoric of Mr. Trump against Mexicans (Baker & Williams, 2015). Specifically, in 2015, the proportion of returned Mexican migrants from the total was of around 30%, which represents a significant decline from 2009.

\[\text{GRAPH 3. ALIENS RETURNED BY REGION AND COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY, 2006-2015}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>582,596</td>
<td>474,195</td>
<td>322,098</td>
<td>230,360</td>
<td>178,691</td>
<td>163,245</td>
<td>129,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>468,672</td>
<td>353,813</td>
<td>205,135</td>
<td>131,958</td>
<td>88,236</td>
<td>72,331</td>
<td>40,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>113,924</td>
<td>120,382</td>
<td>116,963</td>
<td>98,402</td>
<td>90,455</td>
<td>90,914</td>
<td>88,728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\text{Sources: Table generated from U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2015 (July, 2017)}\]

\[^{1}\text{As of August 15, 2017, the official data for deportations during the fiscal year 2016 was not been released. Efforts by the authors to get access were not successful to include the most recent numbers for 2016.}\]
2. EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRANTS IN THE U.S.

Two-thirds of undocumented workers have lived in the U.S. for more than a decade, yet they still face socioeconomic disadvantages (Durand, Massey, & Pren, 2016; Hall, Greenman & Farkas, 2010; Krogstad, Passel & Cohn, 2017). The Migration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which criminalized the hiring of undocumented workers made them easily exploitable and pushed earnings downward (Donato & Massey 1993; Hall, Greenman & Farkas, 2010; Phillips & Massey 1999; Donato & Sisk 2013; Massey & Gentsch 2014)

This also is blamed on lack of education and the ability to speak English. On average, undocumented migrants achieve six years of education Durand and his colleagues conducted interviews with migrants working within the U.S. from 1970 through 2010. They found 27 percent of migrants said they spoke English well, and nearly a third said they had no English ability (Durand et al., 2016).

The concerns over undocumented migrants taking U.S. jobs are not reflective of changes within the concentration within the American workforce. The number of undocumented migrants within the workforce stabilized between 2009 and 2014 (Passel & Cohn, 2016b). Undocumented migrants constitute approximately 5% of the U.S. workforce and they work primarily in farming, construction and other services labor intense jobs. Their share of the workforce outnumbers that of authorized U.S. workers (Passel & Cohn, 2016c). Undocumented migrants hold 26% of farming occupations and 15% of construction jobs (Passel & Cohn, 2016c), but given the low wages, no American would be willing to work in those jobs. The number of migrants within these jobs also outnumber migrants who are considered legal to work in the U.S (Passel & Cohn, 2016c). Other occupations include production, manufacturing, food processing, and service jobs (Lofstrom, Hill, & Hayes, 2013).

Undocumented migrants represent only 2% of the workforce in both professional and office-support jobs. Orrenius & Zavodny (2009) reviewed injuries and deaths statistics from the U.S. labor force and concluded migrants are also more likely to work in dangerous careers such as agriculture and construction. The author’s cited language barriers and lack of understanding about potential risks as reasons (Orrenius & Zavodny, 2009). Migrant workers are also prevalent within the meat packing food industry, where they are subject to infections, skin diseases, and amputations (Orrenius & Zavodny, 2009). Research also finds border crossers median incomes of about $5,000 less than migrants who stay as a result of visa violations, likely as a result lower educational status and lower-skill level (Hall et al., 2010; Lofstrom et al., 2013). Competition from new arrivals from Central America also has a negative impact on wages (Durand et al., 2016). Lofstrom and his colleagues (2013) concluded that migrants who crossed the border did not significantly benefit from legalized status in terms of wages. Not surprising, undocumented migrants also face struggles regarding earnings due to their illegal status (Lofstrom et al., 2013).

One of the most critical problems in the American labor market is that most of the undocumented migrants are paid cash, which benefits the employer by paying lower
wages and avoiding to provide benefits and federal and local taxes. While this offers a benefit for the migrant as the wages in dollars are, because of foreign exchange conversion, higher than the salaries in their countries of origin; the jobs don’t offer protection, benefits, or even contributions for social security (American retirement and medical benefits). Employers, especially small to mid size companies, have been the real beneficiaries of this disparities and ample supply of undocumented workers. The migrants face real challenges are they cannot realistic wage because they have forged documents and few hold bank accounts (Caskey, 2005; Jankowski et al., 2007). Migrant workers without papers are at even greater disadvantage being driven into the secondary labor market. Most of them find jobs through friends and relatives, with less gains in terms of salaries and wages (Durand et al., 2016).

3. PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND MIGRATION

Despite concerns over crime and the blaming of Mr. Trump for high rates of violence, undocumented migrants are not associated with higher crime rates. In fact, violent crime decreased by 48% between 1990 and 2013 as populations increased (Ewing et al., 2016). Property crimes such as theft and robbery also decreased by 41%. Studies also show found native-born Americans are more likely to commit violent crimes than migrants documented and undocumented They are also more likely to be repeat offenders (Ewing et al., 2016).

A crime study in two large American cities (San Diego and Miami) from 1960 to 2010 found no evidence that the arrivals of migrants were associated to high levels of crime (Martinez et al., 2015). In the case of Miami, the study looked at the patterns of crime during the arrival of the two major waves of Cuban migrants moving to Florida, the first right after the Cuban Revolution in 1960 and the second one in 1980 known as the Mariels. In both cases, despite the high numbers of Cuban migrants there was no evidence that crime increased. Martinez and his colleagues (2015) also found that American Blacks primarily and some Haitians who engaged in drugs distribution committed the crimes in Miami.

Similarly, in the case of San Diego, Martinez and his colleagues did not find an increase of crime during the increase of migrants coming from Mexico and other parts of Latin America (2015). They collected and compared data from 1960 to 2010 homicide rates and found that the Latino increases and declines moved closely to the patterns of Blacks and Whites in the same periods. In fact, Latino crime was much lower when compare with Blacks in San Diego. Also, when the authors compares across the country national rates from 1985 to 2009, they found that even when undocumented migration started to increase in 1985, the Latino homicide rates were not related. In fact, starting in 1995, there was a significant decline of Latino crime that has been maintained until 2009, very close with the White rates (Martinez et al., 2015).

