Migrations and Policy Cycle: Overview of Recent Trends

by Pierre Van Wolleghem

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Migrations and Policy Cycle in the UK: 
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Spearhead of multiculturalism in Europe, the UK has considerably moved its position on immigration and integration policies over the 2000s’. Whereas in the 1990s’ the topic did not attract much attention, it increasingly did in the 2000s’, rushing its way onto government’s agenda and pushing policies towards more civic integration policy and less multiculturalism. This paper proposes an overview of the current situation and last policy developments. A first section brushes a picture of immigration trends and its outcomes for migrants. It also discusses the politics around the issue; how public opinion behaves, how political parties are positioned on the question. I then succinctly present the country’s monitoring strategy; or else how it gathers information on both phenomena to inform policy-making. Moving on to policy itself, I present some of the last developments brought about by the Cameron administration before turning to evidence-based policy-making in the UK; or how the UK makes sure policy tackles its purposes.

1. Introduction

The United Kingdom has long been defined in the scholarship as the European archetype of a multicultural approach to integration of foreigners. Providing the perfect contrast to the French republican model, the debate in the UK was from the outset framed with concepts such as “race relations”, “ethnic minorities” or “cultural toleration” (Favell, 2002: 94). With the passage of time however, critics blossomed and even started to transcend political cleavages. Whereas criticisms first came from right wing parties from the 1960’s on in that multiculturalism was a threat to conservative ideas of Englishness, it gained both sides of the political spectrum in the late 1990’s on suspicions of destroying liberal ideas (Kundnani, 2012). The eruption of riots in major British cities with high concentration of immigrant population in 1981, 1991 and 2001 brought the issue of segregated communities under the spotlights and pointed to the need to mend matters through the identification of “common elements of nationhood”; so concluded a report from the British Home Office (Cantle, 2001: 19). Gradually, multiculturalism weakened and converged towards civic integration (Schain, 2010).

Nowadays, immigration is much of a concern for policy-makers and their constituency. In 2006, a Eurobarometer revealed that Britons were less open to migrants than any other Europeans. In 2014, the European election put immigration at the forefront
of European and national politics. In August 2015, Eurobarometer showed that immigration was the most important concern for European public opinion, before economic issues and unemployment. A year later, the debate on whether the UK should leave the EU divides the public over immigration issues.

Resultantly, it is no wonder that policy-makers pay attention to migration-related issues (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2013). Nor is it surprising that these very issues have gained saliency in party competition across Europe (Alonso and Fonseca, 2011). But placing the issue on the agenda is only one part of the policy process that, at least formally, precedes policy decision, implementation and evaluation (Lasswell, 1956). As government is answerable to a constituency, it may want to make sure it delivers on the goals it has been appointed for and at reasonable costs, especially so where the issue is thorny for public opinion. In this respect, the 1999 white paper on Modernising Government marked a breaking point in public services across the UK (UK Government, 1999). In the white paper, the new-in-office Blair government committed to cutting red tape, focusing on policy delivery, increasing policy efficiency and effectiveness through evidence-based policy-making. Most likely however, policy assessment came into fashion for more prosaic reasons. As Solesbury (2001) argues, the advent of evaluation in UK politics owes its place to the conjunction of a utilitarian turn in scientific research along with a more pragmatic, less ideological stance for the New Labour, and a certain loss of confidence in public services.

This paper proposes an overview of immigration, integration and related policies in the UK. It does not pretend to exhaust the topic but it gives some landmarks for further reflection as to the current state of affairs of what is nowadays referred to as an “issue”. In a first section, I take the reader through a description of the situation in the UK in facts and figures (section 2). More precisely, I look at immigration, integration and related politics. Concluding to the centrality of the topic for public opinion and policy makers, I outline the monitoring strategy in place to gather data and better inform policy-making for the two themes, linking them to the UK’s historical legacy (section 3). Turning then to the policy side, I first briefly detail the last policy developments in the UK (section 4) before moving on to the evidence-based strategy for better policies (section 5). I conclude in a last section (6).

2. A state of current trends: immigration, integration and politics

2.1 Facts and figures: sketching migrations to the UK

Migration to the UK is no new phenomenon. Romans, Vikings, Normans have mixed with locals over the centuries. Recent history however shows that immigration to the UK over the 20th century has been rather steady before it increased dramatically after World War II. Britain, like its continental counterparts (Penninx et al., 2014), was experiencing labour shortages and resorted to immigration to fill the gaps (BBC, 2002).
Figure 2.1 – International migration to the UK form 1970 to 2014, including EU and non-EU nationals

Note: Revised Net Migration: estimates revised in light of the 2011 census; crosses: provisional figures.

