Getting to the root of the problem. 
A policy perspective on how the EU is tackling migration through development

By Luca Merotta

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Confronted with consistent streams of migrants, the EU has progressively externalised its migration policy by embedding migration issues into a number of external policies, including development. For historical and geopolitical reasons, Africa has become the privileged continent in this new approach. In order to fully appreciate the dynamics and the rationales behind this externalisation, this paper reviews the major policy initiatives that the EU took over the past decade with regard to international development and migration as two mutually dependent policy areas. Firstly, it assesses the policy debate that underpinned the conception and adoption of the 2015 Agenda on Migration amidst the so-called “migration crisis”. Secondly, it looks at the Agenda and other key events, like the Valletta Summit. Thirdly, it reviews the main policy initiatives that were taken to implement the Agenda. Lastly, it presents the most recent developments and the tools that are being defined or negotiated at EU level.

Introduction

Contrary to the idea that politicians and media often convey, migration is both a complex and fluid phenomenon that has an internal dimension but also stretches beyond EU and national borders. It involves several routes (legal and illegal), several policy areas involved (asylum, employment, integration, border management, security and fight against trafficking) and several push and pull factors.

Vis-à-vis such a complex phenomenon, an effective governance on migration cannot rely exclusively on managing fluxes within and to Northern countries but should also take into account the dynamics and the rationales behind migration and involve the greatest number of actors not only in countries of destination but also in countries of origin and transit. Confronted with consistent streams of migrants, the EU has progressively externalized its migration policy by embedding migration issues into a number of external policies, including development. For historical and geopolitical reasons, Africa has become the privileged continent for this new approach.

In order to fully appreciate the dynamics behind this externalisation, this paper reviews the major policy initiatives that the EU took over the past decade with regard to international development and migration. In particular, it intends to gather all the arguments and the means through which migration and development have progressively been perceived as interconnected and mutually dependent policy areas.
The policy review revolves around the 2015 EU Agenda on Migration, a key programmatic document that marked a major change in EU’s handling of migration at global level. Firstly, it assesses the policy debate that underpinned the conception and adoption of the Agenda before 2015 and amidst the so-called “migration crisis”. Secondly, it looks at the Agenda and other key factors, like the Valletta Summit. Thirdly, it reviews the main policy initiatives that were taken to implement the Agenda. Lastly, it presents the most recent developments and the tools that are being defined or negotiated at EU level as well as the upcoming events that could contribute to reinforcing or undermining the status quo.

1. The road to Valletta

Since the 2000s the EU has increasingly embedded migration into its broader external policies. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility1 (GAMM) is, since 2005, the overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy. The official document, as it was updated in 2011, strengthens the links between multiple relevant EU policy areas and between the internal and external dimension of these policies.

The GAMM makes migration a pivotal component of four different thematic pillars. Three out of four pillars focus on either the EU or the regional context, while giving countries of origin a marginal role. In organising and facilitating legal migration and mobility (first pillar), the EU takes a positive approach by supporting skill-matching and supply-demand dialogue within the EU. At the same time, in preventing and reducing irregular migration and trafficking in human beings (second pillar) the EU takes a negative approach in that it aims at hampering illegal entries to the EU led by organised crime. Promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum policy (third pillar) focuses on refugees and displaced persons, namely by supporting regional protection programmes and enhancing resettlement in the EU.

The fourth pillar focuses specifically on countries of origin and transit, trying to maximise the development impact of migration and mobility. The GAMM acknowledges that interregional and intraregional migrations outweigh migration to the EU, and that south-south migration can often benefit migrations in the form of better job opportunities and higher income. Diasporas become key actors in this transfer of wealth, although the document warns about some downsides. If the EU did not couple facilitation of migrants’ cash transfers with a sound capacity-building in partner countries on employment creation and education, health and housing policies, the social costs and risks would be severe, as households might become dependent on income from remittances. For migration to be mainstreamed throughout the development thinking, it should be embedded into the whole range of EU sectorial policies, such as agriculture, health and education. In addition, the document refers to climate change as a factor that is increasingly driving migration and displacement.

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The Agenda for Change\textsuperscript{2}, adopted in 2011, is the basis for the EU’s development policy. It aims at increasing the impact and effectiveness of EU development policy and focuses, among other things, on inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. Along with committing to reforms in the field of health and education policies, the document recommends that the EU support the decent work agenda, social protection schemes and regional labour mobility thus fully exploiting the interrelationship between migration, mobility and employment. It also mentions the development-migration nexus, arguing that “the EU should assist development countries in strengthening their policies, capacities and activities in the area of migration and mobility, with a view to maximising the development impact of the increased regional and global mobility of people”.\textsuperscript{3} Donors and other development actors should integrate migration and mobility issues into their development policies and instruments.