Yet, during the first 100 days of the Trump Administration, an official report emerged trying to provide a different picture. The U.S Department of Homeland Security,
Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) reported a 37% increase in migration-related arrests within 100 days following the migration orders. The arrests of 41,000 migrants included both undocumented and suspected migrants (ICE, 2017). The agency reported three-quarters of the arrests included migrants who were convicted of crimes (later it was shown that many of the convictions were related to minor traffic violations or even unpaid parking fines). The emphasis on deportations of criminal offenders is not new. In 2009, the agency established the Criminal Apprehension Program that gave ICE officers access to jails to deport undocumented offenders (ICE, 2013). As a result, criminal aliens made up two-thirds of deportations between 2010 and 2013. This program requires voluntary cooperation by local governments, which has created all types of legal challenges in federal courts. Since the program is not really popular among the public, it is unclear if it continues, but even if there is operations conducted by ICE, the agency is careful in not making it public. Here is important to note that the start of these operations began under the administration of President Obama.

4. MAJOR AMERICAN MIGRATION REFORMS AND THEIR POLITICS

The last major immigration reform in the U.S. was in 1986, since then there has not been a major legal reform in the United States, especially related to undocumented migration. 31 years ago with the passage of the IRCA law or Immigration Reform and Control Act, the government sought to create a trusted and long-term mechanism that would alleviate most migration problems. And yet, during these last three decades undocumented migration increased and no significant changes have been approved to regularize migrants and their families.

The increase of migrants especially those without legal documents was provoked mainly by two exogenous conditions: internal factors happening in Mexico and Central America that were beyond the control of the U.S. In the case of Mexico, the insecurity situation that started in 2000 was related to high levels of crime derived from the drug cartels fights which in turn provoked that many families moved to the U.S. seeking safety and peace. In the case of Central America, the situation was related to a combination of declining economic conditions due to low levels of employment and also of rising levels of violence and drug cartels wars. There was one endogenous condition in the U.S. that actively served as a pulling magnet: the American economic expansion (1990-2005), which not only needed migrant workers, but one sector in particular the service industry, critically depended from unskilled non native-workers to increase their profitability.

American reform on migration has been historically a very contentious issue. Every migrant group tends to be more restrictive of future arrivals and created a process of prejudice, biases, and stereotypes that have permeated public opinion. This restrictive and discriminatory practice has happened against the Irish, Germans, Polish, Russian, Italians, and of course, this is the historical time to restrict Latin American immigration (Chavez and Hoewe, 2012).
There have been some laws as in the early 1900s that restricted Chinese migrants, Southern Europeans, and targeted specific groups as Jewish and non-Christian migrants. In many cases, these “undesirables” were stopped at the port of entry and deported. During World War II, the U.S. created an agricultural worker program that allowed millions of Mexican male workers to work in the fields of the U.S. while the American men fought in the European and Pacific war fronts. The program, however, was not finished when the War ended in 1945, in fact it was continued for almost 20 years until 1963 when President Johnson terminated the program and created in collaboration with the Mexican government a program to employ workers on the U.S.-Mexico border area for industrial assembling. While many Mexican workers returned to their local towns, many settled in the U.S. with their families—which both children and spouses who were American citizens. In many cases, this condition helped to avoid deportation. It was until 1986 when the first bipartisan attempt to reform immigration took place. Following is a discussion of the most important American migration reforms from 1986 to 2017.

**Table 2. Major Migration Reforms in the United States, 1986-2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title of Act, Law or Executive Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>The Patriot Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Homeland Security Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Secure Fence Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Executive Order: Border Security and Migration Enforcement Improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 4.1 IRCA Reform of 1986

It’s been 30 years since the U.S. passed some of the most significant migration reform in its history. The Migration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) set standards to provide more control of foreign entries. The act established new standards for migration enforcement, budgets and technology to be used. It increased spending to curb the flow of migrants into the country, but it also provided amnesty for undocumented migrants who had lived and worked in the U.S. (IRCA, 1986; Olvera, 2016; Wheatley & Rodriguez, 2014). The amnesty granted legal status to 2.5 million undocumented migrants (Olvera, 2016).
Several provisions of IRCA had economic impacts. First, it addressed concerns about an inadequate number of available agricultural workers (Olvera, 2016). Agricultural workers with proof of employment for 90 days were allowed residency and established future migrant worker provisions to help insure an adequate work supply. The legal controls were also hoped to stabilize pay and prevent employers from undercutting wages of non-resident workers (Olvera, 2016).

The second was a provision in IRCA that created penalties for employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers (Wheatley & Rodriguez, 2014). Further it established a system that required employers to verify the legal status of potential employees through social security cards, visas, and other forms of identification. Employers were also required to maintain paperwork to document the legal status of employees (Wheatley & Rodriguez, 2014). This measure, which was resisted by employers organizations all over the country, was loosely implemented as businesses depended from inexpensive and reliable labor provided by the migrants.

The efforts to better control the workforce and improve the economic-wellbeing of migrants also resulted in adverse socioeconomic effects (Donato et. al, 2005; Donato & Sisk, 2012). Documented and undocumented migrant workers faced abuses and discrimination such as decreased wages and a reduction of hours worked. Since employers were legally responsible for the status of their workers, an indirect effect was that when employers knew that certain workers were undocumented, the process further drove wages downward (Donato et al., 2008; Flippen, 2012; Hall et al., 2010; Massey and Gentsch, 2011).

Socially, the IRCA also divided families. It granted legal residency to immediate family members, but established quotas for other relatives (Lofstrom, Hill, & Hayes, 2013; Wheatley & Rodriguez, 2014). The restrictions in traveling back and forward between the U.S. and their country of origin provoked that families separated as migrants were no longer free to visit their family (Hagan, 1994).