Figure 2.2 – International migration to the UK form 1970 to 2014, distinguishing EU and non-EU nationals

Notes: crosses: provisional figures.
Like its continental counterparts again, it implemented restrictive measures to stem influxes in the 1970s’. If immigration did not stop altogether, it significantly decreased and resulted in a low to negative net migration rate. Incoming fluxes came back on the rise from the mid-1990s’ and more importantly in the 2000s’ (figure 2.1).

Turning now to figures distinguishing EU nationals from non-EU nationals (figure 2.2), a surge in non-EU nationals in the UK occurs around 1997\(^1\). It then relatively decreases as the number of EU citizens immigrating increases. Such correlation is probably due to EU enlargement and the fact that the UK did not impose any transition period to would-be migrants from the new EU member states that joined in 2004. Note that anyhow figures for extra EU influxes remain above those for EU nationals all over the period considered.

2.2 Migration outcomes: how migrants fare in the UK

There are plenty of ways to (try to) measure migration outcomes or migrants’ integration in their receiving society, none of which reaches absolute consensus for that integration is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon (Penninx, 2014). In order to get an idea of migration outcomes in the UK, I consider the policy areas delineated at EU level in the Zaragoza Declaration, without however clinging to the core indicators set therein (for more information see Huddleston et al., 2013; for an extensive treatment of these indicators, see OECD/European Union, 2015). Namely, this sub-section addresses employment, education, and social inclusion. Active citizenship is left aside given the rarity of data and the difficulty to circumscribe the concept. Note though that some attempts have been made through nationalisation and turn-out rates (see OECD/European Union, 2015). Consider that if employment and education are the most straightforward indicators, social inclusion shall be handled with caution (Entzinger, 2003).

**Employment**

Considering first data on employment, let us notice that rates for unemployed third country nationals in the UK is much lower than in other selected European countries\(^2\). It is also way below the EU15\(^3\) average (figure 2.3). In that respect, the UK fare rather well since only Italy (in the beginning of the period) and Germany (at the end of the same period) display similar figures.

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\(^{2}\) Possible combinations of countries are plentiful. I decide to consider G6 countries, an informal group gathering home affairs ministers to deal with *inter alia* immigration.

\(^{3}\) Comparing to EU15 average appears more sensible than comparing to EU27 or EU28 averages. The members of the former are, in most cases, places of immigration whereas the members of the latter two include countries in a period of transition between immigration and immigration.
Figure 2.3 – Unemployment rates for Extra EU27 citizens (aged 15 – 74) in G6 countries (Poland missing) with EU15 average, from 2006 to 2014, in percent

Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data, migrant integration indicators

Figure 2.4 – Unemployment rates for Extra EU27 citizens (aged 15 – 74) and total unemployment in UK with EU15 means, from 2006 to 2014, in percent

Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data, migrant integration indicators
When compared to the overall population however, there appears to be a consistent gap between third country nationals and the total population when it comes to unemployment in the UK (figure 2.4). Such gap is however bigger for the average EU15 countries.

**Figure 2.5 – Over-qualification rates by citizenship and gender, 2012-13, percentages of 15-64 year-old workers with tertiary education who are not in education**

The data analysed in the OECD/European report on integration (2015) show that over-qualification rates across the EU vary a good deal. Third country nationals’ over-qualification for the job they occupy stands amongst the lowest in the EU and especially if we consider its rate to other historical immigration destinations such as Germany, France or the Netherlands. Most notably, this is the difference between nationals and third country nationals that is strikingly lower than in most other European countries, except if compared to Ireland that however attracts a particular kind of migrants due to its fiscal policy towards big multinational companies employing high-profile foreigners. The UK’s situation is notably in steep contrast with so-called new European countries of immigration (Italy, Spain, Greece, and so forth).

Source: OECD/European Union, 2015: 317
If we now look at the quality of migrants’ employment, an interesting indicator of employment outcome lies with migrants’ qualification compared to the occupational position (figure 2.5).4

In a more dynamic perspective, figure 2.6 below shows that variation over time of over-qualification differs across EU countries too. If it decreased of about 15 points for Luxembourg and Latvia from 2006-07 to 2012-13 for third country nationals, it increased in the UK of about 7 points in the same time span.

