

progetto cofinanziato da



UNIONE
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MINISTERO
DELL'INTERNO

FONDO EUROPEO PER L'INTEGRAZIONE DI CITTADINI DI PAESI TERZI

Migration: a picture from Italy

edited by Vincenzo Cesareo



Quaderni ISMU
2/2013

FONDAZIONE
ISMU
INIZIATIVE E STUDI
SULLA MULTIETNICITÀ

Quaderni ISMU 2/2013

V. Cesareo

MIGRATION: A PICTURE FROM ITALY



Ismu editorial coordination: *Elena Bosetti*

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ISBN 9788898409020

Printed in Milano by Graphidea srl.

Index

1. Italy between emigration and immigration: historical excursus	
by <i>Vincenzo Cesareo</i>	pag. 5
1.1 A short excursus	» 5
1.2 Approaches and interpretations	» 8
2. Foreign population in Italy: statistical framework and integration	
by <i>Gian Carlo Blangiardo</i> and <i>Vincenzo Cesareo</i>	» 11
2.1 A pause for thought or the end of a cycle?	» 11
2.2 What kind of integration?	» 16
2.3 Integration measure	» 18
3. Managing immigration in Italy: between law and policy	
by <i>Ennio Codini</i> and <i>Nicola Pasini</i>	» 29
3.1 Legal aspects	» 29
3.2 Political aspects	» 34
4. Immigration and labour market	
by <i>Laura Zanfrini</i>	» 39
4.1 Italy's specific features in the international context	» 39
4.2 Why Italian labour market has attracted so many migrants?	» 41
4.3 Immigrant labour: dimensions and characteristics	» 44
4.4 Considerations about the government of labour migrations	» 49
5. Migrant children in Italy	
by <i>Giovanni Giulio Valtolina</i>	» 57
5.1 The most relevant migrant communities with children in Italy	» 60
5.2 Migrant children at school	» 61
5.3 Final remarks	» 62

6. Students with non-italian citizenship in the education system	
by <i>Mariagrazia Santagati</i>	pag. 63
6.1 Foreign students in Italy	» 63
6.2 Implications in terms of social cohesion	» 66
6.3 Implications in terms of equity	» 68
6.4 In conclusion	» 71
7. Immigrant associations in Italy	
by <i>Marco Caselli</i>	» 73
7.1 A Brief history	» 73
7.2 Structure and aims	» 74
7.3 Relationships with local institutions and the problem of representation	» 76
8. Italians' attitude towards foreign immigration	
by <i>Giovanni Giulio Valtolina</i>	» 79
8.1 The evolution of Italians' attitudes towards immigrants as a result of the early considerable migration flows: 1980-2000	» 79
8.2 Italians' attitudes during the first ten-years of the new century: the europeanization of attitudes and the consequences of the international economic crisis	» 81
8.3 The present situation	» 83
References	» 85

1. Italy between emigration and immigration: historical excursus

by *Vincenzo Cesareo*

1.1 A short excursus

Information on migrations towards Italy before its political unification is scarce. This is only with the first census launched by the new national State that more precise data became available. Modern censuses were introduced during the 19th century and data relating to migrants began to be gathered in 1871.

In the course of the 19th century, European intra-continental movements of persons did not represent yet a significant phenomenon, even less so if compared to intercontinental ones. As a matter of fact, the phase of great expansion of migrations that occurred in the 19th century was all about fluxes – from Anglo-Saxon countries and then from France and Germany and gradually concerning all European peoples – towards Americas. Intra-European migrations regarded specialized labour forces that were moving from the most advanced areas (for instance Germany) to the less advanced ones (such as Poland or Russia). However, from 1870 onward, the trend reversed and intra-continental migrations gained in significance¹. These migrations were temporary and from economically backward areas to industrialized ones; particularly Germany, France, Switzerland, that were initiating their transformation from emigration countries into immigration countries.

From 1860, the migratory phenomenon was also significant in Italy. Initially, people emigrated from Liguria, Piedmont, High Lombardy and Veneto; only afterwards people started to emigrate, in substantial numbers, from the South, particularly from Calabria, Campania, Puglia, and Sicily.

Italian emigration is particular in some respects. First of all, it took place after Anglo-Saxon's and German speaking people's emigration but quickly reached such dimensions that it became one of the first European countries of emigration by the beginning of the 20th century. Secondly, it peaked between

¹ Alberoni, Baglioni, 1965: 248.

1900 and 1914, period of significant economic expansion in Italy whilst in other European countries economic development was marked by less emigration fluxes.

During the period between the two world wars, migration fluxes declined, especially for what regards transoceanic migrations. The reasons for such a halt are mainly of a socio-economic nature and consist in a twofold process: on the one hand, destination countries (particularly the United States of America) implemented mechanisms to contain fluxes; on the other hand, emigration countries endeavoured to curb the exodus of their nationals.

To the rapid drop of intercontinental migrations corresponds however a stability of intra-continental ones, first and foremost towards France.

During the decades following the Second World War, migrations featured new characteristics: beside traditional emigration destinations; i.e. North America and South America, new destinations emerged, Australia, Venezuela, Israel and so forth. From Italy, movements were mainly heading for France and Switzerland².

In a quantitative perspective, Italian emigration weighed a great deal in the transoceanic and intra-continental migration balance: within one century, between 1876 and 1976, about 24 millions of Italian emigrated³.

Another phenomenon particular to Italy ought to be pointed out: internal migrations. Between the 50's and the 60's, while the North recorded an economic boom, many moved from the *Mezzogiorno* (South) and the Triveneto to Lombardy, Piedmont and Liguria, attracted by the professional opportunities offered by grand industries in the North-West, so-called triangle of the Italian miracle.

From 1973, a new trend inversion of great significance was observable: for the first time, Italy recorded a positive net migration that saw the country turning from an emigration place into an immigration destination. According to the 12th population general census in 1981, foreigners residing on the territory amounted to 321 thousands⁴.

The first legal intervention for the regulation of immigration and above all regulating immigrants' professional activity dates back to 1986 with the law n. 943 *Rules on placement and treatment of third country immigrants workers and against illegal immigration*. It contained general principles of particular importance such as the enjoyment of equal rights between Italian and foreign workers, the guarantee of access to social services and healthcare, the safeguard of cultural identity and the regulation of family reunion. The law also provided for the establishment of a series of authorities and services to ensure these rights be respected. It also provided for an amnesty for all foreigners

² Ibid.: 256.

³ Rosoli, 1978.

⁴ Istat, 1981.

that could prove to be residing in Italy within three months of the promulgation of the law.

In the 90's, immigration became such a phenomenon that a new law had to be adopted. In 1990 the "Martelli" law (n. 39, 28th February 1990) is adopted in an attempt to rule migration towards Italy in an organic way. It thus introduced the rules for entry and stay, the right to seek asylum and the recognition of migrants' fundamental rights as persons and no longer as mere workers.

The first massive influx of migrants to Italy occurred in 1991 and had an acute impact on collective imagination. The fall of the Communist regime in Albania in 1990 and the subsequent grave economic crisis that hit the country spurred a great exodus that the Medias broadcast: images of thousands of people, aboard overcrowded ill-boats, trying to cross the Adriatic in search of better life conditions and new promises.

The significant increase of foreigners in Italy urged the elaboration of a new law, Law n. 40 of 1998, and then integrated into Decree-law n. 286 of the same year. The Single Act, also called "Turco-Napolitano" punctually ruled the programming of entry flows and the releasing of leaves to enter the territory, it provided for the protection of the family and for the schooling of children. It also provided for the fight against illegal immigration, notably through the setup of Temporary Stay Centres (*Centri di Permanenza Temporanea* or *CPT*)⁵.

In 2002, the "Turco-Napolitano" law was repealed and replaced by the so-called "Bossi-Fini" law (n. 189/2002). The latter was then merged into Law n. 94 of 2009, known as the "Security Package" that provided for the implementation of the "Integration Pact" (*Accordo di integrazione*)⁶.

From this synthetic overview, it is clear that legal system and history of immigration in Italy go hand in hand. The arrival of many, from different cultural backgrounds, pressed institutions to the creation of new solutions to ensure coexistence, security and integration.

The first of January 2010, more than 5.3 millions of foreigners were residing in Italy⁷. Even though influxes brought about undeniable questionings, the process of integration seems henceforth launched.

Because integration and coexistence are becoming structural elements in Italy, it is necessary that the reflection on migration and the identification of integration models keep developing.

⁵ Nowadays called Identification and Expulsion Centres (*Centri di Identificazione e Espulsione*) within the meaning of Law n. 125 of 24 July 2008.

⁶ Presidential Decree n. 179 of 14 September 2011, entered into force in March the 12th, 2012.

⁷ Fondazione ISMU, 2010.

1.2 Approaches and interpretations

As time passed, approaches decrypting migration phenomena multiplied. Traditionally, movements of persons from one country to another were interpreted in terms of *cultural distance*. This theory stresses the differences between values and behaviour schemes, conscious or unconscious, that can be found in different societies⁸. The approach in terms of cultural distance was used implicitly or explicitly to read intercontinental migrations and more precisely of those that in the course of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries left Europe for the Americas. Emigrants, most of them being farmers, arriving in the destination country saw the idea of finding a similar social environment fading away⁹. What they actually found was a really, culturally and socially, different reality, perceived distant and extraneous. As a consequence, newcomers tended to keep close-knit relationship with their fellow nationals, thereby distinguishing and isolating themselves from the receiving society. The same occurred when those that were about to leave had had already informed themselves about the receiving society prior to their departure. Once on their new land, people clung to the values and behaviour schemes of their former land, thus observing *ethnocentric attitudes*. On the other side, autochthones' behaviours were akin as they perceived newcomers as bearing cultural features incompatible with theirs.

This period of history was thus characterised by a significant distance between migrants and autochthones, limiting therefore cultural exchange and favouring to the contrary ethnocentrism (understood as the presupposition of superiority of a culture over the others)¹⁰. This tendency makes integration difficult and even more so where there are major cultural differences. For such reasons, the distance between two cultures may render the overall understanding of the receiving society even more difficult.

In summary, intercontinental migrations were mainly characterised by three distinct elements:

- a) profound difference between cultures;
- b) limited, if not inexistent, contacts between autochthones' and migrants' culture with as a consequence limited reciprocal acquaintances;
- c) high level of ethnocentrism, for both autochthones and migrants.

The history of Italian internal migrations from the unification of the country has however introduced studies that criticise the cultural distance theory. If appropriate for international migrations at some point, the cultural distance approach did not however appear adequate to the interpretation of internal migrations in Italy occurring between the 1950's and the 1960's. This is with the advent of such migrations that it became necessary to find a new interpre-

⁸ Ibid.: 100.

⁹ Ibid.: 102.

¹⁰ Ibid.: 105.

tation model in the sense that these movements presented characteristics differing from the flows explained above:

- a) frequent communication and exchange of information between persons living in different areas, notably thanks to mass media that allowed a better knowledge of destination places;
- b) assumption and sharing, before departure, of cultural traits of the receiving place;
- c) reversed ethnocentrism: people moving regarded the receiving place's culture as superior to theirs.

Hence a new approach was elaborated: *anticipated socialisation*. For what regards Italian internal migrations, migrants then in the departing area (north-east and south of Italy) had already acquired sound knowledge of the destination area (Lombardy, Liguria, Piedmont) before arriving. They had already somewhat assimilated behaviour schemes of the regions in course of industrialisation and modernisation. More than that, they wanted to have them. This was allowed, as stated above, by the presence of mass media during these years that played an important role of socialisation.

Some empirical surveys showed that the internalisation of values and cultural models of the destination area favoured the insertion in the receiving area without big trauma or conflict. The experimental research of the Catholic University conducted in Milan between 1961 and 1962¹¹ is emblematic and innovative in this regard. Promoted by the then Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, the study approached the integration of migrants in the city of Milan. The purpose of the study was analysing the level of socio-cultural integration of those newly arrived in the city with a view to verify empirically the hypothesis of anticipated socialisation.

It emerged that the immigrated population had already a good knowledge of the habits of a great metropolis, that it was undertaking a process of integration, that it was willing to share the lifestyle of their receiving place and that it was able to synthesize its culture of origin and the culture of the receiving area. More than 75% of the interviewees declared they wanted to stay definitively in Milan. More interesting, 63% of the interviewees undertook their migration with the conviction that they would adapt to the city not only because of the opportunity it had to offer but also for the fascination they had for a big, modern and industrialised city. About three quarter of the interviewees did not perceive any sort of stigmatisation by the autochthones. More than 50% of the interviewees declared not feeling disoriented further to their migration whereas about 20% admitted having suffered from problems to adapt although only in the first phases of settlement. Besides, the same research showed, which is surely a sign of successful integration, that migrants remained attached to their culture of origin (more than 55% considered the say-

¹¹ Ibid.

ing “*Moglie e buoi dei paesi tuoi*” – wife and oxen from your country – as relevant) and that they struck the balance between adhering to traditional values and Milanese lifestyle.

The aforementioned research, nowadays historical, allowed verifying on the ground the hypothesis of anticipated socialisation. This theory applied to the Italian case raised vivid debates and controversies but, with hindsight, proved to be valid to some extent and under specific conditions.

Beside the cultural distance and anticipated socialisation approaches, attention shall be paid to more recent and less explored theories such as *transnationalism* and *segmented assimilation*. The expansion of communication means and territorial mobility put forth a new figure: the *transmigrant*. The transmigrant maintains significant ties and a solid identification with the country of origin without prejudice to his/her integration into the receiving society. Transnationalism therefore goes against approaches holding the incompatibility between identity ties and effective integration in the receiving country (Caselli, 2010: 109). Transmigrants still represent a minority among those coming to Italy though.

Another approach, mainly drawn from the United States’ experience, consists in the much innovative *segmented assimilation*¹². According to this theory, young migrants initiating a process of selective acculturation, consisting in a positive synthesis between traditional family-community values and the values of the receiving society, have better chances to avoid deviance and assimilation towards the bottom (that the process of assimilation in itself may bear).

Considering the Italian case, it appears that the above theories – cultural distance and anticipated socialisation – can still today propose an interpretation of migrations. These are not necessarily exclusive but shall rather be regarded as complementary, in accordance with the field reality aspects.

It ought to be borne in mind that nowadays’ Italy is not only a country of immigration but remains also a land of emigration. The first of January 2012, more than 4 millions Italians resided abroad (AIRE, Anagrafe degli italiani residenti all’estero – Register of the Italians living abroad).

Cultural distance and anticipated socialisation as much as transnationalism and segmented assimilation propose readings applicable to the study of migrations “from” and “to” Italy that, from the country’s unification onwards, have characterised Italy as an emigration land and since a few decades an immigration country.

¹² Ambrosini, 2011: 19-38.

2. Foreign population in Italy: statistical framework and integration

by *Gian Carlo Blangiardo* and *Vincenzo Cesario*

2.1 A pause for thought or the end of a cycle?

Immigration to Italy seems set to mark time after years of frantic growth. The latest data on the arrivals of third country nationals during 2011 show a decline of about 40% compared to previous year (Istat [Italian National Institute of Statistics], 2012a)¹. This marked decline is especially evident in the case of arrivals for employment reasons (-65%) and is likely caused by the recent economic and employment difficulties; however, it is substantial also in the case of family-related immigration (-21%).

Indications supporting the hypothesis of a general stagnation of the phenomenon can also be found in the 2011 Population Register statistics – available, in preliminary form, on a monthly basis, from Istat (2012b) – which confirms the data already presented by 2011 ISMU Report. The years during which 400,000-500,000 new foreigners were usually counted, seem to have come to an abrupt end, with a modest increase of 69,000 recorded in 2010. The 2011 outcomes show indeed a constant decrease of the monthly net migration balance, not only relative to the “pre-crisis” years (2007 in Figure 1), but also to 2010. On an annual basis, this balance – which includes the movements of the (minority) Italian component² – after showing in 2010 a decrease of 47% compared to 2007, highlights an additional 33% during the following twelve months.

¹ It must however be considered that, while the 2010 flow benefitted mostly of the effects of the regularisation of domestic/home personal care workers (law n. 102/2009), during 2011 there has been a significant increase (from 10,000 to 43,000) of permits issued to refugees and on humanitarian grounds.


² Whose balance for 2011 is estimated at -20,000 persons (Istat, 2012c).

Table 1 - Presence of foreigners in Italy. Years 2003-2011 (thousands)

Years (1 January)	Residents	Legal status, non residents	Non-legal status	Present	
				Number	Change
2003	1,549	251	500	2,300	
2004	1,990	580	250	2,820	+520
2005	2,402	338	443	3,183	+363
2006	2,671	341	650	3,662	+479
2007	2,939	694	349	3,982	+320
2008	3,433	244	651	4,328	+346
2009	3,891	521	422	4,834	+506
2010	4,235	645	454	5,334	+500
2011	4,570	391	443	5,403	+69

Source: Istat data processed by ISMU

Figure 1 - Italy: net value of migration balance with foreign countries resulting from Population Register statistics during the years 2007, 2010 and 2011




Source: Istat data processed by ISMU

That said, it can be estimated, combining information from several official sources, that the foreign population present in Italy as at 1 January 2012 can be quantified at 5,430,000; about 90% of this population has its habitual residence (domicile) in an Italian municipality. Foreigners with illegal status represent the six percent of the total; this is the lowest level ever observed and is certainly not unrelated to the crisis (EMN, 2012).

They are estimated at 326,000 persons, 117,000 less than in 2010; furthermore those who regularly live in Italy without being recorded in Population Register are 245,000 units.

Overall, estimates to 1st January 2012 mark a new collapse in the growth of foreigners presence; decreasing from the already modest +69,000 recorded in 2010 (after the hundreds of thousands, common in the earlier years) to a historical minimum of +27,000 (equal to a modest rate of growth of 5%) in 2011; also, a preliminary account of the latest census snapshot could provide indications that would lead even beyond the mere hypothesis of stagnation of the migration phenomenon.

Figure 2 - Estimate of foreigners present in Italy. Years 2011-2012 (in thousands)



Source: Istat data processed by ISMU

In fact processing the final census data gives the impression that the Population Register, which has always been relied upon to count the foreign residents, overestimates the total number of recorded individuals. This surplus could result in a cut of more than 700,000 persons at the census date of 9th October 2011; these persons are located, almost entirely, in central-northern Italy. Taking this into account, the overall estimate of foreigners' presence in Italy as at 1st January 2012 could drop from the 5,430,000 initially estimated to less than five million. This re-adjustment is consistent with the opinion (al-

ready expressed elsewhere³) according to which the effects of the economic crisis, in addition to slowing down new immigration flows, might also have favoured a certain number of returns to the countries of origin or of transfers to new international destinations. In this regard, it is interesting to observe that the ISMU-ORIM (Regional observatory for immigration and multi-ethnicity) study, carried out in mid-2011 in Lombardy, revealed a non-negligible incidence of plans to return/move abroad for the following twelve months (Blangiardo, 2012). About one immigrant in ten expressed this intention; 5.4% leaned towards a return to the home-country and 5.1% towards a move elsewhere. Specifically, the study in Lombardy showed significant differences in the intentions to return/move; these differences are linked to the occupational status (the highest incidence is observed among temporarily laid off or unemployed subjects and the lowest among businesspeople and workers with stable and regular jobs) and to the type of occupation (it is higher for low-level occupations of services and domestic care and lowest for the occupations in the social-medical area). The seniority of residence also plays an important role in conditioning their intentions to leave our country: the abandonment of the migration plan is a relatively more likely option, especially among those who have lived in Italy for less than two years. In summary, everything indicates that the phenomenon of return, caused by the current crisis, is still alive and could grow. Therefore, it is realistic to assume that, if the labour market conditions worsen further, undercurrent moves that have already become active recently – which have certainly overwhelmed the small trickle of the few hundreds of assisted voluntary repatriations (about one thousand in four years in the framework of the specific project started in the EU) – could surface forcefully.


In conclusion, it is premature to state that a cycle has ended and a permanent shift is under way toward from a less “adventurous” integration model to more “mature and conscious” life-plans. At the same time it is undeniable that the pause for thought that we are experiencing can, at least, contribute to mitigate some problems in the Italian immigration scene; perhaps it can even help to enhance the sustainability of an effective action aimed at fostering the processes of integration of foreign workers and, especially, of their families.