Analysis shows the U.S. spend approximately $186 billion a year on enforcement since the act came into place (Meissner, Chishti, Bergeron, 2013). Provisions focused on border security, once again demonstrating less interest the more highly skilled undocumented workers committing violations regarding visas who entered the U.S. through other ports of entry (Lofstrom, Hill & Hayes, 2013).

4.2 AEDPA Act of 1996

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 further strengthened migration policy. It further increased the number of border control agents (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013). It established “expedited removal” for undocumented migrants suspected of not having paperwork and tightened restrictions on undocumented migrants convicted of crimes (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013). It established mandatory detention of suspected criminals, so they were not longer allowed to be returned without court hearings and the policy also established rules for monitoring entry and exit for visa holders (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013). The rules further threatened the standard of life of
migrants, due to new restrictions on welfare and government benefits (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013).

### 4.3 Patriot Act of 2001-2002

Attention shifted to visa violations in following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The U.S. passed the Patriot Act at the end of 2001, which allowed the provision of terrorism threat to restrict entry into the U.S. (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013). It also reformed monitoring to include wiretaps and profiling of migrants and college students (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013). The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 created an integrated visa monitoring system to better track admissions and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security to provide oversight of migration and enforcement (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013).

Derived from the Patriot Act legislation, for the first time in the history of the country, any American Citizen or legal resident crossing the borders from Canada and Mexico needed to demonstrate their citizenship at the border point. Before the Patriot Act was passed, a sole verbal declaration of their citizen status and showing a drivers license was enough to cross into the United States. Screening was mostly verbal and based on the quality of English command and the answers to questions the border officer asked. The new requirements in 2005 were even more demanding as anybody—including American citizens—crossing into the United States through land borders was required of carrying a valid passport or an enhanced driver license that show their American citizenship on it. Moreover, Canadian citizens who in the past were able to cross the border only with their driver licenses were prohibited to enter the U.S. without a valid passport. Mexican citizens did not have a change, as they were required to carry their special card permits or visas when entering the United States.

### 4.4 The Secure Fence Act of 2006

President George W. Bush signed The Secure Fence Act of 2006 to address the influx of undocumented migrants entering Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013). The act funded border wall projects included a double-reinforced fence, better lighting, and surveillance along 400 miles of those states to combat illegal migration and drug trafficking (Siruno & Kilberg, 2013). At the time of the passing this law, one of the main objectives was to avoid the potential of terrorists entering the country through poorly protected areas of the border. This was done despite the fact that the Director of National Intelligence remarked before the U.S. Senate in 2007 that it was more likely that a terrorist would cross from Canada than from the Southern border.

Additional provisions included the construction of a fence in areas close to the deserts of Arizona and New Mexico and few parts of Texas that did not have a physical separation between the U.S. and Mexico. Also, the new law established stricter criteria for those seeking asylum. This new regulations are touted as one of the causes for the massive
deportations which increased more than 400% from 1996 through 2011 (Kohli, Markowitz & Chavez, 2011).

4.5 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 2012 and Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) 2014

According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, more than 750,000 young unauthorized immigrants have received work permits and deportation relief through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program that President Barack Obama created in August 2012. DACA provides unauthorized immigrants who came to the U.S. before age 16 – “Dreamers” – a chance to stay in the U.S. to study or work. If approved for the program, Dreamers are given a work permit and protection from deportation for two years, benefits that can be renewed (Krogstad, 2017).

As many as 512,000 Dreamers could be eligible to renew these benefits in 2017. However, it is still unclear whether or not President Donald Trump will allow these benefits to be renewed given that he promised on the campaign trail that he would undo all of President Obama’s executive orders. According to a 2014 Pew Research Center estimate, approximately 1.1 million Dreamers are eligible for the benefits. This means that about 78% of eligible immigrants have applied to the program. California has the most DACA recipients at 216,060. Texas is second with 120,642, followed by Illinois with 41,256. Most DACA recipients come from Mexico, with 78% of approved recipients having been from Mexico since DACA began in 2012. This includes both both initial (588,859) and renewed (456,108) recipients of the program (Krogstad, 2017). At 4%, El Salvador is the next most common country of origin for approved applicants. No other country accounted for more than 3% of approvals (Lopez, 2014).

President Barack Obama introduced the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program in November of 2014. According the Pew Research Center, the largest group who would be eligible for relief under DAPA and other expanded deportation relief programs would be the estimated 3.5 million unauthorized immigrant parents to whom DAPA would apply. Immigrants in this category “have lived in the U.S. since Jan 1, 2010, and have children who either were born in the U.S. or are legal permanent residents.” Under the expanded program for unauthorized immigrants, immigrants from Mexico were found to benefit the most under the actions, representing two-thirds of all those eligible. Half of all unauthorized immigrants in the united States are from Mexico (Krogstad, 2016).

Idaho had the highest percentage of immigrants who were eligible for deportation where 46% of the state’s unauthorized immigrant population was eligible for deportation relief. Other states with at least 40% eligible immigrants included Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Between both programs - President Obama’s executive action as well as DACA and DAPA, 62% of the estimated 50,000 unauthorized immigrants in Idaho were eligible for relief, the highest of any state in the nation. Nationwide, 48% of unauthorized
immigrants were eligible for relief under these programs (Krogstad & Passel, 2014). In 2014, when the acts were signed, the Congressional Research Service estimated that visa overstays accounted for between 31% and 57% of undocumented migrants. (Warren & Kerwin, 2015; Wasem, 2014).

4.6 RECENT MIGRATION PRESIDENTIAL ACTS 2017

A series of executive orders signed in 2017, the U.S. increased efforts to control illegal migration along the border and other U.S. entries. The efforts were the result of Executive Orders put in place by the incoming administration run by President Donald Trump.

Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, focused on entry including visa violations and migrants involved in crime (Executive Order, 2017a). It required local jurisdictions to work with migration officers to enforce illegal migration policies. It also stated that sanctuary cities caused “immeasurable harm” to citizens as, “many of these aliens are criminals who have served time in our Federal, State and local jails,” and the federal government would no longer provide funding for cities that protected illegal migrants. The order resulted in an immediate increase of deportations, with emphasis on undocumented migrants with criminal records, including misdemeanors committed years prior.