**Figure 2.6 – Evolution of over-qualification rates among 15-64 years old workers with tertiary education who are not in education, by citizenship, 2006-07 and 2012-13, Percentage points**

![Graph showing over-qualification rates](image)

Source: OECD/European Union, 2015: 317

**Education**

Turning now to education, the UK shows again interesting statistics. The proportion of third country nationals aged 18 to 24, having attained at most lower secondary education and not being involved in further education or training (so-called early leavers) is much less sizeable in the UK than the EU15 average. So is the gap between third country nationals and nationals (figure 2.7).

Similar comments can be made regarding youth neither in employment nor in education and training. Once again, the gap in the UK between nationals and third country nationals is rather low, lower than it is for the EU15 average (figure 2.8).

4 Note that over-qualification is measured through the proportion of people with tertiary education whose activity requires only lower levels of qualifications.
Figure 2.7 – Early leavers (aged 18 to 24) from education and training by citizenship for UK and EU15, percent

Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data, migrant integration indicators

Figure 2.8 – Young people (15-34) neither in employment nor in education and training by citizenship for UK and EU15, percent

Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data, migrant integration indicators

Social inclusion
As already said, social inclusion is a concept difficult to capture in an empirical manner. Subjective sense of belonging, trust in the institutions and neighbourhood characteristics are here considered proxies to inclusion.
Drawn from Saggar et al. (2012), chart 2.1 below presents the proportion of migrant and native respondents to a survey saying they feel “very strongly” or “fairly strongly” that they belong to Britain. Overall, migrants from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) express a rather high attachment to Britain, with 75% of the respondents that have been settled less than 7 years and 92% of those that have been settled for at least 7 years. The latter group ranks even higher than native born Britons (84%).

**Chart 2.1 – Proportion of respondents who feel they belong to Britain, native born with native parents compared to recent (settled within past seven years) and established (moved over seven years ago) migrants, 2012**

Source: Saggar et al., 2012

**Chart 2.2 – Trust in institutions by length of time in Britain, native born with native parents compared to recent (settled within past seven years) and established (moved over seven years ago) migrants, 2012**

Source: Saggar et al., 2012
Interestingly, when looking at people’s trust in institutions, extra EEA migrants, irrespective of their residence length, tend to trust more institutions than natives. Note though that longer established migrants show less trust in the institutions than their more recently arrived counterparts (chart 2.2).

The previous data somewhat contrasts with following figure 2.9a and 2.9b. Whereas previous figures summarised immigration outcomes, the two below deal with ethnic minorities. This is arguably because policies in the UK have been more concerned with minorities than with foreigners (Spencer, 2012). True, the fact that these data do not consider the exact same population renders comparison impossible, strictly speaking. It is however interesting to compare minorities’ condition to the majority population as it may represent the likely condition of newcomers.

Source: ESRC CoDE, 2013

It is striking that all ethnic minority groups in England are most likely to live in deprived neighbourhood. Figure 2.9a shows that there has been some improvement in ten years’ time: the proportion living in the most deprived neighbourhoods decreased

5 The Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 (IMD 2010) defines multiple deprivation as the combination of seven dimensions: income, employment, health, education, barriers to housing and services, crime, and living environment.
for most ethnic groups. There however remain substantial disparities between white British majority and minorities. Figure 2.9b shows territorial disparities in the distribution of minorities in deprived areas. The difference between south and north is here striking.

2.3 Politics around migrations in the UK

Salience in public opinion

There is no need to recall how hot a topic is immigration in general (see *inter alia* Luedtke, 2005). This mere statement is reflected by figures on salience of immigration in public opinion. What should be recalled though is that the attitude of the receiving society may not be regarded as a direct outcome of migrating but it definitely is an indicator of how much a society is integrated (Entzinger, 2003). Figure 2.10 below shows the salience of immigration in public opinion in G6 countries.

Figure 2.10 – Salience of immigration in public opinion in the G6 countries from 2006 to 2012, in percent of respondents

Source: own elaboration on Eurobarometer data, question “What are the two main issues facing your country at the moment?”