The 2013 Commission Communication on Maximising the Development Impact of migration\textsuperscript{4} was meant to feed the second UN High-level dialogue on International Migration and Development (2013) and, more generally, the discussions around the post-2015 development framework. While the Communication still presents the migration-development nexus as a major issue that needs to be considered in the EU external approach, it also explicitly recognises they are mutually beneficial and proposes a broadened approach that gives greater attention to south-south flows. Development, indeed, “rel[ies] on mobility, which is necessary to ensure efficient labour matching and facilitates transfers of social, financial and human capital”, while it also “fosters mobility, providing greater resources for people to migrate in search of opportunities”\textsuperscript{5}. In terms of geographical scope, a particular focus is put on intra-region mobility, cooperation between low- and middle-income countries of origin and destination. In terms of thematic scope, the document refers to the positive impact of circular migration on the economic and social development of countries of origin and destination and calls for the EU to support intra-regional labour mobility as well as skill development, certification and recognition schemes.

As the next paragraph will show, the Valletta Summit constitutes a defining moment in the EU approach to migration through development. The meeting, however, should not be considered as a stand-alone event but rather as the operationalization of an undergoing reflexion within both the international community and the EU.

The EU Agenda on Migration, agreed upon in May 2015, constitutes the programmatic document of such reflexion. The Strategic note “The EU and Africa: Valletta and beyond”\textsuperscript{6} drafted by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), the Commission’s in-house think tank, was instrumental in translating words into deeds. The note adopts a number of recurring themes on migration and development and intends to help stakeholders agree on a common agenda on migration. It takes stock of the challenges that the EU-Africa rela-

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. p. 12.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p.12.
\textsuperscript{6} European Political Strategy Centre (2015) The EU and Africa: Valletta and Beyond, European Commission, Brussels.
tions face, namely a disproportionate demographic growth, the lack of job opportunities and a particular instability. In order for the summit to reach the broadest consensus among partners, the note calls on the EU to match measures against smuggling and readmission with the promotion of legal migration, support for peace, sustainable development and, most importantly, strategies to address “the root causes of irregular migration”? Great emphasis is put on resilience as a major goal of development cooperation in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. As instability, poverty, persistence of food insecurity and lack to basic services are primarily responsible for migration, the EU should adopt strategies to prevent and mitigate instability and conflict. In this perspective, governance is essential to secure sustainable development and should be promoted through the EU-Africa partnership.

2. The post-2015 framework

The year 2015 was particularly salient for the European Union. Albeit relatively small compared to the global figures, the number of refugees that came to the EU in 2014 represented a political challenge for the EU. Negotiations between all policy-makers resulted in the swift adoption of the European Agenda on Migration and the organisation of the Valletta Summit.

2.1 The European Agenda on Migration

Drafted and launched amidst the so-called “refugee crisis”, the Commission presented the EU Agenda on Migration as a response to “the tragic loss of life in the Mediterranean [that] has shocked all Europeans” in order to “prevent this tragedy from continuing unabated”.

The Agenda builds on a double approach and aims at providing policy responses in the short and in the long term. Internally, the EU should step up search and rescue efforts in the short term to restore the level of intervention provided under the previous “Mare Nostrum” operation led by the Italian authorities. At the same time it should target criminal smuggling network by pooling and maximizing information. Internally, it should guarantee an orderly management of refugees through tools to help frontline Member states (the so-called “hotspot” approach), relocation among Member states and resettlement from third countries. Partners in countries of origin and transit will play a key role in tackling migration upstream by putting in place measures to prevent hazardous journeys. The stakes and the expectations that these actions deliver effectively and swiftly are high, as this approach could serve as the blueprint for the EU’s response to future global crises.

As outlined by Commission President Junker in his Political guidelines, the security and border management components of migration policies should be paired with a strong

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7 Ibid., p. 2.
common asylum policy and enhanced legal migration. This is why the Agenda rests on four pillars that will contribute to a better management of migration in the long term. This approach is both cross-cutting, as it requires policy coherence between different policy sectors (development cooperation, employment, trade, foreign and home affairs), and multilateral, as it focuses on countries of origin, transit and destination.

In addition to actions on enhancing effectiveness and sustainability of the Common European Asylum System (3rd pillar) and on long-term borderer management (2nd pillar), the Agenda presents two pillars that are particularly centred on development of third countries.

In advocating for a reduction of the incentives for irregular migration (1st pillar), the document clearly takes stock of the rhetoric on the “root causes of migration” by referring to “irregular and forced displacement in third countries”. In other words, “civil war, persecution, poverty and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate”11. The €96.8 billion for the 2014-2020 period are meant to support the EU external cooperation assistance with a specific focus on development cooperation, poverty reduction, and fight against inequality and unemployment. Such support is targeted to the regions that most of the migrants reaching the EU originate from: Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.