Executive Order: Border Security and Migration Enforcement Improvements (Executive Order, 2017b), more directly focused on issues at the southern border related to crime, including criminal organizations, drug smuggling, and human trafficking. It placed attention on directing funds to construct a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. It also created stricter measures related to detention, deportation and asylum.

Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States (Executive Order, 2017c), included a stricter vetting process for foreigners from the primarily Muslim countries of Iran, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and Sudan. The order included refugees and those with established visas. The order established an immediate, but temporary, halt on the admission of refugees, new visas and foreign entry. People were stranded at airports. Protests ensued as U.S. residents and lawmakers claimed the order placed refugees in harm by forcing them to remain in war-torn countries, including some with visas and others who served with the U.S. military during conflict. Other human rights concerns included the partiality to Christian religions (Liptak, 2017; Newman, 2017; Scott, 2017). Federal Courts immediately stopped the order, however the President said a new order would be mandated as of this writing.

5. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRANTS

Immigration in the United States is one of the most divisive political and ideological issues across the country. The gaps and tensions on immigration go across education, income, occupation, cultural background and social class. During the 2016 Presidential Election, immigration was an upfront topic that showed the polarization of the American
public. The news media was the outlet that distribute information which also shaped American attitudes.

Recent research has shown that immigration is a highly politicized issue in the United States. Many Americans who identify with conservative ideologies and/or the Republican Party support measures that would decrease immigration to the US, whereas Americans who identify with liberal ideologies and/or the Democratic Party tend to support measures that would allow for easier immigration to the US. A study that confirmed these results also found that several other important factors that influence whether an American supports immigration or not. For example, perceptions about the costs of immigration were a very large determining factor in their survey. This study also found that the perception of immigrants as a threat to the “American identity” played a large role in shaping public opinion on immigration. Education also plays a role in that Americans with college degrees are less likely to support efforts to reduce immigration (Garcia & Davidson, 2013).

For Americans who oppose immigration, a common concern expressed is that immigrants will drive down wages and increase poverty in the U.S. A study done in 2009 focused on the fact that the proportion of American residents born in another country increased from 4.8 to 12.4 percent from 1970 to 2003. The researchers used poverty data from 1970 and 2003 to estimate what the current poverty rates would be in 2003 if the percentage of foreign-born residents was still 4.8 percent as it in 1970. This allowed them to determine what effect immigration had on the poverty rate in the US. The results of the study suggested that immigration over this time period "has had negligible effects on poverty overall". The estimated poverty levels for a lower percentage of immigrants were nearly identical to the actual recorded poverty rates in 2003, showing that the increase in foreign-born residents in the US has actually not had an impact on poverty in the country (Raphael & Smolensky, 2009).

The perception of migrants is another problem that has lingered in America from the beginning. Migration in the United States cannot be seen as an isolated process or as a policy issues placed in a vacuum. The entire history of the U.S. is filled with migration patterns and conditions that have had effects on communities, labor markets, and on the broader society. Since the initial European arrivals most perceptions of migrants were the product of either personal contact or through friends, colleagues, and family members. However, with the arrival of the print press in the early part of the 19th Century, the news media became a major constructor of collective perception. Each newer migrant group has been historically harassed and blamed for all the problems the country faced at the time; this is especially true during downturn economic cycles and during high rates of crime. Evidence has shown that the impact on American-born job opportunities and depression of wages was minimal and that crime did not increase during the picks of arrival of Latino migrants (Martinez et.al. 2015). Little is presented by the news media about these clarifying evidence.

Before the American Presidential election of 2016, migration was on the second or third level of importance for most of the population. In 2008 Presidential election, the main topics were the economy, terrorism, health care, Iraq war, and energy policy. In
2008 only 4% of Americans placed migration as the most important political issue, yet 52% considered that it was an important issue to discuss (Pew, 2008). However, in the 2016 election, migration was considered as an important topic by 70% of the American voters (Pew, 2016).

Table 3 shows that over time there has been a change on American attitudes towards migration policies. For instance, in 2015 and 2016 less than a quarter of the respondents favor deportation, however in 2017, more than half or 58% favor permanent removals or deportations.

**Table 3. Public opinion about migration measures, %, 2014-2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favor Deportations</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor Wall</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor Citizenship Reform</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Goo, 2015; Jones, 2016; Suls, 2017

Opinions on migration policies remained relatively consistent within the U.S., despite the 2017 election that caused national divide between the two primary political parties. In table 3 constructed from Pew Research data from 2014 through 2017 indicates overall support for citizenship reforms and constructing a wall along the U.S./Mexico border changed little (Goo, 2015; Jones, 2016; Suls, 2017). Support for deportations showed some fluctuation within that period. It decreased slightly from 2014 (45%) to 2015 (25%), held steady in 2016 (23%), and increased in 2017 (58%), during the campaign (Suls, 2017).

**Table 4. Migration opinion by political affiliation, %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants are making society worse</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants are making crime worse</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants are making the economy worse</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants do not assimilate quickly enough</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants do not learn English quickly enough</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration to the US should be decreased</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration levels should stay the same</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration should be increased</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration in the US needs to be reformed</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Krogstad, 2015

As of 2015, there were 45 million migrants living in the US, including an estimated 11.3 unauthorized or illegal migrants. That’s a near-record 14% of the total US population. According to research done by the Pew Center in early 2015, 45% of Americans said that migrants are making society better compared to 37% who said they are making it worse. As seen in table 4, the biggest determinant of an American’s opinion on migrants is their...
party allegiance. Just over half (53%) of Republicans said migrants coming to the US make society worse in the long run while only 24% of Democrats said the same.

Table 4 shows clearly the gaps between Republicans and Democrats on migration. For instance, 71% of Republicans said they felt migrants were making crime worse compared to 34% of Democrats who said the same. These percentages were the same when participants were asked if they thought migrants were making the economy worse. When it came to assimilation of migrants in the US, a large majority of Republicans also reported thinking that migrants generally want to hold on to the customs and way of life of their home country (81%) and do not learn English quickly enough (74%). Among Democrats, these numbers were 55% and 45% respectively. Americans from either major political party have mostly positive or neutral views of Asian and European migrants. But when it comes to those from Latin America or the Middle East, Republicans were much more likely than Democrats to report negative views of migrants from countries in those regions.