³ Blangiardo G.C., *Se tre indizi (statistici) possono fare una prova* [If three (statistical) indications constitute a proof], in “Il Sole 24 Ore”, 21/5/2012: 9.

Looking at the past to imagine the future

After living an exponential dynamic that in thirty years has led the foreign resident population from the 211 thousand unit (census 1981) to 4.029 thousand counted in 2011, the slowdown in growth which occurred more recently, on the one hand, legitimizes the hypothesis of a less turbulent future, on the other hand it certainly does not change the image of a country increasingly populated by foreign residents and new citizens with migration experience. In this regard, the latest official sources estimate (adequately revised considering recent census data), at a national level, an increase of just over 6 million immigrants between 2012 and 2041; this would mean an incidence on the total of residents that would rise steadily from the current 7%, to the 16%. In the next two decades we will assist to an increase of nearly 2.5 million immigrants. This is insufficient to fully compensate the strong decline of the Italian component of the population, which will go down by as much as 4.4 million between 2041 and 2061.

Figure A - Population by citizenship. Italy 1981-2061 (thousand)



Source: Istat, Census and Population projections (ISMU revision 2013)


All this is happening, although a progressive decline in net migration rate is acknowledged in the Istat forecast, basically directed towards a net contribution of 200 thousand units per year, and the perspective of a growing number of exits from the foreign population due to the acquisition of Italian citizenship has been taken into account. These acquisitions – that give the impression of having been partially underestimated¹ – are intended to pass, over time, the net contribution of a natural balance firmly attested on 100,000 units per year and would help to drive down the numerical growth of residents, progressively addressed to slide down to just a little more than 150,000 units per year.

¹ In this sense, the Istat estimates are lower by 35-40% on the assessments made by the ISMU Foundation through a specific simulation model carried out for the Home Affairs Ministry.

At the same time, in the next three decades, there would also be an important process of structural change in the resident foreign population. This phenomenon could be named as “maturation registry” and finds an eloquent acknowledgement in the increase in the median age from the current 31 and 33 years, respectively for males and females, to 38 and 43 in 2061. More specifically, between 2012 and 2061, this new scenario expects, according to a general increase of 191% of the total of foreign, an increase of 150% minors, 87% young adults (18 - 44 year olds), 255% for the 45-64 years old classes, but especially 2399% (twenty-five times the current consistency!) for the elderly component (over 65 years old).

This dynamic of this transition, from a little over 100 thousand elderly nowadays to over 2.6 million over the next half-century, brings into consideration and concerns for an “imported aging process” and its potential effects as part of a welfare system already destined to be affected by the aging of the strong native component.

Figure B - Foreign population by age. Italy 2012-2061 (thousand)



Source: Istat, Foreign population projections (ISMU revision 2013)

2.2 What kind of integration?

The theme of migrants’ integration is currently much debated: it is going as far as questioning this term, and in some cases, considered unfit for fully representing and signifying the complex process of foreigners’ reception. Several different formulations were proposed in the last few decades, each corresponding to a different theoretical reference model. As a consequence, the construction of measurements methods and the dimensions considered significant may vary depending on the selected definition and integration model (Zincone, 2000).

From an analytical point of view, most experts agree that integration shows three specific characteristics: procedurality, multi-dimensionality, and bi-directionality.

- a) Integration is a process which always and only develops over time and requires some time. The temporal dimension is intrinsically connected (or rather, can be superimposed) to the dimension of historicity, in which the person (and not the individual) plays the primary role, within the terms previously expounded, with all the consequences resulting from our theoretical option.
- b) Integration is always a multi-dimensional process, since it concerns different aspects of a migrant person's life; that is to say: the economic, social, cultural, and political dimension. The integration process can take place in different ways and in different times in relation to each single aspect. As a consequence, integration may be quickly achieved from an economic point of view, but not in political terms. Hence, the need to analytically examine each single dimension without omitting the possibility to reach also a synthetic index simultaneously comprehensive of all dimensions.
- c) Integration is always a bi-directional process, even when it is not immediately visible or it is rejected. Migrants must start a process of inclusion in the host society, which may be put into effect in different ways, but in any case obliges them to be confronted with the culture of the host country. The citizens of the host country, in turn, have to confront their selves with the newcomers and take a stance towards them (rejection, acceptance, mistrust, tolerance, openness, etc.), which may call their lifestyle into question, as well as their idea of their own integration in the society they belong to.

In accordance with the above theoretical approach it can be formulated a definition of integration as “a multi-dimensional process aimed at pursuing peaceful coexistence, within a particular historical and social reality, among culturally and/or ethnically different persons and groups based on mutual respect of ethno-cultural differences, on condition it does not prejudice any fundamental right and does not damage democratic institutions. Integration is always a process that requires time; it is a goal that cannot be reached once for all, but must be continuously pursued at an economic, cultural, social, and political level. Due to its multi-dimensional nature, if limited to a single area it will necessarily prove to be partial. Each single dimension generates different integration levels. Therefore, for example, a high economic integration level may be achieved along with scarce or no integration from a social or political point of view (or vice versa). These different dimensions may be diachronically positioned over time. Finally, it can be said that integration is a bi-directional

process, in that it does not only concern migrants, but also and jointly the citizens of the host country”.

Starting from this definition few years ago ISMU Foundation carried out a national survey aimed to measure differentials of integration among immigrants living in Italy (Cesareo, Blangiardo, 2009). Methods and outcomes of such empirical experience will be briefly discussed in the following pages.

2.3 Integration measure

2.3.1 Methodological and organizational features

The statistical material, in order to measure migrants’ integration levels in Italy, was directly collected between the end of 2008 and the first months of 2009 through a set of personal interviews (*papi* method) and a structured questionnaire administered to more than 12,000 foreign nationals established in the Italian territory.

This survey, which was coordinated at a national level by ISMU Foundation and carried out by 20 local research units in most cases active in the academic field; it covered 32 different provincial or municipal realities. The choice of these areas, though depending in most cases on the location of the organizations which granted their willingness to participate in the research, was made keeping into account both the need to ensure a widespread coverage of the national territory, and the inclusion within the first sampling layer (on a territorial basis) of units with a high migrants’ attendance and a considerable diversification in relation to the conditions of the social and economic context.

The work team, which joined researchers from each research unit and the coordination group (established at the headquarters of ISMU Foundation), took care of preparing the questionnaire to be used for this survey. It has first been drafted in Italian, and then translated into five languages (Albanian, Arab, Chinese, French and Romanian). Each local research unit contributed to develop a sampling plan according to pre-emptively agreed methodological guidelines and took care of coordinating the inquiry on a local scale. The central operating group at ISMU Foundation was responsible for the overall coordination of the survey and the support to local representatives.

Each research unit took care of the selection and training of qualified interviewers (males and females) of different nationalities to administer questionnaires to foreign nationals established in territory; it has identified the places of detection, i.e. the places where the foreign population usually gathers in the municipalities indicated by the sampling plan, this is preliminary for the correct application of the methodology “by centres” adopted also in this

occasion⁴. In-the-field survey activities involved more than 200 interviewers. In order to identify the main socio-demographic characteristics of foreign nationals established in Italy, a closed-question structured questionnaire has been used: it was based on the traditional model adopted for the sample surveys carried out since 2001 by ISMU Foundation in the territory of Lombardy (within the activities of the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multiethnicity of the Lombardy Region). To deal with the themes-objective of the research project, a set of *ad hoc* questions focused on integration, which concerned the four identified cultural, social, economic and political dimensions, was prepared.

2.3.2 Assignment of scores and construction of the integration indexes

In the described approach we can see that the direct acquisition of individual data offers the opportunity to overcome the information limits of official sources, and allows to capture, in a detailed and flexible way, the necessary information concerning, as well as the conditions of the context characterizing migrants' life (job, housing, family, etc.), and also some important expressions of interaction with persons and "rules" of the place in which they are settled.

Going into details, according to the purpose of measuring all the different aspects of migrants' integration, the survey investigated about the following elements: housing, accommodation and working conditions, and the capacity to save money, as economic integration factors; friendly relations, participation in associations, Italian lifestyle reception and acceptance levels, propensities and intentions, as useful elements for assessing social integration; knowledge and use of the Italian language, interest in Italian events, access to information, sense of belonging to the Italian society, migrants' self-perception of their well-being in Italy and their sharing of some integration ideals, as evidence of cultural integration; legal status, registration at the Population Registry Office, and opinions on the importance of citizenship, as elements aimed at evaluating migrants' political integration.

For the purpose of the research, the first step was to attribute to each individual a quantitative integration score basing on qualitative variables. In this regard, if the features to be made operating present, as in our case, ordered discrete states (in other words, if there is a logical order underlying these states), the resulting variables are ordinal and the attribution of values to each single mode should respect the order of such states. In these circumstances, researchers often resort to the attribution of values making use of the series of natural numbers, to which they exclusively acknowledge the ordinal charac-

⁴ See: Baio, Blangiardo G. C., Blangiardo M., 2011: 1-16.

teristics of numbers but not the cardinal ones. These numbers should be interpreted basing on the sequence they express and not on the distance that divides them. Basing on previous evaluations and knowledge, in the attempt to establish different distances between modes, researchers do often attribute scores which reflect a rough and subjective estimate of the distances between the different categories. On the other hand, in a quantitative measurement based on qualitative data, it is not possible to avoid elements of choice, but only to make them become less important.

In order to downsize the subjective element as much as possible, it has been decided to introduce the following method: the modes of the considered variables were preliminarily ordered into a logic scale of “integration effectiveness” ranging from the condition considered to be the worst to the best. In this sense, the assumption according to which indicators concerning migrants’ integration in the host society have been set up, is that the better and the greater are *legal, housing, and working conditions, saving capacity, knowledge of the Italian language and frequency of use, interest and access to information, ties with the local population and with the other communities established in the territory, the sense of belonging and the appreciation of the Italian lifestyle*, the greater are the possibilities of a migrant’s complete integration.

For each considered variable, starting from score zero referred to the worst condition, a score is attributed to the k^{th} modality of the order, equal to the percentage of cumulated valid frequency of the modality (k-1). In this way, each respondent receives a score, which is higher as the share of population living in a worse condition than his/hers is greater, and is lower as the share of population living in a similar or better condition than his/hers is smaller. A “mark” for each considered variable is thus attributed to each individual.

Table 2 - Assigned scores basing on frequency distribution

<i>Modality</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Cumulated percentage</i>	<i>Score</i>
m_1	f_1	p_1	P_1	0
\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots
m_{i-1}	f_{i-1}	p_{i-1}	P_{i-1}	\vdots
m_i	f_i	p_i	P_i	$P_{(i-1)}$
\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots
m_h	f_h	p_h	$P_h=100$	$P_{(h-1)}$
<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>100</i>		

The peculiarity of the measurement proposed consists in the attribution of a score, because it only requires a logic order of the modes of each single variable in an “integration effectiveness” scale, which thus avoids the assignment of arbitrary scores. The score assigned to each variable refers to the population distribution, in relation to the variable itself. Those who have reached the

best positions, which are hardly attainable, receive higher scores than others who have encountered greater difficulties.

The scores in relation to variables referring to the same aspect within a given area are summarized as simple average. For example, the scores concerning individual linguistic skills (comprehension, oral expression, reading and writing abilities) are summarized as simple average into a single score concerning the component of Italian language knowledge.

The scores of all the elements which refer to the same area are then summarized as simple average. For example, the scores related to Italian language knowledge and use, access to information, interest in the Italian events, self-perception of one's well-being in Italy, sense of belonging to the Italian society, and share levels of some ideals, are grouped as simple average into a single score concerning cultural integration. The scores assigned to social, economic and political integration are determined according to this logic as well.

Since the indicators obtained through this process show a variation range which differs from the others, the different indexes concerning cultural, social, economic and political integration were subsequently standardized in order to bring the extremes back to 0 value, in case of non-integration, and to 1 value, in case of maximum integration.

That being stated, it was possible to assign a summary score, called "overall integration index", to each respondent. This index is constructed as simple arithmetical average of the four partial standardized indexes concerning economic, social, cultural and political integration.

The proposed index represents therefore a relative measurement, as it evaluates the integration level achieved by an interviewed migrant compared to the level achieved by the other migrants involved in the same survey. Ultimately, having an individual score for each unit belonging to the respondents' sample, it is possible to estimate the variability and the relations existing in the average integration levels of subgroups defined in relation to appropriate different interest variables: gender, nationality of origin, education level, legal status, professed religion, residence seniority, territorial division, and so on. It is also possible to monitor the presence, among migrants, of niches reporting lower integration levels, or instead, to identify the characteristics of the so-called "groups of excellence".

2.3.3 Some outcomes

The "measure" of integration levels of foreign migrants living in Italy, points out a variety of situations that confirms the hypotheses concerning both the multi-dimensional features of the integration process, and its dependence on structural and environmental factors.

In general, with an average integration index value equal to 0.50, we can reasonably affirm that migrants' universe in Italy is placed halfway between the ideal model of those who reach the highest scores in all tests resulting from the series of questions included in the adopted questionnaire and those who, on the contrary, achieve the lowest scores in all items. There are, however, some clear evidences of a widespread variability, both in relation to migrants' structural characteristics and in relation to the context elements emerging at a territorial level.

Concerning the second aspect, it can be pointed out that the 32 local units in which the survey was carried out, show average values of the overall index which range from a 0.40 minimum to a 0.57 maximum, and that the majority of them (14) gather in the interval between 0.48 and 0.52 (Table 3).

As to a classification of the individual territorial units, the top position in relation to the overall index is held by the province of Trento, followed respectively by Massa-Carrara, Chieti, Modena and Ravenna. The provinces of Pescara, Pisa, Naples, Pistoia and Catania are placed, instead, at the bottom of the list.

However, if we examine these different partial indexes in detail, the province of Chieti overtakes Trento supremacy in terms of cultural integration, and shares with it the supremacy as regards social integration. The leading position in terms of political integration is handed over to the province of Massa-Carrara, while the provinces of Ravenna and Padua are placed on top of economic integration values.

Table 3 - Average value of the integration index in the investigated territorial units

<i>Territorial units</i>	<i>Overall index</i>	<i>Partial index</i>			
		<i>Cultural</i>	<i>Social</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Economic</i>
Trento	0.57	0.60	0.56	0.56	0.57
Massa-Carrara	0.55	0.52	0.51	0.60	0.57
Chieti	0.55	0.62	0.56	0.53	0.50
Modena	0.54	0.54	0.51	0.58	0.55
Ravenna	0.54	0.54	0.45	0.58	0.59
Campobasso-Isernia	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.54
Turin	0.53	0.53	0.51	0.55	0.54
Vicenza	0.53	0.48	0.52	0.55	0.58
Ancona	0.53	0.53	0.49	0.54	0.55
Teramo	0.53	0.52	0.54	0.56	0.51
Arezzo	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.54	0.51
Treviso	0.50	0.48	0.51	0.48	0.55
Padua	0.50	0.47	0.44	0.53	0.59
Forli-Cesena	0.50	0.46	0.47	0.54	0.52
Bari	0.50	0.49	0.47	0.53	0.53
Milan	0.49	0.47	0.45	0.47	0.58
Parma	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48
Lucca	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.46	0.52
Florence	0.49	0.48	0.46	0.49	0.53
Livorno	0.49	0.46	0.47	0.52	0.53
Rome	0.49	0.53	0.50	0.44	0.47
Siena	0.48	0.48	0.46	0.46	0.51
Benevento	0.48	0.50	0.52	0.45	0.45

Rimini	0.48	0.47	0.47	0.44	0.56
Grosseto	0.47	0.44	0.48	0.45	0.49
Palermo	0.47	0.47	0.49	0.48	0.45
Prato	0.47	0.43	0.46	0.47	0.54
Catania	0.46	0.49	0.48	0.43	0.43
Pistoia	0.45	0.46	0.44	0.45	0.47
Naples	0.45	0.46	0.44	0.45	0.44
Pisa	0.43	0.41	0.43	0.42	0.46
Pescara	0.40	0.44	0.43	0.37	0.37
<i>Total – Italy</i>	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.53</i>

As a matter of fact, having ascertained that the composition by nationality is not the same in the different and compared territorial units, and bearing in mind that this feature might significantly weigh on the average values of the partial indexes⁵, it has been considered advisable to recalculate the partial indexes through a standardization process capable to eliminate the distortion effect depending on the variation of the structure by nationality in each local environment⁶.

These reprocessed data – though strongly correlated to the original ones (the correlation coefficient between the two sets of values being in fact +0.89⁷) – lend themselves to express the differential aspects at a territorial level, regardless of the different composition by nationality of the concerned population.

The corresponding distribution of the standardized integration indexes closely follows the original value distribution, though moderately stressing a concentration towards the average value (which obviously remains equal to 0.50).

The overall index classification reports, in this case as well, the supremacy of the province of Trento, followed – in relation to non-standardized values – by the provinces of Ravenna, Modena, Campobasso/Isernia and Turin, while the provinces of Massa-Carrara and Chieti, instead, withdraw. At the bottom of the list, the provinces of Bari and Catania draw back, while Naples and Pistoia gain ground.

Concerning each investigated area, standardized values report the predominance of the province of Trento from the point of view of cultural and social integration, while Ravenna is placed on the top of the list as regards economic

⁵ Empirical results have allowed to assess the existence of a connection between the respondents' country of origin and their average integration score levels, both in the overall and the partial indexes.

⁶ Data standardization has been made through the so-called "population-type method", that is to say, by determining the standardized indicator for a given area as a weighted arithmetic mean of the indicators for each single nationality concerning that area, however by adopting as standards weights (equal in each area) the corresponding population by nationality – assumed as "population-type" – concerning all areas jointly considered.

⁷ The linear correlation coefficient between the two sets of data varies from a -1 minimum (perfect inverse proportionality) to a +1 maximum (perfect direct proportionality), with a 0 value in case of an absolute absence of linear correlation.

and political integration. The bottom place is held by the province of Pescara in three of the four concerned areas – social, political and economic – while the province of Pisa overtakes it downwards only as regards cultural integration.

In general, basing on the average value referring to the considered areas, we can note, on a territorial scale, a strong positive correlation between cultural and social integration (the related coefficient being +0.77) and between political and economic integration (+0.71). Less intense, though persistent, is the correlation between political and cultural integration (+0.55) or social integration (+0.52), and even lower is the correlation between economic and cultural integration (+0.42), or social integration (+0.33).

Table 4 - Average value of the integration index in the investigated territorial units (standardized index in relation to the different structure by nationality)

<i>Territorial units</i>	<i>Overall index</i>	<i>Partial index</i>			
		<i>Cultural</i>	<i>Social</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Economic</i>
Trento	0.58	0.61	0.57	0.56	0.58
Ravenna	0.54	0.53	0.47	0.58	0.59
Modena	0.54	0.56	0.51	0.54	0.55
Campobasso-Isernia	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.55	0.55
Turin	0.54	0.54	0.52	0.55	0.54
Massa Carrara	0.53	0.50	0.51	0.57	0.55
Chieti	0.53	0.55	0.54	0.50	0.53
Vicenza	0.53	0.51	0.54	0.53	0.54
Ancona	0.52	0.52	0.48	0.53	0.56
Teramo	0.52	0.49	0.51	0.56	0.52
Forli-Cesena	0.52	0.50	0.49	0.56	0.54
Palermo	0.51	0.54	0.51	0.48	0.50
Lucca	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.54
Treviso	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.53
Prato	0.50	0.51	0.48	0.51	0.51
Milan	0.50	0.50	0.47	0.47	0.57
Parma	0.50	0.52	0.47	0.51	0.49
Padua	0.50	0.46	0.45	0.51	0.58
Arezzo	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.52	0.50
Florence	0.50	0.51	0.48	0.49	0.51
Rimini	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.46	0.56
Rome	0.49	0.53	0.51	0.44	0.48
Livorno	0.49	0.47	0.46	0.51	0.52
Benevento	0.49	0.47	0.51	0.47	0.50
Siena	0.48	0.48	0.47	0.48	0.51
Grosseto	0.48	0.47	0.49	0.47	0.50
Pistoia	0.47	0.48	0.45	0.47	0.49
Naples	0.47	0.50	0.49	0.46	0.43
Catania	0.46	0.49	0.48	0.42	0.44
Pisa	0.45	0.42	0.45	0.44	0.49
Bari	0.44	0.46	0.43	0.43	0.53
Pescara	0.40	0.43	0.42	0.37	0.40
<i>Total - Italy</i>	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.49</i>	<i>0.53</i>

On a territorial scale, it is interesting to study the relation between average integration score and density of the foreign population. In this connection, available data show a high negative correlation level between these two variables: the corresponding coefficient totals -0.44 concerning overall integration and remains negative – thus evidencing that in general integration levels de-

crease as density increases – also in correspondence of the detail concerning each investigated area: cultural (-0.34), social (-0.30), political (-0.35) and economic (-0.37).