Actions on promotion of legal migration (4th pillar) should support not only employment strategies in EU Member states, but also the development of countries of origin. The EU should therefore support south-south mobility through regional labour mobility schemes that can bring an important contribution to local development. On remittances, the EU should facilitate cheaper faster and safer transfers by adopting the “EU Payment Services Directive II”12 and by making €15 million available through the Development Cooperation Instrument to support flagship initiatives.

2.2 The Valletta Summit and the Action Plan

The Valletta Summit on Migration (11-12 November 2015) gathered European and African Heads of State and Government in an effort to strengthen cooperation and address the current challenges but also the opportunities of migration. The meeting resulted in a political declaration13 stating that both EU and African countries committed “to address[ing] the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement resulting from state fragility and insecurity, as well as from demographic, economic and environmental trends”14. More specifically, they pledged to focus responses on “reducing poverty, promoting peace, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, supporting inclusive economic

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11 See note 8, p. 7.
14 Ibid. p. 2.
growth through investment opportunities and the creation of decent jobs, improving the delivery of basic services such as education, health and security”\textsuperscript{15}.

In order to fulfil their commitments, heads of state and government agreed upon a joint Action Plan\textsuperscript{16}. The plan is built around five priority domains:

1. Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement;
2. Enhancing cooperation on legal migration and mobility;
3. Reinforcing the protection of migrants and asylum seekers;
4. Prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings;
5. Working more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration.

**Table 1 – Priorities and sub-priorities relevant to “migration through development” in the Valletta Action Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Sub-priority</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement</td>
<td>1.1. Investing in development and poverty eradication</td>
<td>Mainstreaming migration in development cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boosting socio-economic development,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting resilience, enhancing sustainable livelihoods and self-reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Development benefits of migration</td>
<td>Promoting cheaper, safer, legally-compliant and faster transfers of remittances and facilitating productive domestic investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting diaspora engagement in countries of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Addressing instability and crises</td>
<td>Taking action with regard to conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Preventing new conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting State building, rule of law and good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcing State capacity to ensure security and fighting terrorist threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Protection and asylum</td>
<td>3.1 Protection</td>
<td>Reinforcing the protection of refugees and other displaced persons (integration into host communities and capacity building)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Humanitarian response</td>
<td>Enhancing efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to countries affected by forced displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Return, readmission and reintegration</td>
<td>5.1 Strengthen cooperation in order to facilitate the return and sustainable reintegration of irregular migrants</td>
<td>Promoting programmes on assisted voluntary return and reintegration, strengthening the capacity of authorities and civil society organisations to manage voluntary returns and support reintegration of all returnees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
Out of the five priorities, priority 1, 3 and 5 particularly focus on local development. Table 1 sums up the most relevant actions that were proposed in the field of migration through development.

The table illustrates that the Action Plan builds on recurring themes that featured in the previous legislation as well as in the Agenda on Migration while it goes beyond them by proposing new actions. The focus on development of countries of origin and transit is complemented with a blurring of the boundaries between the humanitarian and the development approach, stronger focus on forced displacement, resilience, conflict-prevention and state-building on the one hand, the creation of new opportunities on livelihood that are gender and age sensitive on the other hand. Finally, the benefits of migrations are increasingly taken into account (e.g. diasporas and remittances).

The Action Plan also contains 16 concrete actions to be implemented by the end of 2016. On addressing root causes of migration and forced displacement, activities include the launch of projects to enhance employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in the regions of origin and transit of migrants in East, North and West Africa; enhancing professional skills and employability of young people; operationalising the African Institute on Remittances to serve as a focal point for all stakeholder in African remittances; facilitating responsible private investment in African agriculture, agri-business and agro-industries, and boosting infra-African trade and exports of agricultural products. On protection and asylum, activities include one Regional Development and Protection Programmes in the Horn of Africa and North Africa on protection and developmental needs of long-term displaced people and their host communities; projects to improve resilience, safety and self-reliance of refugees in camps and host communities. On return, readmission and reintegration, activities include projects in countries of origin to support the reintegration of returnees into the local community, the labour market and social systems.

3. The implementation of the Agenda on Migration

Over the past two years, the EU has worked on the implementation of the Agenda on Migration and the fulfilment of the 16 actions from the Valletta Action Plan. This resulted in several initiatives that mirror to a large extent the priorities and the approach set out in both documents and touch upon forced displacement, development, reintegration as well as funding and partnership.

3.1 The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

A number of initiatives following the agenda on migration and the Valletta Action Plan aimed at translating political commitment into deeds.