About half of all Americans (49%) said that migration to the US should be decreased. Among Republicans, this figure was 67%, and among Democrats, it was 33%. For comparison, 7% of Republicans and 20% of Democrats said migration should be increased and 25% of Republicans and 43% of Democrats said migration levels should stay the same. Despite these differences in opinion about how migration should be handled, members of both parties agree strongly that migration in the US needs to be reformed: 89% of Republicans and 79% of Democrats said that the migration system needs major changes or needs to be completely rebuilt (Krogstad, 2015).

Even though most of the information that Americans have is shared through social media, where family and friends shared the information they have. However, this has become a source of polarization as conservative alt.right groups have embarked in the construction of fake news. The surge of cable news channels with liberal or conservative orientation is fragmenting the public to view or hear the news that fits their ideology or political perspective. And, worse, the President of the United States has declared a war to the news media for doing their journalistic work. It is not a surprise that same issues on migration are seen very different based on political affiliation, what is a surprise is the distortion and deconstruction of facts to fit a political agenda and present it as the truth.

6. Conclusion

The unprecedented political conditions in the United States, derived from the divisive 2016 Presidential Election, have given a primacy to migration issues that used to be in second and third tier of importance to Americans. Despite the political rhetoric, one of the most important triggers was the amount of foreign-born population in the U.S. or 12.6%, which is very close to the historical peak of 1890 that represented 14.8% of the entire population. However, the major factor is that the largest group of migrants in the country happens to be Hispanic/Latino. Some calculations have shown that the foreign-born population has grown by around 1 million persons per years in the last two decades. This
created an erroneous perception that the high presence of Latinos in the U.S. is the result of migration when, in fact, is derived from high fertility rates (Suro, 2009).

Besides the amount and visibility of the foreign-born population, there were other two important triggers for placing migration on the top of public opinion: the September 11 attacks and the 2007-2009 Great Recession. First, foreigners who caused the attacks had apparent connections with some local radical Al-Kaeda groups that triggered a persistent distrust of Middle Easterners. This in turn has provoked that many Anglo Americans distrust anybody who looks non-Anglo. The other factor was the 2007-2009 Great Recession that had significant repercussions to employment and wages. Many American-born workers across economic sectors but especially those unskilled lost their jobs and they turn their anger against foreigners. So far, this is nothing new as historically any problem America has faced is blamed to the recent migrant group.

Another problem faced in the United States is undocumented migration along the U.S.-Mexican border. In order to get to the U.S. from Mexico, some immigrants, especially Central Americans, attempt to cross the Sonoran desert and enter the country without documents. Between 1994 and 2012, it was estimated that over 5,000 migrants died in the Sonoran desert. In a 2012 study, Androff & Tavassoli identified three major areas where human rights crises were occurring due to the criminalization of migration in the US: “the rise of deaths and injuries of migrants crossing the border in harsh and remote locations, the use of mass hearings to prosecute apprehended migrants, and abuses of migrants in detention”. There is little evidence to suggest that attempts to criminalize migration have decreased it. Instead, they appear to have increased the suffering and deaths of migrants (Androff & Tavassoli, 2012). Recently, humanitarian groups working to help migrants have also been targeted for criminalization in the United States.

As shown in this chapter, Americans tend to see migration as “good” for the country; however, solving the legalization of undocumented migrants, setting caps for legal migration, and establishing the numbers of family members who can be brought by a U.S. citizen or permanent resident is far from easy. In fact, in the last two years it has become one of the most contested policy issues after health care and taxes. The arrival of Mr. Trump to the White House has increased the tensions and hostilities towards migrants and to demonize migration as the source of all problems America has. And the timid reactions of the U.S. Congress don’t provide hope to find a humane and comprehensive reform benefiting migrants and their families – at least in the short term. And there is little comfort to see that this problem is also happening in the U.K and other countries in Europe.

It is ironic that the majority of Americans think positively about migration and its benefits. In fact, most Americans support legalization for those who are undocumented in the country, and they support the notion that employers should be the enforcers of legal status and not border controls. Yet, most Americans think that the numbers of migrants should be decreased and close attention should be paid to the countries of origin, languages and religions migrants should have to be allowed into the United States. This shows that despite having some general positive perspectives on migration, the
mechanisms to make them policies and laws are what have divided the country in the last years.

Everything about migration in America is changing daily. The current conditions are not favorable for the migrants and their families. Nativism and ethno-nationalism resurged during the presidential campaign of 2016, and it is early to see how far it will expand. That is why more social sciences research is needed to keep an eye in how traditional media is informing the public, in how and who in social media is shaping public opinion, in understanding how modern propaganda is creating facts, and in analyzing how governmental action is shaping migration, and the American society.

**REFERENCES**


1. The Development of Immigrant Policies: From European to Local Realities

Immigrant policies must be distinguished from immigration policies: the first concern the citizenship rights for immigrants and the regulations for the cohabitation of natives and immigrants. The latter, which are usually at the heart of public and political debates, concern the incoming flows, in other words the regulations that rule the selection and the admission of foreign nationals. This distinction, that risks fading because of the high politicization of the immigration topic, is fundamental, since immigrant and immigration policies have very different aims and objectives. Yet, as will be shown below, it is possible to observe a tendency that sees immigrant policies transform into immigration policies.

In the Member States of the European Union, the elaboration of immigrant policies involves different levels of administration: the European, the national and the regional/local administrations. The relationship among these three levels is not always linear though. Since 1999, with the Amsterdam Treaty, migration issues have fallen within the competence of the European Union: nevertheless, we have witnessed a slow communitarization, since European countries did not want and are not going to cede their national sovereignties regarding migration issues.¹ The instrument that represented the basis for all the European immigrant policies, although it is not binding by nature, is the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy, adopted by the Justice and Internal Affairs Ministries in 2004. It consists of eleven common basic principles that, as well as promoting a shared definition of integration,² identify the conditions for fair inclusion in the host society.