2.3.4 Typology and paths

The search of similar realities and discriminating elements in relation to the goal of migrants' integration, can be extended from an overview of aggregated data at a territorial level to a micro-analysis of the individual profiles of all the members who are part of the investigated universe.

In this case, the resort to statistical classification procedures (*cluster analysis*) proves to be particularly useful in identifying and characterizing – within the mass of elementary data – the presence of groups formed by homogeneous sub-populations in relation to the different dimensions of the integration process. These groups, also in the light of processed micro-data, are strictly correlated to one each other, in particular the cultural and the social dimension⁸.

The results of the classification of the more than 12,000 cases composing the investigated sample, suggest a typology structured into four different groups⁹. The group which seems more ahead in the integration process – group A, which could be labelled as the one including “those who are on the point of reaching the goal” – gathers 23 per cent cases, and in parallel a 0.71 overall average score points out values close to 0.75 as regards the cultural and economic dimensions.

Group B, which gathers 25 per cent of the investigated universe, can be considered in general the group of those who are about “halfway” in this process, and has its strong point in the area of cultural integration (with an average 0.60 score). This dimension is instead the weak point of group C, which with a 29 per cent numerosness out of the total, reports the persistence of a large area in which “the integration process has difficulty in going on”.

Even more difficult is the progress of integration in correspondence of the fourth group D (“those who have gone less than one third of their way”) including 23 per cent cases, in which both the overall and the partial average indicator values never exceed 0.30.

As to the characterization of these four homogeneous groups through structural and behavioural variables, it seems interesting to point out in particular the two extreme situations, namely the group of those who are less integrated and the one of those who are most integrated.

⁸ Correlation coefficients range from a +0.61 maximum for the cultural/social pair to a +0.32 minimum for the social/economic pair.

⁹ After appropriate empirical checks, a non-hierarchical classification was preferred, and it was decided – in the light of a set of simulations – to consider optimal a division into four groups.

Table 5 - Respondents' classification into four homogeneous groups in relation to integration index value

Group	No. of cases	Overall index	Partial index			
			Cultural	Social	Political	Economic
A	2,794	0.71	0.74	0.67	0.69	0.75
B	2,983	0.50	0.60	0.55	0.47	0.36
C	3,526	0.44	0.38	0.42	0.49	0.48
D	2,739	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.29
Total	12,042	0.50	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.53

In this regard, individual data point out that the profile of less integrated migrants is characterized by a slight predominance of males, a lower amount of persons with family ties, rather limited income levels, relatively low educational qualifications, and usually short migration seniority. But, above all, this profile often goes along with housing situations widely based on the sharing of an accommodation with other subjects (relatives and/or friends).

On the contrary, the subjects who belong to the group which reports the highest integration levels are in general women, above all married ones (especially if married with an Italian national) with children. The members of this group have in general a high educational level and a fairly high income. They have lived in Italy for a long time (most of them for more than 15 years) and live with their families in an independent house or flat. They usually have few links, in terms of relations and economic support (remittances), with their native country¹⁰.

Finally, if we closely examine the virtuous group of the best integrated subjects, and the characteristics of the narrow sub-group which represents a sort of "integration Olympus" as it gathers the minority of the migrants' universe (totalling 0.6 per cent) which reached at least an average 0.90 value in the total score, we can find further elements in confirmation of some of the hypotheses we formulated in this research.

New empirical evidences lead us to be increasingly persuaded of the determining role a long presence in Italy plays in promoting the goal of migrants' integration, their possibility to live together with their whole family, their achievement of high educational qualifications, and relatively high income levels.

At the same time, with a similar relevance, the role of the Roman Catholic religion – professed by a part of the elite of the most integrated migrants, which is double compared to the percentage in which it recurs among the rest of the migrant population – emerges, as well as the belonging (among women) to two important East-European nationalities. In particular, Romanian and, above all, Albanian women, within the sub-group reporting maximum integra-

¹⁰ An exception, from this point of view, are those transnational migrants who, though living in Italy for many years now, keep steady emotional and economic relations with their country of origin.

tion levels, play – in spite of widespread clichés – a considerable and quite surprising role.

Table 6 - Characteristics in conjunction with situations of greater and lower migrants' integration*

<i>Less integrated migrant</i>	%	<i>Highly integrated migrant</i>	%
Cohabitation with spouse/partner + relatives/acquaintances	163	Religion: Coptic	125
Cohabitation only with friends / acquaintances	114	Migration seniority >15 years	119
Migration seniority 0-1 year	103	Italian spouse	117
Cohabitation with friends, acquaintances and children	100	Net monthly earned income: 1.500-2.000 €	106
Migration seniority 2-4 years	87	No sense of belonging to the country of origin	100
No educational qualification	78	Scarce sense of belonging to the country of origin	85
Cohabitation with relatives + friends/acquaintances	76	Net monthly earned income exceeding 2.000 €	81
Does not live with any of his/her children in the host country	73	Net monthly earned income 1.200-1.500 €	72
Cohabitation with relatives friends/acquaintances and children	67	Migration seniority 11-15 years	55
Cohabitation with relatives and children	64	Educational qualification: University degree	49
Foreign spouse of another nationality	49	Lives alone with children	49
Net monthly earned income: less than 600 €	46	Cohabitation with spouse/partner + children	48
Lives alone	43	Scarcely interested in the events of the country of origin	44
Religion: other Christian	37	Cohabitation with spouse/partner	39
Religion: Buddhist	37	Net monthly earned income 1.000-1.200 €	37
Educational qualification: compulsory education	26	Lives with all his/her children in the host country	36
Religion: Muslim	21	No interested in the events of the country of origin	35
Origin: Sub-Saharan Africa	20	Origin: Latin America	33
Net monthly earned income 600-800 €	18	No religion	31
Origin: North Africa	18	Fair sense of belonging to the country of origin	23
Marital status: unmarried	16	Cohabitation with relatives (parents, brothers/sisters)	21
High sense of belonging to the country of origin	16	Cohabitation with spouse/partner + relatives and children	16
Man	15	Religion: Roman Catholic	14
Religion: Sikh	12	No remittances to the country of origin	14
Without children	11	Origin: Eastern Europe	13
Regular remittances to the country of origin	11	Woman	10
Net monthly earned income 800-1000 €	11	Marital status: married	9

* These values point out how higher (in percentage) is the relative incidence of this modality in each group (less integrated or most integrated) in relation to its incidence within the overall population.

Table 7 - Elements which more than others characterize the sub-group reporting maximum integration levels (formed by the cases in which the overall index is >0,9)

Characteristics	% of the characteristic within	
	Maximum integration sub-group*	Overall population
Woman	69 (+44%)	48
Married	77 (+38%)	56
Diploma	44 (+5%)	42
University degree	41 (+116%)	19
Roman Catholic	52 (+100%)	26
Net monthly earned income >1500 €	19 (+280%)	5
Cohabiting only his/her spouse e children	62 (+138%)	26
Cohabiting only with his/her spouse	17 (+55%)	11
With all his/her children	96 (+71%)	56
In Italy for more than 15 years	55 (+293%)	14
East-European	58 (+53%)	38
Latin-American	19 (+73%)	11
Albanian women	14 (+180%)	5
Romanian women	14 (+75%)	8

* The values in brackets point out how higher (in percentage) the relative incidence of this modality is within the set of maximum integration compared to its incidence in the overall population.

3. Managing immigration in Italy: between law and policy

by *Ennio Codini* and *Nicola Pasini**

3.1 Legal aspects

From the beginning of mass immigration towards Italy from the eighties to 1998, the Italian discipline of immigration was marked by instability and fragmentation.

In 1986, law n. 943 was adopted and provided for equal rights for Italian and foreign workers; in 1990, for the first time, Italy enacted law nr. 39, the so-called Martelli Law, an *ad hoc* set of general rules on foreigners' entry and stay; before that, immigration was only ruled by the Public Security Code (*codice di pubblica sicurezza*). In 1995-1996, Italy adopted a series of decrees, the so-called Dini decrees, which did not repeal but rather considerably amended previous provisions. In 1997, under definitely urging circumstances, an exceptional decree was enforced dictating an *ad hoc* discipline for the about 17,000 Albanese that set foot in Puglia.

In 1998, there was a passage from instability to relative stability. The Parliament adopted law n. 40, the so called Turco-Napolitano law, subsequently merged into the Single Immigration Act (*testo unico sull'immigrazione*) n. 286 providing for systematic rules on third country nationals' entry and stay. This Act remains the basis of the law in force.

The Single Immigration Act was partly amended by law n. 189 of 2002, the so-called Bossi-Fini law, aiming to render the rule stricter (looking at the matter from a political point of view, with law n. 189, the right wing "revised" a discipline laid down by the left wing). Likewise, in 2008 the Government introduced new amendments with the so-called Security Package (*pacchetto sicurezza*); the "package" laid down *inter alia* a new type of criminal offenses consisting in illegal entry/residence on the State territory and extended the period of legal detention in Identification and Expulsion Centres (detention cen-

* Par. 3.1 by *Ennio Codini*, par. 3.2 by *Nicola Pasini*.

tres where migrants entering the territory illegally are held pending expulsion) to eighteen months. These provisions were hotly debated.

In 2007, Decree n. 30, implementing the European Directive 2004/38/EC providing for “the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”, laid down elements of an EU citizen status. According to this Decree, a migrant for example from Romania must register at the Municipality registry office in which he/she resides within three month from his/her entry in the country. This transition from the status of “immigrant” to that of “EU citizen” was completed in a context in which the Romanian community represented one of the major foreign groups present for some time in Italy, with definitely high and increasing growth rates.

Despite the relative legal stabilization, emergency solutions kept on coming up. In 2011 vis-à-vis the new large scale arrivals of economic migrants and later on of refugees from Tunisia and Libya, a state of humanitarian emergency was declared. As a matter of fact, there was two emergencies: the first one stemmed from the thousands of economic migrants who landed illegally in Italy within only three months (from January to March 2008); the second emergency stemmed from the much higher number of people requesting international protection than in the previous years. The response to the first emergency was a decree providing for all illegal economic migrants a permit “on humanitarian grounds”, renewable, with all the rights and the obligations ordinarily valid for legal immigrants, including the right to work. The response to the second one was essentially to issue exceptional measures of civil protection aimed at providing accommodation to those requesting asylum.

Alongside the new large scale arrivals, another “emergency” situation, related to the implementation of the European Directive 2008/115/CE on procedures for returning illegally staying third country nationals, came about in 2011.

The term for the implementation of the aforementioned directive expired in 2010 without any specific measures were adopted because of the widespread opinion that Italian law had already met the terms required by the directive. But the European Court of Justice in 2011 found the Italian legal system in contrast with the Directive regarding sentences and deportation of illegal migrants provided therein for lack of proportionality. As a consequence, the Government adopted Decree n. 89 amending the provisions of the Single Immigration Act concerning sentences and deportation of illegal migrants.

3.1.1 Immigration for work purposes. Regularizations

At the beginning, entry for work purposes was conditioned to the unavailability of suitable workers already present on the territory.

The Turco-Napolitano law did not recall the reference to the lack of available workers on the territory and provided for a regulation planning every year with an *ad hoc* decree (*decreto flussi*) of binding “numbers” of entry (*quote*), except for particular cases (the most relevant, introduced by law n. 189, being “professional nurses employed in public and private healthcare structures”). This regulation was only marginally amended by law n. 189.

Another rule introduced by the Turco-Napolitano law and ultimately upheld by the Bossi-Fini law was that of making entries for subordinate work conditional to a previous engagement of the employer to recruit the immigrant. The major derogation was introduced by law n. 40 and provided for the possibility to authorise a certain number of entries for “seeking a job” with the guarantee of a sponsor; however this derogation was soon after repealed by the Bossi-Fini law.

Actually, the larger part of people immigrating for work purposes came either through illegal entry or through legal entry but with a visa inappropriate to immigration, such as for example overstaying a tourist visa or a seasonal job visa. The difficulty to make demand and offer coincide with the foreigner living abroad, as provided for by the law, has played a relevant role as a factor pushing to illegal entry.

The law answered this phenomenon by, first, providing for sanctions focusing essentially on expulsion measures. The discipline of expulsion became more incisive through law n. 40 and became increasingly severe through the Bossi-Fini law and the “security package”. However, these measures have not proved able to keep illegality within reasonable limits.

Consequently, facing stocks of some hundreds of thousand immigrants in irregular situation, the Government was obliged to resort to extraordinary mass-amnesty provisions aimed at granting residence permit to immigrants residing irregularly. The first amnesty was decided in 1986. Then, exceptional regularization campaigns were led in 1990, in 1995 – with about 250,000 permits – in 1998-1999, in 2002 – the greatest one with the granting of more than 650,000 residence permits – and in 2009, with more than 250,000 permits.

Moreover, almost all applications related to legal numbers of entry were actually submitted by foreign workers who had already come and settled in Italy for long. In this regard, for example, there has been a sort of regularization of about 500,000 migrants’ situation in 2006-2007; in short, a measure quite similar to the 2002 “official” regularization.

Undoubtedly, the fact that immigration for work purposes has extensively developed outside the framework of legality, except for subsequent periodical

recoveries through mass-regularization or using *de facto* decrees on migration flows as regularization measures, does not play in favour of a regulation which has always proved unable to effectively manage this phenomenon.

Unfortunately, the political debate did not reveal a complete awareness of this problem. A marked “dirigiste” approach has always been prevailing up to now, in an attempt to subdue market logics to the Government’s will, refusing a more liberal approach which would not clash with the market’s logics but instead that would be merely aimed at governing the practices resulting from these logics in order to safeguard the different interests at stake.

3.1.2 Immigration for family reunification or asylum

In connection with entry for family reunification purposes, the Turco-Napolitano law laid down a complete discipline that was only marginally amended by law n. 198.

Unlike entry for subordinate work, entry for family reunification corresponds to a real right in Italian law, related to the right to family unity: if the foreigner has a member of its family falling under the categories provided for by the law (spouse, children, etc.) and satisfies particular conditions as provided for by the law concerning accommodation and income, “reunification” cannot be denied.

Unlike entry for subordinate work, entry for family reunification is usually “legal” and, with this specific permit, able to guarantee a long term legal residence. In fact, in the last few years, the highest number of entries in compliance with the legal provisions was for family reunification.

In Italy, Asylum has been considered for a long time as a relatively marginal phenomenon compared to labour migration and family reunification.

Only in 2008 a comprehensive regulation concerning the examination procedures for asylum applications was laid down through Decree n. 25 which enforced the European Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards for asylum procedures. In this way, the long-expected systematic definition of the rules on asylum matters could be completed. These rules are based on three pillars: the aforementioned Decree n. 25, decree n. 251/2007, enforcing the European Directive 2004/83/EC concerning the qualification and status of international protection beneficiaries, and Decree n. 140/2005, enforcing the European Directive 2003/9/EC, concerning minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers.

This legislation resulted in a system adequate as a whole. However, there are two main critical aspects: first, the person has not always the opportunity to lodge his claim for asylum; second, if, as it is often the case, applications exceed 5-6 thousands in a year, the reception system is not able to accommodate all asylum seekers.

3.1.3 Integration and citizenship

In connection with integration, we can observe that before the Turco-Napolitano law, laws were not particularly focused on immigrants' integration because of their emergency-oriented nature. Law n. 40 thus represents a turning point by affording great attention to this issue and establishing a discipline that was only marginally amended by the Bossi-Fini law.

The basic logic is to promote integration by treating almost completely equally immigrants and nationals. The Single Immigration Act in particular does not only reaffirm the acknowledgement of foreigner's fundamental rights, and hence of irregular migrants too, but also states that, barring exceptions, the foreigner who regularly resides on the territory enjoys the same civil rights as those granted to Italian citizens.

The law *inter alia* has provided for a right-duty of compulsory education for all foreign minors residents, disregarding their parents' status regarding residence discipline. That is, school is regarded –as it can be deduced from the substance of these provisions – not only as a place in which a fundamental right is implemented, but also as an essential “integration agency”.

As a matter of fact, the whole welfare sector has been “opened” to immigrants, even if some exceptions or limitations as regards irregular immigrants remain. These ones must be in any case “reasonable”. For example in 2008 the Constitutional Court found the legal provisions subordinating the granting of public allowance for invalidity to the possession of a long term residence permit for third country nationals unconstitutional. The Court stated that it should be considered unreasonable to subordinate the access to such allowance to the holding of a title – the aforementioned residence permit – which assumes the availability of a certain income with the consequence of actually excluding the poorest, thereby clearly contradicting the ends of the provisions concerning this type of allowance.

In 2010, a regulation concerning the “Integration Pact” (*Accordo di integrazione*) was laid down on the basis of the French model: every new migrant must commit to the achievement of the language level A2, as defined by the Common European Framework of Reference, within two years time upon arrival. In addition, the Pact provides that foreigners must follow a civic education course and be informed about civic life in Italy (however, if we consider the contents of this last provision, they seem quite modest as, in substance, the obligation an immigrant is subject to consists in attending a “session of civic education and information on civil life in Italy” which lasts 5-10 hours in all.)

With regard to citizenship, it is well known that the Italian law system – strictly bound to the *ius soli* criterion typical of countries without significant immigration – is one of the most restrictive in this regard.

The granting of citizenship, save for the case of marriage with an Italian citizen, requires a very long time of residence, both for immigrants – who

may only apply after ten years of legal residence – and their children born in Italy who are regarded as foreigners until the age of eighteen years old when only then they may apply for citizenship.

Generally speaking, immigration-related issues highlight the need to radically rethink the law concerning citizenship acquisition in order to link it to actual political integration processes, thus changing the citizenship from a belated “admission” to a booster of such processes. That said, the current parliamentary debate does not seem likely to lead to the adoption of any significant amendment to the law in force as regards the issue of citizenship acquisition.

3.2 Political aspects

3.2.1 Immigration and political system

Immigration issues have always occupied a central position in Italy’s public opinion and political system. It is one of the main themes that has drawn attention and concerns of an ever-growing part of the Italian population. Even during the past few years in which economic questions drew much of people’s attention, immigration remained on the public agenda. Political parties have given answers in terms of policy, particularly of a regulatory nature, aimed at limiting influxes and promoting integration in an attempt to find a position that reflects the preferences of their electorate. In this respect, it is of great relevance to highlight how the Italian party system responds to issues related to immigration. As it often happens with sensitive issues, different positions are likely to be encountered not only between parties but also within them. When a theme divides the different orientations of a society, the party system tends to be structured by socio-political cleavages (e.g. church-state, centre-periphery, capital-labour, etc.) that generate boundaries and allegiances.

Based on this reflection, an investigation shall be conducted so as to shed light on how immigration structures the Italian party system, by emphasizing parties’ positions on each issue and the centrality of the Italian immigration policy agenda.

3.2.2 Immigration and political agenda

Several surveys show that in Italy, immigration (including its perception as a phenomenon) generates a series of worries and alarms that require public decision-makers take action and that such action goes beyond symbolism. The emergence of these questions bears witness of the central role immigration plays in the public debate. Policy-makers are therefore called to play an active

role in drawing up immigration policies. Here, we are interested in understanding how immigration remains one of the long-lasting issues on the Italian political agenda.