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (hereinafter “the Trust Fund”) is an essential instrument in delivering the actions proposed in the Valletta Action Plan. In the framework of the Agenda on Migration, the European Commission proposed to commit
€1.8 billion from the European Development Fund (EDF) to an EU-wide trust fund, with the possibility for Member states to participate financially and operationally through additional resources. The Trust Fund was launched at the Valletta summit and is now worth over €2.85 billion (€2.64 billion from the EDF and €202.4 million from EU Member states and other partners).

Overall, the Trust Fund is to address crises in the African continent while supporting aspects of stability, contributing to better migration management and addressing the root causes of destabilisation, irregular migration and forced displacement. It does so by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security, development and human rights. The main beneficiaries are refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and local communities that are hosting them, other vulnerable or marginalised groups (e.g. victims of human trafficking, youth, women and children).

In terms of geographical scope, projects funded under the Trust Fund are eligible in three regions: Sahel region and Lake Chad (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal); Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda); North of Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt). Projects implemented in neighbouring countries are eligible for funding on a case-by-case basis and as long as they respond to the regional dimension of cross-border migration flows and other challenges.

While the Trust Fund aims at addressing crosscutting themes, its Strategic orientation document takes into account the specific political and socio-economic profiles of the three regions. The Sahel and the Lake Chad basin are characterised by volatile security (widespread organised crime, violent extremism and terrorist attacks), gender inequalities and reduced resilience. The Horn of Africa features persistent poverty and vulnerability, food insecurity exacerbated by the effect of climate change, corruption and absence of rule of law, and border and water disputes. The North of Africa can count on the largest resident diaspora population within the EU and has long been included in EU development programmes on strengthening of economic governance and public policies.

To date, 118 programmes across the three regions have been approved for a total amount of around €1.8 billion (Sahel/Lake Chad €1001.8 million, Horn of Africa €665 million, and North of Africa €222.5 million). Programmes in the three regions were approved and rolled out in four different phases between December 2015 and May 2017. Box 1 shows a few examples of projects funded under the Trust Fund.

Programmes in the Sahel/Lake Chad regions first addressed root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, namely through employment creation, migration management and resilience-building (1st and 2nd phase). A group on programmes supporting domestic security and border management was then added up (3rd phase), while the lat-
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, through its 4th phase, supported programmes to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. These programmes were in collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). They focused on migration management and governance, facilitation of returns and reintegration, youth employment, protection of vulnerable groups, and fight against radicalisation.

Programmes in the Horn of Africa included actions on the fight against trafficking of human beings, employment creation, support to the peace agreement in South Sudan, return and reintegration of South Sudanese and Somali refugees (1st, 2nd, 4th phase) as well as actions on resilience to climate change (3rd phase).

**Box 1 - Examples of programmes funded under the Trust Fund**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sahel/Lake Chad:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Strengthening migration management and governance, returns and sustainable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>reintegration in Burkina Faso</strong> (in French). This project, implemented by the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM), aims at protecting 5,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>migrants in transit and supporting 2,700 voluntary returns to the home country,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and facilitating sustainable reintegration of returnees jointly with partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Programme of support for enhanced security in the Mopti and Gao regions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>and for the management of border areas</strong> (Mali). This programme aims to help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strengthen the rule of law in the area through the increased effective presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of security forces operating as part of civilian missions (police, gendarmerie,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national guard, Malian Armed Forces, customs, civil protection).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Horn of Africa:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Building resilience to impacts of el niño through integrated complementary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>actions to the EU resilience building programme</strong> (Ethiopia). This project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aims to address the structural and systemic root causes of vulnerability and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chronic food and nutrition insecurity of populations in the most vulnerable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>areas. It contributes to addressing the adverse effects of el Nino on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resilience of already vulnerable regions and communities, and reduce the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effects of forced displacement and irregular migration in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Strengthening resilience of IDPs, returnees and host communities in West</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Darfur</strong> (Sudan). This action aims to strengthen community resilience,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social cohesion and peacebuilding in areas affected by flows of returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Chad as well as areas affected by internal displacement and refugee</td>
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<tr>
<td>flows. It will do so by improving access to and quality of health services,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whose absence is recognised as one of the main push factors of forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displacement in these areas.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North of Africa:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Managing mixed migration flows in Libya through expanding protection</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>space and supporting local socio-economic development</strong> (Libya). The</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programme aims, first, at enhancing the protection space for migrants,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugees and host communities in Libya through both scaling up relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacities and provision of assistance, and, second, support socio-economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development at municipal level and local governance, in order to better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrate migrants and stabilize host communities. Implemented by IOM, UNDP,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR, UNICEF, GIZ (Germany).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Strengthening protection and resilience of displaced populations</strong> (Libya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The programme aims mainly at increasing access to protection spaces (especially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>healthcare) for stranded migrants and at piloting alternatives to detention,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in particular for children. Whenever possible, the programme will be carried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out through existing local organisations and public service delivery facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented by a consortium of NGOs led by the Danish Refugee Council.</td>
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</tbody>
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Programmes in the North of Africa\(^23\) focused on both individual and multiple countries. Some projects focused on inclusion of migrants, social cohesion and employment creation in Egypt and Libya (1st phase), others focused on protection of vulnerable groups and fight against racism and xenophobia against migrants in Libya, Tunisia and Morocco (2nd phase). A later stand-alone programme on protection of migrants and refugees, socio-economic development and local governance was approved for Libya (3rd phase), while the latest programmes focused on cooperation between Morocco and Senegal, Ivory Coast and Mali, migration governance and better socio-economic opportunities for migrants and host communities (4th phase).