Note: Spr: spring barometer; fall: fall barometer

The most notable fact, apart from the 2006 peak for Spain, is the relatively high salience of the topic in UK’s public opinion over the period, ranging from about 15% to 40% (with a mean of 28.2%) of respondents to deem immigration as one of the two most important issues their country faces. Overall, such figures exceed other European

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6 Salience of immigration in public opinion is measured thanks to Eurobarometer 67.2 to 78.1 (TNS Opinion and Social, 2007), question “What do you think are the most important issues facing (your country) in the moment? (max 2 answers)”.

7 Notably due to the sudden surge in sea arrivals over a very short length of time (Carrera, 2007).
countries. Eurobarometer 83 of Spring 2015 reveals that the figure is still rather high as it stands at 36% (TNS Opinion and Social, 2015).

More than being a prominent issue in British public opinion, empirical evidence shows a rather hostile stance to immigration. If I leave aside the importance of the issue to concentrate on how the issue is perceived, data show that around 75% of the population is hostile to immigration, a figure that ranks higher than those across Europe and northern America (Saggar and Somerville, 2012: 4-5).

Beyond immigration, looking at figure on integration, the data reported by Saggar and Somerville (2012) reveal that over 50% of the British public thinks integration in the UK is poor, a lower but still substantial share. Interestingly, the two authors also question the views people have of integration, which, they conclude, is not so clear.

**Position of major political parties**

Beyond public opinion, it is interesting to see how political parties regard the same very issues and see how salient they are for them. The two following histograms show the position on immigration (figure 2.11) and multiculturalism (figure 2.13) of the main political parties in the UK. Data is available for the years 2006, 2010 and 2014. Note first that the two main parties, the Labour and the Tories, are in favour of a more restrictive policy on immigration (figure 2.11), along with UKIP that displays off-the-chart (so to speak) values. Smaller parties tend to show more open an approach to immigration, perhaps due to the fact that the issue is less salient for them.

**Figure 2.11 – Party position on immigration for the main political parties in the UK, from 2006 to 2014**

![Histogram showing party position on immigration](image)

*Source: own elaboration on Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006-2014*

*Note: scale ranging from -5 to 5: -5 meaning fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration; 5 meaning fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration. The scale as in CHES 2010 originally ranks positions from 0 to 10; for the purpose of this paper, I have centred the values around the neutral point (i.e. 5).*

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8 The only exception would be Malta, although not represented here. On average, Maltese’s salience stood at 28.2 over the same period, about the same average as in the UK. Data are not displayed here for reasons of convenience but are available upon request.
Figure 2.12 suggests a linear relationship between position on immigration and salience of the issue as far as UK political parties are concerned.

**Figure 2.12 – Position on immigration and salience of the issue of the issue for the main political parties in the UK, 2010**

![Graph showing linear relationship between position on immigration and salience of the issue](source: own elaboration on Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010)

**Figure 2.13 – Party position on multiculturalism for the main political parties in the UK, from 2006 to 2014**

![Bar graph showing party positions on multiculturalism](source: own elaboration on Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006-2014)

Note: scale ranging from -5 to 5: -5 meaning strongly favours multiculturalism; 5 meaning strongly favours assimilation. The scale as in CHES 2010 originally ranks positions from 0 to 10; for the purpose of this paper, I have centred the values around the neutral point (i.e. 5).

The picture is slightly different when we consider position on multiculturalism (figure 2.13). If correlation is high between position on immigration and position on multicultu-
turalism⁹, there is sizeable change in Labour’s position on multiculturalism between 2006 and 2010. From favouring assimilation, it passes to favouring multiculturalism. Note though that the issue is of less interest for the party than immigration (figure 2.14), as far as 2010 data are concerned.

**Figure 2.14 – Position on multiculturalism and salience of the issue of the issue for the main political parties in the UK, 2010**

![Figure 2.14](image)

Source: own elaboration on Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010

### 3. Monitoring immigration and integration in the UK

#### 3.1 Monitoring immigration: data and definition

Since the entry into force of Regulation 862/2007/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on Community Statistics on Migration and International Protection (EU secondary law), UK’s Office for National Statistics is required to provide Eurostat with reliable data which comply with the United Nations’ definition of long-term international migration. Despite the existence of a handful of exploitable data sources, only one of these complies with this definition: the International Passenger Survey (IPS).