In the ‘80s and ‘90s migration issues were mainly dealt and defined within the borders of each Nation state, consequently causing two risks: on the one hand, the risk of

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¹ See the referendum under the government of Viktor Orban against the relocation of immigrants who arrived in Italy and Greece decided by Brussels. For further details, see Ortensi, 2016.

² Integration is defined as a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
reification of the national integration models (the French assimilation model and the multicultural model of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden). On the other hand, there is what Wimmer and Glick Schiller have called “methodological nationalism”, that is to consider a Nation state as a natural unit for the study of social phenomena, including migration (Wimmer, Glick Schiller, 2013).

With the beginning of the new century, the focus moved to a local dimension (Penninx et al., 2004; Penninx, Martiniello, 2007; Penninx, 2009). Cities turned out to be capable of not only implementing the national policies, but also developing approaches on issues that traditionally had been considered national expertise. This is the case, for example, in Switzerland, where the final decision regarding the granting of citizenship is made by a local political entity (Caponio, 2014). Cities have also the possibility to play an additional role, that is to put pressure on central governments. Many Italian municipalities, for example, have granted honorary citizenship to immigrants’ children who were born and/or raised in the national territory: this choice was meant to put the issue of the reform of the citizenship law back on to the national political agenda.

Beyond the modalities of governance of the migration processes, it is possible to identify a common trend in Europe which has involved most European countries. We have witnessed a transition from the cultural pluralism paradigm to the civic integration paradigm (Carrera, 2006; Carrera, Wiesbrock, 2009; Enar, 2016; Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010), although with some exceptions. Some neo-assimilationist concerns have spread, for example in the form of a request of adhesion and acceptance of the host society values and its institutions. Regarding this, the choices of some European countries are emblematic.

In January 2016 Austria approved the 50 Action Points for the integration of persons entitled to asylum or subsidiary protection in Austria. These measures focus specifically on the learning of the German language and “Austrian” values (such as gender equality and secularism), with the establishment of courses for the transmission of these values and concerning every-day life in Austria. In Finland, in many refugee shelters, the asylum seekers have had to attend meetings on “how to behave with Finnish women” (Enar, 2016). As well as the concept behind these measures, that is an alleged superiority of the European natives towards the foreign nationals (Ibid.), according to some scholars, these immigrant policies, inspired by an assimilationist approach, have become a selective instruments for the flows (Carrera, 2006; Groenendijk, 2006). What immigrants are asked for is to be “deserving”, even before entering any European countries, in terms of knowledge of the language and integration agreements to stipulate (Enar, 2016).

3 For a debate regarding the limitations of the integration national models and their “gaps” in comparison with the political and social practices, see Martiniello, 1997.

4 As Zanfrini claims (2016: 14) “immigration represents an assertive challenge to that idea of homogeneity in the ethnic composition – defined in terms of language, culture, history and common traditions – that lies at the heart of the process of the foundation of a State nation. Perhaps it is an artificial homogeneity, but it is built and reinforced through the recourse to powerful national myths”. Translation from Italian by the Authors.
2. THE INTEGRATION PLANS IN EUROPE

To govern the presence of immigrants in their territories, some European states have written Integration Plans, a coherent set of principles and objectives as guidelines for the processes of inclusion of the immigrants into the European societies. As a matter of fact, an effective inclusion in the housing, working and school environments and access to the services require long-term planning (Enar, 2016), which must be capable of overcoming the emergency aspects that migration has been perceived and governed by (Ambrosini, 2011).

One first distinction must be made between the European countries that have officially adopted an integration plan (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Great Britain, Romania, Spain) and those that haven't (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden). 6

The socio-political and cultural contexts of the countries that have chosen not to compose an integration plan, and the reasons behind this choice, are extremely variegated. In some countries, for example, despite the lack of a national plan, regional and local plans have been put into practice (this is the case of Belgium, where the three regions – Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels – have different integration plans, and Luxembourg, where local plans have been adopted). In Sweden, which is a leader in Europe for its favourable policies for the integration of immigrants (Huddleston et al., 2011), the situation is different. This Northern country, which has an old tradition of policies based on a multicultural approach (Riniolo, Bergnehr-Moscatelli, 2014), hasn’t adopted any integration plans: based on the principle of mainstreaming, the policies favourable to the integration of immigrants are formulated across the various areas of interest (work, school, welfare, etc.).

The lack of an integration plan in Hungary, conversely, can be attributed to its peculiar situation: in 2015 Hungary received the highest number of asylum requests in Europe, both with respect to the number of inhabitants, and to the number of foreign nationals already present in the country (over 174,000 requests in the face of little more than 145,000 foreign national citizens) (Ortensi, 2016). This has made it even more difficult to accept the transition from being an emigration country to a transit country, and more and more, to an immigration country, feeding a violent and harsh political debate (Ibid.).

5 For a close examination of the Italian case, see paragraph 3.

6 This distinction is based on the information present in the 2016 Enar report. It is necessary to underline that, in some cases, the integration plans are addressed only to specific immigrants (for example, the holders of international protection, refugees, etc.) and not to the migrated population that has been residing in the country for a medium to long term. Austria is an example of that. In other cases, the integration plans are complete programs involving the entire migrated population with specific measures and monitoring instruments (such as in Portugal). Notice that the 2016 Enar report enlists Italy among the countries that have not elaborated an integration plan, because the National Integration Plan for international protection holders, that will be analysed below, was pushed later, in September 2017.
Beside this group of states that, for very different reasons and concepts, haven’t composed an integration plan, other countries have decided to adopt an explicit and coherent strategy of immigration governance. For reasons of space, it is not possible to analyse all the integration plans of all European countries in this paper. The choice has fallen on the integration plans of Germany and Portugal, two countries with two different migration histories. Germany is a country of old migration, Portugal, on the other hand, has a recent history of migration.