### 3.2 The Commission Communication on Forced Displacement and Development

The EU has recently stepped up its efforts to address forced displacements. The European Commission, drawing on the global debate around humanitarian assistance that reached its climax in the first-ever World Humanitarian Forum (Istanbul, 23-24 May 2016), issued the Communication “Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance”\(^24\) in April 2016. The document reflects on the relationship between humanitarian aid and development in addressing forced displacements by adopting a holistic approach to both preventing and handling crises.

Such renewed strategy to forced displacement is politically significant in the African context. While the Communication does not refer to Africa in particular, it offers a strategic analysis of what forced displacements are and what consequences they have. It generally assumed that forced displacements are a short-term consequence of temporary political, social and environmental instability. However, data shows that displaced people live in protracted displacement for a long time – most displaced people live in protracted displacement for more than five years, with displacement lasting on average 25 years for refugees and more than 10 years for 90\% of internally displaced persons\(^25\). Secondary and multiple movements are common and reflect, according to the Communication, a “collective failure to address the specific mid – to long-term needs and vulnerabilities of forcibly displaced people and their host communities and to provide them with durable solutions”\(^26\). The African geopolitical and historical frameworks suggests that if the EU fails to address the issue of forced displacement in an effective way, people will be more willing to embark in risky journeys and reach the EU through illegal channels.

The Communication argues that the pre-2016 approach to forced displacement was built on a risky linear humanitarian-development approach. Providing assistance throughout the displacement time and development assistance once the displacement is over under-


\(^{26}\) See note 24, p. 2. - As per the international legal frameworks, the three durable solutions for refugees are voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement. Source: UNHCR (2011) Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: The 10-Point Plan in Action, New York, p. 186.
mines opportunities for refugees and internally displaced persons to become more self-reliant. According to the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development27, forced displacements can also have a negative impact on development by reversing the progress made in recent years.

The new holistic approach puts forwards three sets of actions on education, access to the labour market and access to other services. The objective is to improve living conditions throughout the whole duration of the displacement and to implement most effectively solutions that can bring the displacement to an end. Quality education is instrumental in child protection strategies and is one of the main priorities for both displaced people and host communities. In order to counter the threat of “lost generations” of uneducated displaced children (65 million children aged 3-1528), the EU should facilitate access to full, equitable and quality education at all levels – early childhood, primary, secondary, vocational and higher education. Access to labour markets is essential to ensure financial independence, integration into and participation to host communities and language learning. However, many countries still prohibit or restrict the access to the national labour market by displaced people. The Communication recommends granting displaced persons access to the formal labour market and involving development actors at an early stage of forced displacement crises in order to enhance host communities’ preparedness. Integrating the potential long-term needs of displaced people, such as housing and healthcare, can boost sustainable development of both host communities and displaced persons. In addition, social protection can contribute to the empowering of displaced persons and give them long-term support to address their chronic vulnerability.

Partnership and complementarity among actors are essential for the new strategy to deliver. Joint programming between the EU and Member states is a flexible exercise and a useful tool to tackle forced displacement. Participation of host governments is crucial in securing long-term solutions as they set the timing and space for humanitarian development as well as the parameters for development interventions and are responsible for the legal and policy frameworks where refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities interact with one another. The diaspora could assist by raising awareness on the crises and financially supporting the setting up of micro-business by host communities and displaced persons. Stronger cooperation between development and humanitarian actors will boost efficiency and improve outcomes while reducing dependence on humanitarian aid and maximizing the effectiveness of development investment.

By releasing the Communication a month before the UN-led World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul in May 2016, the European Commission intended to feed the global debate around forced displacement in the attempt to impact the new global strategic orientations. The political communiqué29 signed at the end of the Summit takes stock of many of the EU key priorities, including investment in resilience, efficient and effective financ-

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27 UN General Assembly, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, New York.
ing, preventing and ending crises, and bridging the divide between humanitarian and development actions.