Given that immigration is at the centre of Italian politics, we examine the way in which this phenomenon has become so important (what definition; what frame) for public opinion. A survey carried out by *Demos* (www.demos.it) on a representative sample of Italian citizens shows that in 2007 immigration was a major concern for Italians: 35% of the respondents took the view that immigrants were a threat to Italian culture, identity and religion; 36.7% saw immigrants as a threat to employment; and 50.7% thought that immigrants were a threat to public order and people's safety. In 1999, as the same questions were posed, the results were somewhat similar. Compared to the initial application, the question that connects immigration and threat to Italians identity and culture went through a fluctuating trend: 27% of Italians agreed with the statement in 1999 compared to 35% in 2007. As for the second question connecting immigration and threat to employment, 32% of the respondents agreed in 1999 while they were 37% in 2007. Finally, 46% of the respondents agreed with the third statement, the one linking immigration to security threat, in 1999 while they were 51% in 2007 (a significant growth compared to 2005, when the proportion reached 39%). Immigration is therefore first perceived as a threat to people's safety and secondly as a risk for employment and cultural identity.

It appears that Italian public opinion have defined its priorities in a clear manner when it comes to immigration. The increase of those who associate immigration with security threat bears witness of the fact that for many people immigration means above all insecurity. In this manner, the change of cognitive frames through which policy-makers have formulated policies of influxes control is fairly consistent with people's demand. To put it differently, public opinion and cognitive schemes seem to be going hand in hand. Beyond the effectiveness of individual measures, policy-makers seem to give the answers that citizens' demand.

The second aspect has to do with the positioning of political parties on the subject and aims at checking whether this positioning reflects the structure of the current party system or tends to put in crisis the boundaries and their respective memberships. Party systems were in fact born through the expression of different positions on single issues. These positions generate cleavages that shape the party system, even if the party system changes over time. In essence, there are public issues that do not allow heterogeneity of positions within political parties or even within coalitions of parties. There are others that allow this heterogeneity without significant consequences on the party system.

The fact that immigration is at the top of the agenda and that it meets citizens' concerns and expectations suggests that immigration has, in this period

of time, a structuring power that is by no means secondary. It also suggests that, if the parties' or coalitions' positions are not coherent on this issue and its solutions, the current party system is likely to change and realign in a more consistent way to overcome the structuring fracture.

3.2.3 Institutions and policy production

In analysing “*how many responses institutions have given to the immigration issue?*”, we analyse their legislative production. This choice merits some preliminary considerations. The first is that policies are not only laws. The concept of policy is something much more complex (even a non-choice is in some respects part of a policy). The second is that not all laws are equal. Therefore, “making more laws” does not necessarily mean solving the problem. Our goal is simply to understand the extent to which immigration issues have occupied the overall legislative production of several Italian institutions.

The Italian Parliament¹ produced (by approving them) the following acts² from 2006 to 2011.

Table 1 - Total acts and acts on immigration approved

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Immigration</i>	<i>%</i>
2006	333	18	5.4
2007	266	16	6.0
2008	238	18	7.6
2009	211	20	9.5
2010	252	22	8.7
2011	192	6	3.1
<i>Total</i>	<i>1,492</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>6.7</i>

Source: Normattiva (www.normattiva.it)

In the (nearly) five years considered, the acts approved related to immigration accounted for 6.7% of the total. A not so significant proportion if we consider the centrality of the issue for public opinion. A further consideration can be made on the various coalition governments. In Table 1 we can see that when the centre-right coalition was in office, the weight of immigration increased in the responses produced. The perception of citizens with regard to the different capacity of the two coalitions to handle the problem is to some extent confirmed by these data, if citizens measure capacity by the number of responses approved. Few citizens had indicated the centre-left coalition as the coalition

¹ The study was conducted by examining the regulatory databases. Acts considered were those containing in the text or title the terms: immigration OR foreigner* OR migrant* OR immigrant*. For 2011 the period of time considered is from 1st January 2011 to 25th August 2011.

² The regulatory acts taken into consideration are the numbered acts published in the “Official Gazette (*Gazzetta ufficiale*)”, General Series.

capable of handling the problem and in the period in which it governed at national level (2006-2008), the black box's production of immigration policies amounted to less policies (compared to the total policy production) than during the period of centre-right government.

A second level of analysis is at the regional level. We conducted the same study as the one done for the Parliament in five Italian regions: Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany. The total results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 - Total number of regional laws approved and laws related to immigration

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Immigration</i>	<i>%</i>
2006	187	5	2.7
2007	201	9	4.5
2008	196	8	4.1
2009	223	13	5.8
2010	167	7	4.2
2011	101	6	5.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>1,075</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>4.5</i>

Source: ISMU elaborations on data provided by the regional Councils

From 2006 to 2011 immigration was dealt with in 4.5% of the regional laws, a figure that is lower than what was registered at the national level. The trend of this figure over time is however slightly different from the figure previously analysed: in this case the peak is in 2011. To examine the significance of this figure it is useful to look at the data disaggregated by region (Tab. 3).

Table 3 - Regional laws on immigration

<i>Year</i>	<i>Lombardy</i>			<i>Veneto</i>			<i>Piedmont</i>		
	<i>Tot.</i>	<i>Imm.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Tot.</i>	<i>Imm.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Tot.</i>	<i>Imm.</i>	<i>%</i>
2006	32	1	3.1	28	1	3.6	39	1	2.6
2007	36	3	8.3	36	1	2.8	29	1	3.4
2008	38	1	2.6	23	0	0.0	37	1	2.7
2009	33	2	6.1	30	1	3.3	38	3	7.9
2010	22	1	4.5	30	0	0.0	27	1	3.7
2011	15	2	13.3	17	0	0.0	16	0	0.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>176</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>5.7</i>	<i>164</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>186</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>3.8</i>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Emilia Romagna</i>			<i>Tuscany</i>		
	<i>Tot.</i>	<i>Imm.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Tot.</i>	<i>Imm.</i>	<i>%</i>
2006	23	2	8.7	65	0	0.0
2007	31	1	3.2	69	3	4.3
2008	25	4	16.0	73	2	2.7
2009	35	0	0.0	87	7	8.0
2010	18	2	11.1	70	3	4.3
2011	12	2	16.7	41	2	4.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>144</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>7.6</i>	<i>405</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>4.2</i>

Source: ISMU elaborations on data provided by the regional Councils

The region in which immigration weighed the most in terms of laws produced is Emilia Romagna. The one where immigration weighed the least is Veneto. In 2011, Lombardy and Emilia Romagna legislated a great deal in this sector while Veneto and Piedmont did not legislate at all. Tuscany occupies a position in between. The diachronic analysis of single regions shows that Tuscany and Piedmont had a peak in 2009 (a pre-election year) while the other regions had less constant trends.

The output, in terms of production related to immigration on the national scale, represents a small percentage of the total output on the national scale and is linked to public opinion's changing mood over time. On the sub-national scale some regions have more legislated (Emilia Romagna) than others (Veneto). The pattern that we deduced from data on the national scale is thus reversed: the region that produced the greatest number of laws on immigration is a centre-left region whereas the one which produced the least is a centre-right one.

In conclusion, the twofold analysis that has been proposed here confirms that immigration issues have a relevant importance. In our opinion, two main elements emerged. The first is related to public opinion: immigration is, especially in Italy, a primary concern, even though its intensity is slightly on the decline compared to the last years, just as the way in which the phenomenon manifests itself has partially changed (immigrants are less seen as a risk for one's job; many feel that it is correct to give immigrants the right to vote in municipal elections).

The second element concerns the performance of the decision-making process. While at the national level the periods in which immigration is most present among the acts approved coincide with the years of centre-right government, at the regional level we saw that the region that the issue the most times in its acts is of the centre-left and the region that approved the least is of the centre-right.

As a last word, if we consider the consequences of this issue's centrality on the decision-making process, we can see that it is strongly affected by the proximity to (or distance from) election deadlines.

4. *Immigration and labour market*

by *Laura Zanfrini*

4.1 **Italy's specific features in the international context**

In the second post-war period, the transition of Europe towards a destination area marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of international migrations. Differently from “New World” countries, where immigration is an essential component of the national identity, *prevailed here a functionalist conception of immigration strictly connected to the labour market's need.* Face to face with the continuous growth that went along with the so-called “glorious thirty years”, many European countries began to import labour force, whether consisting of spontaneously arrived persons or specially recruited workers through temporary work programmes. This stage in migration history may be called “Fordist”, since it coincided with the consolidation in Europe of a production pattern based on large-scale enterprise and resorting to huge crowds of low qualified workers, including immigrants to a great extent. The recruitment system complied with the *excess theory*: an excess of unemployment in the sending countries and the need to export its costs; an excess of vacant jobs in the destination countries, along with the need to limit wages. Between the late 1960's and the early 1970's, European countries put an end to active recruitment policies. The oil shock in 1973, marked the definitive conclusion of the previous stage: from then onwards, migrations began to put on the character of “undesired” presences, either tolerated or rejected, depending on circumstances, but in any case increasingly less legitimated by economic needs. From that moment onwards, the idea that the so-called “push factors”, those determining forsaking the countries of origin, were at the origin of migration flows became prevailing. And immigration, increasingly and manifestly not depending on planning policies any longer, began to be depicted as an emergency from which we have to defend ourselves.

It was actually during that period, dominated by restrictive policies and spontaneous immigration flows, that South-European countries, at the head of which was Italy, began their transformation into destination areas for heterogeneous flows arrived out of any active recruitment policy, and destined to be introduced in the numerous niches of an economy that just in that period knew

its transition to post-Fordism. In the mid-1980's, Italy had all the characteristics for typically representing this new stage in international migrations. A rather heterogeneous foreign presence and openly independent of any active migration policy; a marked *feminization* in migration flows, and particularly those for labour purposes; and, again, the public opinion sharing an idea of immigration as a non-desired and non-demanded, moreover unnecessary to an economy that was far from granting full employment.

The particular stage in which Italy knew its migratory transition did considerably weigh upon the analyses dedicated to this theme. In the other European countries, immigration had been studied as an *industrial phenomenon*, which called in question themes and problems connected to class relations and industrial clash, identification processes with the working class, relationship between local and immigrant workers, trade unions actions, social mobility strategies, and social movements. The social integration of immigrants and of their families, and all the problems associated with inter-ethnic coexistence started to attract the attention of both researchers and governmental authorities at a later stage, as soon as immigration began to transform itself from a substantially *economic* matter into a *political* one. To some extent, in the Italian case this process was opposite, since the economic functionality of immigration was far from being taken for granted. This explains the reason why the first studies carried out during the 1980's and the early 1990's, had actually the function of shedding light on immigrant labour, opposing the immigrant worker's figure to that of a parasite or potential deviant, which was in the air in the public opinion (Colasanto, Ambrosini, 1993). A group of surveys carried out in several local realities allowed outlining a map, however fragmentary and incomplete, of immigrant work (cf. Zanfrini, 1993). The first two regularizations, launched respectively in 1986 and 1990, allowed the emergence of dozen of thousands work relations, but most of all allowed newly regularized workers to gain access to the opportunities that in the meantime had opened in the Italian labour market, or more precisely, in the northern part of the country. In confirmation of the chronic dualism characterizing the national economy, researchers found that a mobility process inside the country was in progress, following the direction of the 1950's and 1960's migrations from the south to the north of the country. Provinces such as Bergamo, Brescia, Modena, Reggio Emilia, Verona, Vicenza, Trento, Treviso (besides, obviously, Milan), characterized by a widespread economic welfare, unemployment rates much below the national average, a growing access to secondary and tertiary education, thus making workers' turnover increasingly problematic, also due to the presence of a *famiglia lunga*¹ that encouraged a mostly "voluntary" unemployment. And just in those local realities a peculiar integra-

¹ *Famiglia lunga* (long family) means the tendency of young Italians to live in their parents house longer than what usually happens in the other countries and to delay their entrance in the labour market, thus avoiding to accept jobs below their education and expectations level.

tion model began to take shape (along with the typical urban model, characterized by a prevalence of the tertiary industry providing services to enterprises and families and by a marked foreign presence “feminization”), whose ideal-type figure is the immigrant worker employed in small and medium enterprises, particularly in the metal-mechanical and building industries.

On the basis of those empirical evidences, several authors identified different territorial models of immigrants’ integration (for a comprehensive review see Zanfrini, 1998a). If the approach by local societies had represented, throughout the 1980’s, a kind of *leit motiv* in the Italian economic sociology (for a comprehensive review see Zanfrini, 1998b), its adoption in the study of immigrants’ inclusion became its automatic consequence. The beautiful metaphor, suggested by A. Luciano (1991), of immigration as the “litmus test” of the peculiar characteristics of local labour markets summarizes in this way one of the basic acquisition of this stage: *the spatial diversification of labour inclusions, the mirror of a heterogeneous economy and society*. The second significant heritage of that inquiry season is the idea of *complementarity between local and immigrant labour force*, an idea almost unanimously shared by researchers despite the persisting employment difficulties for an absolutely non-negligible share of the Italian labour force, and motivated referring to the growing autonomy of the domestic labour supply.

4.2 Why italian labour market has attracted so many migrants?

As we shall see, the idea of complementarity will begin a sort of axiom in the analysis of migrants’ role in the Italian labour market. In any case, to understand phenomena that have been increased far beyond all expectations, it is necessary to take into account some characters of the Italian economic system:

- *the very high incidence of non-qualified and manual workers* within the employment and the new hirings. In all advanced economies, the advent of the service society stimulated the growth of non-qualified jobs – often “bad jobs” – largely filled by migrant workers. But in Italy this demand is also fed by traditional sectors, and it often concerns skilled manual workers, even more difficult to recruit. Heavy jobs, mobility depending on building yard transfer, exposure to climatic/environmental conditions, relative job uncertainty, represent the major factors that drive young Italians away from the building industry, even those who are not in possession of any training credit, and generate a strong demand for migrants to be employed as masons, manual workers, carpenters, and assemblers: the proportion of foreigners, compared to the total foreign population, employed in the building sector is more than twice as high as the proportion of Italians employed in the same sector, compared to the total population of Italians. In the metal and mechanical industry, the recruitment problems de-

riving from the disaffection from factory work shown by the new generations entering the labour market are well known: a large part of predicted hiring of migrants concerns skilled workers, plant operators and unskilled personnel;

- *the Italian model of social protection* that, as it is known, represents the “familistic” variant of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Having to face the growing demand for care engendered by the population’s ageing process, Italian families increasingly resort to migrant workers (largely female), to the point to give birth to a “parallel welfare” whose dimensions are larger than those of the national health system. Migrants’ role in feeding this segment of the labour market is attested by their percentage out of the total number of house-help workers registered by the Inps (National Institute for Social Security), that reached 75% in 2002 and continued growing in the following years;
- *the employers’ tendency to address themselves to migrant workers to fill jobs already characterized by their presence*. Together with the autonomous and self-propulsive initiative of migrant workers – who enter the labour market largely using ethicized channels – this tendency have contributed to stigmatize some kind of occupations, subsequently labelled as “migrants’ jobs”, without necessarily reflect real recruiting difficulties². This process contributes to reinforce the ethnicisation of the labour market (involving the risk of migrants’ occupational segregation and wage discrimination), but also to erect material and symbolic barriers which obstruct the access to these jobs by the Italian workers still available. The most eloquent case is represented by persons assigned to cleaning services: this is the job profile that, in collective imagination, represents the example par excellence of a tributary low social prestige job³;
- *the abundance of informal job opportunities*, a phenomenon which characterises the whole country, but that has some peculiar regional and sectorial features. In the economically more dynamic regions, immigrants’ irregular employment is contiguous to a tendency to multiply “bad jobs” and make job relations precarious, and mixed up with an impudent use of only apparently legal contractual solutions. The case of the building industry is particularly impressive, as this is a sector in which outsourcing logics more evidently go along with labour precariousness. In low-qualification services, and in the whole area of “bad jobs”, concealed labour may be described as the last stage of a dismantling action carried out

² In this context, we can also observe the concentration in the same sector or job of migrants sharing the same national origin, a phenomena that to some extent may be assimilated to the concept of ethnic specialization for both the men’s and the women’s subgroups.

³ According to Excelsior estimate (yearly survey on labour needs and shortages), the cleaner is the profile which records the highest foreigners’ incidence (sometimes more than 60%) on total planned engagements.

on the typical institutions and rights of the *société salariale* (Castel, 1995), where immigrants' labour discrimination and underpayment easily give rise to social dumping phenomena. Nonetheless, it is in the southern regions that irregularity becomes a sort of "normal" element of a system that we might define as a "widespread illegality model", involving employers, new immigrants and, for some aspects, local workers who enjoy public unemployment benefits. Finally, in the case of home help and carer jobs in families, the decisive factors leading to irregularity mostly depend on a family need to limit the cost of those services, the ease of concealing a worker's presence, the rarity of checks or inspections, a lack of institutionalisation and of deterring public policies, and the fact that this market represents a "normal" outlet for newcomers who come to Italy illegally or with a tourist visa;

- *the growing number of self-employed migrants and entrepreneurs*, a process which has counterbalanced, in recent years, the progressive reduction of Italian independent workers. At the source of this phenomenon there are several different reasons, which may refer both to a particular propensity, shown by some groups to self-employment, and to the shape the structure of job opportunities has begun to take over time. The traditional spreading of self-employment, one-man businesses and micro-firms in the Italian reality, the general drop in earning capacity involving many activities (which has diverted the interest of local entrepreneurs in them), the need for a generation turnover depending on the fact that many artisans and self-employed workers have become well on in years, the growth of an outlet market formed by migrants themselves, the interest shown by some Italian consumers' segments in "exotic" products, are all factors that may have encouraged the development of self-employment among migrants. Along with these factors, we should consider also some structural changes that are at the base of the emerging new metropolitan economies, and of the resulting springing up of firms operating in the area of retail trade, food (shops and restaurants), cleaning services, transports, house upkeep services, and so on, and in the second place, in the spreading of outsourcing logics, which have strengthened the need to have available a network of small suppliers to which less profitable activities can be left. The self-employment phenomenon should be therefore interpreted also in the light of the labour market changes that have gradually made the boundaries of self-employment, subordinate employment and unemployment more permeable and indefinite than in the past. Most firms established by migrants are in fact one-man businesses that, to simplify, might in some circumstances represent a sort of functional equivalent of the resort to atypical contracts. The adaptability of first-generation migrants, but also their juridical vulnerability, may contribute to explain their particular "propensity" to set up businesses on their own, although the

boundaries between their search for greater autonomy and their subjection to the terms imposed by customers can be however hardly traced out.

4.3 Immigrant labour: dimensions and characteristics

There are no doubts that the massive inclusion of immigrant workforce is one of the major elements characterizing the changes occurred in the last decades in the Italian labour market. At the same time, a vulnerable point in the analysis of immigrant labour has always been the problems arising from data timeliness, completeness and reliability. The consequences have been, first, an under-representation of the phenomenon of foreigners' participation in the regular labour market, and then, a substantial impossibility to outline its boundaries. Limiting ourselves to consider the available sources, non-EU workers insured by INPS passed from 209,000 in 1991 to 540,000 in 1999; then they began to rapidly grow: in 2002, this number exceeded one million-four hundred thousand individuals. In 2005, the setting of a *permanent survey on workforce* carried out by the Central Institute of Statistics (Istat) had, among others, the aim to succeed in registering for assessment the immigrants' population and employment conditions. According to this source, the number of both active and employed migrant workers have been continuously growing, conferring to the Italian labour market a more and more evident multi-ethnic composition (see Table 1).

This growth hasn't been broken up even during the present economic recession, an aspect which merits to be deeply analysed. Actually, according to many international experts, the economic crisis started in 2008 opened a "new era for economic migrations", characterized by a deceleration in flows from developing countries to advanced ones, and by a drastic worsening of occupational opportunities for migrants. In this scenario, Italy has only partially conformed to the general trends: the impact of the crisis on immigration has proved to be less significant thus revealing the particularity but also the weakness of the Italian labour market. Suffice to observe that, from 2005 to 2012, employed migrants had almost doubled (Table 2), and during the most acute phases of the crisis, the overall employment has increased thanks solely to the foreign component.

The additional foreign employment that has been produced in these turbulent years amounts to over one million; i.e., a volume significant enough to force us to face the question of its consequences for the Italian workforce. What is certain is that the substantial need for foreign labour expressed by Italian families – for tasks decidedly unattractive to most of the native labour force – is not enough by itself to account for the extraordinary absorption capacity demonstrated by Italian economy; if only because, together with female

employment (largely concentrated in the domestic sector), the male one has grown as well.