Intended as a means to provide data on travel and tourism in the first place (Bijak et al., 2013), the IPS considers as a population passengers travelling through the main entry and exit points from the UK including airports, seaports and the Channel Tunnel. As any survey, the estimates produced are based on only one of a number deemed representative of the population of passengers. As any survey then, it is subject to sampling error and estimates are therefore published alongside a 95% confidence interval (Office for National Statistics, 2015). It is the only data source in the UK that complies with United Nations’ definition referred to above (Bijak et al., 2013).

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⁹ Figures not reported here for the sake of clarity. They are available upon request.
In order to augment IPS data, a number of other data sources, namely administrative data, could be used. The first is data of non-UK domiciled students from the Higher Education Statistics Authority (HESA); the second is data on the number of new National Insurance Number (NIN) registrations of foreign nationals, from the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). They are however not specifically designed to measure immigration, and thus do not conform to the UN definition referred to above. Such data sources are systematic and should therefore be free of biases due to sampling variability as it is with surveys. Yet they can still be biased due to differences in the underlying concepts and definitions, as well as in their coverage.

From 2013 onwards, the practice distinguishes different methods for different statistics, depending on the purpose of the latter. First of all, long-term international migration statistics uses mainly the IPS as a data source (Office for National Statistics, Long-term international migration statistics, 2015). Note that estimates on short term migration are also obtained from IPS data (Office of National Statistics, Short-Term International Migration Estimates for England and Wales, 2014). Second, when it comes to country of birth and nationality information, a series of data sources are pullled together. The estimates are produced using the Annual Population Survey (APS), one of the largest household surveys in the UK. It is constructed from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) plus various boosts to increase the size of the sample (Office of National Statistics, Population by Country of Birth and Nationality, 2014).

Although not perfect, these data are used for a series of reports by the Office of National Statistics10. A set of recommendations have been made by the Economic and Social Research Council, Centre for Population Change, in order to improve the state of current data collection (Bijak et al., 2013) but are yet to be implemented.

3.2 Monitoring integration: tensions between history and data collection

Integration has never really been the focus of UK’s migration-related policies. Since the debate on integrating new comers into the UK has historically been framed in terms of “race relations”, data is routinely collected on ethnic diversity, on differences in outcomes for ethnic minorities; much less so on migrants to the UK (Spencer, 2012). Resultantly, monitoring integration has been rather secondary to policy-makers up to now and is still not the object of systematic efforts. Until 2013, the remit was of the UK Borders Agency (whose main activities were border control) which housed a small unit focused on integration. The latter has spurred some of the research on integration and managed and evaluated all the UK projects funded by European Union’s integration and refugee funds.

The data usable to gain insights into immigration outcomes consists in several data sources (Gidley, 2012). First, the Census gathers information about the migrant population at every geographical scale. It is therefore a reliable source of information. It also has its drawbacks: based on a categorisation that reflects UK’s colonial past, it records

10 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/.
ethnicity, which is not fit for the new structure of immigration in the UK. Second, the Labour Force Survey gathers some more information as to the year of arrival. It also sounds out migrants’ subjective sense of belonging. Third, the Citizenship Survey consists in a biennial survey. It notably goes through influencing decisions, civic engagement, formal and informal volunteering, trust in institutions, cohesion, belonging, satisfaction with the local area, meaningful interaction with people from different backgrounds, racial and religious harassment and discrimination. Fourth, the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s How fair is Britain? study monitors inequalities between social groups, amongst which migrants. Pursuant to the Equality Act of 2006, the first report was published in 2010\(^\text{11}\) gave extensive information on different outcomes for different ethnic groups, but no data by place of birth or nationality.

These are the main data sources from which information as to immigration outcomes is drawn. Another insightful source of information are the reports commissioned by different public bodies: Kofman et al., 2009; Saggar et al. 2012; to name but a few.

4. A brief policy review of immigration and integration in the UK

4.1 Immigration policy: “the best and the brightest”

Like most European countries, the UK has shifted its policy stance on immigration from rather open to rather closed in the 1970s’, further to the oil crisis. So did immigration patterns. From immigration coming from Commonwealth countries, it shifted in the 1980s’ with growing numbers of people fleeing war in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, and seeking protection in the UK. Further EU enlargement in 2004 and the absence of transition period for the UK for within-EU migration further changed migration patterns. Further to new patterns and sizeable influxes, immigration drew much of media attention (Gidley, 2012), and gained salience for both public opinion and political parties. The 2006 Eurobarometer revealed that Britons were less open to migrants than other Europeans\(^\text{12}\). In a 2011 speech, PM Cameron\(^\text{13}\) overtly announced his will to get the policy right: “good immigration, not mass immigration”, the point being attracting “the best and the brightest” to the UK. In May 2010, the new conservative-liberal coalition publicised its programme on immigration (HM Government, 2010) with at its core the drastic reduction of net migration. Policy objectives were then fleshed out in further declarations (see House of Commons, 2015) that inter alia heralded the advent a reformed points-based system through the austere “selective immigration system” wording\(^\text{14}\). The points-based system was originally introduced under Labour’s term in 2008 and was widely based on the Australian system. Deemed ineffi-