In the wake of the Summit and in line with the Communication, the EU has launched an initiative to increase support to education for children in emergencies.\(^\text{30}\) The increase from 4% in 2016 to 6% in 2017 of the EU humanitarian aid budget puts the EU well ahead of the global average (2% of global humanitarian funding). The contribution will support access to formal and non-formal education for children in conflict areas and hosting communities, namely life skills and vocational training, recreational activities and psychosocial support.

### 3.3 The Commission Action Plan on Returns

The European Commission set up an Action Plan on Returns\(^\text{31}\) in September 2015 following the recommendations of the European Council and in the framework of the EU Agenda on Migration. The Agenda highlighted that one of the incentives for irregular migration is the knowledge that the EU’s system to return irregular immigrant is not sufficiently effective.\(^\text{32}\) As a result, the Action Plan aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of EU system to return irregular migrant and stepping up cooperation with countries of origin and transit.

While the Plan addresses some intra-EU procedural aspects of returns (e.g. detention and alternative to detention, mutual recognition of return decisions etc.) and the political relations with third countries (e.g. readmission agreements), some actions directly aim at creating the right conditions in countries of origin and transit for the effective return of irregular migrants. The idea is that since voluntary returns remain the preferred option in the case of irregular migration, the EU should accompany reintegration measures of irregular migrants to consolidate their position in their home countries and deter new irregular migration.

Since Member states are primarily responsible for designing and implementing return programmes, the EU contributes by allocating funding and supporting for a for exchanging practices and increasing operational cooperation. The EU provides Member States with direct funding through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and assists their programmes in cooperation with governmental and non-governmental partners, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It also supports the European Reintegration Instrument Network (ERIN), which provides reintegration support as well as social and job support for returnees. The Commission will monitor and assess though the European Migration Network (EMN) whether disparities among Member States’ programmes on return and reintegration could lead to “return shopping”, i.e. migrants entering Member States offering the most lucrative package.

Governments of countries of origin and transit play an active role in the implementation of the Action Plan. There would be no use in concluding and implementing readmission

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\(^\text{32}\) The Action plan refers to the fact that “in 2014 40% of the irregular migrants that were ordered to leave the EU departed effectively” (p. 2).
agreements if the EU did not provide the support needed to reintegrate illegal migrants. The EU and its Member States should pay particular attention to transit countries and support them in facilitating the return of third-country nationals who transit through their territory and assist them with the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries.

The Commission issued an updated version of the Action Plan\textsuperscript{33} that draws some lessons from the previous year. The “renewed plan” highlights that while the actions envisaged had been or were being implemented, the overall impact on the return track record across the EU remained limited due to factors both within and outside the EU. The actions proposed in the renewed plan aim at improving return rates.

On reintegration, the renewed plan complements the previous version by adding concerns on third countries and on “return shopping”. Not only can disparities between reintegration practices in different Member States influence what destination illegal migrants pick, it can also affect return rates in third countries, as governments might favour only returns coming from Member States that offer higher reintegration packages. It is therefore essential that reintegration packages and practices are consistent among all Member states. To this end, the Commission will support Member states through the European Migration Networks’ Return Experts Group (EMN-REG).

3.4 The Migration Partnership Framework for Third Countries

One year after the adoption of the EU Agenda on Migration, the European Commission drew harsh conclusions on its implementation. The Communication on “Establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries\textsuperscript{34}” noted that the EU was still faced with a humanitarian crisis, that third countries and EU Member States were still hosting millions of refugees and migrants aspiring to come to Europe, and that instability in Libya was increasing illegal migration flows.

According to the Commission, the message that migration issues had been put on the top of the EU’s external relations had not been fully communicated to and appreciated by partners. As a result, the EU should mainstream migration into all its partnerships with third countries, with a specific focus on returns and readmissions. The Communication lays out a comprehensive framework for these renewed partnerships. More specifically, “the ultimate aim of the Partnership Framework is a coherent and tailored engagement where the EU and its Member States act in a coordinated manner putting together instruments, tools and leverage to reach comprehensive partnerships (the so-called “compacts”) with third countries and to better manage migration in full respect of our humanitarian and human rights obligations”\textsuperscript{35}.

While a set of short-term actions focus on border management in third countries and aim at “enabling” migrants and refugees to stay close to home and to avoid taking dangerous


\textsuperscript{34} European Commission, Communication on Establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, 7 July 2016, COM(2016) 385 final.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 6.
journeys”, long-terms actions address “root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement” in line with the EU Agenda on Migration. In particular, the EU will tackle the political, social, economic and environmental factors that constitute these root causes by ensuring synergies between all policies, initiatives and processes and facilitating, among other things, economic, social and cultural investments of public and private actors (e.g. the diaspora in countries of origin).