Table 1 - Employed workers per economic activity sector, gender and geographical areas. Absolute values (thousands of units). Year 2012

		Total	Agricult.	Total industry	Building industry	Manuf. industry	Tertiary industry	Comm. and trade	Others
Italy	Italians	20,564.7	734.5	5,591.6	1,422.3	4,169.3	14,238.6	4,232.6	10,006.0
	Foreign.	2,334.0	114.6	770.4	331.7	438.7	1,449.0	418.4	1,030.6
	Total	22,898.7	849.1	6,362.0	1,754.0	4,608.0	15,687.6	4,651.0	11,036.6
North	Italians	10,501.7	273.8	3,360.5	691.8	2,668.7	6,867.4	2,091.9	4,775.4
	Foreign.	1,398.8	41.2	541.3	192.1	349.2	816.3	221.4	594.9
	Total	11,900.6	315.0	3,901.8	883.9	3,017.9	7,683.7	2,313.3	5,370.4
North-West	Italians	6,010.0	111.2	1,914.8	405.9	1,508.8	3,984.0	1,160.2	2,824.0
	Foreign.	803.2	17.6	288.0	112.6	175.5	497.5	121.1	376.4
	Total	6,813.2	128.8	2,202.8	518.5	1,684.3	4,481.5	1,281.3	3,200.2
North-East	Italians	4,491.7	162.6	1,445.7	285.9	1,159.9	2,883.4	931.7	1,951.7
	Foreign.	595.6	23.6	253.2	79.5	173.7	318.8	100.3	218.5
	Total	5,087.4	186.2	1,699.0	365.4	1,333.5	3,202.2	1,032.0	2,170.2
Canter	Italians	4,195.3	87.3	976.6	265.3	711.4	3,131.4	867.8	2,263.5
	Foreign.	622.5	28.0	170.4	101.3	69.1	424.0	116.5	307.5
	Total	4,817.8	115.3	1,147.1	366.6	780.5	3,555.3	984.3	2,571.0
South	Italians	5,867.6	373.3	1,254.4	465.2	789.2	4,239.8	1,272.8	2,967.0
	Foreign.	312.7	45.3	58.7	38.2	20.5	208.7	80.5	128.1
	Total	6,180.3	418.7	1,313.1	503.4	809.7	4,448.5	1,353.3	3,095.1

Source: Eurostat, 2012

Table 2 - Employed people, by gender and nationality. 2005-2012

		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total	Foreigners	1,169	1,348	1,502	1,751	1,898	2,081	2,251	2,334
	Italians	21,393	21,640	21,719	21,654	21,127	20,791	20,716	20,565
	Total	22,563	22,988	23,222	23,405	23,025	22,872	22,967	22,899
Males	Foreigners	737	836	923	1,050	1,111	1,212	1,292	1,299
	Italians	13,001	13,103	13,133	13,013	12,678	12,422	12,327	12,142
	Total	13,738	13,939	14,057	14,064	13,789	13,634	13,619	13,440
Females	Foreigners	433	512	579	701	787	869	960	1,035
	Italians	8,392	8,537	8,586	8,640	8,449	8,369	8,389	8,423
	Total	8,825	9,049	9,165	9,341	9,236	9,238	9,349	9,458

Source: Eurostat, various years

We can see two factors at the basis of this result. The first is the *high activity rate of the foreign population*, which, while continuing to fall, maintains over time a strong positive differential compared to the average values. Notwith-

standing the gradual stabilization of the foreign population in the territory, the increase of families and the growth of second generation, Italy retains the typical profile of a country of recent immigration and does not seem to display those discouragement effects that, in other national contexts, have engendered a decrease in the activity rate of the immigrant population to levels lower than the total ones. If we take a close look at the data reported in Table 3, we can see that, while gradually decreasing over time, the activity rate of foreigners is – in every year considered – well above that of the Italians, for both males and females.

On the other hand, the second factor to be considered is *the high employability which characterizes the immigrant labour supply*. With the exception of the female population in the northern regions (with the autochthonous component advantaged in access to employment), the immigrant component of the labour force, both male and female, enjoys a competitive advantage in all territorial districts; in the southern regions, the gap becomes so pronounced as to make manifest the wholly *sui generis* character of this labour market. Moreover, in this case too the most recent data confirm a differential in favour of the foreign component, despite the deterioration of employment chances that over time occurred for foreigners themselves (or rather for foreigners to a greater extent than for Italians).

A correct interpretation of these data, though, cannot avoid considering the concurrent growth of foreign presence in Italy, which has resulted in a significant increase of immigrant labour force available on the Italian labour market. In the short time span (since 2005) for which we have data disaggregated by nationality, the incidence of the foreign component on total labour force almost doubled to reach, in the early months of 2011, the symbolic quota of a foreign worker for every ten. But, above all, while the native labour force experienced a contraction of more than 700 thousand units (mostly concentrated in the male component, with a reduction of over half a million economically active people), the imported one increased continuously reaching, in 2011, a figure that has more than doubled since 2005. Thus, it is solely to the immigrant component that we have to ascribe the maintaining of the volume of labour supply, which would otherwise result depressed as a consequence of demographic trends and of the discouragement effect caused by the crisis.

Even the phenomenon of unemployment among foreigners has to be analysed in the light of these considerations. Since the beginning of the crisis, the unemployed rate has been growing for both Italians and foreigners. Nevertheless. In this time span, the Italian labour force dropped so far beyond the decrease of the number of Italian unemployed people; on the contrary, the increase in the number of unemployed foreigners appears negligible when compared to the simultaneous growth of foreign labour force. Finally, only the next years will tell us whether the negative differential affecting foreigners might be a consequence of the recession – since most foreign labour, as

known, is concentrated in those companies that suffered most from it – or, differently, indicates a gradual alignment with international trends, which see the immigrant component systematically disadvantaged in access to employment opportunities.

In order to explain the “soft” impact of the crisis on migrants’ occupational performance we can suggest that the law quality which is a distinguish mark of migration in Italy, has contributed “to protect” migrants. Actually, despite some initial signals towards a qualitative labour improvement and up-grading, the crisis ended up in a downward realignment of the employment structure, the deterioration of the overall employment quality and a growth in the number of low-salaried jobs. By affecting mainly low-skill occupations and more traditional sectors, the new job created exacerbated the traditional forms of segregation by gender and nationality. Actually, the Italian approach to migration seems to exacerbate what I call “the unresolved paradox of the European history” (Zanfriti, 2010). It is the paradox of a population of “guest workers” (admitted with a temporary permit strictly linked to their working condition) upgraded to the rank of *denizens* (which formally guarantees the access to a rich range of rights and opportunities), without a significant change in the Europeans’ expectations towards immigration. These expectations – which can be summarized by the expression “who can come are all those who have a job, and, more exactly, a job we do not want to carry out” – generate an unsolvable contradiction with the principle of equal opportunities pointed out by the European Union as the high road for the construction of a cohesive society and a competitive economy. In other words, the labour market ethnicisation represents the other face of the complementarity between national and imported labour force. The distribution of employed workers by occupation (Table 4) clearly demonstrates migrants’ segregation in the lowest levels of the jobs’ hierarchy in all the years for which data are available.

Therefore, *employed foreigners’ distribution outlines an overall picture characterized by substantial immobility*. Certainly, at an individual level, there are several examples of upward mobility processes, which take shape as migratory seniority grows, and outline the paths to emulate. However, at a general level, the needs expressed by firms and families seem to unavoidably re-route foreign labour towards those segments which are already widely characterized by its presence and which, in some cases, satisfy the need to cover jobs deserted by Italian workers (such as it happens in the typical case of home-caregivers).

Table 3 - Activity, employment and unemployment rate, by gender and nationality; 15-64 years. 2005-2012

	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
	<i>Activity rate</i>															
	<i>Foreign.</i>	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Foreign.</i>	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Foreign.</i>	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Foreign.</i>	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Foreign.</i>	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Foreign.</i>	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Foreign.</i>	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Foreign.</i>	<i>Italians</i>
Men	87.5	74.0	89.0	73.9	87.9	73.6	87.1	73.6	86.2	72.7	85.1	72.3	84.0	72.1	82.0	73.1
Women	58.0	50.0	58.6	50.4	58.7	50.2	59.9	51.0	59.9	50.4	58.7	50.4	59.1	50.7	60.3	52.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>72.9</i>	<i>61.9</i>	<i>73.7</i>	<i>62.1</i>	<i>73.2</i>	<i>61.9</i>	<i>73.3</i>	<i>62.3</i>	<i>72.7</i>	<i>61.6</i>	<i>71.4</i>	<i>61.4</i>	<i>70.9</i>	<i>61.4</i>	<i>70.6</i>	<i>62.9</i>
	<i>Employment rate</i>															
Men	65.5	57.2	67.3	57.9	67.1	58.1	67.1	58.1	64.5	56.9	63.1	56.3	62.3	56.4	60.6	56.4
Women	81.5	69.4	84.2	69.8	83.3	69.9	81.9	69.5	77.7	67.9	76.2	66.9	75.4	66.7	71.5	66.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>49.1</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>50.7</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>51.3</i>	<i>46.3</i>	<i>52.8</i>	<i>46.8</i>	<i>52.1</i>	<i>45.9</i>	<i>50.9</i>	<i>45.7</i>	<i>50.5</i>	<i>46.1</i>	<i>50.8</i>	<i>46.7</i>
	<i>Unemployment rate</i>															
Men	6.8	6.2	5.4	5.5	5.3	5.0	6.0	5.6	9.9	6.6	10.4	7.4	10.3	7.4	12.8	9.7
Women	15.4	9.8	13.4	8.6	12.7	7.6	11.9	8.3	13.0	9.0	13.3	9.4	14.6	9.1	15.7	11.5
<i>Total</i>	<i>10.2</i>	<i>7.7</i>	<i>8.6</i>	<i>6.8</i>	<i>8.3</i>	<i>6.0</i>	<i>8.5</i>	<i>6.7</i>	<i>11.2</i>	<i>7.6</i>	<i>11.7</i>	<i>8.2</i>	<i>12.2</i>	<i>8.1</i>	<i>14.1</i>	<i>10.5</i>

Source: Rilevazione continua sulle forze di lavoro, various years

Table 4 - Employment by nationality and occupation (%), 2005-2010

	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	I	F	I	F	I	F	I	F	I	F	I	F
Skilled workers	35.5	9.2	37.8	9.3	38.8	9.9	38.4	8.3	37.5	7.2	36.8	7.1
Clerical. Service/sales workers	27.7	16.8	26.8	18.2	26.7	18.6	27.5	18.3	28.4	17.1	29.3	16.4
Manual workers	27.5	41.1	26.5	43.0	26.0	43.0	25.7	41.4	25.6	39.7	25.1	38.7
Elementary occupations	8.2	32.9	7.8	29.5	7.4	28.5	7.2	32.0	7.3	35.9	7.6	37.7
Armed forces	1.2	0.1	1.2	0.0	1.2	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.2	0.0	1.3	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Istat, *Indagine continua sulle forze di lavoro*, 2005-2010

In this situation, the deskilling of well-educated migrants has soon emerged as a distinctive trait of the Italian experience, to be confirmed by all the following inquiries: just to cite an example, according to the “Immigrant Citizens Survey” (May 2012), the percentage of employed immigrants who believe that their main job does not require the level of skills or training that they have is decidedly more significant in the two Italian towns than in all the other European cities involved in the research; furthermore, the percentage that have applied for recognition of qualifications, is in Italy dramatically lower than that recorded in the other countries.

4.4 Considerations about the government of labour migrations

After a first phase characterized by an *institutional regulation deficit*, the lack of an organic law on immigration was filled in 1998 with the approval of a Consolidated Act on immigration (Law Decree n. 286/98) which, among others, had the aim to discipline economic migrations. Though this issue is still being disputed, we should recognize an innovative value to the Italian choice of adopting an annual planning system concerning entries for labour purposes. In a European framework that, in the late 1990’s was still marked by restrictive orthodoxy, it was in fact necessary to cross the ocean and look at Canada, Australia, the U.S., for finding active migration policies. Particularly exposed to migration pressure from abroad, Italy and the other South-European countries have found themselves with the function of “renewing” European migration policies, thus contributing to reopen the debate on this matter.

On the threshold of the new Millennium, the annual Unioncamere-Excelsior survey on the professional needs of Italian enterprises included for the first time a question aimed at investigating their propensity to employ mi-

grant workers⁴. The results were quite surprising, since they did not only report particularly high-incidence rates as regards resorting to foreign labour force on a national scale, but also in regions chronically suffering from unemployment. And again, the overall needs estimated by this and the following editions of the survey – which, moreover, did not include the demand from families – appeared drastically over-dimensioned in comparison with the annual planning⁵. Confirming the new role of immigration in Italian economy, the entrepreneurial class, after many years of “silence”, took explicitly the initiative of demanding more compact migration flows to allow – so it was claimed – the very survival of local enterprises and production processes. *In the course of a few years, Italy had then passed from a situation of substantial invisibility of immigrants’ work to a sort of celebration of the idea of complementarity.*

The following years were characterized by a growing relevance of migration and by the strengthening of the new regulatory system, which has become the object of vivacious ideological controversies. In 2002, the coming in power of a new government coalition produced the conditions for the introduction of new amendments to the Consolidated Act on immigration. The “Bossi-Fini” law (n. 189 of July 30th), by upholding some public opinion widespread claims, hypostatizes a functionalist concept of immigration, foreshadowing a sort of coming back into fashion of the old figure of the “guest worker”, establishing a “residence contract” for labour purposes. Actually, despite the tendency to portray it as a restrictive law, *its implementation transformed Italy in one of the major official labour importer in the international context*: as shown in Table 5, the quotas established by yearly decrees have laid the foundations for authorizing the entry of several hundreds of thousands of workers, up to reach, in 2006, almost 700,000 labour migrants’ access. Indeed, the 2006 decree represents the most glaring example of a “disguised regularization” – in line with the trend of the previous years, during which the decrees on migration flows had taken the character of functional equivalents of amnesties –. On the other hand, even though difficult to estimate, the number of migrants completely lacking in a stay permit enabling them to work who appear on the Italian market has still very high in all the years concerned, thereby confirming the image of a country in which the distance between law and

⁴ The results of this survey were published on a volume promoted by Unioncamere in cooperation with ISMU Foundation; cf. Zanfrini, 2000.

⁵ The number of predicted non-seasonal hirings of migrants was 149,468 in 2001; reached the record of 223,944 in 2003 (when almost one third of planned engagements concerned immigrant workforce) and then it started to decline, totalling 162,320 in 2006 (less than one fourth of the total), 167,000 in 2008 (20% of the total), and 82,990 (14% of the total) in 2011, the lowest figure ever recorded. It should be however pointed out that an orientation to recruit a migrant does not imply in itself an additional demand to be covered by importing workforce from foreign countries, since there exists, since the mid-2010, a large internal recruitment reservoir consisting of already resident (whether employed or unemployed) immigrant workers.

general practices is a *normal* trait of its functioning. Consequently, *the incoming labour flow has been to a large extent independent of any law provision and, in particular, has escaped a real planning action that has at heart economic competitiveness and social cohesion goals.*

Table 5 - Planning evolution. 1995-2012

	Non-seas. workers	Seasonal workers	Autonomous workers	Privileged quotas*	Of which specific categories**	Search of job	Total
1995	15,000	10,000	-	-	-	-	25,000
1996	10,000	13,000	-	-	-	-	23,000
1997		20,000	-	-	-	-	20,000
1998	54,500	-	3,500	6,000	-	-	58,000
1999	54,500	-	3,500	6,000	-	-	58,000
2000		66,000	2,000	18,000	-	15,000	83,000
2001	27,000	39,400	2,000	15,000	5,000	15,000	89,400
2002	14,000	60,000	3,000	63,600	2,500	-	79,500
2003	9,700	68,500	-	72,300	1,300	-	79,500
2004	46,500	66,000	-	106,400	3,000	-	115,000
2005	115,500	45,000	-	145,500	18,500	-	179,000
2006	558,500	80,000	-	288,500	51,500	-	690,000
2007	167,000	80,000	3,000	127,100	112,900	--	252,000
2008	150,000	80,000	--	44,600	105,400	--	230,000
2009		80,000	--	--	--	--	80,000
2010		80,000	4,000		36,000	--	120,000
2011	98,080	60,000	--	68,080	30,000	--	158,080
2012	11,850	35,000	2,000	--	--	--	48,850
2013***	--	30,000	--	--	--	--	30,000

* Quotas assigned to countries which are expected to cooperate in contrasting irregular migrations. Including quotas assigned to new EU countries. They are comprised or not comprised, depending on the year, in the total amount of seasonal and non seasonal entries.

** Categories such as professional nurses, managers, IT experts, house helpers and care givers.

*** Updated May 2013.

Source: ISMU Documentation Center

Furthermore, the years before the crisis coincided with the advent of a sort of “demandist” orthodoxy, according to which the mere existence of an employer willing to hire a migrant would determine a right to entry or a right to be regularized, as though this were sufficient to prove the existence of a need that could not be otherwise satisfied. This demandist approach concealed behind such statements – which is strangely mingled with humanitarian considerations – ends by driving Politics to relinquish its task of governing migratory phenomena through an evaluation of their impact on the labour market, on the welfare system, and on the quality of coexistence. Besides other consequences, the hegemony of “demandism” have contributed to overestimate actual employment opportunities and to neglect the basic element of the self-propelling nature of migrations, that is to say, their tendency to become, over time, relatively independent both of law constraints, and of integration chances in the host society. Not surprisingly, the job applications submitted on the occasion of the last flows decrees – after the beginning of the crisis – seem

having lost any correspondence with the actual size of imported workforce requirement. Their number and characteristics (considering the difficult economic phase) are sufficient to prove the artificial character of most of the alleged demand for immigrant labour, as well as the inevitable disadvantage suffered by those candidates who wish to comply with the legal procedures, patiently waiting for the approval of a decree to plan their entry into Italy. On the other hand, more than victims of an oppressive and illiberal immigration regime which attracts them on one side and on the other forces them into living underground (as we often hear people say), irregular immigrants are people who pursue their own objectives with determination and tenacity. They do so without disdaining the use of unlawful means and subterfuge at the edge of legality; in this encouraged also by the example of many that preceded them. Conclusively, the serious employment crisis, has removed the veil of hypocrisy that has always accompanied the “planning of the admissions”: while formally aimed at addressing the needs of the economy, the planning decrees quickly turned out to be functional equivalents of amnesties and, more recently, instruments to grant legal entry under the justification of fictitious employment relationships simulated by friends and fellow-countrymen or bought at a high price in the market. To summarize, *the recession gave the coup de grace to a legislative framework that has not met any of its objectives*; certainly not that of preventing illegal arrivals, but neither that of satisfying the needs of the employers, nor, even less, that of managing the flow of workers from abroad in accordance with a plan aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises and to guarantee social cohesion. Moreover, it should be noted that the context in which the present discipline on immigration took its first steps, is then significantly changed: it took the threat of recession to bring to the surface the impact of immigrant labour on the Italian labour market. It is not by chance that some concerns about the competition immigration might exert mostly towards the weaker segments of local labour offer, which have long remained asleep due to a sort of exaltation of the idea of complementarity, have begun to become manifest. Such as it already happened in other national experiences, the immigration issue started to feed new conflicts and disclose the difficulty to find solutions in the position to combine different claims: altruistic claims, that is, those coming from large areas of civil society, which however seem sometimes to undervalue the consequences in the medium-long term of an inflow of a highly adaptable labour force such as the immigrant one; claims from the enterprise world, which is scarcely inclined to do without the benefits that resorting to immigrants’ labour indisputably brings about, particularly – or perhaps, chiefly – in a difficult economic period, when the need to improve work productivity by limiting costs becomes increasingly urgent; and finally, the claims of the social categories that might be more penalized by immigration, as their claims end up by being represented by political and social “anti-immigrant” forces.

Finally, *the priority that till now has been given to the issue of entry selection should therefore give way to a reflection on the most suitable way to manage their impact on the labour market and to valorise the potential represented by immigration* through the recognition of their skills and competences, through the promotion of their role as a driving force for the internationalization of local and national economies, and through the adoption of strategies of human resource administration inspired by the perspective of cross-cultural management. But, first of all, it is indispensable *to rethink the idea of integration, which until today has been strongly unbalanced towards the purely working dimension*. A public discourse that persists in legitimising immigration solely to its economic role is inevitably doomed to produce a short circuit when – as exactly occurs in a recessionary period – the benefits of immigration become at least more disputable. But, above all, it feeds only a partial and distorted conception of membership in a society, which is reduced to working and creating no problems (perhaps remaining as invisible as possible). This entails the corollary of a lack of participation in social, cultural and political life, and of a poor awareness of one's own rights and duties, starting from that of contributing, through regular work, to the production of collective well-being and the financing of the welfare system.