\(^\text{12}\) See Eurobarometer eb66, 2006.


cient by Home Secretary in a 2012 speech\(^\text{15}\), the system underwent changes. In summary, action consisted in limiting annual work visa releases as well as applying more selective criteria (see House of Commons, 2015, for a detailed review). Further changes aimed amongst others at: deterring abuses of student visas; limiting post-study work rights; introducing more restrictive conditions to family reunion; fighting sham marriage.

### 4.2 Integration policy: a turn towards civic integration

Despite Britain’s long migration history, integration of foreigners is a rather new concern in the UK. The emphasis on minorities and race relations in the second half of the 20\(^{th}\) century somewhat obscured the notions of migrant and integration (Spencer, 2012); the UK did not have a coherent integration strategy until 2009 (Gidley, 2012). The concept of integration is first mentioned in the 1960s’ in Home Secretary Jenkins’ words: “I define integration therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (cited in Banton, 1985). The so-called multicultural model however showed increasing signs of weakness in the late 1990s’, beginning 2000s’ (Kundnani, 2012). The riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in summer 2001 were interpreted by the government as evidence that multiculturalism was no longer effective in channelling political conflicts. As Gidley argues (2012: 346), the terrorist attacks in the US some weeks after the riots further crystalized public anxieties around the presence of Islam in Britain. London’s attacks in 2005 precipitated the crisis with Trevor Phillips, then chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, accusing multiculturalism of having allowed Islamist extremism to fester in British society. He concluded that new emphasis on integrating minorities and immigrants to ‘British values’ was needed, position then adopted by Gordon Brown (Kundnani, 2012). As mentioned earlier, the idea of identifying “common elements of nationhood” had already emerged a few years before in a report from the British Home Office (Cantle, 2001: 19). Gradually, the UK initiated a turn towards civic integration measures with a ground-breaking move in 2002 with the introduction of citizenship test and a citizenship ceremony by way of law (Schain, 2010). Falling under the competence of the UK Borders Agency up to 2013, migrants’ integration has scarcely been addressed beyond the European Integration Fund (EU policy for which the UK opted in). Most of the Agency’s work on integration has actually targeted refugees. As Gidley contends (2012: 347), “Although the country is formally signed up to the European Commission’s Common Basic Principles on Integration (CPBs), there was no national integration strategy for migrants until 2009”.

That being said, the 2000s’ were marked by a series of policy undertakings. On the one hand, emphasis was gradually placed on the obligations new first-generation migrants would have to comply with. Notably, language examination and citizenship

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tests were introduced in 2004. On the other hand, and in response to early 2000s’ riots and ensuing Cantle report, Community cohesion policies in segregated areas were ran to bring communities together (notably through summer youth programs, school-twinning projects, and ethnically mixed housing policies). Such policies were however undertaken at local level (Saggar and Somerville, 2012).

The last developments entered into force under PM Cameron consist in raising the knowledge of English language and life in the UK requirements in order to be granted a leave to enter, or remain, in the UK. Such requirements were raised for students and workers but also for spouses and/or partners. If language level remains at a reasonable B1, the “life in the UK” test was substantially revised. Since its entry into force in 2013, it has a greater focus on British history and culture (House of Commons, 2015).

5. Opening and closing the policy cycle: the place of evidence in policy-making

Introduced in early political science (Lasswell, 1956), the idea that policy, at least formally, follows a cycle considerably improved the overall understanding of policy-making. Emergence on the agenda, formulation of the problem, defining a solution to it, implementing it, evaluating it for then terminating or reshaping the policy is theoretically the path policy shall follow. The search for “evidence” has increasingly gained importance in the process over the years. In order to base policy-making on evidence, different sorts of evaluation strategies are in place in the UK. In a first time, any new regulation, bill, legal initiative goes through a Regulatory Impact Assessment. When it comes to national migration policies, further evaluation is conducted via inspections, or fact-finding missions. Two other sorts of evaluation are possible but will be discarded in this section. One is conducted by the National Audit Office and aims at scrutinising public spending for Parliament in order to hold government to account. It is disregarded in that it is not specific to the UK. The second one is ex-post impact assessment. It is not considered because it is too far from being systematic.