The Communication is intended to cover a big number of partnerships between the EU and third countries. However, the Commission picked a few countries of transit and origin to implement pilot activities around a limited number of priorities (the so-called “compacts”). The countries selected are Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Libya for the Middle-east and North African window, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Niger for the Western Africa window, Ethiopia for the Horn of Africa window.

Over the past year the Commission has released four progress reports on the Framework Partnership (October 2016, December 2016, March 2017 and June 2017) which provide an evolutionary perspective on the implementation of the Communication. While the initial focus shifted from the architecture of the framework partnership to its effective operationalization, the full potential of the Communication has not yet been entirely exploited due to the limited linkage with other policies (legal migration, trade, energy, agriculture and education) as well as the limited contribution of EU Member States to the Trust Fund. However, coordination between EU Member States vis-à-vis third countries has improved and the geographical scope has broaden and now includes both the priority countries and other key countries of origin and transit.

In addition to providing a comprehensive framework for actions at both EU and Member State level, the Communication has the advantage of presenting a programmatic reflection on the full range of possible financing mechanisms that the EU could set up in the medium term. It highlighted that the European Commission was considering the creation of “an ambition External Investment Plan” that would “tackle the root causes of migration while contributing to the achieving of the sustainable development goals”.

The third progress report makes reference to the on-going negotiations on the European Fund for Sustainable Development, which should be concluded in the first half of 2017 and should complement the Trust Fund in delivering results under the Agenda on Migration.

36 Ibid.
41 As per the Communication, the Trust Fund is a key financial instrument to mainstreaming migration into the EU partnerships with third countries.
42 See note 34, p. 11.
4. Recent initiatives and future developments

On the occasion of the mid-term review of the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, the European Commission proposed the creation of a European External Investment Plan (EIP) package to boost investment in Africa and support sustainable development. Economic growth in developing countries, including African countries, has indeed now reached its lowest level since 2003 due to a number of factors such as the financial and economic crisis that broke out in 2008, instability and conflicts. This has resulted in increased overall indebtedness and reduced access to finance for needed investment. Ultimately this has played a role in the increased number of people moving from Africa and the European Neighbourhood.

In response to these challenges the Commission has proposed the EIP and made it one of the key financial instruments to translate the Partnership Framework with third countries into practice. The EIP will be based on three pillars: 1) mobilising investment through the new investment fund and its guarantee; 2) technical assistance to develop economically viable projects; 3) cooperation programmes and dialogue to improve economic governance and promote a better business environment. Since traditional development assistance alone cannot bring out sustainable development, the EIP aims at maximising the use of and leverage public funds by working as a catalyst for investments from a wide array of actors (financial institutions, donors, public authorities and the private sector). At the same time, EU partners will assist in developing economically and financially viable projects to attract investment and will support reforms and economic governance. Preliminary projections estimate the EIP could mobilise €44 billion based on €3.35 billion contribution from the EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF). With Member States’ contributions the EIP could leverage a total investment of €88 billion.

The EIP will focus on Africa and the EU Neighbourhood and will target socio-economic sectors that participate to sustainable development of third countries. These include energy, water, environment, social infrastructure, human capital and support to micro-, small- and medium-size enterprises in support of job creation.

The European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) plays a key role in enabling the EIP. The three different declinations of the EFSD - the fund itself, the EFSD guarantee, and the EFSD guarantee fund, will indeed be the main financial instruments supporting the first EIP pillar on mobilising investment. More specifically, they will leverage additional financing by allowing risk sharing with private investors, international financial institutions and development banks.

Both the EIP and the EFSD are currently under negotiation between the EU co-legislators, the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament raised a number of issues in the Commission proposal, namely the risk that the private investment replace official development

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assistance (ODA) as a key means for eradicating poverty in development countries, or that both financial instruments are used purely for migration control purposes. One institutional issue under discussion is the role that the European Investment Bank will play. More specifically, the Bank played a key role in the Investment Plan for Europe which inspired the EIP to a great extent, but lacks a clear mandate to operate outside the EU. The Commission has called on both institutions to reach a deal on the final draft as soon as possible in order to make the EIP and the EFSD operational by the EU-Africa Summit that will be held in autumn 2017.

Since the adoption of the Agenda on migration in 2015, the EU has come a long way in reframing migration on a global scale. The initial debate around the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility was prolonged for several years while leading to an increasingly more holistic approach that now encompasses different policy areas, development and humanitarian aid, short-term and long-term thinking, public and private investment, returns and reintegration. Not only does this momentum highlight how the EU has tried to respond to external and internal crises (e.g. the financial and economic crisis, the so-called “migration crisis” and global instability), it also shows its progressive alignment with the international developments, such as the adoption of the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Vice-versa, the way the EU frames migration throughout its external action is likely to influence several actors and processes. The upcoming Africa-EU Summit that will be held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in November 2017 and the talks on the post-Cotonou partnership between the EU and the ACP countries44 by 2020 will determine how the two continents perceive and interact with one another on a number of issues, including migration. The EU is expected to promote its recent EU acquis on migration and development throughout the debate and this will either strengthen or question the status quo.