As far as the desirable reform of the normative framework is concerned, it must be founded on some basic considerations. The first one concerns the causes at the origin of non-legal immigration (the majority of the arrivals of labour migrants continue to be of this nature); all too often, in the political and mass media debate, these are reduced to the restrictive character of the immigration laws. This underestimates the fact that this phenomenon not only mirrors the frequency of unreported work in Italy, but, in addition, is by now deeply rooted in the migrant cultures of the foreign communities living in Italy and in the very organizational cultures of the agencies that deal with immigrants and even in those of the official bodies. Some “touch-ups” to the legislative framework are certainly not sufficient to re-establish the sense of legality; this would require a capillary cultural activity of sensitization and systems of rewards and penalties that reward law-abiding behaviour (while the opposite has happened up to now). Another consideration concerns the caution with which migratory policies should accommodate the needs of the labour market. This is one of the lessons that international experience teaches us. While, over the past ten years, a significant proportion of immigrants obtained employment in the emerging sectors, an even larger proportion went into declining areas (OECD, 2012). Besides the probable consequences of an occupational nature, this situation increases the segmentation of the labour market and all the involitional processes associated with it. These risks are especially pertinent to the case of Italy: ethnicisation has always been one of the interpretation codes of the processes of work integration of immigrants, but the crisis has even exacerbated the traditional forms of segregation based on sex and

nationality. Above all, these risks have been largely hidden in the name of the demandist ideology, which ended up, as we have seen, consecrating the request for employment as the absolute criterion to legitimize the right to admission and to legal status. Now, while, from a humanitarian point of view, legal status can certainly be considered an individual right, insisting on basing this right on strictly economic considerations is a risky venture for a labour market that must absorb the repercussions of the flow of a “poor” and underpaid workforce. And it is risky, in the first place, for the immigrants themselves, who could be “displaced” by the newcomers and see their professional and earning prospects compromised.

In the near future, *a rise in labour shortage that would require planning large admission quotas is unlikely to be envisaged*. The hypothesis of a “return” of Italians to the more “ethnicized” occupations remains, for the time being, to be verified (beyond what has been reported by several media investigations); it seems more likely to think of a cooling of the employers’ attitude, which, inevitably, accompanies an enduring recession. In addition, by demonstrating a strong preference to hire immigrant employees that have already acquired work experience, businessmen signal that they prefer those who are already in Italy, conscious of the fact that they can draw from a recruitment pool of considerable size and deeply involved in job-to-job mobility processes. In this contingent economic situation, managing immigration cannot, however, be limited to reactive responses, which reduce new arrivals to zero and reinforce the contrast with “unwanted” immigration. *It is especially necessary to attempt to make the match of demand and offer of labour work better*, as suggested in the European strategy “Europe 2020”, by investing with conviction in the services for employment. In this context, unemployed immigrants or immigrants who risk losing their job, can be the ideal subjects on whom the new models of action can be tested; these models are more consistent with a scenario in which there is a greater need for personalized interventions, capable of filling the individual gaps, but also for taking advantage of “diversities” in all their manifestations.

Casting an eye towards the medium-long term, *the demographic picture and the characteristics of the cohorts set to enter the labour market lead us to forecast a need to again take advantage of the lever of immigration from abroad*, despite an extension of the working life and a desirable growth in the female participation rate. But this need should be interpreted, once again, in the light of some considerations. The first is that *the potential need for immigrants in the context of an aging population cannot be estimated solely on the basis of demographic imbalances*. The changes in the nature of employment must also be taken into account; it is expected that these changes will be subject to a greater dynamism compared to the same changes in composition by age of the population and of the workforce. The traditional “replacement” function of immigration must, therefore, be rethought in the light of the prob-

able evolution of the demand for labour. Another consideration concerns the vanishing illusion that we will be able to choose the immigrants we want (and that we might be able to get rid of them when they are no longer needed). In fact, the increase of the foreign component of the workforce, in Italy as in all other large immigration countries, will largely include admissions based on humanitarian and family reasons (which cannot be planned by their own nature) and the demographic growth within the immigrant communities. Also for this reason, the policies of management of the labour market, which favour matching offer and demand are at least as important (probably even more important) than the migratory policies themselves, although they are less susceptible to being exploited for political-ideological ends. Moreover, in a country where a decidedly large share of the new jobs continues to involve manual tasks, although not necessarily unskilled (they often incorporate components of professionalism and creativity) *it is necessary to be aware of how harmful it is to think that the problems of replacement of the workforce can be solved solely by importing workers from abroad.* Today, immigrant workers are already overrepresented in some of the most typical “Made in Italy” sectors and their arrival was essential to keeping alive production activities whose very survival was at risk “because the young no longer want to do some work”. However, it would be overly unwise, for all sorts of reasons, to think that assigning entire sectors to immigrant workers can bridge this gap between the economic model and social model of development that characterizes the evolution of many local systems of production (as it is unreasonable to think that the migrants’ children, albeit numerous in technical and professional schools will gladly accept to satisfy the need to replace an entire generation of manual workers and craftsmen). Once again, the challenge ahead is, above all, cultural; the goal is to dismantle the many prejudices that make the differences (of nationality, ethnicity, sex, and age) unduly predictive traits of occupational opportunities, in order to garner the full value of individual skills, aptitudes, and talents within a new work culture in which work is a tool both of self-accomplishment and of responsibility towards society.

5. *Migrant children in Italy*

by Giovanni Giulio Valtolina

In the analysis of the integration processes of foreigners immigrated to Italy, the issues originating from the increasingly consistent presence of children with a non-Italian citizenship take on particular importance. Being born in Italy to foreign parents or rejoining the members of the family already present for some time on our territory have, indeed, as a consequence the constant transformation of the models of cohabitation. Despite the fact that the immigration phenomenon has by now been recognised by policy makers and stakeholders as no longer as an emergency in Italy, its features are however still marked by a strong propulsive capacity, particularly for the so-called “second generations”. Even though from today’s standpoint it is not simple to imagine scenarios or make forecasts, because of statistics and research data which are still partial and fragmentary, and also due to the heterogeneity of the migratory biographies and of the consequent paths of development of foreign immigrant minors; nevertheless several topics come out with particular strength. We will present now the demographic dimension of the phenomenon, concerning both the characteristics which today distinguishes the presence of migrant minors in Italy and its possible upcoming dynamics.

The ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of Statistics), in its latest update on the foreign population residing in Italy (2013), offers an exhaustive panorama regarding the two main causes of the growth of migrant population: the reunification of families and the children born in Italy by foreign families.

According to the latest data made available by ISTAT (2013), therefore, the total number of foreign minors present in Italy on 1st January 2013 was calculated to be 1.036.498, 22.2 % of the total amount of foreign residents: about 5.5% more compared to 1 January 1, 2012. Nearly $\frac{2}{3}$ of that increase is made up of children born in Italy to parents who are both foreign: since there is indeed no provision in the current law for the so-called *jus soli*, that is to say the acquisition of citizenship by being born in the country, those born in Italy to foreign parents are considered – and therefore counted as – foreign minors for all purposes. There were 79.074 children born in Italy to both foreign parents in the year 2011 (+1,3 % compared to the previous year), a figure equal to the 14,5% of all the children born in Italy. This constitutes the most

important portion of the total increase of minors with foreign citizenship, making up 71.2% of the 102.000 additional minors present compared to the previous year. The remaining part consists, of course, of those minors who arrived in Italy through the institute of family reunification. It should be pointed out, however, that the increase of the number of foreign minors in Italy goes with the increase of the foreign population in general, as the percentage of minors in the total foreign population, stably anchored around 20-25% over the last six years, demonstrates.

Nearly a quarter of foreign residents in Italy on the 1st of January 2013 were minors. This figure confirms the steady increase of the number of these minors in Italy in the last decade: in fact, through the effect of the births in Italy to foreign parents and of family reunifications, they rose from the 160 thousand minors of the 2001 census to the 1.036.498 of 2013: a number that has multiplied by more than six.

In these same years, children born to foreign parents have taken on increasing importance. Over 10 years, in fact, the percentage of foreign children born in the total of resident births in Italy has more than tripled, going from 4% in 1999 to 14,5% in 2011. At a regional level, the regions of the North, and – to a lesser extent – those of the Centre, are those that see percentages much higher than the national average: the areas of the countries with a longer tradition of immigration and a more settled and stable presence of migrants. Indeed, one new born child out of five is a foreign citizen in Emilia Romagna, Veneto and Lombardy, and, approximately, one out of six in Piedmont, Umbria, Marche, Friuli, Tuscany. On the contrary, in almost all of the regions of the South, the percentage of births of foreign children is decidedly more contained: little more than 3% in the South and in the Islands.

Table 1 - Children born with foreign citizenship in Italy. Years 1993-2008. Birth rates per 100 foreign residents

<i>Years</i>	<i>Births</i>	<i>Birth rate</i>
1993	7,000	1.16
1994	8,028	1.22
1995	9,061	1.27
1996	10,820	1.33
1997	13,569	1.45
1998	16,901	1.60
1999	21,186	1.78
2000	25,916	1.90
2001	29,054	2.29
2002	33,593	2.31
2003*	33,691	1.90
2004	48,925	2.23
2005	51,971	2.05
2006	57,765	1.97
2007	64,023	2.09
2008	72,472	2.32

Source: ISTAT, 2010

An element that is worth noting concerns fertility levels. As can be observed in Table 1, in 2008 female foreign citizens residing in Italy had an average of 2.31 children: one children more than Italian women, whose average number of children has been attested at 1.32.

Moreover, considering the distribution of the citizenships of the parents by the type of couple, it can be observed the elevated tendency to form a family with children among migrant from the Maghebrian, Albanian and Chinese communities, and more generally in all of the Asian and African communities. On the contrary, women from Ukraine, Poland, Moldova, Russia and Cuba migrated to Italy show a marked tendency to have children in Italy with Italian partners more often than with their countrymen. The Romanian community is branded by a high level of homogeneity – around 2/3 of the children born –, but also by a significant bent to have children with Italian partners.

If we consider the age groups of migrant children (Tab. 2), distinguishing between children of a pre-school age (0-5 years old), children attending primary school and middle school (6-12 years old) and adolescents (13-17 years old), we can easily note how, in the first two age groups, the number of children tends to be equal (428,848 and 424,134, respectively), whereas, in the higher age group, the number of foreign minors present in Italy is consistently lower (183,516).

Table 2 - Migrant children in Italy on January 1st, 2013

<i>Age</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
0	37.517	35.171	72.688
1	37.707	35.574	73.281
2	37.562	35.465	73.028
3	38.007	35.343	73.350
4	36.439	34.194	70.633
5	34.036	31.833	65.868
6	33.176	31.139	64.315
7	30.791	28.460	59.251
8	28.276	26.739	55.015
9	25.452	23.817	49.269
10	25.364	23.666	49.030
11	26.082	24.054	50.136
12	25.912	24.082	49.994
13	24.576	22.548	47.124
14	24.308	22.455	46.763
15	24.560	22.012	46.572
16	23.245	21.069	44.314
17	24.320	21.547	45.867
<i>Totale</i>	<i>537.331</i>	<i>499.167</i>	<i>1.036.498</i>

Source: ISMU data processing, 2013

This distribution has evident effects on various areas, and in particular with regards to the organisation of activities in all the different grades of the school system¹.

Particularly interesting is the growth, showed by the analysis, of the number of foreign minors over the course of time. As it can be noted in table 3, the increase of the number of foreign minors in Italy from 2015 to 2030, if current trends were to continue, would be steady and progressive.

Table 3 - Migrant children in Italy in 2015, 2020 and 2030

Age	2015			2020			2030		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
0-5 y.	234,301	213,948	448,249	277,184	258,257	535,442	283,450	270,461	553,911
6-13 y.	249,598	232,255	481,853	355,022	321,609	676,630	385,651	358,363	744,013
14-17 y.	107,324	100,514	207,838	144,686	127,120	271,806	204,102	185,001	389,103
Total	591,223	546,717	1,137,940	776,892	706,986	1,483,878	873,202	813,825	1,687,027

Source: ISMU data processing on ISTAT data

5.1 The most relevant migrant communities with children in Italy

The Romanian children are the largest group of migrant minors living in Italy (Tab. 4). They are mostly present in Northern Italy, in Piedmont and in Veneto, and in the centre of Italy in Lazio. The cities with the biggest number of these children are Rome and Turin. The second largest group of migrant children living in Italy comes from Morocco; they are predominantly present in the North of Italy. Even the Albanian and Chinese community have large groups of minors, living mainly in some counties, such as Florence, Prato, Milan and Rome.

Table 4 - Largest groups of not Italian children in Italy 2012

	Nationality	Number of children
1	Romanian	183.299
2	Moroccan	140.433
3.	Albanian	124.125
4	Chinese	113.046
5	Moldovan	48.696
6	Indian	27.234
7	Filipino	26.046
8	Ecuadorian	23.399
9	Tunisian	26.242
10	Macedonian	21.958

Source: ISMU-MIUR, 2013

The other largest migrant children groups are the Moldovans, resident in the North and in the Centre of Italy, the Indians, mainly present in two regions of

¹ About the school presence of migrant children, see paragraph 5.2.

the Northern Italy; the Filipinos, resident mostly in the metropolitan areas of Milan and Roma; the Ecuadorians, mainly present in the areas of Genoa and Milan; the Tunisians, resident prevalently in Sicily; the Macedonians, mostly living in the two regions, Lazio and Campania.

5.2 Migrant children at school

Pupils with non Italian citizenship are today a structural component of Italian school: historically, their enrollment showed a brisk and noteworthy increase in the last decade (Tab. 5), moving from the 196.414 students in 2001/2001 – 2.2% of the total student population – to the 755.939 students in 2011/2012, the 8,4% of the total student population.

Table 5 - Student with non-Italian citizenship in Italian schools: 2001/2002-2011/2012

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total non Italian pupils</i>	<i>Kindergarten</i>	<i>Primary School</i>	<i>Medium High School</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>Base 100, in 2001/2002</i>
2001/2002	196.414	39.445	84.122	45.253	27.594	100
2002/2003	239.808	48.072	100.939	55.907	34.890	122
2003/2004	307.141	59.500	123.814	71.447	52.380	151
2004/2005	370.803	74.348	147.633	84.989	63.833	188
2005/2006	431.211	84.058	165.951	98.150	83.052	213
2006/2007	501.420	94.712	190.803	113.076	102.829	240
2007/2008	574.133	111.044	217.716	126.396	118.977	282
2008/2009	629.360	125.092	234.206	140.050	130.012	317
2009/2010	673.800	135.840	244.457	150.279	143.224	344
2010/2011	710.263	144.628	254.653	157.559	153.423	367
2011/2012	755.939	156.701	268.671	166.043	164.524	397

Source: ISMU data processing on ISTAT data

Analyzing the data of the last decade, it can be said that the major increase of migrant students has been in the kindergartens and in the high-school. The minor increase instead was in the primary school. The biggest increase was in the group of high-school students, that increases sixfold from 2001/02 to 2011/12. This is not just because of the considerable phenomenon of the family reunion, but also for the growing up of those children who are born in Italy from non Italian parents.

Averagely, the increase of migrant children in Italian schools has been about 60-70.000 since 2001 to 2007. Since 2008 to 2011, instead, the increase slows down up to 35-40.000 new students per year.

Even in 2011/2012, for the sixth year in a row, the children with Romanian citizenship are the largest group of students in Italian schools (141.050). Also very numerous are the Albanian students (102.719) and Moroccan students (95.912). It is worth noting that, considering the most sizeable groups of stu-

dents in Italian schools we have children from all the continents (except Oceania), mainly from Eastern Europe, Asia (China, India, Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh), Northern Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt) and South America (Ecuador and Peru).

Actually, the biggest challenge that the Italian education system has to face is to continue the excellent daily intercultural work in class, despite the difficulties raised with the shortage of resources due to the economic crisis. Interculturalism, in fact, is a pillar of the school programs of the Italian Ministry of Education since the Nineties.

5.3 Final remarks

Several European experiences indicate that, with the appearance of the second generation, the society takes a step forward, that is, for many aspects, irreversible. It is precisely for this reason that having a life plan is crucial not only for these migrant minors, but for society itself. The quantitative consistence of their presence in Italy, which, as we saw, is becoming increasingly important in the years to come, and the difficult juridical placement which invests the weakest segments of the universe of migrant minors in Italy – as, for example, the unaccompanied minors – should lead to the awareness that without a real project for their lives these minors will not be able to contribute to the construction of that “sustainable integration” which is so important for mutually supportive and peaceful interethnic cohabitation. But a life plan is also developed in the interests of a search for “citizenship spaces”, where to bring together diverse experiences and diverse origins in a single place, capable of guaranteeing stability and identity. So far, citizenship in Italy is obtainable only through the *jus sanguinis*, so children born in Italy from non Italian parents are not Italian citizens. Hence, nowadays, citizenship spaces for migrant children – school, relations with peers, aggregation also on an ethnic basis – offer them the experience of a citizenship that is fragmented and discontinuous, that may run the risk – in the future – of reaching a stall if not pushed towards an inversion of the tendency, concerning the decision of these minors to take part in full name in the Italian society.

6. *Students with non-italian citizenship in the education system*

by Mariagrazia Santagati

In Italy, the current debate about growing diversity in education concerns students with non-Italian citizenship in the education system: this presence is a dynamic, yet well-established phenomenon. To deal with this issue, Italian schools have developed a set of best practices and experiences, which have allowed them to outline specific intervention strategies.

In particular, the ministerial paper *La via italiana per la scuola interculturale e l'integrazione degli alunni stranieri* (Ministero dell'Istruzione, 2007 – *La via italiana per la scuola interculturale e l'integrazione degli alunni stranieri – The Italian Route to Intercultural School and Foreign Students' Integration*) places emphasis on the complementary of directives, which include integration of foreign students and intercultural exchanges in curricular and extracurricular activities, of knowledge and competences. The choice made by Italy to invest in interculturalism and in education to foster dialogue and coexistence within multicultural school contexts goes in the same direction as the European Union.

The Italian model is also based on the idea of “common school”, that is to say, school policies based on the inclusion of students who do not hold the Italian citizenship in normal classes. Nonetheless, in this field there are some grey areas: Italy is the only country in the world where, although educational inclusion has existed in legal terms for almost forty years, it has never been seriously implemented in practice (Bauman, Mazzeo, 2012). In this complex frame, we can interpret the data concerning the presence of non-Italian students and their implications for the education system, in terms of social cohesion and in terms of equity of opportunities.

6.1 Foreign students in Italy

The Ministry of Education in cooperation with the ISMU Foundation has recently produced two National Reports (Miur, Fondazione ISMU, 2011; 2013), that focus on the rapid and significant increase of foreign students in Italian schools, which is shown to have sextupled over a decade. The over 100,000

foreign students of the year 1999/00 have increased to 755,939 in 2011/12, which corresponded to 8.4% of the total school population. Nowadays, the phenomenon has become stable and a slower growth can be noticed in the number of foreign students attending Italian schools.

Although the increase in the presence of migrant students appears significant, when comparing the Italian situation with that of other EU Member States Italy emerges as one of those countries where the incidence of migrant students is still moderately low (ranging between 6% and 10%). Among the countries which report a greater percentage of foreign students are Austria, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden (ranging between 11% and 20%), whereas the percentage of non native students in Germany and Switzerland exceeds 20% of the total school population (Nomisma, 2009).

Table 1 - Students with non-Italian citizenship in the Italian school system. Historical series

<i>School year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Per 100 students</i>
1999/00	119,679	1.4
2000/01	147,406	1.8
2001/02	196,414	2.2
2002/03	239,808	2.7
2003/04	307,141	3.5
2004/05	370,803	4.2
2005/06	431,211	4.8
2006/07	501,420	5.6
2007/08	574,133	6.4
2008/09	629,360	7.0
2009/10	673,592	7.5
2010/11	711,046	7.9
2011/12	755,939	8.4

Source: MIUR, ISMU Foundation

Data confirm the historical “primacy” of primary school (6-10 years), which has always shown the highest number of foreign students and a higher percentage than in the other school levels (35.5%), followed by lower secondary schools (11-14 years: 22%), upper secondary schools (14-18 years: 21,8%) and then by pre-primary schools (3-5years: 20,7%). Primary school has had a smaller weight over the last decade, unlike upper secondary school, which has instead seen a significant increase.