2.1 The National Integration Plan in Germany

The elaboration of an integration plan implies an implicit acceptance of a stable presence of foreign nationals in a territory. This cannot be taken for granted in a country like Germany, where “not until recent times has the term “immigrant” entered the institutional language. It has always been preferable to resort to a variety of expressions, all presenting an emphasis on the foreign nationality of the immigrants and the temporary aspect of their presence. The most common one is the euphemistic expression of Gastarbeiter […], that recalls the non-belonging to the host society”7 (Zanfrini, 2016: 14).

The adoption of the National Integration Plan, New Paths, New Opportunities8 in 2007 was meant to recognise, implicitly and explicitly, that the immigrants present in the German territory have no intention to return to their countries of origins, and that, therefore, Germany is a country of immigration. In the introduction to the national plan, the State Minister Maria Böhmer writes:

“These people came to us as “guest workers”: at first alone and subsequently accompanied by their families. Initially, the intention and their wish was that their stay would be temporary, but many made the decision to take up residence in Germany.”

Before the composition of this plan, due to the lack of a national integration policy, many initiatives and measures were taken from the bottom, by cities and other organizations of civil society.

The National Integration Plan is the result of a mission that started on 14th July 2006, during the Integration Summit called by Chancellor Angela Merkel. Since that date, until March 2007, different players worked together on the composition of the national plan: the federal government, the länder, the local councils, the immigration communities and various proponents of civil society committed to migratory issues.

What the plan lacks is a definition of integration, although it is possible to infer that the concept of integration beneath the entire plan refers to the concept of civic integration, due to the emphasis on the acceptance of German values, language and culture.

“What is decisive is firstly the willingness on the part of migrants to engage in life within our society, accept our basic constitution and entire legal system without

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7 Translation from Italian by the Authors.
limitation and the mastery of the German language as a visible sign of affiliation to Germany.” (National Integration Plan 2007)

This plan is mostly based on the voluntary acceptance of “400 voluntary commitments”: this is the reason why many players from civil society have criticised the scarce concreteness of the plan, and some Turkish organizations have accused the government of abusing them to legitimate its migratory policy (Siliprandi, 2014).

On 25th May 2016, the federal government set up a new migration reform, adopting the Integration Act, which aims to facilitate the refugees in the access to language courses and to reduce the obstacles to the marketplace and training courses.9

2.2 The 2015-2020 Strategic Plan for Migrations in Portugal

A significantly different approach has been adopted by Portugal. This State, which is second to Sweden regarding integration policies (Huddleston et al., 2011), has chosen to enhance the contribution of immigrants to the country, in terms of what they can give to the economy and public finances. In the plan there is no emphasis on the necessity to learn Portuguese values and culture.

Facing a demographic deficit, Portugal has chosen to elaborate a plan that deals organically with both incoming and outgoing flows. In the past years there has been a decrease in the number of immigrants arriving in the country, and an increase in Portuguese citizens emigrating to other countries. The government has therefore decided to adopt the 2015-2020 Strategic Plan for Migration10 which is composed of 106 measures, grouped into five thematic challenges: 1) immigrant policies for integration 2) inclusion of the new Portuguese citizens 3) coordination of the incoming flows 4) enhancement of the quality of the services for the immigrants; 5) support for the return of Portuguese emigrants.11

For each measure, the actions to undertake, the indicator of realization, the authority in charge and, finally, the estimated date of realization, are indicated. For example, the first measure wants to outline some local strategies to ensure an arranged action with all the different players involved in the migration issues. This leads to the creation of local immigration plans as instruments for the development of local policies for the reception and integration of immigrants. The indicator is the implementation of fifty local plans on a municipal scale.

The entire plan was written also with the purpose of monitoring the real implementation: this task has been assigned to the High Commissioner for Migration

10 The 2015-2020 Strategic Plan for Migration was approved by a Resolution of the Council of Ministers n. 12-B/2015 on 20th March and it entered into force on 23rd March 2015.
(ACM, I.P.), who is in charge of the writing of a biennial report about the achievements of the established purposes.

3. Italy

In Italy, according to the Consolidated Act of Provisions concerning immigration and the condition of third country nationals (TU 286/1998), the responsibility to define and implement integration plans for foreign nationals is under the jurisdiction of the Regions. Its financial contribution occurs through the fund for migration policies (art. 45 of the above mentioned TU).\textsuperscript{12} This is certainly in line with the reform of the Title V of the Italian Constitution approved in 2001, which saw a considerable extension of the tasks and the functions of the Regions and the local entities for a multi-level governance (MLG).

As an opposite trend to this approach, in 2009, as part of the so-called “Security Package”, the first national set of regulations regarding integration was introduced. It was called the Integration Agreement. In September 2017, moreover, the Ministry of the Interior presented the National Integration Plan for international protection holders. This document, as highlighted in its introduction, “focuses only on the beneficiaries of protection; however, the intervention strategies can be considered as the first step towards an integrated and inclusive system also of the other foreign nationals regularly living in the country”. The migration issue has pointed out a latent contradiction in the system: on the one hand the constitutional reform above mentioned has led to the decentralization of social policies, and on the other hand immigration (and the integration of foreign citizens) has become a primary issue for the national government (Campomori, Caponio, 2016).

The management of European funds (in particular of Fei Fund and, currently, of AMIF Fund) has become part of this context. Nowadays these funds represent essential instruments to determine the actions in favour of integration.

3.1 The introduction of the Integration Agreement and its implementation

As previously mentioned, in 2009, the so-called “Security package” (law 94/2009 “Disposition on public security”) introduced the first national regulations regarding immigration. With the introduction of art. 4-bis in TU 286/1998, an implementing Regulation has been approved, thanks to which criteria and modalities for the acceptance of an integration plan for foreign nationals above 16 years have been established.\textsuperscript{13} This agreement sanctions the commitment to reach specific integration goals within a two-

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\textsuperscript{12} For further information, consult Campomori, Caponio, 2013.

\textsuperscript{13} Regulation approved with a Presidential Decree on 14\textsuperscript{th} September 2011 n. 179, entered into force on 10\textsuperscript{th} March 2012.
year time frame. The acceptance of the agreement is also binding to the release of the permit.