Conclusions

Since the 2000s the EU has been integrating migration into its external policies, including development. Because migration remains one of the fastest ways to produce and transmit wealth, the EU has adopted the migration-development nexus and sought to maximise the positive impact of migration on development. The EU's geopolitical and historical context has influenced the way migration policy was framed and the related policy responses. The major challenges the EU-Africa cooperation is faced with, such as great demographic growth and overall political, social and environmental instability, led the EU to rethink its approach to migration to strengthen the internal-external and the migration-development nexuses.

The migration-development nexus was present in the policy debate long before the 2015 Agenda on Migration. The Global Approach to Migrations and Mobility (GAMM) (2005), the Commission Communication on Maximising the development impact of migration and the Agenda for Change (2011) already recognised the added value of migration, namely south-south migration, on the sustainable growth and human development of countries of

44 Countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States.
origin. As a result, they recommended that facilitating migrants’ cash transfers be paired with sound capacity-building and policy assistance in third countries on education, health, housing and employment policies.

It was the EU Agenda on Migration (2015), however, that made addressing the “root causes of migration” one of the pillars of the EU’s external action and focused to a larger extent on the development of countries of origins and transit in achieving this. Since instability, poverty, persistence of food insecurity and the lack of basic services are primarily responsible for irregular migration, the EU should blend internal actions aimed at saving lives and combating human trafficking with enhanced partnerships with countries of origin and transmit to tackle migration upstream and prevent hazardous journeys.

The Valletta Summit (2015) complemented the Agenda on Migration by layout out an Action Plan that contained 16 concrete actions to be implemented in Africa. The activities set up in pilot countries of origin and transit in East, North and West Africa respond to region-specific challenges and aim at enhancing revenue-generating activities, facilitating private investment, addressing developmental needs of long-term displaced people and hosting communities, and supporting returns and readmissions.

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, launched at the Valletta Summit, supports 118 programmes across Africa with €1.8 billion of direct funding for addressing crises, contributing to better migration management and tackling the root causes of destabilisation, irregular migration and forced displacement. Three sets of regional projects (West Africa, Horn of Africa and North of Africa) focus on resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security, development and human rights. Beneficiaries are refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and local communities that are hosting them, other vulnerable or marginalised groups.

Through its Communication on Forced Displacement and Development (2016), the Commission strengthened the link between short-term and long-term responses to crises as well as between the humanitarian and the development approach. Forced displacements usually are protracted for a very long time and secondary movements of refugees and internally displaced people to countries of transit and destination highlight a failure in addressing their medium and long-term needs. The Communication proposes to couple humanitarian assistance with development-oriented activities on housing, health, social protection, education and employment that aim at building refugees’ and forced displaced peoples’ resilience beyond the end of the crisis.

The Commission Action Plan on Returns (2015) built on the idea that one of the incentives for irregular migration is the knowledge that the EU’s system to return irregular migrants is not sufficiently effective. The Plan accordingly strengthens some procedural aspects with third countries while supporting programmes on reintegration in order to consolidate returnees’ position in their home countries and deter new irregular migration. As Member states are primarily responsible for reintegration measures, the Commission recommended that standards be coherent in order to avoid the so-called “return shopping” where migrants and countries of origin accept respectively to migrate to and receive returnees from the country offering the best deal.
In response to the consistently high levels of irregular migration, the Commission has deemed that the key role of migration into the EU external action had not been properly communicated and fully appreciated by partners. As a result, the Commission has mainstreamed migration into all the EU’s bilateral relationship through the Migration Partnership Framework for Third Countries. On the one hand the Framework focuses on third countries’ border management systems to keep migrants and refugees from taking dangerous journeys. On the other hand it addresses the root causes of migration and forced displacement, namely the political, social, economic and environmental factors.

More than two years after launching the Agenda on Migration, the EU has implemented almost all the initiatives to which it had committed. The European External Investment Plan and its financial instrument, the European Fund for Sustainable Development, are currently being negotiated between the Council and the Parliament and should provide additional funding for achieving the goals of the Agenda. In particular, by leveraging public and private investment, making best use of public funds, promoting sustainable development, they would give Africans fewer reasons to move to Europe. These instruments, along with the initiatives taken over the past two years, will be fundamental in the upcoming negotiations (e.g. the Africa-EU Summit and the post-Cotonou talks on the partnership between the EU and the ACP countries) and will affect how Africa and the EU perceives and cooperate with one another on common challenges.

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