5.1 Regulatory impact assessment: evidence and policy options

Impact assessment in the UK is a thing. Champion of liberalism in Europe, the UK has for long attempted to cut red tape with a view not to tread on individual liberties. Less regulation, less burden for companies has been a motto. In then PM Blair’s words, it is “getting government right” (UK Government, 1999: 4). As a consequence, every piece of regulation must go through a thorough Regulatory Impact Assessment. The creation in 2005 of the Better Regulation Executive marked the institutionalisation of a practice. Since then, in ten years’ time, more than 3500 Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA) were conducted16.

A RIA is both:

“A continuous process to help think through the reasons for government intervention, to weigh up various options for achieving an objective and to understand the consequences of a proposed intervention; and
A tool to be used to help develop policy by assessing and presenting the likely costs and benefits and the associated risks of a proposal that might have an impact on the public, private or civil society organisation, the environment and wider society over the long term.” (HM Government, 2011: 6)

RIA should be informed by wide public consultation with organisation affected by the would-be regulation in order to increase its desirability and acceptability. It shall also assess the cost-benefit relationship as well as estimating overall benefits and impact on society as a whole. RIA has become an integral part of the policy-making process in that it informs the policy options that are considered as the policy develops. One of the main purposes of RIA is to answer the question: is this objective worth the resources which will have to be spent on it? A Cost-Benefit Analysis will usually do the job even though in many cases non-monetised impacts for society and third parties are also considered. To exemplify what a RIA is, I detail a simple case, the impact assessment concerning the English language requirement for spouses.

Example: Assessing the impact of a Regulation on English language requirement for spouses

The first few pages of the RIA consist in a summary. It clearly states the problem to be tackled and the objectives pursued by Government through the bill under scrutiny. It names the different policy options available. It also provides an estimation of the costs and benefits the would-be regulation implies for government, the private, civil society, its impacts on the economy, and the environment. The rest of the RIA goes into more detail. Most of RIA reports eventually vary between 20 and 30 pages.

The RIA in question states that spouses is the largest group of immigrants to the UK that need not satisfy language requirement of any sort. The state of regulation at the time of the RIA is that spouses must demonstrate language ability and knowledge of the life in the UK before being granted indefinite leave to remain (within two years upon arrival). In the case at issue, the regulation under discussion pertains to the domain of immigration control and integration. It establishes that speaking English is key to integration, to lift cultural barriers, and to offer better prospect to newly arrived spouses or partners. It is also a way to ensure spouses are beneficial to the UK. With regard to the options envisaged, one is literally “do nothing” whilst the other one considers the introduction of language requirements. Namely, non-EEA nationals should demonstrate some command of the English language prior to applying for a leave to

enter the UK territory. The level required is the level A1 of the Common European Framework of Reference. Spouses will have to provide evidence that they have passed a test with a UK Borders Agency’s approved test providers.

According to the RIA, the costs of doing nothing result in translation services provided by local authorities and public services and damage to integration of migrants mostly whereas the benefits are no costs for the UK Borders Agency and no impact on family reunion. Intervention otherwise implies initial, organisational and judicial costs for the Borders Agency; training costs for the private and third sector; and tuition fees for applicants and sponsors. Benefits are expressed in terms of enhanced productivity of new comers, improved social cohesion and reduction of public expenses for translation. The RIA provides estimates of monetised costs for all impacted parties: a minimum, maximum, and central figure are hypothesised in an attempt to envisage different scenarios. Benefits are forecast likewise. Conclusion is drawn on that basis and policy recommendation is made. Here, in spite of higher monetised costs than benefits, the RIA recommends the policy be implemented:

“[Intervention] is our preferred option because it will achieve our objectives of aiding the economic well-being of the UK by improving integration for migrant spouses into UK communities, enhancing employment prospects and highlighting the importance of learning English. The costs are in proportion to these aims.” (p. 10).