Article 4-bis introduces also a definition of integration, that has become a guide line of the whole disposition:

“Integration is a process aimed to promote the cohabitation of Italian and foreign nationals, in full compliance with the values enshrined in the Italian Constitution, with the mutual commitment of participating in the economic, social and cultural life of the society.” (Art. 4-bis, comma 1, TU 286/98)

By signing the Agreement (at the Immigration Services Office or at the Questura-Police Headquarters), the foreign nationals commit to acquire an adequate level of spoken Italian – at least equivalent to A2 level in the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) –, acquire an acceptable level of knowledge of the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Republic and civil life in Italy, and guarantee the fulfilment of the education obligations for minors.

By signing the Agreement, the foreign nationals claim also that they adhere to the Charter of Values of Citizenship and Integration. As well as references to the dignity of people, their civil rights and duties, the principles of freedom of religion, state secularism, and the promotion of peace, the Charter contains precise references to the classical cultural roots (Ancient Greece and Roman Empire) and to the Jewish-Christian tradition, constituting the “values on which the Italian society is based” (Charter of Values of Citizenship and Integration, Decree of the Minister of Interior, 23rd April 2007).

The emphasis on the compliance with Italian values and culture, and the importance of learning Italian as a second language recall, therefore, the paradigm of civic integration presented in the introduction to the chapter and found in the National Integration Plan in Germany.

The Agreement is based on credits that can be acquired – through the registration of minors at school, the selection of the General Practitioner, the presentation of a certificate of Italian language level, the study of civics, attendance of training courses, etc. – or reduced – due to criminal court orders, implementation of personal safety regulations, imposition of pecuniary fines non-inferior to ten thousand euros. At the expiration of the residency permit (usually 2 years), the foreign nationals have to prove having obtained at least 30 credits (including the 16 assigned on the stipulation phase), in order to renew the title.

The State, on the other hand, commits to support the integration process of the foreign nationals with the implementation of suitable initiatives in collaboration with the Regions and Local Entities.

3.2 The National Integration Plan for International Protection Holders

On 26th September 2017 the Ministry of the Interior presented the first National Integration Plan for International Protection Holders, developed by the National Coordination Board, as requested by the Lgs D 18 of 21st February 2014.
The plan originates from the premise that, in order to activate a virtuous paths towards integration, an initial acceptable reception is not enough, but it is necessary to establish specific dispositions to facilitate the inclusion into the host society and the acceptance of its values. Integration is consequently defined as a pathway that cannot exclude the acceptance of the principles and values of the Italian Constitution and, in particular, of gender equality, respect for the secularity of the State, and respect for personal freedom.

Within this frame, the document defines a series of priorities:

1. Support interfaith dialogue through the actualization of the National Pact for Islam at a local level, promote training courses for the exponents of the religious communities, opening of places of worship;
2. Facilitate the access to education and culture, making Italian language courses obligatory in the reception centres, promote training courses in the territory for adults;
3. Promote instruments for training and professional enhancement, facilitating participation in internships and apprenticeships, promote enterprise start-ups and access to the National Civil Service;
4. Simplify access to the National Health Service, promoting preventative measures and enhancing the training of medical staff;
5. Promote access to houses and residences, including the international protection holders in the regional and local emergency housing plans, and map the public properties for a reassignment of the houses.
6. Promote participation and active citizenship, encouraging the attendance of voluntary work in the territory and enhancing socialization;
7. Prevent and contrast discrimination, developing the network of anti-discrimination centres and experimenting with the mediation of communities and/or neighbourhoods where SPRAR centres are located.

The plan proves to be in continuity with the approach that originated with the Charter of Values that, introduced by the Integration Agreement, is considered an important precedent. In this sense, this new document generally confirms an adhesion to the above mentioned paradigm of civic integration, focusing on the importance of the acceptance of the values of the host society and the learning of the second language, as pillars of the integration process.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, it is interesting to notice how most of the integration programs have language and civic courses at their core: the learning of the language of the host country is an essential instrument to approach the institutions, but in many cases this is not enough. Immigrants have, in fact, the perception that their knowledge of the language (perceived as never adequate) is not enough to cover certain work positions and not to be discriminated against (Enar, 2016).
Furthermore, as recently highlighted by a study on the integration processes in Europe (Gilardoni et al., 2015), with a specific reference to the Italian case, language courses are attended by those who want to learn Italian to enrich their personal knowledge or to have better work opportunities, rather than to respect an “integration agreement” signed with the institutions.

Overall, the governance of the integration of Third Country citizens by European countries, for different reasons (ideologies, different historical-geographical contexts, different concept of political communities, etc.), appears to be articulated and diversified, even though it is possible to identify a common line: European migration policies are not mature yet (Penninx et al., 2004). Regarding this, it is important to mention a recent study that investigated the players that facilitate the implementation, by European countries, of soft law instruments in the immigrants’ integration (Van Wolleghem, 2017). This research specifically analyses the European Fund for the integration of third-country nationals, that is the financial instrument for the implementation of the Common Basic Principles for integration policies. The research highlights how monetary subsidies are less effective than the pressure that the public opinion and the voluntary sector organizations apply on the governments for the implementation of soft law instruments (Ibid.), putting the role of civil society back at the centre.

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Migration in Italy and in the EU are undergoing radical changes. In its Twenty-third Italian Report on Migrations 2017, the ISMU Foundation estimates that as of 1st January 2017 the foreign population in Italy has reached 5,958,000 units and looks at the new migration trends in Italy and Europe.

The Report highlights how, once again, in 2017 the so-called “migrant crisis” has been at the core of the political agenda and debate in Italy. While the number of irregular migrants has drastically decreased in 2016 following the EU-Turkey deal that has de facto halted fluxes through Balkan route, the migrant crisis is far from being solved. The deep crises that hit several countries both in Africa and the Middle-East have leveraged migrant flows to Italy, which has once again become the main gate to Europe in the Mediterranean despite the steady decline in arrivals in 2017.

Beyond the traditional areas of interest (demography, legislation, economy and labour, education), the Report provides an insight into highly topical themes such as the relation between EU and migration as well as unaccompanied minors. The Report ends with an analysis of migration in the US.