Table 2 - Students with non-Italian citizenship by school level, s.y. 2011/12

<i>School level</i>	<i>S.y. 2011/12</i>		
	<i>A.v.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Per 100 stud.</i>
Pre-primary school	156,701	20,7	9,2
Primary school	268,671	35,5	9,5
Lower secondary school	166,043	22	9,3
Upper secondary school	164,524	21,8	6,2
<i>Total</i>	<i>755,930</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>8.4</i>

Source: MIUR, ISMU Foundation

If the general trend is characterized by a slowdown in the increase of students with non-Italian citizenship, there is a progressive transformation in the composition of the foreign school population. Among this latter group we have, on the one hand, a significant growth in the number of those born in Italy from foreign parents: according to the most recent available data, the number of these students is 334,284, which corresponds to 44.2% of the total of foreign students in 2011/12, and it will probably continue to increase.

Table 3 - Native born students with non-Italian citizenship by school level, s.y. 2007/08-2011/12

School level	S.y. 2007/08		S.y. 2011/12	
	A.v.	Per 100 students with n.i.c.	A.v.	Per 100 students with n.i.c.
Pre-primary school	79,113	71.2	125,956	80.4
Primary school	89,421	41.1	145,278	54.1
Lower secondary school	22,474	17.8	46,280	27.9
Upper secondary school	8,111	6.8	16,770	10.2
Total	199,119	34.7	334,284	44.2

Source: MIUR, ISMU Foundation

This increase has corresponded with a decrease in the number of newcomers. Between 2007/08 and 2011/12 this group has decreased from 10% to 4,8% of the total of students with non-Italian citizenship. These trends show the gradual but substantial change occurred in the structure of the foreign school population, which highlights the need for a distinction and a recognition of the variety of foreign students' life experiences (from newcomers to native born). As a consequence, it is necessary to offer courses which meet the learning, social and identity needs of each foreign student, based on a deep understanding of their complex universe.

Moreover, foreign students in Italy represent a heterogeneous universe in terms of nationalities (almost 200): this aspect is typical of the Italian context, which differs from other European countries and from USA, whose school structures show a consolidated presence of foreign students, a higher homogeneity in terms of students' nationalities and a higher concentration of national groups in local areas. By looking at the main nationalities of the Italian school system, we can see that the top five nationalities represent around 50% of the total foreign school population, including groups of old and new comers: among those present in 2011/12 are Romania (141,050 students, i.e. 18.6% of the students with non-Italian citizenship), Albania (102,719, 13.5%), Morocco (95,912, 12.6%) and China (34,080, 4.5%). Moldova is the fifth nationality (23,103, 3%) and it further increases the presence of young people from Central-Eastern Europe within our school system.

The presence of students with non-Italian citizenship reflects the trends in migration flows and sheds light on the variety of ways, times, methods and places of settlement, emphasizing, in particular, the different speeds at which

the migratory process takes place in the North, Centre, and South of Italy. This process is influenced by the local and regional social and economic structure and by the labour market trend.

There is a particularly significant incidence rate of foreign students in the North-East of Italy, followed by the North-West regions and by the Centre. Lower than average percentages are instead reported in the Southern regions and the Islands. The analysis of the presence of foreigners in Italian schools reproduces the distribution of foreign people in our country, by showing their concentration not only in big urban areas, but also in medium and small-sized provinces/municipalities.

Over the years, Lombardia has remained the leading region as for the number of students with non-Italian citizenship: around a quarter of them are attending schools of this area. Lombardia is then followed by Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Piemonte, Lazio and Toscana; almost half the foreign students living in Italy are attending schools of these regions. Furthermore, these areas' percentages of native born students are higher than the national average. The ranking changes if we analyze the incidence rate of students with non-Italian citizenship on the total school population: in this case, the regions ranking first are Emilia Romagna, Umbria, Lombardia, Veneto and Marche.

6.2 Implications in terms of social cohesion

Over the last few years, both politics and researches have drawn considerable attention on the increasing concentration of foreign students in specific areas, schools and classes, particularly in Northern and Central Italy and in compulsory education. This phenomenon derives from two processes: the widespread presence of immigrants – that is to say, more and more foreign students are attending Italian schools – and their geographical concentration – with an overrepresentation of foreigners in specific urban or rural areas.

The number of schools not affected by the presence of foreign students have further decreased during the year 2011/12: indeed, these were only 12,841 (i.e. 22.4% of the total of schools).

Table 4 - Italian schools by incidence rate of students with non-Italian citizenship, s.y. 2011/12

<i>Incidence rate of foreign students out of the total of students</i>	<i>S.y. 2011/2012</i>	
	<i>A.v.</i>	<i>%</i>
Not present	12,841	22,4
Less than 30%	42,217	73,3
More than 30%	2,449	4,3
<i>Total</i>	<i>57,507</i>	<i>100</i>

Source: MIUR, ISMU Foundation

On the other hand, there has been a slight increase in the number of schools with less than 30% foreigners (i.e. 73.3% of the total). Limited, if increasing, is the number of schools with more than 30% foreigners out of the whole number of students (2,449, i.e. 4.3% of the total of Italian schools).

The high concentration of migrant students in some schools can have implications for social cohesion and interethnic coexistence: this is a complex issue, that cannot be addressed without taking into account the generative mechanisms which underpin it. The high numbers of foreign students in specific Italian schools are undoubtedly a mirror of immigrant families' settlement processes in different territorial areas, as a result of economic, social and housing conditions, but also of the various educational offerings and of the freedom of educational choice for both Italian and immigrant families.

Although a significant relationship between foreign students' concentration and poor school performance has not yet been demonstrated in the sociological literature, high numbers of foreign students are however regarded as a general indicator of social and educational risk, on the basis of the debate triggered in countries with a considerable migration experience (cf. Commission of European Communities, Green Paper *Migration and Mobility: challenges and opportunities for EU education systems* of 2008). The concentration of foreigner may constitute a risk factor because:

- foreign student' educational pathways might be separated on ethnic basis, which in turn might hinder the transmission of both Italian and European social values, as well as the integration of second-generation immigrants;
- circumstances might occur which prevent socially disadvantaged students from having the chance to live and grow up in high-quality and multifaceted schools contexts;
- schools might become isolated and marginalized places, both in a physical and a figurative way, while it would be necessary for them to have a strong link with their geographical area.

However, it is a task of empirical research to find evidence of the negative (but also positive, if any) consequences of foreign students' concentration in Italian schools. A recent study on highly multicultural secondary schools in Lombardia (Besozzi, Colombo, 2012; Besozzi, Colombo, Santagati, 2013) has highlighted serious problems in the learning processes and in the disparities between Italian and foreign students, yet also positive aspects, particularly in the classroom and school climate, the pursuing of which has been a specific educational objective addressed to all students, as a result of promotional didactic actions implemented by teachers. Researches carried out in the field of urban sociology have also shown that segregation in Italy is far from the educational model of UK or other European countries (namely Holland and Germany): this results from both the application of an integrated model, based on the inclusion of foreign students in ordinary education, and the small extent of resi-

dential segregation, an unplanned effect of a failed building policy which has led to the current spread of foreign citizens in different areas (Kazepov, Barberis, 2013).

6.3 Implications in terms of equity

The presence of students with non-Italian citizenship also arises several questions in terms of equity of opportunities. Looking at the statistical analysis, we can highlight: the poor performance of foreign students and the increase in those who fail one or more years, particularly in lower secondary school; the concentration of foreign pupils in technical and vocational education, which means a preference for short careers, aimed at a more quick entrance in the job market; the school “lag” (that is, attending classes lower than those corresponding to age) of foreign students in secondary school; the risk of dropout, which can be considered an “inevitable” effect of migration, as well as of the difficulties deriving from the transition to a different education system and from belonging to social groups that often lack the necessary resources and skills to achieve positive school outcomes.

First of all, in upper secondary schools there is an ongoing tendency to “educational guidance”, aimed at orienting foreign students towards vocational training and towards a fast entry into the labour market; this approach is also very widespread in other European countries (Brind, Harper, Moore, 2008).

Table 5 - Students with non-Italian citizenship in upper secondary school careers, s.y. 2011/12

School curriculum	S.y. 2011/2012	
	A.v.	%
Lyceums	36,691	22.3
Professional institutes	64,852	39.4
Technical institutes	62,981	38.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>164,524</i>	<i>100</i>

Source: MIUR, ISMU Foundation

By comparing the different educational choices for the year 2011/12, we notice the concentration of foreign students in professional institutes (39.4%) and in technical institutes (38.3%); there is a huge gap between these latter and lyceums (22.3%). On the contrary, Italian students attend lyceums (47.8%), technical institutes (33.3%) and finally professional institutes, although to a smaller extent (18.9%).

The concentration of foreign students in vocational training, defined as “educational segregation” (Colombo, Santagati, 2010), is influenced by a series of personal and structural factors which regulate the access to lyceums; these factors are likely to influence future educational and professional choices. As for the international trend, data referring to upper secondary school and

the choice between general and vocational programs highlight that Italy holds the record of participation in vocational training within the whole euro-Mediterranean area: additionally, in all European countries, foreign students tend to be over-represented in professional careers (cf. Eurostat data).

Another important indicator of the condition of foreign students is their progress at school.

Table 6 - Successful students (per 100 students assessed) with Italian and non-Italian citizenship by school level, s.y. 2000/01-2009/10

School year	Lower secondary school			Upper secondary school		
	Foreign students	Total of students	Difference (a-b)	Foreign Students	Total of students	Difference (a-b)
2000/01	88.4	96.0	-7.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2001/02	87.4	95.6	-8.2	77.0	84.7	-7.7
2003/04	89.0	95.9	-6.9	72.7	85.0	-12.3
2004/05	89.8	97.3	-7.5	72.3	84.8	-12.5
2005/06	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2006/07	90.5	96.8	-6.3	72.0	85.8	-13.8
2009/10	87.8	95.3	-7.5	70.6	85.0	-14.4

Source: MIUR, ISMU Foundation

The trend of school pass rates (number of successful students per 100 students assessed: cf. Tab. 7) highlights a huge gap between the results of foreign students and those of the whole school population. This gap decreases in primary school (which is less selective); it then gets more stable and substantial in lower secondary school and dramatically increases in upper secondary school.

A further nuance in the analysis of school pathways and results is given by the data of the 4th edition of the Pisa Oecd 2009 international survey on 15 year-old students' skills in reading, maths and sciences: these give a worrying picture of the ability of Italy to ensure equal opportunities to migrant students (Invalsi, 2011).

Among the countries showing an average presence of students with a migration background (5-15% of the total school population), Italy (5.5%) shows the biggest gap between non-native and native born students in terms of reading skills: this gap is even more serious in first generation foreigners, in the South and in the Islands, in professional institutes and in vocational training. Only two of the countries surveyed (Mexico and Iceland) show a bigger gap than Italy in the difference between native and migrant students' reading skill, which is weaker in this latter group; finally, five countries show more substantial gaps between native students and first generation immigrants (Mexico, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Iceland).

It is important to highlight that, from 2000 to the present, this gap between native and foreign students has increased in Italy, particularly among first generation immigrants (yet this is also true for Finland, Sweden and Austria). Nonetheless, in the Italian case the gap has halved between first and second generation foreigners – which is positive – following a common trend that is

however not widespread everywhere (on average, Germany, Belgium, Canada and Estonia have seen no progress between first and second generation students; the Netherlands, the USA, Luxembourg, New Zealand and the Czech Republic have instead witnessed a worsening: cf. Invalsi, 2011: 327-328). Italy remains one of the Oecd countries with the highest inequalities in terms of school performance, which derives not only from socio-economic disadvantages, but also from the status held and the treatment received by foreign students in the local school system.

Further evidence of the existence of a problem in treating diversity in our school system, which has negative effects on students' career and learning, can be found in that foreign students' school lag is more serious than their school failure: as already known, this phenomenon is not only due to the fact of repeating years, but also to the practice of putting newcomers in classes lower than their age, in order to give them more time to develop the necessary language skills for learning Italian.

Table 7 - Students with Italian and non-Italian citizenship (per 100 students) who lag behind, by school level, s.y. 2011/12

<i>Level of education</i>	<i>2011/12</i>	
	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Foreign students</i>
Primary school	0.8	17.4
Lower secondary school	4.8	46
Upper secondary school	24.6	68.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>10.7</i>	<i>39.5</i>

Source: MIUR, ISMU Foundation

Foreign students with school lag are about three times as much as Italian students, although the situation has improved over time, probably thanks to the increase in the number of native born students. As highlighted by the data on the year 2011/12, the situation of foreigners with school lag gets increasingly worse as the school level gets higher: foreign students born abroad lag further and further behind when they have a delayed integration in the Italian school, when they move to other schools or have an insufficient attendance or repeating years. The gap of 16.6 points shown by foreign students in primary school gets up to 41.2 in lower secondary school and to 44.3 in upper secondary school. Therefore, almost three quarters of the foreign students attending upper secondary school lag behind their mates, which indicates the extent to which a similar situation can influence adolescents' early school dropout.

Table 8 - 18-24 year-old students by school dropout, gender and citizenship (absolute values in thousands and %). Year 2010

	Italians			Foreigners		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
Dropout	402	244	646	81	83	163
Non-dropout	1,615	1,677	3,292	96	114	210
Total	2,017	1,921	3,938	177	197	374
	% column					
Dropout	19,9	12,7	16,4	45,6	42,1	43,8
Non-dropout	80,1	87,3	83,6	54,4	57,9	56,2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Istat, *Workforce monitoring Survey*, 2010

In the Report on social cohesion of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche sociali, 2012) we can find the data on school dropouts by nationality – i.e. the number of 18-24 year-old students who have left school before obtaining an upper secondary school diploma or a vocational qualification – which confirm what already said on foreign students' tendency to school dropout.

In 2010, the average percentage of 18-24 year-old school leavers was 18.8%. This value is definitely higher than the EU 25 (13.9%) and way far from the objective pursued by the 2000-2010 Lisbon Agenda and maintained in the 2020 Europe Strategy, which aims to reduce school dropouts to less than 10%. Although limited in its absolute values, the phenomenon of early school leaving is more frequent among foreign students (43.8% against the 16.4% of Italian students). Of the total number of students who have left school before obtaining an upper secondary school diploma, 79.9% are Italians and 20.1% are foreigners.

6.4 In conclusion

The condition of foreign students in our school system – mainly first generation ones – if compared to that of their Italian peers, is still worrying: indeed, problems such as educational concentration, the high rates of school failure, the poor reading skills, the high levels of school lag and the subsequent early school leaving have been widely confirmed as being particularly widespread among foreigners.

While it is true that some bright spots can be found in the educational pathway of native born foreigners (who often achieve the same educational levels as their Italian mates and choose among multiple educational options, which in turn improves their skills and school performances), first generation foreigners are definitely the most vulnerable category in terms of education, and one which should be given the proper attention.

The persistence of unresolved issues serves as a necessary reminder to policymakers that they can no longer put off dealing with these problems, which

must be handled with systematic actions that have to be widespread and continuative, which favour the students' access to and participation in a quality educational offering. These measures are urgently needed, both at the pre-school and primary school level, the schools that are most especially called upon to offer programs suited to the learning needs of the new generations, born and raised in Italy; as well as in secondary schools, where it becomes essential to support pupils' choices and provide study aid to preadolescents and adolescents, whose specific needs deriving from the migration experience must be recognized, through measures that orient and accompany them in the delicate and complex transition to adult life, experienced in the host country.

For all these reasons, it is therefore important to continue monitoring foreign and Italian students' careers as well as the evolution of educational trends, in order to allow a quick implementation of all the necessary policies and projects in school. A crucial role in pursuing such policies is played by research in the field of education (Santagati, 2012), which not only provides essential tools for the construction of a future inter-ethnic society, but also acts as a privileged observatory to detect any possible threats to equity, social cohesion and to the guarantee of equal opportunities to the varied group of the "new Italians".

7. *Immigrant associations in Italy*

di Marco Caselli

In the last decade, immigrant associations have become a subject the studies on migration in Italy are significantly focusing their attention on.

This attention is justified first of all by a likely – considering the lack of reliable data on a national scale – and ever-growing spreading of these realities throughout the Italian territory, but also because of the serious and, to a large extent, unsolved concerns about the actual possibilities to integrate a considerably rising number of foreign migrants. The associations of immigrants, in fact, are quite often perceived by researchers and local institutions as one of the subjects capable of promoting the integration process of foreign populations in the Italian society (Danese, 2001).

In particular, the role these realities play consists in providing a link, a mediation channel not only between foreign citizens, on the one hand, and local institutions, on the other, but also between the culture of origin and the receiving culture.

7.1 A Brief history

In outlining the history of immigrant associations, we can follow the pattern of the “periodization” approach proposed by Carchedi (2000). According to this approach, the first phase of the phenomenon in Italy, defined as the *pioneer* stage, took place between the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. In this period the immigrant associations were mostly formed by students and refugees and were characterized by a marked orientation – in a political key – to the country of origin. The second phase, focused on *recognition and visibility*, covered the second half of the 1980s. In this stage associations began to focus their attention decidedly on the conditions and problems of the migrant population established in Italy. In the first half of the 1990s the phenomenon developed significantly. This phase, also known as “the golden age” of immigrants’ associations in Italy, is focused on the *active participation and the pivotal role of these associations in social matters* (Camozzi, 2008: 34). In this period, immigrant associations began to be recognized officially by the Italian law and some networks of immigrant associations were formed. Some attempts were made by the legislator and by local institutions to involve migrants in laying down immigration policies through the council system, which quite

often witnessed a direct or indirect participation of these associations in their composition process. This period, marked by great enthusiasm and full of prospects as regards migrants' participation in public life through their associations, was followed by a phase of *retreat*, which from the second half of the 1990s has extended roughly up to the present. This phase is characterized by migrants' deep disenchantment with the possibility to weigh on public life through their associations, and this disenchantment is connected in particular with the substantial failure of the council system. In this stage, immigrant associations seem to re-orient themselves, and in some cases, to actually retreat, either towards the provision of services to their reference immigrant communities or towards cultural activities.

However, in recent times a new phase, which we would call a phase of *expansion and re-emergence*, seems to have begun. As a matter of fact, as a consequence of the continuous growth of the resident foreign population in Italy, we can record a very large number of immigrant associations which represent almost all nationalities present in our country; and it's possible to report a renewed interest in them expressed in particular by several local authorities and institutions. A renewed interest, which is justified by the attempt made by the Italian authorities to find appropriate interlocutors in a position to help them coming into contact with the different immigrant communities established in the Italian territory, in order to determine – and also communicate – with greater precision and effectiveness their integration policies.

7.2 Structure and aims

In general terms, immigrant associations established in Italy form an extremely heterogeneous universe. Indeed, a number of characteristics distinguish them from one another, for example: number of members, structure, pursued aims, number and characteristics of organized events, communication ability, and so on. Nonetheless, one of the characteristics the studies carried out up to now have particularly focused on, concerns members' nationality. In this regard, we can make a distinction between mono-ethnic associations, which up to now are widely predominating,¹ and multi-ethnic associations. Both kinds of associations in some cases offer also the membership to Italian nationals.² A particular kind of mono-ethnic association consists in the so-called *home town associations* (Caglar, 2006), established by immigrants who do not only share the nationality, but also originate from the same city or village. Regarding instead multi-ethnic realities, it should be pointed out that in some cases these associations are the result of the transformation undergone by groups which had formed with a specific national connotation, while in

¹ In Lombardy, for example, immigrant associations with a specific ethnic connotation represent three-fourths (Caselli, Grandi, 2010).

² With reference to Lombardy, immigrant associations based in the region including also Italian members represent 75.4 per cent (Caselli, Grandi, 2010).

other cases, they reveal as from their origin a multi-national vocation (Caselli, 2010). Furthermore, multi-ethnic associations may be either genuinely cosmopolitan or addressed to larger than strictly national groups, but in any case characterized by some regional (as in the case of Latin-American associations) or cultural, or religious (as in the case of Muslim associations) homogeneity.