RIA has become systematic and its quality has significantly improved over the years (Ambler et al. 2010). Its aim of informing policy-making is laudable and likely to matter. That said, since it is based on evidence, a lot has to do with data, their collection, their quality. Yet, when it comes to migrations, data are seldom complete. So argues the Migration Observatory in its report* *Top Ten Problems in the Evidence Base for Public Debate and Policy-Making on Immigration in the UK* (2011).

5.2 Inspecting implementation and outputs

Since 2007 and the entry into force of the UK Borders Act, an independent chief inspector is appointed to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the UK’s border and immigration functions. It produces an annual report discussed in Parliament and a series of other reports throughout the year, elaborated further to inspections, sometimes planned ahead, sometimes not. Inspections’ announced focus is on outcomes, processes, impact and management. However, it appears that inspections revolve more around implementation than impact. More specifically, attention is paid to the application and enforcement of the legal provisions in force as well as the outputs of the latter, rather than the outcomes. An example would be the handling of visa applications for entrepreneurs (see Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2013).

18 [http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/](http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/)
Whereas the purpose of these visas is to “attract ‘high value’ applicants to the UK with a view to promoting economic growth” (p.7), the job the Inspector carries out is to assess the handling of the visa applications by the UK Borders Agency; i.e. the decision rendered; “with a particular focus on the quality of its decision-making” (Ibid. p.7), and not whether the legislation actually attracts high value applicants.

Inspections touch upon a wide domain of immigration policies. Visa applications’ treatment, border control, sham marriage legislation enforcement, asylum applications’ treatment and so forth. Mirroring the UK’s policy focus on immigration and asylum, no inspection properly investigates integration policies. A plausible explanation may be that the Inspector’s concerns are linked to the Home Secretary’s, whose mission is of national relevance, whereas integration lacks a coherent national framework and in many instances depend on local authorities (Spencer, 2012). As for the methods employed, they vary according to what is under scrutiny but a constant seems to be field inspections (in a fact-finding manner) and interviews with the personnel.

6. Conclusion

If immigration is a hot topic, evidence shows it is all the more so in the UK. From public opinion to political parties, it occupies a significant position in the public sphere. This is however a rather recent trend. Of course, ethnic tensions were high in the 1980s’ but in 1999 salience of immigration for the public was rather dull with a mere 5% of Britons identifying immigration as a top-ranking issue (Saggar and Somerville, 2012). In the 2000s’ however, the topic consistently gained salience and decidedly rushed its way on successive governments’ agenda, irrespective of their political colour. Integration of foreigners follows a similar pattern, even though it is more blurred. Integration as a concept is wide-spread on continental Europe; a whole lot less in the UK where it is still much loaded of assimilationist connotation (Spencer, 2012). Public opinion seems however somewhat detached from the statistics about it. True, immigration is a prominent phenomenon in the UK; whence may come salience in public’s view. As for integration, the situation as experienced by migrants seems less distant from natives than it is on continental Europe. Migrants in the UK seem to fare better in terms of employment and education than other western EU member states for what we can tell from existing data. Comparing social inclusion across countries may be trickier; what can be said is that migrants’ sense of belonging to their receiving society is rather high, so is their trust in the institutions.

Because of its historical multicultural position, much of the monitoring effort regards immigration and differences between ethnic minorities; not so much integration of migrants. By looking at ultimate developments in terms of policies, it is still pretty much about immigration. Cameron’s government has been committed to significantly reduce immigration to the UK and to attract “the best and the brightest”, as he overtly announced. As for integration policies, the critics of multiculturalism over the past decade have somehow moved the debate towards instilling some Britishness; hence Blair’s discourse in 2006 titled “The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values” (Blair,
2006). Integration policy therefore merged into immigration policy as migrants would need to comply with integration requirements from this point forward.

But beyond the goals pursued by the policy, the procedure follows the route taken by all regulations in the UK: the Regulatory Impact Assessment. It is a way to assess the implications of a policy before it is actually implemented. Based on wide consultations, it aims at appraising the impacts, monetised or not, of a new regulation onto government, third parties and civil society. The goal pursued is indeed that of better regulating. This is however highly conditional on the existence of good data, which tends to be a rare event. In order to improve immigration policies, the UK also established an independent body, the Immigration Chief Inspector that runs field inspections with a view to assess practices and further needs so that implementation be smoothened. Such inspections seem to concentrate on implementation (application and enforcement foremost) of immigration policies and not so much integration policies. Once again, integration of migrants has not yet been a policy focus of central government.

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