Transversally to a distinction between multi-ethnic and mono-ethnic groups, we witness, in addition, the creation of associations in which members share a particular condition or a common life experience, as in the case of the numerous foreign women's associations and those established by the so-called "second generations".

Finally, a further distinction can be made between associations established in Italy and "bedded-out" groups, which represent an issuing or a continuation of realities pre-existing their members' and promoters' migratory experience, and have often a political or religious nature (Carchedi, 2000).

However, taking a step back, it is worth considering that most existing immigrant associations have a marked ethnic and national connotation. Among the reasons justifying the peculiarity of this phenomenon, we would mention in particular the role played by the network of family, friendly and acquaintance relations in driving and orienting migration flows (Zanfrini, 2007: 99-103; Wilson, 1992). This enables an immigrant to be included, from the very moment in which he/she arrives in the host country, in a network of ethnically connoted relationships, which is quite often the starting point of an association experience. Furthermore, it should not be neglected that the experience of migration and, especially, the establishment in a foreign country tends to emphasize migrants' ethnic identity (Moya, 2005: 839), and to let emerge their need for cohesion, which sometimes develops also in opposition to other ethnic groups of foreign origin (Schrover, Vermeulen, 2005: 826). It has to be noted, in this connection, that the association promoters' migratory experience may play a potentially ambivalent role. In fact, if on the one hand, living in a foreign country may lead a migrant to stress his/her ethnic identity, on the other it may lead him/her instead to recognize in the common "migrant" condition – and in the problems and aspirations related to this experience – an element capable to unite persons of different nationalities. This element is quite often at the root of the creation of multi-ethnic immigrant associations, as well as of the currently emerging coordination and networking experiences between organizations and realities referring to several nationalities.

As mentioned, a distinguishing element of these associations consists in the aims they pursue. Aims which may be different, but almost always relate to an attempt to make migrants' integration processes in Italian society easier. It is however necessary to underline that the kind of integration these associations aim at and try to promote is far away from the idea of assimilation. The associations of immigrants, in promoting the integration of their members, or in general of foreigners, in the host-country society, hardly give up their own specific cultural identity which, on the contrary, is often promoted through activities aimed at exchanging opinions and encountering the native population. Immigrant associations can thus become a

vehicle to promote integration, intended both as a peaceful encounter between different cultures, and as a link between immigrants' societies of origin and Italian society.

If immigrant associations potentially represent an important instrument in foreign nationals' integration process in the Italian society – an element which justifies the ever-growing attention paid to these realities by scientific and institutional circles – we must however underline that, for the time being, their potential remains widely unexpressed, one of the reasons being, in general, the weakness that seems to characterize them. This weakness often depends on the lack of resources and competences that would allow them to develop and carry out specific projects and activities, but it can be linked to other elements as well. Among these factors, we point out, first of all, the strongly personalistic features of immigrants' associations, the fate of which is often indissolubly connected to the ups and downs of the migratory experience of their promoters. In this connection, the cases of associations which ceased to exist as soon as their presidents decided to return in their country of origin are not infrequent. In addition, these realities are quite often used by their leaders as an instrument for increasing their personal visibility and achievements, and sometimes even for the purpose of shaping and building a political career or trying to obtain a leading role within their own national groups, or competing with the representatives of other associations. Another element of weakness in immigrant associations depends on a fragmentation of the different ethnic groups' representativeness in the host country. Finally, we wish to mention the important and widespread presence, in the territory, of Italian trade unions and religious associations which deal with migrants' problems, which in virtue of their organizational strength and reliability, are preferred as partners by local institutions when they decide to put actions in favour of migrant people into effect. A similar kind of partnership would instead prove to be for all immigrant associations an extraordinary opportunity to acquire and increase their competences and organizational strength (Caponio, 2005).

7.3 Relationships with local institutions and the problem of representation

As noted, the associations of immigrants can perform different roles, such as facilitating the relations of their members with the host society and its institutions, and providing their members with an instrument that would allow them to participate effectively in host-country political and social life.

These associations are, consequently, an instrument through which immigrants try to approach local institutions and establish relations with them. However, in this sense, it's possible to see – so to say – a dual movement. Local institutions, too, try in turn to approach the migrant population through its associations' channel because they seem to become increasingly aware that migrants' involvement in the

outline of integration policies is a prerequisite to ensure a successful outcome of those policies (Zanfrini, 1997: 212).

It is interesting to note that their kind of approach to immigrant associations could even start some particular mechanisms capable to further boost immigrants' tendency to establish mono-ethnic associations. In general, institutions aim at identifying reliable subjects in a position to represent their reference national communities, and consequently seem to prefer getting directly in touch with this kind of group. The result being the rise of an "induced associationism", which can likely better meet the needs expressed by the institutions but not migrants' ones. (Mantovan, 2007: 78-79).

Anyway, it is useful to point out the basic ambiguity which seems to vitiate the way Italian institutions relate to the reality of immigrant associations. Local institutions, in their understandable attempt to simplify the complex intertwining of relationships and dynamics characterizing the migrant universe, aim at identifying, within the different national communities established in their territory, those associations which represent in an effective and authoritative way their reference communities. However, the concept of representativeness seems rather weak and problematic in such a context, since – with reference to migrants' presence – the concept itself of community is as weak and problematic. Even if sharing the same nationality, the foreigners who live in a local environment quite often do not form a community. In addition, immigrant associations frequently become an instrument through which some representatives of the different national groups try to consolidate or construct their leadership within these groups, usually in competition with other aspiring leaders and their respective associations. The strains and the fragmentation which divide national groups into different factions and leaders risk to be further fostered and increased by the attempts made by the public administrations to identify valid interlocutors inside these associations. As a matter of fact, one's boasting about a cooperation relationship established with a local institution is an element capable of significantly contributing to the legitimization of one's leadership claims within the respective national groups. Furthermore, basic fragmentation and contrasts are one of the main reasons why, in Italy, immigrant associations have often merely a local range, and their spreading on a national scale is relatively scarce.

As a consequence, the attempt by local institution to find among the immigrant associations genuine representatives of the different nationalities established in the territory contributes helps strengthen and increase migrants' tendency to create realities definitely characterized by a marked ethnic connotation. At the same time, however, the problem of identifying reliable and representative interlocutors could become a decisive boost for the establishment and strengthening of networks of immigrant associations referring to different ethnic groups. Some experiences in this regard have already been put into effect, driven – as in the case of multi-ethnic groups – by members' awareness that their sharing the "immigrant" condition can better unite them than their belonging to different nationalities can divide them.

These networks may become, over time, a priority reference point for local institutions, which in turn, thanks to the attention placed in these realities, would *de facto* promote the spreading and strengthening of such experiences. Institutions are indeed more inclined to relate with the representatives of a network of immigrant associations rather than be obliged to establish relations with different representatives of many individual associations. Furthermore, an element able to drive local institutions to prefer a relation with networks and coordination committees is their awareness that a representativeness problem actually exists.

The ability to coordinate themselves with other associations representing different national groups – and often different interests – would become, in the eyes of institutions, an evidence of the strength and reliability of the associations which participate in these networks, as well as of their – even minimum – planning capacity.

In this sense, one might speculate on the emerging of a typical self-fulfilling prophecy: the institutions identify the associations able to establish coordination as their privileged interlocutors, because they are seen to be the legitimate expression of their respective national communities; and, in turn, these associations, given that they have been able to establish relationships with the local institutions, acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the national communities they are an expression of.

8. *Italians' attitude towards foreign immigration*

by *Giovanni Giulio Valtolina*

8.1 The evolution of Italians' attitudes towards immigrants as a result of the early considerable migration flows: 1980-2000

Opinions and attitudes toward immigration grow up from both its own characteristics in a particular space-time contest and the native population's ability in perceiving and explaining it. In fact, views on immigration are based not only upon direct perceptions but also on messages, analysis and interpretation that mass-media and political institutions offer to the public opinion.

In Italy, first surveys on attitudes toward immigration date back to the second half of the Eighties. Since then, the researchers' interest on immigration issues widely increased. On the strength of these studies, the researchers seem to agree with the possibility to identify some different historical phases, each of them linked to a different social gap between the Italian population and foreign immigrants.

The first phase – *neutrality* – concerns the Seventies of the past century. Immigrants, usually students or refugees, aroused curiosity, but did not produce social expectation, because of their small number and lack of permanent standing.

In the second phase – *unawareness* – spreading in the first half of the Eighties, immigration began to become a no longer negligible phenomenon in terms of amount. The view of foreigners markedly changed, as much as immigrants represented a potential competitor in welfare benefits, until then exclusively for Italian citizens. Nevertheless the consciousness of the immigration's importance was far from being achieved.

The third phase – *emergency* – began with the 943 Act in 1986 and ended straight after the second amnesty Act endorsement in 1990. In this period, political and social authorities activated themselves on the immigration flow as a social concern requiring a more and more urgent intervention. Immigrants were seen as a dangerous attendance for the existing social and economic balance, increasing marginalization and deviance areas without any contribution to the country, and, on the contrary, burdening it with unnecessary social and economic costs.

In the fourth phase – the so-called *labeling* – that characterizes the Nineties, the foreign immigration shifts from a social question to a problem of public order: immigrants not only became unwelcome people but also the cause of a “welfare concern”. They were widely stereotyped, so the social gap between Italians and immigrants greatly increased.

Many national surveys confirm the shift in attitudes from a general acceptance and attention to a pronounced refusal toward immigrants.

In 1992, a survey carried out by Eurobarometer pointed out that 64% of the Italians interviewed felt the presence of too many immigrants living in Italy, while in 1988 they were only 34%. The Italians ethnocentrism index, the lowest in Europe in 1988 (1,51 on a scale from 0 to 5), climbed to 2,75 in 1992, so that Italy took his place among the countries with the highest score.

The surveys carried out in 1987-88, 1991 and 1997 by the Institute for Population Research of the National Research Council (CNR), provided circumstantial reports on the characteristics of subjects’ groups expressing similar opinions, in order to detect changes. Therefore, according to the researchers, such a schematization can be presented:

- 1987/88: because of the immigrants’ poor social visibility, a large, quite indefinite and unaware cluster takes shape, primarily consisting of women with homogeneous cultural profiles, while men’s position was changing in age and educational level;
- 1991: the first huge arrivals of Albanians dramatically place the immigration issue at the center of public attention. This emerging concern forced Italians to be fully aware of immigration’s consequences and clearly pointed out divergent opinions. With regard to researches, this phenomenon resulted in a large cluster, collecting the more hostile positions, mainly composed by people with a low education level;
- 1997: opinion clusters became further different. The education level increasingly acts as a determinant factor in characterizing groups, even though different positions were more blurred and diversified. Italian citizens with a basic education shift toward refusal, while clusters with a tendency toward acceptance consisted in a great number of university graduates. Moreover, we can find a lack of information, especially in lower educated population – showing a great hostility to immigrants –, with a real risk of building attitudes based on superficial information or not objective reports, so that the dramatic reality of immigration is was trivialized.

Thus, worries and fears seemed to be the result of the phenomenon’s mental representation rather than the product of an actual daily comparison with immigrants.

In this period, the surveys by CNEL, a governmental organization, presents another remarkable note on the evolution of Italians’ attitudes toward immigration. In three following surveys (November 1997, April and November 1998), the “immigration” issue became quite an important concern (inter-

viewees considering it at the first place rose from 9% in November '97 to 15% in November '98); up to exceed the “retirement” issue in the last survey, keeping the third place at the back of “job” (57%) and “criminality” (20%).

8.2 Italians' attitudes during the first ten-years of the new century: the europeanization of attitudes and the consequences of the international economic crisis

The first ten-year period of the new century has been characterized by several great events playing a different role in orienting Italians' opinions and attitudes. Among the most important ones, we can list the Twin Towers collapse in New York because of a terrorist attack on 11th of September 2001, the war in Iraq, extremist groups' assaults in Europe, and the heavy economic crisis of many countries at the end of 2008.

According to researches, in the first years of the new century, immigration, even though as a source of concerns, didn't stand out among the most important fears, namely rise in prices, unemployment and criminality.

A remarkable survey, about Italians' identity and values “in the beginning of the twenty-first century”, that allows to compare data from 1997 to 2003, was supported by ANCI and carried out by the Institute for Research SWG. Italians showed a kind of “quiet certainty” in being able to metabolize the foreign presence in their country, as the trend of attitudes toward acceptance proves.

Italians pointed out a progressive and clear openness toward immigrants, with a strong belief in their enrichment contribute to Italy. At the same time, they showed awareness about a “destabilization potential” that foreigners constitute for labor market and public order. It is interesting to note that, according to the SWG survey in 2003 and ISMU's Eighth report, the Twin Towers shocking attack on September 11th, did not reverse the trend toward acceptance, that was steady increasing: in fact there has been only a stabilization of the “openness” answers between 2000 and 2002 (54% and 55% respectively). However this event seemed to affect the “geography of confidence” (so-called by North East Foundation researchers). In accordance with the 2003 Eurisko analysis, arranging the different groups according to the level of confidence in them, at the first position were the immigrants coming from developing countries (Sub-Saharan Africa and South America in general: 64,4% in the response *a lot* and *enough*), at the second place people from Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia: 59,0%), at the third position Chinese (54.8%), at the fourth place immigrants from Balkans (ex-Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria: 44.8%), and at the fifth place Arabian immigrants (40,5%).

The ISMU longitudinal survey (2000-2005) pointed out the main aspects of the progressive trend toward openness, typical in the first years of the twentieth century. The percentages of those in agreement with the idea of foreign workforce's utility for Italian economy increased in 2005 compared to 2003 (this opinion was shared by over the 3/4 of interviewees in 2005).

It can also be noted an increase in the percentages of Italians thinking that immigrants could culturally improve Italy, being the majority in the 2005 survey (54,6%). Needless to say, educational level emerged as a determinant variable in expressing a favorable position.

Conversely, the temporal trend for those strongly believing a relationship between the growth of immigration and the increase of criminality is consistent with the fluctuation during the years: the percentage in fact declined by 13 points in 2001, while rose by about 6 points in 2002 and 2003, and went down by over 5 points in 2005 again (58,7%).

With regard to the issue of allowing the right to vote to immigrants, Italians don't show a substantially prohibition to enlarge citizenship. The proportion of those declaring for, in 2005, was enhanced compared to previous years, so that more than half of interviewees was in agreement with allowing immigrants to vote in local elections.

Nevertheless, beginning from 2007, the typical trend of the first years of the new century starts to change. The crescent awareness of the role of Italy in the international immigration system and the shift of Italy from being an emigration to an immigration country are becoming shared feelings within the majority of Italians. Immigrants are considered to be an integrant part of the society, their membership's rights are recognized, and this statement is confirmed by the widespread percentages of Italians in total agreement with allowing immigrants to vote.

At the same time, on the other hand, like in many other European countries, many researches show that anxiety is becoming widespread again, and fear and concern toward foreigners are growing among Italian people, especially since 2007. This point is supported by local, national and international surveys, for instance those carried out by Chamber of Commerce of Milan, ISMU Foundation and Eurobarometro, respectively. According to several researchers, the integration process seems to stop in Italy, since some concern toward the overall effect of the immigration flow increased more rapidly than expected.

In this background framework, interviewees' opinions point out the complexity and variety of attitudes, depending on the different fields examined each time. Italians seem not to be captured by abstract general ideas or by "kind" representations of immigrants, since they show receptiveness in admitting the immigration's role – actually, they are widely in agreement with both the equality of political rights between immigrants and citizens, and the positive role of foreigners for economy's development. Similarly, Italians reject

negative stereotypes, like “barbarian invaders”, and, on the contrary, seem to be able to express independent opinions toward different social issues, with regard to their own matter and everyday life impact. Labor market, political participation, cultural diversity are less problematic questions, whereas security and welfare appear more conflicting issues – and therefore more anxiety-inducing ones. According to the national survey supported by the Minister of Interior in 2008, the greatest deviation from the responses of 2007 is in the case of the claim “immigrants exploit welfare services without paying taxes”, owing to a considerably higher mean level of agreement with this statement.

Throughout 2009, the security order and the immigration issues (barges driven back to Libya) were pointed out, until the President of Italy warning about the risk of xenophobia and intolerance spreading in Italy.

As in some other European countries, Italians stabilized their level of anxiety about immigrants since 2007, and strengthened it because of the world economic crisis, which was striking a lot of countries at the end of 2008. This statement is confirmed by national results, like those collected by ISPO and the Minister of Interior, and international results, like Eurobarometro ones. By comparing ISPO surveys carried out in 2002 and 2009, Italians seemed to be very aware of immigration in 2009, and their attitudes became harder than in 2002. Thus, 39% of the population believes that immigration has to be stopped, whereas the same response accounted for 24% in 2002. Among the categories that show hostility toward immigrants, there are the most marginalized members of the society: old people, those with lower education, housewives. In this period, the requests strongly emerging from surveys claim the observance of the law by immigrants; the end of advantages – true or supposed – given to immigrants with regard to welfare, school, nursery, hospital and emergency care; a stronger police force into the town, to give order and security mainly in those districts where immigration is widely considerable; a better teaching quality in school, for example, by fixing the maximum number of immigrant students in each class; a bigger surveillance around worship and meeting place, above all the Muslim ones, in order to prevent terrorist attack.

8.3 The present situation

In the last years, the immigration issue is forcefully becoming prominent also on the international political scene. In Italy, the immigration question rose again in the first part of 2011, mainly because of the riots that have changed the North-Africa political geography, causing an immigration flow to Lampedusa and the Italian coasts. According to the Media Observatory of the University of Pavia, in the first four months of 2011, TV news, for instance, focused on the immigration issue for 6% of the time, contrary to the European average of 2%. Even though in the complex of European television news the

immigration issue wasn't discussed with anxiety – the European average of “alarmist” news about immigrants was 3,2%, among all the news concerning immigrants –, in Italy “alarmist” news held the journalist agenda for 14%.

From an international perspective, the TTI survey (Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010) emphasized that Italians have one of the most skeptical attitude toward immigration. While in 2008 more than 50% of Italians felt too many foreigners living in Italy and about 80% were concerned toward illegal immigration, a further worsening of attitudes toward immigrants was registered in 2010. Thus in 2009 only 29% of interviewees thought that legalized immigrants increase criminality, this opinion was clearly shared by the majority (56%) in 2010, and a quite similar percentage believed that illegal immigrants help increasing criminality (57%).

Although Italian people express uncertainty toward a positive impact of immigration on the society, on a political level the awareness that there is a large foreign labour force demand, to meet the needs of economic sectors such as services, agriculture and manufacturing, is clear since a long time. Actually, international surveys pointed out that Italians are the less concerned about immigrants' competition for the labour market: more than two out of three don't believe that immigrants steal work from Italians and three out of four claim that immigrants are employed in certain jobs that otherwise wouldn't be done by Italians.

Among surveys carried out in Italy, it is worthy to highlight the Eurispes research (2011). According to these findings, almost half of the Italian people (46%) believes that suspicion toward immigrants is excusable, although only sometimes. Conversely, this attitude is called “dangerous” by 23% of Italians, “reprehensible” by 18% and “shareable” by 10%. Also in this case, the prevalent opinion – shared by 86% of the interviewees – is that immigrants are doing jobs that Italians no longer want to do, so contributing to improve Italian economy. In comparison with adults, young people seem to be more suspicious about immigrants, as a GfK Eurisko survey shows (2010). Immigrants presence in Italy is believed to be “large” or “very large” by about three out of four (76%) of the young interviewees, but immigration is considered positive by only the 22% of them. These percentages seem more negative when compared with adults' results, since for the majority of them (71%) immigrants' presence in Italy is “large” or “very large”, but 35% of adults affirms that immigration is positive. Nevertheless, young people appear not to be scared by cultural and religious differences, but by the increasing daily uncertainty, mainly because of the criminality and the uncertainty of the future, specifically about the job. Overall, the most recent surveys seem to point out and confirm that “*security is the necessary condition to build a relationship among different cultures*” (Baumann, 2003). Thus, the “persistent perception of insecurity”, as reported by several surveys, can be overcome only through a new social drawing, developing from widely shared significances and values, according to an intercultural integration model.

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